In order to maximize shareholder value, firms attempt to align the incentives of the executives with those of the shareholders by giving them equity as a portion of their compensation package. The terms associated with this equity compensation forces the executives to hold undiversified portfolios, resulting in a sizeable deadweight loss. This paper uses the formula developed by Meulbroek (2001)1 to calculate the dollar value of this deadweight loss, in order to quantify the costs associated with equity-based compensation. We find that the 56 executives in our data set have a combined deadweight loss of $70 billion, and that on average they are losing $1.25 billion each. These results raise the question of whether the incentive alignment is worth the large costs associated with it, and why firms continue to use equity as a form of compensation.

Unstable residential and inadequate academic environments lead to poor educational outcomes for low-income students in urban areas. In 2011, Ohio enacted a law to create a college preparatory boarding school (CPBS) for low-income students by 2013. However, Ohio's CPBS has not yet been established, thereby denying these students an opportunity to attain skills needed to enter college. Using the policy feedback theory (PFT) and Fredrickson's theory of social equity (SET) as foundations, the purpose of this qualitative study was to understand the nature of implementation barriers and propose solutions by exploring 2 successful CPBS programs in Maryland and Washington, D.C. The research questions focused on identifying implementation practices from the successful CPBS programs with the aim to propose options to implement Ohio's law. Data were collected from a purposeful sample of 14 participants which included 2 Ohio legislators; public administrators, Ohio (7), Maryland (1), Washington, D.C (3); and 1 Ohio union leader, and a review of relevant public and official records. All data were deductively coded and subjected to a constant comparison analysis. Results showed that Ohio's public education administrators were excluded from the CPBS policy's design, unlike their peers. Further, Ohio's CPBS law favored a particular stakeholder involved in its design and was not executed when Ohio's education administrators and the entity disagreed over public assets ownership. The findings affirmed SET's condition for an open and inclusive policy process and PFT's claim that current policies affect resources and the paradigm for new policies. Positive social change implications from this study include recommendations to Ohio's policymakers to create a more inclusive process involving parties willing to provide an effective learning environment for economically marginalized children.

在經營權與所有權分離的企業經營環境中，權益基礎薪酬扮演著連結股東與經理人利益之重要角色。本研究旨在探討經理人權益基礎薪酬與企業策略聯盟行為間之關聯性，並進一步檢視權益基礎薪酬對於企業策略聯盟形成、策略聯盟數目、類別及跨產業聯盟與否之影響。本研究以2003年至2013年美國上市櫃公司為樣本，研究結果顯示經理人權益基礎薪酬對於企業策略聯盟形成有正向影響。給予經理人較高比重權益基礎薪酬之企業，不僅形成策略聯盟之機率較高，且形成策略聯盟之次數亦較多。再者，給予經理人權益基礎薪酬較高比重之企業，其形成研發聯盟之可能性較高，且更傾向於形成同產業間策略聯盟。

本文主要探討權益薪酬對審計委員會監督關係人交易效果之影響。本研究從美國證券交易所公開資訊EDGAR資料庫以手動蒐集關係人交易資訊，以2010年至2013年間之中小企業為樣本進行實證分析。實證結果發現關係人交易與權益薪酬交乘項與企業價值呈現顯著負相關，意即發放權益薪酬使得審計委員會極大化個人利益而過度注重短期財務績效，選擇默許管理階層不當之關係人交易安排，進而造成企業價值不利之影響。額外分析亦指出審計委員會之權益薪酬對其監督關係人交易效果有負面影響，但未發現證據指出審計委員會之現金薪酬與其監督關係人交易效果有關聯性。 / This study investigates whether equity-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with the effectiveness of their supervision on related party transactions. We hand collect the data of related party transactions for small and medium-size firms from EDGAR database for the period 2010-2013. We find that the interaction effect between related party transactions and stock compensation for audit committee members is negatively associated with firm value. It suggests that in order to maximize short-term benefits, audit committee members with stock compensation are inclined to be more tolerable to earnings management through related party transactions that are unfavorable to shareholders. Additionally, we do not find any evidence indicating that cash compensation is associated with the effectiveness of audit committee’s oversight on related party transactions.

The current thesis explores a relatively new academic topic – equity-based crowdfunding. The purpose is to examine which quality signals, used by the entrepreneurs in their fundraising process, tend to increase the probability of closing an equity-based crowdfunding campaign successfully. The findings in this thesis serve as an additional contribution to a relatively unexplored topic of signaling in equity crowdfunding. Besides a theoretical contribution, it provides practical insights that may help entrepreneurs and crowdfunding platforms to increase the probability of successful campaign closure. The data for this study was collected from an international crowdfunding platform Fundedbyme.com. The explanatory variables, both continuous and binary, were divided into several thematic groups, while the dependent variable was defined by either successful or unsuccessful outcome of the campaign. The effect of the explanatory variables on the outcome of the campaign was tested with the help of the logistic regression (logit) model. The results showed that crowd investors in the network of Fundedbyme.com use particular quality signals to distinguish between the projects, in fact, both financial signals and more qualitative signals. Increases in the financial signals such as funding goal and price per share affect the probability of success negatively, while the presence of the qualitative signals (received awards and the indication of the non-executive board) contribute to a higher probability of success. Secondly, the results imply some similarities between the selecting mechanism in traditional funding, reward-based and the equity-based crowdfunding. As a third point, this research shows that the presence of a specific selecting mechanism in crowdfunding helps to some extent decrease the information asymmetry and adverse selection in the market of crowdfunding.

Purpose: The study aims to describe and analyze how investors are influenced by information in decision-making processes regarding equity and debt-based crowdfunding. Theories: Elaboration Likelihood Model, Asymmetric information and previous relatable studies.  Method: Qualitative method with semi-structured interviews. Conclusion - The results from the study showed that central factors can lead to debt-based projects and peripheral factors to equity-based projects. The decision-making processes differed in the two different types of crowdfunding according to the security, or uncertainty, of the project. It also turned out that investors preferred debt-based crowdfunding projects. The study also proved the importance of information for the investors differs whether it is a debt- or equity based project.

The main goal of this dissertation was to obtain an understanding as to the true economic nature of employee share options and the problems surrounding the accounting thereof. The main conclusion of this study is that employee share options should be expensed in the income statement as and when the employee's services are performed. The reason is that employee share options are valuable financial instruments which the employer has used to compensate the employee for his services. It was also concluded that exercise date accounting and classification of outstanding employee share options as liabilities on the balance sheet is the most appropriate accounting treatment. Such accounting treatment trues up the accounting of employee share options with that of cash-settled share appreciation rights, which are economically equivalent transactions. The measurement of employee share options should be based on their fair value using an option-pricing model adapted for the specific features of employee share options. / Accounting / Thesis (M. Com. (Accounting Science))

本研究主要針對目前企業績效不佳，董事會成員坐領高額董監酬勞之情況進行研究。本研究首先從權力與監督兩構面分析目前影響董監酬勞水準之因素，並進一步從權力與監督構面探討執行業務董監領取員工分紅產生之激勵或稀釋效果對公司價值與股東權益之影響。 實證結果顯示，董事會成員之權力擴張會導致較高水準之董監酬勞，尤其是執行業務董監之員工分紅部分，且執行業務董監領取員工分紅對於公司股東權益及公司未來價值具有負向之影響。家族企業之董監酬勞並不會隨著權力擴張而有較高的水準。在內部監督機制方面，獨立董監之監督效果較不明顯；在外部監督機制方面，主動機構投資人相較於被動機構投資人，具有抑制董監酬勞自利行為之效果。 / Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 1996-2004, this thesis examines the determinans of compensation of board directors from the power and monitoring perspectives. In addition, this thesis investigates the effect of equity-based compensation of executive directors on firm value and return on equity. The empirical result indicates that the entrenchment of managerial power determines the level of directors’ pay, especially on equity-based compensation. The more powerful the board of directors, higher the level of compensation, lower the company value and the return on stockholders` equity. However, as compared to non-family-controlled firms, the directors of family-controlled firms tend to have lower level of compensation. Moreover, we find that active institutional investors have greater monitoring effect on the compensation level of board of directors.

本研究以權益基礎報酬占總報酬的比率來捕捉薪酬結構，並據以探討給予審計委員會的薪酬結構對於公司權益資金成本及信用評等之影響。利用 2006 至 2010 年間納入美國 S&P1500指數之公司 (排除金融服務與保險業) 為樣本，本研究發現，若權益基礎報酬佔審計委員會薪酬比率越高，其公司之權益資金成本越低，但該公司之信用評等卻越差。顯示權益基礎報酬之比重在二種財報使用者眼中具有不同涵義。投資人認為給予審計委員會較高之權益基礎報酬比重，可使監督更有效，投資人承擔之資訊風險降低，進而願意降低其要求報酬；信用評等機構則認為，給予較高的權益基礎報酬比重將傷害審計委員會獨立性，影響公司治理結構，並降低財務報導之品質，因而給予此類公司較差之信用評等。 / This study examines how investors and credit rating agents react to audit committees’ equity-based compensation. Based on a sample of S&P 1500 firms during 2006-2010, the empirical results show that firms who pay audit committees higher portion of equity-based compensation have lower cost of equity capital and lower credit rating. These results suggest different information users perceive and react to equity-based compensation in different ways. Particularly, investors appear to perceive that higher portion of equity-based compensation can align audit committee members’ interest with the shareholders’, leading to more effective monitoring and smaller information risk. Therefore, investors react by reducing their cost of equity capital. In contrast, credit rating agents appear to perceive that higher portion of equity-based compensation may harm audit committees’ independence, resulting in decreased quality of financial reporting. Therefore, credit rating agents react by downgrading firms’ credit ratings.

The main goal of this dissertation was to obtain an understanding as to the true economic nature of employee share options and the problems surrounding the accounting thereof. The main conclusion of this study is that employee share options should be expensed in the income statement as and when the employee's services are performed. The reason is that employee share options are valuable financial instruments which the employer has used to compensate the employee for his services. It was also concluded that exercise date accounting and classification of outstanding employee share options as liabilities on the balance sheet is the most appropriate accounting treatment. Such accounting treatment trues up the accounting of employee share options with that of cash-settled share appreciation rights, which are economically equivalent transactions. The measurement of employee share options should be based on their fair value using an option-pricing model adapted for the specific features of employee share options. / Accounting / Thesis (M. Com. (Accounting Science))