In this thesis I am analyzing the causes of failure of the recovery program resulting from the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) the implementation of which the National Recovery Administration (NRA) ensured. I am searching for the act's ideological roots and directions of thought which had projected themselves into it, first. Further on, I deal with the content, process of drafting and approving of the codes of fair competition, as well as the facts which were determining them. In the next part I am scrutinizing the procedures of enforcing the codes and code compliance, including the twists in development of these. For the understanding of these procedures is what I regard as necessary for grasping the increasing hostility towards the NRA of part of business. In the last two chapters I deal with the NRA's failure's causes proper. I divide these causes into, first, which I think do not result from the NIRA conception and which could have revealed themselves during any other program's implementation. And, second, which result from the legislation's real essence directly. These I am dividing, further on, into causes (defects) emanating from the NIRA just as a result of concrete historical circumstances of time and place and causes emanating from the act's conception necessarily, disregard of circumstances. My central idea, to the advantage of which I am setting forth the arguments in this thesis, is that the NIRA must have ended up unsuccessful, exactly because of the inherent problems it contained, even if there was no Supreme Court's Schechter decision. In accordance with Mises's idea of any interventionist model's necessary instability I utter the hypothesis that the NIRA had but two ways ahead of it. One led to the state before the act's passage, the other one led in the direction of central planning, in any form, which only could have, although for a short time, deal with the problems resulting from the missing inter-industrial coordination in the state of the fragmented order of market.

A tese parte da hipótese central de que existe uma antinomia fundamental no pensamento político ocidental contemporâneo entre os Direitos Humanos e a Soberania. Observamos tal antinomia em dois campos distintos, porém interconectados: no campo propriamente teórico, no qual chegamos à antinomia do projeto universal-cosmopolita dos Direitos Humanos em relação ao Estadoemuralhado- nacional, e no campo do direito internacional, no qual a antinomia se faz presente em alguns instrumentos jurídicos internacionais do pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial. Ao final da pesquisa, a hipótese central se confirmou, o que mostrou, portanto, a vigência de uma dupla matriz teórico-prática no pensamento político (duas filosofias) presentes no mundo contemporâneo. De um lado, os Direitos Humanos levados às últimas consequências (em sua extremidade lógica), remetem a um mundo sem fronteiras e o defendem: o do kosmopolites (cidadão do mundo). Por outro lado, a Soberania, de igual forma, em sua extremidade lógica, remete às fronteiras territoriais, aos territórios fechados e de jurisdição exclusiva. Vista por esse viés, a Soberania atém-se à lógica da muralha, da distinção e polaridade do eu e do outro enquanto o cidadão-nacional versus o estrangeiro. / This thesis argues from the central hypothesis that there is an essential antinomy in the contemporary Western political thought between human rights and Sovereignty. This antagonism can be observed in two fields (although interconnected): in the theorethical field itself, in which we arrive at a universal-cosmopolitan project antagonistic to the State-enclosed-national terrritory; and in the field of international law, where we encounter this paradox in some of the international post-Second World War legal instruments. At the end of the research, the hypothesis was confirmed, thus revealing the existence of a double theoretical-practical matrix in the political thought (two philosophies) of the contemporary world. On the one hand, human rights are taken to the very end (in its logical extreme), correlate and defend a world without borders, of the kosmopolites (world citizen). On the other hand, Sovereignty, equally taken in this logical extreme, refers back to territories frontiers, to the closed territories, and its exclusive jurisdiction. Seen from this point of view, Sovereignty ties itself to the logic of the wall, the distinction and polarity of I and the other, as the national-citizen versus the foreigner.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento CientÃfico e TecnolÃgico / A presente dissertaÃÃo tem como proposta a reconstruÃÃo das teses de Schmitt acerca da distinÃÃo moderna entre facticidade e validade em teoria polÃtica. O objetivo deste estudo à analisar os paradigmas polÃticos modernos â normativismo e realismo â como consequÃncia do problema da relaÃÃo entre imediatidade e mediatidade da forma polÃtica. A hipÃtese de trabalho desta pesquisa Ã, afinal, a investigaÃÃo de que, por um lado, (I) se a teoria polÃtica de Schmitt se configura em contraposiÃÃo ao modelo normativista, por outro, nÃo se adequa ao paradigma do realismo polÃtico â seja realismo fraco seja realismo forte â, representando uma proposta teÃrica alternativa diante do problema da mediaÃÃo racionalista; assim, (II) torna-se necessÃrio perscrutar quais as caracterÃsticas fundamentais do projeto schmittiano de reestruturaÃÃo do paradigma da teoria polÃtica desenvolvido, de forma geral, em trÃs momentos distintos na sua reflexÃo: o primeiro articulado atravÃs da noÃÃo de Entscheidung e, posteriormente, trabalhado no Ãmbito de uma teoria da exceÃÃo; o segundo momento denominado de existencialismo polÃtico; e o terceiro momento, desenvolvido a partir da teoria do nomos. Os resultados principais desta dissertaÃÃo sÃo a demonstraÃÃo de que Schmitt empreendeu uma tentativa de reestruturaÃÃo dos paradigmas polÃticos da modernidade diante do problema da mediaÃÃo entre ser e dever-ser e, enfim, a indicaÃÃo de que o autor desenvolveu a tese de que nÃo hà mediaÃÃo possÃvel, mas apenas a imediatidade de uma forÃa jurÃdica nÃo mediada por leis, ou seja, um fato institucional concreto e ordenativo entre o universal e o particular atravÃs do qual dispensa a necessidade de uma teoria normativa da justificaÃÃo da ordem (legitimidade), pois o Sein Ã, antes de qualquer coisa, realidade social mediada e constituÃda juridicamente, por isso, a legitimidade deve ser compreendida como histÃrica e concreta demonstrando a co-originariedade entre ser e dever-ser e, assim, solucionando o paradoxo mediaÃÃo/imediaÃÃo atravÃs da proprosta do pragmatismo polÃtico. / This dissertation proposes the reconstruction of Schmittâs thesis about the modern distinction between facticity and validity in the field of political theory. The purpose is to analyse the modern political paradigms â normative and realism â as a consequence of the problematic relationship between immediate and mediate in the political way. The hypothesis is (I) if on the one hand Schmittâs political theory arises in opposition to the normative model, on the other it cannot be applied to the political realism â be it strong or weak â meaning an alternative theoretical proposal in the face of the rationalist mediation; therefore (II) itâs necessary to scrutinize what are the essential characteristics of the Schmittian project of restructuring of the political theory paradigm developed, generally speaking, in three distinct moments of the discussion: the first articulated by means of the notion of Entscheidung and later developed within the scope of the Theory of Exception; the second called political existentialism; and the third developed from the theory of nomos. The main findings of this research are the demonstration of Schmitt undertakes an attempt of reorganize the modern political paradigms in the face of the problem of the mediation between âbeingâ and âought to beâ, and the possibility that the author developed the thesis of there is possible mediation, but only the immediateness of a legal force does not mediated by laws, in other words, a real and legal institutional fact between the universal and the particular by means of which needs no necessity of a normative theory of justification of law (legitimacy), for the Sein is even now, and first of all, a social reality mediated and constitued legally, hence, the legitimacy should be understood as historical and real demonstrating the cooriginality between âbeingâ and âought to beâ, and, finally, solving the mediate/immediate paradox by means to a political pragmatism.

A tese parte da hipótese central de que existe uma antinomia fundamental no pensamento político ocidental contemporâneo entre os Direitos Humanos e a Soberania. Observamos tal antinomia em dois campos distintos, porém interconectados: no campo propriamente teórico, no qual chegamos à antinomia do projeto universal-cosmopolita dos Direitos Humanos em relação ao Estadoemuralhado- nacional, e no campo do direito internacional, no qual a antinomia se faz presente em alguns instrumentos jurídicos internacionais do pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial. Ao final da pesquisa, a hipótese central se confirmou, o que mostrou, portanto, a vigência de uma dupla matriz teórico-prática no pensamento político (duas filosofias) presentes no mundo contemporâneo. De um lado, os Direitos Humanos levados às últimas consequências (em sua extremidade lógica), remetem a um mundo sem fronteiras e o defendem: o do kosmopolites (cidadão do mundo). Por outro lado, a Soberania, de igual forma, em sua extremidade lógica, remete às fronteiras territoriais, aos territórios fechados e de jurisdição exclusiva. Vista por esse viés, a Soberania atém-se à lógica da muralha, da distinção e polaridade do eu e do outro enquanto o cidadão-nacional versus o estrangeiro. / This thesis argues from the central hypothesis that there is an essential antinomy in the contemporary Western political thought between human rights and Sovereignty. This antagonism can be observed in two fields (although interconnected): in the theorethical field itself, in which we arrive at a universal-cosmopolitan project antagonistic to the State-enclosed-national terrritory; and in the field of international law, where we encounter this paradox in some of the international post-Second World War legal instruments. At the end of the research, the hypothesis was confirmed, thus revealing the existence of a double theoretical-practical matrix in the political thought (two philosophies) of the contemporary world. On the one hand, human rights are taken to the very end (in its logical extreme), correlate and defend a world without borders, of the kosmopolites (world citizen). On the other hand, Sovereignty, equally taken in this logical extreme, refers back to territories frontiers, to the closed territories, and its exclusive jurisdiction. Seen from this point of view, Sovereignty ties itself to the logic of the wall, the distinction and polarity of I and the other, as the national-citizen versus the foreigner.

I denna uppsats fördjupar jag mig i hur Westboro Baptist Church ser på människan och hur rörelsen övertygar omvärlden hur en människan ska leva. Uppsatsen är byggd på öppna brev ifrån Westboro Baptist Church som de har publicerat på deras hemsida. Breven behandlar vad Westboro Baptist Church anser vara mänsklighetens syndfulla levnadssätt och ger reprimander mot såväl stora som små aktörer i samhällets kretsar. Målet med uppsatsen är att ge förståelse för hur Westboro Baptist Church kan med hjälp av retoriken knyta samman sin gemenskap, och överleva när hela världen står emot dem. Genom Bergers teori om nomos och den klassiska retorikens tre grundpelare ämnar uppsatsen ge en bild av hur rörelser kan med hjälp av retorikkonsten hålla en rörelse levande trots att de står ensamma mot världen. / In this exam paper I seek a deeper understanding of how the Westboro Baptist Church views human life and how the Westboro Baptist Church tries to convince the world through their rhetoric. The paper is based on open letters by the church which have been published on their website. In the letters Westboro Baptist Church write about, what they think, are the most sinful parts of a human’s life, and they give guidelines as to how people should correct their habits and live a good Christian life. These letters of correction are sent out to people in the social arena, both big and small. The goal of the paper is to give a deeper understanding of how Westboro Baptist Church can keep their congregation alive through its rhetoric, and survive when the whole world is against them. With the help of Peter Berger’s theory of nomos and the three basic focal points of classical rhetorical analysis, this exam aims to give a better picture of how a closely knit group can remain functional when the whole world hates them.

Thesis (M. Div.)--Grace Theological Seminary, 1986. / Abstract. Bibliography: leaves 72-78.

No description available.

On November 9, 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States. No aspect of the campaign was more remarkable than Trump’s rhetoric, which ranged from the candid and unexpected to the crude and incendiary. Now, two years later, his rhetoric—and the reasons for its widespread appeal—remain largely opaque, even under examination from proto-fascist or populist lenses. I seek for a partial account of Trump’s rhetoric using the concept of antinomic rhetoric coupled with the widespread popular perception of him as similar to an internet troll. In short, I believe it is his violation of the conventional standards (nomoi) of rhetoric—his “trolling”— that best explains his remarkable rhetoric. Antinomic rhetoric, as I characterize it here, aims at disruption instead of persuasion and employs deception and aggression instead of shared values and rational proofs. By examining a series of rhetorical exchanges between Trump and Senator Elizabeth Warren, I find evidence that his use of antinomic rhetoric derails conversations, dissolves the standards of rational civic discourse, and draws his opponents into unforced strategic errors. These effects contribute to a chaotic environment where more “ordinary” persuasion can take place on territory more favorable to Trump. I also draw broader inferences about Trump’s use of antinomic rhetoric in rhetorical exchanges other than the ones analyzed here and inquire into what further questions could be asked to deepen our understanding of Trump’s trollery and of antinomic rhetoric in general.

This paper presents a contextual analysis of Joseph Wright of Derby's “scientific series” which contains three paintings with science motifs. The purpose of the essay is to analyze how the contemporary context has been expressed in the paintings with regard to the relationship between religion and science. This is done with a theoretical starting point in the concepts of nomos and anomy. Together this starting point and method create a basis for a broader understanding of these three paintings with a focus on religion and science. My conclusion is that these three paintings express the tense relationship between religion and science that was current in England during the 18th century (and is still found today), and that each painting provides information about the changes that arose in the nomos in correlation to the progress of science. Much research has been made on these three paintings separately, studying these paintings together, however, opens up for many new interpretations.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-05-10T14:32:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Maurício Pedroso Flores_.pdf: 1452373 bytes, checksum: b3eefd002f5203610f3f86784a7b5ce5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-10T14:32:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maurício Pedroso Flores_.pdf: 1452373 bytes, checksum: b3eefd002f5203610f3f86784a7b5ce5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-28 / Nenhuma / O jurista norte-americano Robert Cover desenvolveu importante reflexões sobre aspectos fundamentais para a teoria do direito, como a genêse da normatividade social e a legitimidade dos tribunais. Uma vez que não conseguiu sistematizar seus escritos de uma forma relativamente coerente, o autor deixou a comentadores e críticos muitas reflexões, mas também muitos questionamentos sobre a sua obra. As diferentes interpretações e apropriações de seu pensamento demonstram que seu pensamento ainda é, em grande parte, um livro aberto. O objetivo do presente trabalho é, apresentando as principais concepções do autor, demonstrar que seu pensamento permanece atual e relevante como fonte de insights sobre o direito contemporêneo. Para tanto, nossa exposição se baseia em dois movimentos. Primeiro, procura reconstituir o pensamento de Cover a partir de seus principais textos e ideias. Em um segundo momento, propõe uma especulação sobre possíveis caminhos teóricos apontados por sua obra. A reconstrução de suas principais ideias é centrada em dois grandes marcos de sua obra: os ensaios Nomos e Narrativa (1983) – onde Cover elabora seus conceitos mais influentes, como nomos e jurisgenesis – e Violência e a Palavra (1986) – em que Cover sugere que a interpretação jurídica se estabelece em um “campo de dor e morte” e é indissociável da violência. As mensagens centrais desses dois ensaios têm sido interpretadas por comentadores e críticos como parcial ou totalmente contrárias. Considerando-os como igualmente fundamentais para compreender o pensamento de Cover, o trabalho recorre a alguns desses debates à procura de uma interpretação que possa conciliar as duas abordagens. Por fim, com base nessa interpretação, sugere que a obra de Cover pode ser lida a partir da ideia de um pluralismo normativo, acepção que compreende aqui dois significados: tanto a adoção de uma pluralidade de fontes normativas como a presença de critérios normativos para avaliar criticamente o direito. / The American jurist Robert Cover developed important reflections on fundamental aspects of the theory of law, such as the genesis of social normativity and the legitimacy of the courts. Since he could not systematize his writings in a relatively coherent way, Cover’s work stood as a source of many reflections, but also many questions, for his commentators and critics. The different interpretations and appropriations of his thought show that his thinking is still largely an open book. The aim of this thesis is to present Cover’s main ideas and to demonstrate that his thinking remains current and relevant as a source of insights into contemporary law. To do so, our exposition takes up two tasks. First, it seeks to reconstruct Cover's thinking from his main texts and ideas. In a second moment, it proposes a speculation on possible theoretical paths pointed by his work. Our reconstruction of is centered on two major milestones of his work: the essays Nomos and Narrative (1983) – where Cover elaborates his most influential concepts, like nomos and jurisgenesis – and Violence and the Word (1986) – in which Cover suggests that legal interpretation is established in a "field of pain and death" and is inseparable from violence. The central messages of these two essays have been interpreted by commentators and critics as partially or totally contrary. Considering them as equally fundamental to understanding Cover's thinking, the paper resorts to some of these debates in search of an interpretation that can reconcile the two approaches. Finally, based on this interpretation, it suggests that Cover's work could be read as containing the idea of a normative pluralism, an expression that has two meanings here: it connotates not only the adoption of a plurality of normative sources but also the presence of normative criteria to evaluate law critically.