Hip Hop graffiti has been marking our urban landscapes for decades. However street art, a much less researched topic, has claimed notoriety in recent years. Much of the existing research groups hip-hop graffiti, gang graffiti and street art together and calls for a uniform response from communities, city officials and law enforcement. While street artists have made their mark in the urban landscapes of the United States as well as internationally, it is important to define the terms "street art"and "graffiti" and where they deviate from one another in order for cities to begin to address these expressions with any level of success. As municipalities grapple with visual public expression--street art and graffiti--a framework must be established taking into consideration legal parameters for both cities and artists.

La présente étude tend à replacer le contexte de la construction fédérale américaine à la lumière d'un théisme politique émergent. L'exceptionnalisme procède à ce titre d'un paradoxe originel qui vient directement nourrir nos interrogations : la reconnaissance par la lettre constitutionnelle puis par les juges de la Cour Suprême d'un véritable « mur de séparation » entre le spirituel et le temporel, parfois exacerbé par les instruments du droit, mais qui doit être associé à la mise en place d'une «religion de la République» élaborée et fortement institutionnalisée. De là, l'auteur voit dans la notion d'exceptionnalisme religieux la mise en œuvre d'une rhétorique nouvelle qui entend offrir les instruments conceptuels permettant de revisiter la subtile immixtion de l' « esprit de religion » et de l' « esprit de liberté » chers à Alexis de Tocqueville. Cette perspective a dès lors pour dessein d'entrevoir une résolution de l'impossible oxymore que forme la république théocratico-laïque. Cette apparente dichotomie ne peut être entrevue à travers une lecture exclusivement doctrinale, elle emporte au contraire nombre d'incertitudes sur le plan jurisprudentiel. L'étude démontre à ce titre que les juges, en éludant la notion d'exceptionnalisme américain, ne peuvent construire un paradigme juridique apte à apprécier de manière satisfaisante les dispositions de droit positif en matière religieuse. Aussi, le constitutionnaliste œuvre à étudier les mécanismes juridiques traduisant un phénomène sociologique exceptionnaliste. Cette approche éclaire de telle manière la notion sans cesse revisitée de « laïcité américaine ». / This study tends to put the federal construction in context of an emerging political theism. Exceptionalism reveals an original paradox that directly feeds our questions: the recognition by the Constitution then by the judges of the Supreme Court of a “wall of separation” between spiritual and temporal powers, sometimes exacerbated by the instruments of the law, but which must be associated with the establishment of a “religion of the Republic” highly developed and institutionalized. From there, the author sees the notion of religious exceptionalism as the implementation of a new rhetoric that aims to provide the conceptual tools to revisit the subtle interference of the “spirit of religion” and the “spirit of liberty”, quoted from Alexis de Tocqueville. This perspective has therefore the ambition of establishing a possible resolution of the oxymoron that forms the theocratic-secular republic. This apparent dichotomy cannot be seen through a purely doctrinal reading, it brings on the contrary many uncertainties on the jurisprudential work. The study shows that the judges, eluding the notion of American exceptionalism, cannot build a legal paradigm able to appreciate adequately the provisions of substantive law in religious matters. To this end, the constitutionalist studies the legal mechanisms resulting from an exceptionalist sociological phenomenon. This approach sheds light on the concept so constantly revisited of “American secularism”.

This project examines how Georgia draws the line between religious freedom and child abuse. In Georgia, certain religious parents are granted spiritual exemptions for conduct that would otherwise be prohibited due to its potential harm to children, while other parents must alter their religious practices to conform to the law. An examination of Georgia law governing conduct that is both religiously-motivated and poses a risk of physical harm to children illustrates that Georgia’s spiritual exemptions have contributed to producing legally-defined religious orthodoxy, inconsistent regulation of religious conduct, and less stringent state protection from harm for the children of some religious parents.

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La liberté religieuse, qui représente l’un des principaux mythes fondateurs des États-Unis, est devenue un enjeu juridique et d’intérêt public majeur qui s’est renforcé au seuil du XXIe siècle. Garantie par le Premier Amendement à la Constitution fédérale, elle affirme que « le Congrès ne fera aucune loi visant l’établissement d’une religion où l’interdiction du libre exercice de celle-ci ; ou à limiter la liberté d’expression, de la presse ou le droit des citoyens de se réunir pacifiquement ou d’adresser à l’État des pétitions pour obtenir réparation de torts subis. ». Aussi, l’État se doit-il de garantir la liberté religieuse de ses citoyens (selon la célèbre clause du libre-exercice), tout en restant neutre à l’égard de toutes les religions (c’est ce que l’on appelle la clause d’établissement). Si à première vue les clauses constitutionnelles semblent claires, la formulation délibérément vague choisie par les Pères fondateurs, dont James Madison qui fut chargé de rédiger les Amendements, jette déjà les bases des débats perpétuels sur l’interprétation du rôle de l’État dans la gestion du fait religieux et plus particulièrement des limites de la liberté religieuse expressément protégée par la clause du libre-exercice, mais dont la portée demeure confuse. Lorsque la finalité de la loi ne permet pas l’intégration d’un aménagement prévoyant des clauses spécifiques à une religion, le groupe peut alors demander à être totalement exempté de l’application de la loi en question. L’exemption est donc le deuxième recours envisageable, mais contrairement à l’aménagement, elle est accordée uniquement par les juges, qui après le passage de la loi, peuvent, au nom de la clause du libre exercice, dispenser le groupe religieux ou l’individu d’observer la loi qui représente selon eux une entrave à leur liberté religieuse. Dans la grande majorité des cas, le conflit entre pratique religieuse et application de la loi donne lieu à un litige opposant l’État, représenté par le Procureur (Attorney General) au groupe en question, et donc à un procès. Ces trente dernières années, les procès pour menace à la liberté religieuse ont été plus nombreux que dans toute l’histoire du pays. Comme l’observe le sociologue des religions James Richardson, ce sont principalement les mouvements religieux minoritaires qui sont concernés par ces litiges, leurs pratiques religieuses paraissant parfois trop « déviantes » au vu de la culture protestante, dominante aux États-Unis. L’objet premier de cette thèse est donc de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des situations de conflit entre les pratiques religieuses collectives ou individuelles d’une part, et l’exercice de l’autorité de l’État, de l’autre, sachant que ce dernier se doit de faire appliquer la loi à l’ensemble de ses citoyens, tout en veillant à protéger leurs droits constitutionnels. Afin de tenter d’apporter un éclairage sur la jurisprudence en matière de liberté religieuse, nous proposons une analyse de conflits juridiques impliquant exclusivement ce type de groupes (et non des religions dites « traditionnelles »). Dans le cadre de nos études de cas, nous avons privilégié une analyse de cinq mouvements religieux minoritaires (MRM), dont la pertinence réside principalement, à notre sens, dans leur diversité. Nous soulignerons ici que nous n’entendons pas fournir une étude exhaustive de la jurisprudence en matière de liberté religieuse, puisqu’il s’agit de ne retenir que quelques affaires qui ont jalonné l’histoire de cette chronologie façonnée de manière assez inconstante par une Cour Suprême changeante, à la fois reflet et actrice des évolutions de la société. / Religious freedom is one of United States’ major founding myths and it has become a key issue in the public sphere. The First Amendment to the US Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”. Religious freedom is thus a fundamental principle protected by the first part of the Amendment called the free exercise clause while the State is prohibited from interfering with or favoring any religion. However, when a law of generally applicability is seen by an individual or a group as overlapping their religious freedom, going to trial to protect their constitutional right appears in many as the best option. The “case by case” approach by the courts, and in particular by the federal Supreme Court, as well as the lack of a coherent jurisprudence show how difficult and challenging dealing with religious freedom issues are. Indeed, beyond judging facts in the various cases the judges hear, their constant redefinitions of the boundaries of religious freedom have given them a major role in regulating religious matters. In our study, we focus on six such religious groups which have been involved in litigations and most of whom had their case heard by the US Supreme Court, in order to seek an exemption from the law and continue their otherwise illegal religious practice. After a review of the Mormons’ famous polygamy cases in the late 19th century, we move on to analyzing the litigation involving a Brazilian Church (called the Centro Espirto Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal) using an illegal substance in their sacramental tea. The child death cases involving Christian Scientists are also analyzed as they point out the question of the limits of parents’ religious rights when it comes to their children’s health. The issue of parents’ rights is further discussed in the following case studies of the Amish who can have their own community schools since the famous US Supreme Court Yoder decision in 1972, and in the case of the Twelve Tribes who have been facing accusations of child abuse and illegal child labor.

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[pt] Este é um trabalho sobre a natureza das razões as quais a Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos recorre para resolver casos envolvendo a liberdade de discurso. Considero que sejam dois os tipos de razões que orientam o processo decisório da Primeira Emenda: as formais e as substantivas. As razões substantivas são aquelas que o direito compartilha com outros domínios da ação social humana, como a moral, a economia e a política. As formais, por sua vez, são razões jurídicas autoritativas - no sentido de derivarem de uma norma jurídica válida (Constituição, leis, regulamentos, precedentes, contratos, e outros documentos normativos afins) – e compulsórias (ou excludentes), pois geralmente excluem do horizonte do raciocínio decisório razões substantivas concorrentes. O meu objetivo nesta dissertação é descrever a maneira pela qual o raciocínio jurídico formal e o raciocínio jurídico substantivo foram em certa medida conciliados no âmago da prática decisória da Suprema Corte norte-americana. Para tanto, esforço-me em apresentar, comentar e comparar entre si alguns dos mais emblemáticos julgamentos levados a cabo pela Corte ao longo de mais de um século de jurisdição constitucional da Primeira Emenda. Procuro mostrar também que os métodos adjudicatórios por ela desenvolvidos podem ser classificados de acordo com a importância que cada um deles atribui às razões formais (ou, por outro lado, às razões substanciais) da liberdade de discurso. Por exemplo: o conflito entre “balanceamento” e as metodologias pertencentes a “tradição definicional” (e.g., absolutismo, categorização) nada mais representa senão uma instância particular do conflito mais geral entre forma e substância no pensamento jurídico norte-americano. Mas se até meados da década de 1960 a discussão sobre métodos decisórios da liberdade de discurso era completamente dominada pela oposição entre balanceamento e absolutismo, aos poucos a Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos, em companhia com grandes nomes do pensamento jurídico daquele país, foi abrindo seus olhos para a existência de pontos médios entre aqueles dois extremos. O resultado disto foi a criação de novas teorias normativas da decisão (e.g., o balanceamento definicional), bem como de uma série de testes, fórmulas, parâmetros e presunções, tornando assim possível que elementos formais e substantivos do raciocínio jurídico da Primeira Emenda passassem a conviver no domínio das mesmas metodologias decisórias. Para além do meu esforço em reconstruir racionalmente as transformações pelas quais passaram as abordagens metodológicas da Suprema Corte ao longo das últimas décadas, me proponho também a dotá-las de algum sentido. Interpreto que a preocupação que a Corte historicamente tem demonstrado com a estabilização de seus procedimentos decisórios, bem como com a previsibilidade de seus julgamentos, guarda íntima relação com a crença de que as justificativas subjacentes à Primeira Emenda (e.g., maior controle do governo pelo povo; busca pela verdade e autoexpressão artística e intelectual) são mais eficazmente promovidas mediante a adoção de uma abordagem decisória que priorize o alcance de melhores resultados em um nível global em detrimento daquilo que muitas vezes parece ser o melhor resultado para o caso mais imediato. / [en] This is a paper about the nature of the reasons that the United States Supreme Court uses to resolve cases involving freedom of speech. I believe that there are two types of reasons that guide the First Amendment decision-making process: formal and substantive. Substantive reasons are those that law shares with other domains of human social action, such as morality, economics and politics. Formal reasons, in turn, are authoritative legal reasons - in the sense that they derive from a valid legal norm (Constitution, laws, regulations, precedents, contracts, and other related normative documents) - and compulsory (or exclusionary), because they generally exclude competing substantive reasons from the horizon of decisional reasoning. My aim in this dissertation is to describe the way in which formal legal reasoning and substantive legal reasoning have to some extent been reconciled at the heart of the decision-making practice of the US Supreme Court. To this end, I endeavor to present, comment on and compare with each other some of the most emblematic judgments carried out by the Court over more than a century of First Amendment constitutional jurisdiction. I also try to show that the adjudicatory methods she has developed can be classified according to the importance each of them attaches to the formal reasons (or, on the other hand, the substantial reasons) for freedom of discourse. For example: the conflict between balancing and the methodologies belonging to the definitional tradition (e.g., absolutism, categorization) represents nothing more than a particular instance of the more general conflict between form and substance in American legal thought. But while until the mid-1960s the discussion about methods of deciding freedom of speech was completely dominated by the opposition between balancing and absolutism, little by little the United States Supreme Court, in company with the great names of legal thought in that country, opened its eyes to the existence of middle points between those two extremes. The result was the creation of new normative theories of decision (e.g., definitional balancing), as well as a series of tests, formulas, parameters and presumptions, thus making it possible for formal and substantive elements of First Amendment legal reasoning to coexist in the realm of the same decision-making methodologies. Beyond my effort to rationally reconstruct the transformations that the Supreme Court s methodological approaches have undergone over the last few decades, I also propose to give them some meaning. I argue that the Court s historical concern with the stabilization of its decision-making procedures, as well as with the predictability of its judgments, is closely related to the belief that the justifications underlying the First Amendment (e.g., greater control of government by the people; the search for truth; and artistic and intellectual self-expression) are most effectively promoted by adopting a decision-making approach that prioritizes the achievement of better outcomes on a global level over what often appears to be the best outcome for the most immediate case.