Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Reissued 5 May 2017 with typographic corrections to degree, abstract. / Broadly, this thesis argues that success in Afghanistan—for Afghans and their neighbors alike—entails establishing state-building measures, supremacy of law and human rights, rapid economic growth, and strong Afghan National Security Forces who can encourage the Afghan public to accept the practices of stable democracy and good neighborly relations. To fix some of the myriad variables in Afghanistan's likely state in 2026, which will mark the end of the transformation decade following the U.S. withdrawal in 2016, the proposed project installs three hypothetical scenarios: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly. These scenarios do not predict the future in Afghanistan but rather shed light on the factors and variables that will shape the postwar period. Examining such scenarios may allow strategic planners to develop alternative measures for complex situations. Sustained political stability and the will to reform by the Afghan establishment, fortified by consistent international financial and military support for at least 10 to 15 or more years, would likely be the key to success in the Afghanistan end game. Otherwise, Afghanistan will slip back into a situation much like the one that emerged once after the Soviet withdrawal—extremism, war, and instability. The scenarios are developed by examining several factors: the criticality of the Afghan issue throughout history; Afghanistan's indigenous facts and prospects; Pak–Afghan cross-interests and policy dimensions; Global War on Terror implications; conflicting interests; and regional and extra-regional politics. / Commander, Pakistan Navy

Notre travail comprend trois parties. La première analyse et présente les constructions géopolitiques remarquables qui ponctuent la dynamique des métamorphoses géopolitiques de l’Europe à partir de 1945 sous leurs aspects socio-géopolitiques. Du TCECA au Traité de Lisbonne en passant par le TCEE et le TUE, l’UE ne parvient pas toujours à se hisser au niveau d’une politie européenne intégrale. Les barrières mythiques ne ce cessent de gangréner son cheminement.Avec la seconde partie nous établissons la courbe infinitésimale représentative des nouvelles mutations géopolitiques de l’Europe qui montre jusqu’où les barrières mythiques empêchent l’UE à bondir au-delà de l’asymptote de paix perpétuelle. Avec les catastrophes élémentaires, de la collision des attracteurs géopolitiques et des réseaux sociaux, il ressort que le flux de l’âme européenne qui, une fois, bien structurée pourrait apporter à L’Europe beaucoup plus de cohésion et de cohérence nécessaires pour franchir les barrières mythiques.Dans la troisième partie, avec l’échelle des puissances géopolitiques internationales, nous trouvons que l’UE ne constitue qu’une puissance M+. Partant, nous proposons les attributs nécessaires pour faire muer l’UE, d’une puissance M+, en une politie européenne intégrale, puissance géopolitique internationale intelligente et positive. / Our work falls into three parts. The first part analyzes and presents the remarkable geopolitical constructions which punctuate the dynamic of European geopolitical metamorphosis since 1945. Since T ESCS to the Treaty of Lisbon via the TEEC and the TEU, the EU doesn’t always manage to heave up level of a European integral politie. It is situated somewhere between the trans-politie and the politie. The mythic fences do not stop to gangrene it path. With the second part, we establish the representative infinitesimal curb of that new process of European geopolitical mutations which demonstrate how far the mythic fences stop the EU to bond beyond the asymptote of perpetual peace. With the elementary catastrophes, since the collision of geopolitical attractors and social networks, it emerge the flux of European soul which once well structured should bring to Europe much more coherence and cohesion necessary to cross the mythic barriers.In the third part, with the scale of international geopolitical powers, we see the EU as only an M+ power. Consequently, we propose the necessary attributes so that EU can change from M+ into an integral European politie as an international geopolitical power, clever and positive.

Este trabalho versa sobre o pensamento geopolítico argentino entre 1910 e 1945. Neste país, a Geopolítica se desenvolveu dentro de uma estrutura plurinucleada marcada pelo dissenso quanto ao que se entendia ser os objetivos nacionais. Apresenta-se, aqui, um exercício comparativo das ideias do vice-almirante Segundo Rosa Storni (1876-1954) e do embaixador, filiado à União Cívica Radical, Horacio Carrillo (1887- 1955). A partir da leitura da literatura geopolítica desses autores representativos, se objetivou avaliar qual das concepções analisadas encontrou condições de desenvolvimento dentro do cenário em questão. A proposição que defendemos como tese é que, apesar de ser mais citado nos manuais como o principal geopolítico argentino, as ideias insulares de Storni foram superadas pelas ideias continentais de Carrillo. O projeto storniano de uma sociedade marítima não frutificou por conta da insuficiência econômica e territorial do país, dos objetivos continentais de sua política externa e da melhor aceitação das ideias continentais enquanto concepção de mundo. Com esses resultados, nós esperamos lançar luz sobre a gênese da geopolítica argentina, que é estudada amiúde em um estágio de evolução mais elevado, que é o segundo pós guerra. Usando o pensamento geopolítico brasileiro como base de comparação, nós apresentamos conclusões importantes para a compreensão do pensamento geopolítico brasileiro do mesmo período. Neste particular, verifica-se a correlação direta das ideias de Horacio Carrillo com a cosmovisão de Mário Travassos (1891-1973). Isso se dá pelo significado estratégico atribuído, pelos dois autores, à integração física e à visão comum das cidades estratégicas do interior do continente. / This work is about the Argentine geopolitical thought between 1910 and 1945. In this country, Geopolitics has been developed into a polynuclear structure characterized by the disagreement with respect to what was understood as national objectives. We present an exercise of comparison between the ideas from the vice-admiral Segundo Rosa Storni (1876-1954) and the ambassador, filliated to the Radical Civic Union, Horacio Carrillo (1887-1955). From readings of geopolitical works from both representative authors, we aim to evaluate which conception has found conditions of developing in that scenario. Our proposition is that, despite of being more cited in manuals such as the main Argentine geopolitical, the insular ideas of Storni were overcame by the Carrillos continental ideas. Stornis project of a marine society has not fruited due to the economic and territorial scarcity of the country, the continental goals of his foreign policy and the better acceptance of the continental ideas as conception of world. With this result, we expect to shed light on the genesis of the Argentine geopolitics, which is often studied in a more elevated stage, the second post-war. Using the Brazilian geopolitical thought as basis of comparison, we present important conclusions for the understanding of the Brazilian geopolitical thought the same time. In this respect, we verified that there is a direct correlation between the ideas from Horacio Carrillo and the cosmovision from Mário Travassos (1891-1973). This point of view can be explained by the fact that both authors gave strategic significance to physical integration and the common vision of strategic cities in the countryside.

Depuis 2012, le Mali est confronté à une rébellion des minorités touarègues menée par les insurgés du MNLA (mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad) et leurs alliées du MAA (Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad) et du HCUA (Haut conseil pour l’unicité de l’Azawad) ; tous, regoupés au sein de la CMA (Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad). Ainsi, les parties nord du pays (Azawad : objet de revendication pour une autonomie ou pour une indépendance) ont servi de lieux d’affrontements les plus meurtriers entre l’armée malienne et les insurgés. Grâce à une coalition MNLA-AQMI (Al Qaïda au Maghreb islamique) et alliés (narcotrafiquants, An Sar Dine, etc.), ils ont défait l’armée malienne et occupé les territoires revendiqués avant d’être chassé à leur tour les terroristes. Cependant, si, les interventions française (de l’Opération Serval) et africaine depuis janvier 2012 ont mis un frein à l’offensive des terroristes et libérer les grandes villes du Nord, elles n’ont pas mis fin à la guerre qui oppose rebelles et soldats maliens qui continuent jusqu’au mois de mai 2015. Malgré les pourparlers d’Alger (entamés depuis début 2015), les insurgés qui occupent toujours la ville de Kidal, poursuivent leur revendication d’un statut juridique et politique pour l’Azawad. De manière générale, la présente rébellion est une suite logique des précédentes (des années 60, 90 et 2000). Elles émanent d’un malaise de certaines communautés arabo-touarègues manifesté par la mauvaise gouvernance et la marginalisation dont celles-ci pensent avoir subi. Ce mal être des insurgés résulte aussi de la part de l’héritage des rapports difficiles et conflictuels entre nomades et sédentaires, entre « noirs » et « blancs », entre maîtres et esclaves, entre assujettis et « seigneurs ». Aussi, la crise du Sahel a aggravé l’enclavement et l’isolement du Mali-Nord, notamment de l’Azawad, et accentué le sentiment d’être oublié. Elle a desserré et distendu les liens d’avec le reste du Mali « utile ». Toutefois, le soulèvement de 2012 n’a pas entraîné toutes les communautés de l’Azawad dont les rebelles supposent défendre ou parler en leur nom. Il intervient également dans un contexte de soulèvements populaires dans certains Etats arabo-berbères (« printemps arabe » pour les médias), notamment en Libye (guerre civile, puis, la chute de Kadafi). De nombreux combattants touaregs de l’armée libyenne ont ainsi rejoint (avec armes) les rangs du MNLA. / Since 2012, Mali ha been facing a rebellion of the Tuareg minority-led insurgents MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) and allied MAA (Arab Movement of Azawad) and HCUA (High Council for the Uniqueness of Azawad); all together within the CMA (Coordination of movements of Azawad). Thus, the northern parts of the country (Azawad claim object for autonomy or independence) have served as scene of the deadliest clashes between the Malian army and the insurgents. Through MNLA-AQIM coalition (Al Qaeda in Islamic Magrheb) and allies (drug traffickers, An Sar Dine, etc.), they defeated the Malian army and have occupied territories claimed before have being chased in turn terrorists. However, if the French and African’s intervention (Operation Serval) since January 2012 have curbed the terrorist offensive and freed the major cities of the North but, they have not ended the war between rebels and Malian soldiers continue until May 2015. Despite the Algiers talks (started since early 2015), the insurgents who still occupy the city of Kidal, continue to claim a legal and political status for Azawad. In general, this rebellion is a logical continuation of insurrections (1960, 1990 and 2000). These rebellions erupted because certain Arab and Tuareg communities feel discontented and they have suffered from poor governance and marginalization. The insurgent unrest also results from the legacy of difficult and conflicting relations between nomads and settled, between "black" and "white", between masters and slaves, and between subjects and "lords". Also, the Sahel crisis have aggravated the isolation of North Mali (particularly Azawad) and accentuated the feeling of being forgotten. It has stretched and distended the bonds of the rest of "useful" Mali. However, all the communities’ Azawad didn’t participate in the 2012 uprising therefore rebels cannot defend or speak for them. It also comes amid popular uprisings in some Arab-Berber States ("Arab Spring" for the media), especially in Libya (civil war, then the fall of Kadafi). Many Tuareg fighters of the Libyan army joined (with then weapons) the ranks of the MNLA.

Este trabalho versa sobre o pensamento geopolítico argentino entre 1910 e 1945. Neste país, a Geopolítica se desenvolveu dentro de uma estrutura plurinucleada marcada pelo dissenso quanto ao que se entendia ser os objetivos nacionais. Apresenta-se, aqui, um exercício comparativo das ideias do vice-almirante Segundo Rosa Storni (1876-1954) e do embaixador, filiado à União Cívica Radical, Horacio Carrillo (1887- 1955). A partir da leitura da literatura geopolítica desses autores representativos, se objetivou avaliar qual das concepções analisadas encontrou condições de desenvolvimento dentro do cenário em questão. A proposição que defendemos como tese é que, apesar de ser mais citado nos manuais como o principal geopolítico argentino, as ideias insulares de Storni foram superadas pelas ideias continentais de Carrillo. O projeto storniano de uma sociedade marítima não frutificou por conta da insuficiência econômica e territorial do país, dos objetivos continentais de sua política externa e da melhor aceitação das ideias continentais enquanto concepção de mundo. Com esses resultados, nós esperamos lançar luz sobre a gênese da geopolítica argentina, que é estudada amiúde em um estágio de evolução mais elevado, que é o segundo pós guerra. Usando o pensamento geopolítico brasileiro como base de comparação, nós apresentamos conclusões importantes para a compreensão do pensamento geopolítico brasileiro do mesmo período. Neste particular, verifica-se a correlação direta das ideias de Horacio Carrillo com a cosmovisão de Mário Travassos (1891-1973). Isso se dá pelo significado estratégico atribuído, pelos dois autores, à integração física e à visão comum das cidades estratégicas do interior do continente. / This work is about the Argentine geopolitical thought between 1910 and 1945. In this country, Geopolitics has been developed into a polynuclear structure characterized by the disagreement with respect to what was understood as national objectives. We present an exercise of comparison between the ideas from the vice-admiral Segundo Rosa Storni (1876-1954) and the ambassador, filliated to the Radical Civic Union, Horacio Carrillo (1887-1955). From readings of geopolitical works from both representative authors, we aim to evaluate which conception has found conditions of developing in that scenario. Our proposition is that, despite of being more cited in manuals such as the main Argentine geopolitical, the insular ideas of Storni were overcame by the Carrillos continental ideas. Stornis project of a marine society has not fruited due to the economic and territorial scarcity of the country, the continental goals of his foreign policy and the better acceptance of the continental ideas as conception of world. With this result, we expect to shed light on the genesis of the Argentine geopolitics, which is often studied in a more elevated stage, the second post-war. Using the Brazilian geopolitical thought as basis of comparison, we present important conclusions for the understanding of the Brazilian geopolitical thought the same time. In this respect, we verified that there is a direct correlation between the ideas from Horacio Carrillo and the cosmovision from Mário Travassos (1891-1973). This point of view can be explained by the fact that both authors gave strategic significance to physical integration and the common vision of strategic cities in the countryside.

Depuis plusieurs années, un nombre non négligeable d’Etats africains, sont confrontés à la problématique de la remise en cause des acquis démocratiques. Aussi, en 2008, l’actualité politique de la Mauritanie et la Guinée est-elle secouée par les coups d’Etat qui ont lieu respectivement en août et décembre. Au fil des jours qui s’égrènent, ces deux Etats entrent dans une crise politique avec un air de guerre larvé. La communauté internationale porte une attention particulière à l’évolution de ces derniers, d’autant plus qu’ils font partie, pour la Mauritanie, de la zone sahélosaharienne, et pour la Guinée, de la sous-région ouest-africaine, deux espaces géographiques en proie à l’instabilité. Ainsi, conformément aux dispositions prévues par le droit international, la communauté internationale au nom desquelles l’Union Africaine, la CÉDÉAO, la France et les Etats-Unis, s’implique afin de conduire le processus de sortie de crise dans chaque pays. La présente thèse investit de ce fait les contours de cet interventionnisme étranger, tout en mettant en lumière les facteurs déclencheurs sousjacent de ces deux crises politiques. Ce faisant, nous examinons les principes et enjeux fondamentaux régissant cette ingérence. Une dynamique qui, dans sa globalité, permet d’apprécier les postures contrastées adoptées par les acteurs étrangers face à chaque putschiste / Over many years, numerous African States are facing serious issues due to the reappraisal or challenges of their so called democratic political system. Also, in the year 2008, the existing political conditions in both Mauritania and Guinea were destroyed by a coup d'état known as coup (e.g., putsch, or an overthrow), respectively in August and December of the same year; And over the days, these two states entered into political crisis considered as implying actions to be taken or steps toward civil war. The international community is highly considering these above mentions two states, for they are respectively parts the very geographical spaces threatened by constant instability such as the Sahel-Saharan zone (e.g., Mauritania) and the west-African sub-region (e.g., Guinea). In accordance with regulations and provisions by international law, we could acknowledge the involvement of the international community amongst the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), France and the United States, in order to lead the post-crisis process in each country. This thesis endeavors to investigate all the aspects with respect of these foreign interventionists, while highlighting the factors that trigger off these two political crises. Meanwhile, this thesis contributes to examine the principles and fundamental stakeholders of this external interference from these countries. Hence, the overall system, allows understanding the versatility of external forces or foreign actors standing out each coup d'état or "stroke of state"

This paper examines the capital - asset pricing model (CAPM) which has been extended with a factor for geo-political risk. I use monthly stock return data for all stocks listed on a major US exchange from January 1990 to December 2016 and utilize a Fama-Macbeth Regression with Newey-West standard errors to test the geo-political augmented Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. The paper first determines if increased sensitivity to geopolitical risk lead s to lower average returns and second assesses if geo-political risk as an explanatory variable is a significant enough to expose a failure of the CAPM to capture expected returns fully through beta. The results of our regressions do not confirm the hypothesis that firms with high sensitivities to geo-political risk have expressly different returns in the long run. Furthermore, our Fama-Macbeth regression does not find expressly significant average slopes for geo-political risk as a variable.

The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate a new empirical and systemic geopolitical approach to the study of the ongoing territorial dispute in the Arctic resulting from the desire of two nation states, Denmark and Russia, to extend their own northernmost limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone to the central part of the Arctic Ocean. This approach combines geographic, legal and political analytical perspectives with quantitative research design to produce an inter-disciplinary study. Empirical evidence on the long-term socio-geographic development in the region (1993-2013) is provided together with information on particular territorial gains and losses for all decision-makers that arise in a number of potential scenarios (options). Variation in each decision-maker's aggregate national socio-geographic resource, as implied by particular territorial modifications in the central part of the Arctic Ocean, serves as a basis for derivation of nontrivial payoffs on each option in the dispute. These payoffs are introduced into a three-player graph model for conflict resolution (Denmark, Russia, and the World) and stable dispute solutions are suggested on the basis of different combinations of decision-makers' strategies, whose optimality is evaluated as well. Finally, alternative scenarios of...

This particular work deals with the process of expansion by the North Atlantic Alliance in view of the theory of balance of power and the relationship between Russia and NATO. The author of the work draws on assumption that NATO's expansions, that have followed the end of the cold war, strengthen NATO's might, to which Russia must react to counter the growing power of the potential adversary. This work is divided into two main thematic parts. The first part regards the three waves of the expansion which followed the breakup of the Soviet Union (1999, 2004, and 2009); therein, the author analyzes NATO's strengthening on the military, political and geopolitical levels. The second part of the work is devoted to unveiling of Russia's potential counterbalancing steps. The Russian attempt to counterbalance the NATO's moves, of course, has also been analyzed within three frames - military, political and geopolitical. The analysis of the counterbalancing by Russia, as well as the strengthening of NATO is presented within the frame defined by five year periods. To facilitate the theoretical view, the power counterbalancing analyses has been divided into, so called, "Hard balancing" and "Soft balancing". Because the end of the bipolar conflict contributed to substantial changes in international political...

The aim of my work is to apply the political-geographical or geopolitical optics to a specific foreign security activities of the EU, i.e. to put political aims and activities of political-geographical framework. In geopolitical terms, it is necessary to assess the potential and the current deployment of civilian missions. For this purpose, in accordance with the hypothesis of my work, that the civilian aspects of crisis management CSDP are based mainly on the willingness and desire of Member States in a given area or country involved should be analyzed for the three major priorities of Member States (UK, Germany and France) in civilian areas (see National Security Strategy). The work compares the current activities of EU civil security-CSDP and geopolitical intentions of the three great European powers, Germany, France and Great Britain. Civilian CSDP should concentrate in geographic areas that are of key importance to most member states and especially for three large powers. The question is whether the major European powers reflect their priorities in EU policy in its entirety or whether there are other factors that prevent them from doing so. Such factors include decisions based on consensus and the growing power of the European Commission, which defends its interests very hard in the CSDP. Large Member...