Nous proposons dans ce travail une interprétation de la référence à la psychanalyse chez Adorno et Horkheimer, en partant de son usage dans un champ inattendu, quoique central : la critique de la rationalité. Adorno et Horkheimer affirment, notamment dans la Dialectique de la raison, que la raison, concept à la fois central et structurant pour la société moderne capitaliste, entre en conflit avec elle-même jusqu'à son autodestruction, qui doit être comprise comme passage dans la folie. Nous entendons soutenir que cette affirmation peut être comprise de manière non-métaphorique par le recours à la psychanalyse, à partir d’une double lecture de leurs écrits, à la fois génétique et micrologique. Nous situons la genèse du croisement entre psychanalyse et critique de la rationalité dans leurs premiers travaux, au moment de traiter du rapport entre psychologie et théorie de la connaissance, d’abord dans une perspective philosophique néokantienne, puis dans le cadre du programme de recherches interdisciplinaires des années trente. Ce croisement précoce conduit Adorno et Horkheimer à s’intéresser tant à la part inconsciente qui travaille les processus de connaissance, qu’à la logique des phénomènes apparemment les plus irrationnels. Nous réinterprétons ainsi les travaux des années trente et quarante comme la mise au jour d’une conjonction de formes spécifiques de rationalisation sociale avec la montée de phénomènes sociaux particulièrement irrationnels, notamment liés à l’émergence du fascisme. Cette conjonction mène alors à la thématisation psychanalytique de l’autodestruction de la raison. Notre thèse est que la mise au jour de ce paradigme critique singulier – qui associe approche psychanalytique, critique de la raison et théorie de la connaissance – révèle de façon cohérente et globale la fonction attribuée à la psychanalyse par ces auteurs : rendre compte de la déraison comme effet de la logique contradictoire que la société moderne capitaliste établit entre nature et histoire. Nous pouvons ainsi conclure notre travail en analysant à quelle condition une théorie de la connaissance dialectique et critique est susceptible de ne pas reconduire l’écueil que la psychanalyse a permis d’identifier au niveau social, à savoir la réduction du rapport entre histoire et nature à un rapport de domination. Nous entendons ainsi montrer les potentialités critiques de ce paradigme dans le cadre des débats contemporains sur les pathologies de la raison. / In this study, we will propose an interpretation of the psychoanalytic references in the works of Adorno and Horkheimer, by starting from the way they are used in an unexpected, and yet central, field: the critique of rationality. Especially in Dialectics of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer affirm that reason, a concept that is both central and structuring to the modern capitalist society, comes into conflit with itself to the point of its self-destruction, which should be understood as a passage to madness. We intend to defend that this affirmation can be understood, by having recourse to psychoanalysis, in a non-metaphorical manner, starting from a double reading, both genetic and micrologic, of their writings. We situate the genesis of the intersection between psychoanalysis and the critique of rationality in their early works, when they were dealing with the relationship between psychology and the theory of knowledge, at first in a neo-Kantian perspective, then within the framework of the program of interdisciplinary research in the thirties. This precocious intersection led them to become interested as much in the unconscious part which works through the process of knowledge, as in the logic of phenomena which are apparently the most irrational. We therefore interpret their works from the thirties and forties as the unveiling of a conjunction of specific forms of social rationalization with the rising of particularly irrational phenomena, especially related to the emergence of fascism. This conjunction then leads to the psychoanalytical thematisation of reason’s self destruction. Our thesis is that by disclosing this singular critical paradigm – which links together the psychoanalytical approach, the critique of reason, and the theory of knowledge – the function attributed to psychoanalysis by these authors can be revealed in a global and coherent fashion: accounting for unreason as an effect of the contradictory logic that the modern capitalist society establishes between nature and history. We can therefore conclude our work by analyzing on what condition a dialectical and critical theory of knowledge is likely to avoid the pitfall that psychoanalysis has allowed to identify at the social level, i.e. the reduction of the relation between history and nature to a relation of domination. In this way, the critical potentials of this paradigm within the framework of contemporary debates on the pathologies of reason can be brought to light.

Esta pesquisa busca compreender o potencial de influência da mídia no processo formativo do ser humano na sociedade contemporânea. A abordagem é filosófica e, por isso, o enfoque priorizado na análise é o estudo da racionalidade nos diferentes períodos analisados. O ponto de partida foi buscar em Platão e Aristóteles a compreensão de Paidéia, pela qual se da a formação humana e do cidadão. Assim, mesmo acontecendo uma distinção entre as esferas pública e privada, a idéia formativa é extensiva aos dois âmbitos, principalmente a pública. No pensamento moderno, especialmente em Rousseau e Kant, a intenção é formar um homem virtuoso que seja ético para a sociedade. A vivência de sua cidadania funda-se em princípios racionais que, assim, exigem o exercício de posturas públicas e coletivas. Na contemporaneidade, a partir de Adorno e Horkheimer, a mídia é o novo elemento de forte influência no processo formativo das pessoas. Assim, racionalidade e mídia passam a se inter-relacionar simbioticamente e, por isso, necessitam ser analisados conjuntamente. Tal simbiose foi avaliada como sendo negativa para o esclarecimento do homem, tanto que a denúncia de Adorno e Horkheimer na Dialética do Esclarecimento apontou de que a racionalidade que sustenta a mídia é a mesma que restringe a ação do ser humano na sociedade. Nesse sentido, a racionalidade transforma-se num instrumento que serve ao interesse do mercado econômico, levando, o homem à barbárie ao invés de conduzi-lo a um estado de humanidade. Habermas avança na reflexão sobre a racionalidade, abandona a filosofia centrada no sujeito e desenvolve uma racionalidade comunicativa, a partir de uma filosofia da linguagem. O caráter discursivo dado à razão clarifica a influência da mídia na medida em que ele desenvolve, na sua teoria, as diferentes formas da racionalidade acontecer na sociedade contemporânea: a estratégica, normativa, dramatúrgica e a comunicativa que leva ao entendimento. São explicitações importantes que ajudam a compreender o potencial formativo da mídia e a dinâmica de como ela se alicerça na sociedade. Assim, a racionalidade estratégica e a comunicativa que leva ao entendimento apresentam-se no mundo do sistema e no mundo da vida, respectivamente. A partir desse fundamento teórico habermasiano pode-se compreender o processo midiático como acontecendo na esfera pública em forma de visibilidade e discursividade. Concretamente isso significa ter um instrumental de análise que possibilita compreender com mais lucidez os diferentes diálogos que resultam da inter-relação entre mídia e sociedade. Compreender a mídia na sua expressão em forma de visibilidade e discursividade possibilita uma reflexão mais ampla, profunda e lúcida em torno do papel que essa instituição desempenha na contemporaneidade ocidental e principalmente brasileira no processo formativo.

This work attempts to confront certain political problems created by the individualistic bias in psychoanalytic thinking, and the resulting failure to adequately theorise the importance of social processes. The thesis traces the origins of intrapsychic thinking to Freud's initial move from the seduction theory to the Oedipal theory. This development is offered as a prototype for the debates between conceptualisations of childhood traumatisation as a social problem of actual abuse occurring within dermed power relations, and theories which locate pathology purely within internal conflicts occurring inside the individual. Several criticisms of this shift are offered, and it s impact on later theory is considered. Here a contrast is offered between the theoretical approaches of Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott, arguing for the usefulness of Winnicott's emphasis on environmental factors within psychodynamic theory. The impact of these theoretical approaches is illustrated through a critical evaluation of Freud's case study of Judge Schreber. Additional historical material is brought in to show the importance of environmental considerations ignored by Freud, and contrasting psychodynamic readings of the case are offered. As an alternative to purely intrapsychic approaches, a reinterpretation of certain strands of Critical Theory is then presented. Adorno's theory of the Authoritarian Personality and Marcuse' s concept of One-Dimensional Man are extended using Winnicott's formulations concerning psychological development. This leads to an examination of the question of the relationship between social structure and individual consciousness. Post-structuralist accounts of language and the construction of identity are explored. These are then developed drawing on theories of ideology, language and consciousness, integrating these with Winnicott's developmental theory to offer an alternative psychodynamic understanding of the relationship between social process and psychopathology. An attempt is made to reformulate - the notions of consciousness and the unconscious in terms of the possibilities and difficulties of representation within available social symbolic codes. In conclusion the it is argued that psychology needs to integrate critical social theory and contemporary understandings of the social construction of consciousness in order to become a meaning force in positive social transformation.

Esta pesquisa busca compreender o potencial de influência da mídia no processo formativo do ser humano na sociedade contemporânea. A abordagem é filosófica e, por isso, o enfoque priorizado na análise é o estudo da racionalidade nos diferentes períodos analisados. O ponto de partida foi buscar em Platão e Aristóteles a compreensão de Paidéia, pela qual se da a formação humana e do cidadão. Assim, mesmo acontecendo uma distinção entre as esferas pública e privada, a idéia formativa é extensiva aos dois âmbitos, principalmente a pública. No pensamento moderno, especialmente em Rousseau e Kant, a intenção é formar um homem virtuoso que seja ético para a sociedade. A vivência de sua cidadania funda-se em princípios racionais que, assim, exigem o exercício de posturas públicas e coletivas. Na contemporaneidade, a partir de Adorno e Horkheimer, a mídia é o novo elemento de forte influência no processo formativo das pessoas. Assim, racionalidade e mídia passam a se inter-relacionar simbioticamente e, por isso, necessitam ser analisados conjuntamente. Tal simbiose foi avaliada como sendo negativa para o esclarecimento do homem, tanto que a denúncia de Adorno e Horkheimer na Dialética do Esclarecimento apontou de que a racionalidade que sustenta a mídia é a mesma que restringe a ação do ser humano na sociedade. Nesse sentido, a racionalidade transforma-se num instrumento que serve ao interesse do mercado econômico, levando, o homem à barbárie ao invés de conduzi-lo a um estado de humanidade. Habermas avança na reflexão sobre a racionalidade, abandona a filosofia centrada no sujeito e desenvolve uma racionalidade comunicativa, a partir de uma filosofia da linguagem. O caráter discursivo dado à razão clarifica a influência da mídia na medida em que ele desenvolve, na sua teoria, as diferentes formas da racionalidade acontecer na sociedade contemporânea: a estratégica, normativa, dramatúrgica e a comunicativa que leva ao entendimento. São explicitações importantes que ajudam a compreender o potencial formativo da mídia e a dinâmica de como ela se alicerça na sociedade. Assim, a racionalidade estratégica e a comunicativa que leva ao entendimento apresentam-se no mundo do sistema e no mundo da vida, respectivamente. A partir desse fundamento teórico habermasiano pode-se compreender o processo midiático como acontecendo na esfera pública em forma de visibilidade e discursividade. Concretamente isso significa ter um instrumental de análise que possibilita compreender com mais lucidez os diferentes diálogos que resultam da inter-relação entre mídia e sociedade. Compreender a mídia na sua expressão em forma de visibilidade e discursividade possibilita uma reflexão mais ampla, profunda e lúcida em torno do papel que essa instituição desempenha na contemporaneidade ocidental e principalmente brasileira no processo formativo.

The thesis deals with the contemporary topic of cognitive deficit present by schizophrenic people. It introduces the subjective point of view of the patients in more detail, which means the experience of deficits in the cognitive area. The text itself consists, as usual, of the theoretical and the research section. The theoretical section deals with the specifics of cognitive functions and their deficits present by schizophrenic patients. It focuses more closely on the subjective point of view of an individual, the impairment-related experience which follows from the impaired cognitive functions. The thesis pursues also the impact of cognitive impairment on an individual's life. A part of the theoretical section is also dedicated to the tools designated to measure cognitive functions. The major subpart is dedicated to self-evaluating tool entitled Frankfurt Complaint Questionnaire (FCQ), concerning primarily its origin, description and psychometric properties. The research section is based on the usage of the Czech translation of the FCQ in practice. Based on an observation of a sample of 53 individuals diagnosed with F20.0 and 53 healthy people, the psychometric qualities of the FCQ (discriminant validity, Cronbach's alpha, test-retest reliability) were examined. In case of patients diagnosed with...

Currently the most influential accounts of personal autonomy, at least in the Englishspeaking world, focus on providing conditions under which agents can be said to exercise self-control. Two distinct accounts of personal autonomy have emerged in this tradition: firstly, hierarchical models grounded in the work of Harry Frankfurt; and secondly, systems division models most famously articulated by Gary Watson. In this thesis I show the inadequacies of both of these models by exploring the problematic views of the self and self-control underlying each model. I will suggest that the problems faced by these models stem from the fact that they endorse a problematic fragmentation of the self. I suggest that a Nietzschean account of personal autonomy is able to avoid these problems. The Nietzschean account can largely, I show, be drawn from Nietzsche’s understanding of both the ‘man of ressentiment’ and his opposite, the sovereign individual. On this picture wholeness of self – rather than fragmentation of the self – is required in order for us to be most fully autonomous. Furthermore, this wholeness of self requires the kind of integrity which is opposed to the problematic fragmentation endorsed by Frankfurt and Watson.

Theodor Adorno’s view of Arnold Schoenberg can be seen in light of his criticism of Immanuel Kant. Critiquing Kant’s concept of Enlightenment and his dualist philosophy, Adorno also critiques common misconceptions about Kant's work in bourgeois society. Similarly, in Schoenberg's oeuvre Adorno finds radical musical creation but also a reversion to formulaic composition in its reception by Richard Hill among others. In both Kant and Schoenberg, Adorno identifies a tripartite movement: (1) A radical work (philosophical or musical) is created by a member of bourgeois society. (2) The work adopts the function of a societal critique. (3) However, bourgeois society is incapable of understanding the work as critique and erases its radical nature. Seen in light of Adorno's thought, the thesis explores the transactional nature of idea production and reception in society.

No description available.

In this thesis ”The Dialectics of Technology: Ambivalences and Ruptures in Herbert Marcuses’ Philosophy of Technology” I present a thorough analysis of Herbert Marcuses’philosophy of technology as it developed from the late 1940s until his death in 1979. Whereas, previous studies have tried to reduce his philosophy of technology to one coherent project, I argue that his philosophy of technology is characterised by ambivalences and ruptures and therefore cannot be reduced to such a coherent totality. Marcuses’ philosophy of technology vacillates between what I, with Andrew Feenbergs’ concepts, callan instrumentalist and substantialist notion of technology. An instrumentalist notion is one where technology is understood merely as a tool to be wielded by external actors, in Marcuses’ case that of the capitalist class and the state. In contrast to this, Marcuse also precents a substantialist philosophy of technology, where it is imbued with its own agency and direction.The previous scholarship has largely reduced Marcuses’ philosophy to one of these positions, rather than emphasising how both of them are present through out the text. Furthermore, I argue that his substantialist understanding of technology itself is characterised by ruptures and ambivalences, where technology is viewed both as inherently emancipatory and as inherently subjugating. It is in regard to this duality I argue that his philosophy of technology should be understood as dialectical, in the sense that technology at the same time can be a central part of human subjection and one of the most important vehicles for emancipation. In relation to this, I agree with Samir Gandesha that one of the most fruitful directions Marcuses’ philosophy opens is an understanding of technology as bearer of a historical substance, that is to say that technology is imbued with certain goals, desires and world-views beyond those of the wielder, while at the same time understanding that this substance can be changed through historical processes. Beyond the more exegetic presentation of Marcuses’ philosophy and the critique against the previous scholarship, I argue for critical theory, and especially Marcuses’, relevance for current debates around technology and automation. In the current debates between left wing accelerationist cheerleaders of technology and those radicals more sceptical of technologies emancipatory potential, an investigation into the nature of technology itself is severely lacking. While, the former uncritically embraces the technology arisen in capitalist society and views it as a direct path towards a utopian post-scarcity communism,the latter solely focuses on technology as a tool of capitalist class power. In relation to this, I argue that the historical and dialectical understanding of technology that can be salvaged from Marcuses oeuvre would be a welcome and useful addition to the debate.

No description available.