Dans le cadre de cette thèse, nous nous proposons d’explorer la patiente explication que Heidegger a poursuivie avec Hegel à propos de l’origine de la négativité – problème qui s’impose de fait à titre d’« unique pensée d’une pensée qui pose la question de l’être ». Partant du constat d’une affinité insoupçonnée entre les deux penseurs quant au rôle insigne qui doit revenir à la négation en philosophie, nous entendons percer à jour les motifs de la constante fin de non-recevoir que Heidegger oppose néanmoins à la méthode dialectique de son plus coriace adversaire. Afin de rendre justice aux différents rebondissements d’une explication en constante mutation, et qui, de surcroît, traverse l’ensemble de l’œuvre de Heidegger, nous procédons à une division chronologique qui en circonscrit les quatre principaux moments. I. En un premier temps, notre regard se porte ainsi sur l’opposition résolue que le jeune Heidegger manifeste à l’égard de la montée du néo-hégélianisme, au nom d’une appropriation toute personnelle de l’intuitionnisme husserlien. Les transformations auxquelles il soumet la méthode phénoménologique de son maître doivent néanmoins laisser transparaître un furtif emprunt à la dialectique hégélienne, dont le principal mérite serait d’avoir conféré une fonction productrice à la négation. II. Le propos d’Être et temps demeure toutefois bien discret quant à cette dette méthodologique, bien que ses vestiges se laissent exhumer, notamment sous la forme d’une négation contre-déchéante dont l’intervention essentielle ponctue l’analytique existentiale. C’est qu’un désaccord subsiste entre Heidegger et son prédécesseur quant à l’origine ontologique de la néantité, qui semble devoir se dérober à toute forme de sursomption dialectique. III. Loin d’être alors définitivement réglé, le problème de l’origine du négatif rejaillit au cœur d’une nouvelle mouture métaphysique du projet heideggérien, la minant peut-être même en son fond. Il s’agit en l’occurrence de disputer à Hegel une compréhension plus originaire du néant, comprise comme témoignage de la finitude de l’être lui-même et s’inscrivant en faux face à l’accomplissement spécifiquement hégélien de la métaphysique. IV. Des tensions qui ne sont pas étrangères à cette délicate entreprise entraînent toutefois Heidegger sur la voie d’un dépassement de l’onto-théo-logie et de l’achèvement technique que Hegel lui a préparé. Il s’agit dès lors de situer l’origine abyssale du négatif auprès d’un irréductible retrait de l’estre, à l’encontre de l’oubli nihiliste auquel Hegel l’aurait confinée en la résorbant au sein de l’absolue positivité de la présence. Par là même, Heidegger propose un concept de négation qu’il juge plus originaire que son contrepoids dialectique, négation à laquelle il attribue la forme d’une réponse interrogative, patiente et attentive à la réticence hésitante de l’événement appropriant. Mais est-ce suffisant pour soutenir qu’il parvient, en définitive, à se libérer de l’embarras dialectique qui semble coller à sa pensée et qui exige de lui un constant effort de distanciation ? Cette thèse entend contribuer à établir les conditions d’une décision à cet égard. / In this thesis we explore Heidegger’s patient engagement (Auseinandersetzung) with Hegel about the origin of negativity – an inescapable problem insofar as it is “the sole thought of a thinking that asks the question of Being”. We begin by noting an unsuspected affinity between the two thinkers with respect to the privileged role that negation must play in philosophy, and from there we elucidate the motives for why Heidegger nevertheless rejects the dialectical method of his toughest adversary. Heidegger’s engagement with Hegel evolved constantly over his entire oeuvre; in order to do it justice we therefore propose a chronology that delimits its four principal stages. I. Firstly, we examine the young Heidegger’s resolute opposition to the rise of Neo-Hegelianism in the name of a very personal appropriation of Husserl’s intuitionism. The modifications that Heidegger made to his master’s phenomenological method nevertheless reveal that he also surreptitiously borrowed from Hegelian dialectic, the principal merit of which was to have granted negation a positive function. II. Being and Time does not openly declare this methodological debt, yet traces of it can be found, notably in the form of a counter-falling negation that plays a marked and essential role in the existential analytic. A disagreement remained between Heidegger and his predecessor as to the ontological origin of nothingness, which seemed to elude any form of dialectical sublation. III. The problem of the origin of the negative, far from having been definitively settled, then resurged at the heart of a new conception of metaphysics within the Heideggerian project, perhaps even undermining its very foundations. Heidegger vied with Hegel for a more originary understanding of nothingness, one which he conceived as a testament to the finitude of Being itself and as opposed to the specifically Hegelian accomplishment of metaphysics. IV. However, the tensions inherent to this delicate enterprise led him to go beyond onto-theo-logy together with the technical completion that Hegel had envisioned for it. From then on, Heidegger sought to situate the abyssal origin of the negative in an irreducible refusal of Being – over against the nihilistic forgetfulness to which Hegel had confined it by having resorbed it into the absolute positivity of presence. In so doing Heidegger proposed a concept of negation that he deemed more originary than its dialectical counterpart, construing negation as an interrogative answer, patient and attentive to the hesitant refusal of the event (Ereignis). But can it ultimately be maintained that Heidegger thereby succeeded in freeing himself, once and for all, from the dialectical troubles that seemingly clung to his thought and from which he constantly strove to distance himself? The present thesis will contribute to settling this very question.

Geralmente, as propriedades das orações principais-declarativas-afirmativas-ativas são tomadas como protótipo de orações verbais finitas, ou seja, o modelo a partir do qual orações não-finitas se diferenciarão (GIVÓN, 2016, p. 272). A literatura prevê que tal diferenciação ocorra nos seguintes ambientes sintáticos: orações subordinadas (CRISTOFARO, 2005) e nominalizações, configurando-se este último como fenômeno claramente predominante nas línguas sul-americanas (GIJN; HAUDE; MUYSKEN, 2011a). Esta tese tem como foco as propriedades da finitude nesses três ambientes sintáticos: sentença matriz, oração subordinada e nominalização. Em várias línguas há um morfema que cria nomes a partir de verbos intransitivos e transitivos indicando semanticamente o lugar onde X acontece ou um instrumento para X(COMRIE; THOMPSON, 2007). Na língua Wayoro (subfamília Tupari, Tupi), este morfema é -p~-m nominalizador. Contudo, notamos construções com um morfema homófono que aparecem como complementos de verbos e que permitem propriedades oracionais. Seriam esses complementos melhor analisados como nominalizações ou como orações subordinadas? As propriedades das sentenças matrizes (marcas morfossintáticas de finitude) identificadas marcas de pessoa, morfemas de alteração de valência, marcas de tempo e aspecto, tipos sentenciais, modalidade e polaridade serviram à comparação entre as orações subordinadas e as nominalizações. Com base nas propriedades de finitude, analisamos como nominalização a construção que se comporta sintaticamente como sintagma nominal, sem qualquer marca de finitude. Como oração subordinada (infinitiva), analisamos a construção com -p~-m que funciona como objeto de um verbo e que permite marcas de aspecto e expressão de sujeito pronominal cliticizado ou não pronominal. Dessa forma, as marcas de finitude nos permitem: (i) distinguir, por um lado, nominalização de oração subordinada e, por outro lado, orações matrizes de orações subordinadas, uma vez que sentenças matrizes apresentam concordância e indicação de tempo, o que não ocorre nas orações subordinadas infinitivas; (ii) distinguir predicados verbais (sentenças matrizes e orações subordinadas) de predicados não verbais, visto que a cópula e os verbos existenciais não ocorrem com afixos de tempo/aspecto e marcas de pessoa. / Generally, the properties of the main-declarative-affirmative-active clauses are the finite verbal clause prototype, that is, the prototype from which non-finite clauses will deviate (GIVÓN, 2016, p. 272). As mentioned in the literature, such deviation will occur in the following syntactic environments: subordinate clauses (CRISTOFARO, 2005) and nominalizations, being the latter a clearly predominant phenomenon in the South American languages (GIJN; HAUDE; MUYSKEN, 2011a). This thesis focuses on the properties of finiteness in these three syntactic environments: matrix sentence, (infinitive) subordinate clause, and nominalization. In several languages, there is a morpheme that creates nouns from intransitive and transitive verbs with the meaning of a place where X happensor an instrument for X(COMRIE; THOMPSON, 2007). In the Wayoro language (Tupari subfamily, Tupian), this morpheme is -p~-m nominalizer. However, we noticed constructions with a homophonous morpheme that appear as complements of verbs and that show properties of clauses. Are these complements better analyzed as nominalizations or as subordinate clauses? The property of main clauses (morphosyntactic finiteness features) person marking, valency-changing morphemes, tense and aspect markers, sentential type, modality, and polarityserve to compare the subordinate clauses and the nominalizations. Based on the morphosyntactic finiteness features, we analyze as nominalization the construction that behaves syntactically as a noun phrase without any finiteness feature.We analyze as a subordinate (infinitive) clause the -p~-m construction which functions as an object of a verb and allows aspect markers and expression of cliticized pronominal subjects or non-pronominal subjects. In this way, morphosyntactic finiteness features allow us: to distinguish, on the one hand, nominalization from subordinate clauses and, on the other hand, matrices from subordinate clauses, since matrix sentences exhibit agreement and tense marking, which do not occur in infinitive subordinate clauses; to distinguish verbal predicates (matrix sentences and subordinate clauses) from nonverbal predicates, since copula and existential verbs do not occur with person marking and tense/aspect affixes.

A presente tese doutoral consiste, essencialmente, no desenvolvimento de três tarefas: a) exposição do problema filosófico do conhecimento do mundo exterior a partir da Primeira Meditação de Descartes; b) caracterização das respostas ao ceticismo filosófico acerca do mundo exterior elaboradas a partir da noção de alternativas relevantes por Austin, Dretske, Cohen e Lewis; c) avaliação do grau de sucesso das estratégias de resposta ao ceticismo baseadas na noção de relevância. A tese principal que procurei defender, mediante o desenvolvimento das tarefas elencadas, foi que a abordagem do conhecimento a partir das alternativas relevantes é válida para pensar as condições que nos legitimam a dizer que sabemos (asserção justificada), embora, do ponto das condições do conhecimento, seja ainda possível que não saibamos aquilo mesmo que dizemos saber. Em última análise, isso significa que o ceticismo filosófico acerca do conhecimento do mundo exterior pode ser uma possibilidade para seres finitos como nós somos.

The goal of the present dissertation is to display the reconstruction of the concept of understanding which has down through the history of philosophy been used as the synonym of knowing. Hence, my main intention is to focus on the Heidegger&rsquo / s and Gadamer&rsquo / s critique of epistemological conception of understanding and their reevaluation of this concept in terms of ontology. Finally, I will try to examine the similarities and dissimilarities between the philosophers and try to call attention to their emphasis on finite and historically conditioned human understanding. To fulfill the task I put forward, I shall apply to early Heidegger&rsquo / s magnum opus Being and Time (1927) and Gadamer&rsquo / s most influential book Truth and Method (1960).

A presente tese doutoral consiste, essencialmente, no desenvolvimento de três tarefas: a) exposição do problema filosófico do conhecimento do mundo exterior a partir da Primeira Meditação de Descartes; b) caracterização das respostas ao ceticismo filosófico acerca do mundo exterior elaboradas a partir da noção de alternativas relevantes por Austin, Dretske, Cohen e Lewis; c) avaliação do grau de sucesso das estratégias de resposta ao ceticismo baseadas na noção de relevância. A tese principal que procurei defender, mediante o desenvolvimento das tarefas elencadas, foi que a abordagem do conhecimento a partir das alternativas relevantes é válida para pensar as condições que nos legitimam a dizer que sabemos (asserção justificada), embora, do ponto das condições do conhecimento, seja ainda possível que não saibamos aquilo mesmo que dizemos saber. Em última análise, isso significa que o ceticismo filosófico acerca do conhecimento do mundo exterior pode ser uma possibilidade para seres finitos como nós somos.

A presente tese doutoral consiste, essencialmente, no desenvolvimento de três tarefas: a) exposição do problema filosófico do conhecimento do mundo exterior a partir da Primeira Meditação de Descartes; b) caracterização das respostas ao ceticismo filosófico acerca do mundo exterior elaboradas a partir da noção de alternativas relevantes por Austin, Dretske, Cohen e Lewis; c) avaliação do grau de sucesso das estratégias de resposta ao ceticismo baseadas na noção de relevância. A tese principal que procurei defender, mediante o desenvolvimento das tarefas elencadas, foi que a abordagem do conhecimento a partir das alternativas relevantes é válida para pensar as condições que nos legitimam a dizer que sabemos (asserção justificada), embora, do ponto das condições do conhecimento, seja ainda possível que não saibamos aquilo mesmo que dizemos saber. Em última análise, isso significa que o ceticismo filosófico acerca do conhecimento do mundo exterior pode ser uma possibilidade para seres finitos como nós somos.

This essay is an attempt to understand what Albert Camus philosophy of the absurd entails, using the figure of Sisyphus in The myth of Sisyphus as a reference. We all face the absurd: the discordance that results from the confrontation of the human longing for the absolute with the worlds non-absolute character. Camus illustrates this condition with Sisyphus among other “absurd heroes”. But what does he want to tell us about our existence with this metaphor? Is life a punishment? Or is it completely indifferent as Sisyphus improbable happiness might indicate? And how can Sisyphus represent us although he is not mortal in the original myth? In order to answer these questions, I investigate the following aspects of the absurd in this essay: what it tells us about the human condition or even the human nature; if it entails a life in indifference; how it is related to finitude; and finally in which sense Sisyphus is an adequate analogy for our existence. My analysis is a combination of an in-depth study of Camus book and a critical discussion of the commentaries of Robert C. Solomon, Arnaud Corbic, and Avi Sagi on The myth of Sisyphus. I conclude that the image of Sisyphus contains some inconsistencies, but that its main goal is to illustrate the constant act of balance, the conscious effort that never reaches its goal which life is for Camus. Such a life does however not need to be dark or indifferent, but rather on the contrary is an authentic life in knowledge of one’s boundaries and possibilities, a life where finitude highlights the value of what it restrains, a life worth living despite its difficulties. While arguing for this reading of Camus, I also attempt to show how this philosophy of the absurd already contains key elements of an ethical position which according to a common view on Camus only appears in his later works.

[pt] O propósito desta pesquisa foi refletir sobre a revelação de um Deus transcendente e a sua relação com um ser humano finito a partir de Paul Tillich. Ao se perguntar sobre essa relação, a pesquisa se norteou pela a ideia de como é possível o conhecimento de Deus, condicionado pela finitude humana, e como esse conhecimento corre o risco de se tornar um conhecimento como outro qualquer. Pois a única maneira de o ser humano conhecer a realidade a sua volta é sempre através da estrutura sujeito-objeto. Porém, Deus não pode ser um objeto entre outros. Sendo assim, a pesquisa propôs a estudar a teologia de Paul Tillich, um teólogo que postula o conceito de símbolo como linguagem da fé, sendo um caminho para que a revelação de Deus seja acolhida, sem tornar Deus objeto de idolatria e fanatismos. Para responder a esses questionamentos, no primeiro momento a pesquisa perpassou os limites da razão humana, através da contribuição de alguns filosofos, fazendo uma relação entre finitude e existência humana. Num segundo momento a pesquisa se estabeleceu sobre a relação entre a revelação de um Deus transcendente e a experiência humana, no cotidiano. A experiência de uma revelação que exige aproximação, que não é algo fora, objetivo, mas existencial. Por último a pesquisa se deteve sobre a fé como uma dimensão inerente ao ser humano, uma fé que se comunica através de símbolos, mediada pela linguagem e que tenta fugir de todos os propósitos fundamentalistas de dominação e imposição. / [en] The purpose of this research was to reflect on the revelation of a transcendent God and his relation with a finite human being in Paul Tillich. When asked about this relationship, the research is lead by a the idea of how can the knowledge of God, conditioned by human finitude, and how that knowledge is in danger of becoming a knowledge like any other. For the only way of man to know the reality around you is always through the subject-object structure. But God can not be an object among others. Thus, research aimed at studying the theology of Paul Tillich, an existentialist theology, which posits the concept of language as a symbol of faith as a way for the revelation of God is welcomed, without making God an object of idolatry and fanaticism. To answer these questions, the first time the research pervaded the limits of human reason, through the contribution of philosophy, making a relationship between human existence and finitude. In a second time the research established the relationship between the revelation of a transcendent God and human experience in everyday life. The experience of a revelation which requires approximation, which is not something outside, objective, but existential. Finally the search was halted on faith as an inherent dimension of the human being, a faith that communicates through symbols, mediated by language and tries to escape all the purposes of fundamentalist domination and imposition.

This thesis examines Bonnefoy’s cultivation of the performative aspects of the poetic act in his later collections of poetry. It investigates the poet’s use of the theatrical structures of poetic performance, their temporal and spatial dynamics, to deconstruct conceptual or representative modes of thought. It examines how Bonnefoy uses apostrophes to insentient phenomena and addresses to an unidentified other in his attempts to open language up to the finitude and sharing of existence. Working within language, against language, the poet cultivates what he describes as ‘un savoir, tout négatif et instable qu’il soit, que je puis peut-être nommer la vérité de la parole’. The first chapter of this thesis investigates how the image of the ephemeral flame becomes a model for a finite poetic performance in ‘La Terre’. The second chapter scrutinises how Bonnefoy makes the signifying function of language ‘passive’ to the inappropriable excess of material presence in Début et fin de la neige. The third chapter, analysing ‘La Voix lointaine’, explores how Bonnefoy dramatises the experience of self-presence as the act of listening to a distant voice. The fourth chapter, investigating the relationship between finitude and form in ‘L’Heure présente’, analyses how the dissolution of form gives rise to a form that is always à venir, a dynamic, ‘un possible’.

Ce mémoire a pour but de montrer que le premier tournant herméneutique de Paul Ricœur en 1960 gravite essentiellement autour de la problématique de la volonté mauvaise. Nous soutenons autrement dit que Ricœur a initialement donné une tournure herméneutique à sa philosophie pour penser le serf-arbitre, c’est-à-dire pour penser la liberté captive d’elle-même. Afin de rendre compte adéquatement de ce tournant, notre attention sera principalement dirigée vers le deuxième tome de la Philosophie de la volonté de Ricœur, Finitude et culpabilité. Notre question se pose ainsi : comment et pourquoi, dans une problématique du mal, Ricœur entame-t-il son tournant herméneutique? Pour y répondre, nous expliciterons le parcours de Ricœur allant de L’homme faillible à La symbolique du mal. Nous verrons dans un premier temps que si le philosophe arrive à thématiser le concept de faillibilité à partir d’une ontologie de la disproportion, si la réflexion a accès à la possibilité du mal, il n’en ira pas de même pour le noème inintelligible que constitue le mal moral. Afin de penser la faute, nous verrons que Ricœur se tournera vers l’herméneutique en se mettant à l’écoute du langage de l’aveu. Ainsi, dans la deuxième partie de notre mémoire, nous expliciterons les trois moments de compréhension (phénoménologique, herméneutique et réflexif) propre à l’herméneutique philosophique de Ricœur de 1960. / The purpose of this dissertation is to show that the first hermeneutics turn of Paul Ricœur in 1960 essentially revolves around the problematic of bad will. We argue ie that Ricœur initially gave a hermeneutics twist to his philosophy to think the servile will, that is the freedom captive of itself. To properly account for this turn, our attention was mainly directed to the second volume of the Philosophy of the Will of Ricœur, Faillible man and The symbolism of evil. Our question is this : how and why, in a problematic of evil, Ricœur starts his hermeneutics turn? To answer this question, we will explain the course of Ricœur from Fallible man to The Symbolism of evil. We will see at first that if the philosopher comes to thematize the concept of fallibility from an ontology of disproportion, if the reflection has access to the possibility of evil, it does not go well for the unintelligible noema that is moral evil. To think of the fault, we will see that Ricœur will turn to hermeneutics is by listening to the language of confession. Thus, in the second part of our dissertation, we will explain the three stages of understanding (phenomenological, hermeneutics and reflexive) to own philosophical hermeneutics of Ricœur 1960.