The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) has led to significant changes in the business environment and academic discussions. AI boosts productivity and positively impacts the competitive advantage of organisations. However, it also has its dark sides, such as prejudice, non-transparent processes, and people's fears that AI will be able to take their jobs in the future. The successful implementation of AI in organisations depends on several factors, including geopolitical, cultural, ecosystem, organisational, and individual factors. Geopolitical context and cultural differences can play an important role in the adoption and implementation of AI in organisations. This study examines the influence of geopolitical and cultural contexts on the decision-making process for the adoption and implementation of AI by managers from the fashion retail industry in Sweden and India. Given the extensive scope of these contexts, the authors narrowed their focus on specific factors. In the cultural context, the authors consider selected dimensions of the GLOBE project that reflect national culture. Within the Geopolitical context, particular attention is given to aspects such as data access and control, as well as the regulatory framework. In the course of this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted, and additional secondary data was studied. The study showed that the specifics of data access and control, as well as governmental legislative regulation, directly affect the decision-making process regarding the adoption and implementation of AI. As for the cultural context, here the degree of influence is heterogeneous, and decision-making on the implementation of AI is not always subject to the direct influence of the national cultural factors.

By looking at the reactions of Russian actors regarding the development of the Belt and Road Initiative of the People’s Republic of China in Central and Eastern Europe, this dissertation presents new theoretical and empirical findings that can be used extensively in the fields of Area and Global Studies, as well as practical policymaking. In this context, the Russian Federation’s foreign policy in the region is understood as cumulative activity and strategy developed by the government of Russia regarding the relationship with other countries that are being impacted by multiple internal and external factors. In order to understand a complex relationship between Russian, Chinese, and Central-Eastern European actors, this study employs uniquely created methods focusing on analyzing the reactions of the relevant Russian policymakers, as well as literature, documents, and statistical data. The reactions are also collected via extensive reflection of interviews and primary source material. In this framework, the areas of Russian interests directly related to and operationalized in Central-Eastern Europe are identified, and those affected by the Belt and Road Initiative the most are researched. The study’s results highlight the many discourses and contradictions when contrasting portrayal and perceptions against statistical data. Since none of these areas were analyzed under these circumstances before, many characterizations about the nature of the Initiative, perception of the actors’ behavior, understanding of the positioning of Russia within contemporary geopolitical realities, and many other aspects have been broadened. That leads to a better comprehension of the mechanisms and networks between the companies and political actors based in the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, and Central-Eastern Europe, the effects of their interdependencies and relationship, and general international relations. This research demonstrated a tension of interests within the Russian expert community when assigning securitization to the Belt and Road Initiative sections that affect Russia and East-Central Europe. They are recognized as intertwined with internal politics, economics, geopolitical competitiveness, and international strategy and are thus appropriately employed when reacting to and debating them.

本論文的問題意識在於，中國是否將與其古代帝國一樣，在力量強大時追求以武力或其他強制手段達成戰略目標，並試圖建立以其為核心的東亞勢力範圍與國際秩序，結果導致升高與周邊國家甚至美國在內的其他亞太強國的緊張關係與衝突發生機率，與其所宣稱的「和平發展/崛起」、「和諧世界」不符。 中國戰略菁英繼承了帝國時代遺留下來的天下觀、內政導向戰略文化與陸權性格等地緣戰略遺產。同時，缺乏海軍戰略傳統的中國也在1950年代從同為大陸強國的蘇聯之處承接了19、20世紀的法國、德國、蘇聯等歐陸國家發展出來的以劣抗優的大陸國家縱深防禦海軍戰略與積極防禦艦隊海戰戰略。這些遺產與當代外來海軍戰略共同促成了中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略。 在中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略中，古代天下觀在當代因為中國的國力迅速發展與中國戰略菁英的自信加強，而逐漸形成強調中國制度與文化優越性的新「中國中心主義」。此一新中國中心主義配合中國追求實現其領土主權聲索的現代「九州一統」周邊地緣政治密碼，壓倒日本、印度、東協等區域競爭對手，組織以其為核心的東亞地緣戰略領域的區域地緣政治密碼，以及中國自冷戰時期起就發展出的追求全球體系多極化與建立國際政治經濟新秩序，和在冷戰後希望消除美國於東亞的影響力，追求將亞太地緣政治次體系轉變為美中並立兩極結構的體系/次體系地緣政治密碼，使得中國難以成為一個維持現狀的國家。而中國的內政導向戰略文化雖然強調對內優先於對外，但其實際上具備相當重視權力政治與武力在國際事務中效用的強現實政治特徵和備戰本質。而中國的陸權性格與從蘇聯繼承而來的陸權式海洋地緣戰略，使當代中國的地緣戰略重心與方向皆位於東亞大陸與周邊海域，並未真正跨出亞太邊緣地區，只是將西太平洋的島鏈作為海上長城、島鏈周圍的海洋作為新的資源開發地區與戰略緩衝區，以此區隔與美國在亞太的勢力範圍，並按照安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作來組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域。 本論文認為中國擴大參與東亞整合的原因，只是為了因應目前其實力尚無法獨力以軍事、政治等強制性手段完成組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域的戰略目的的間接戰略運用，目的是藉此極大化中國的利益，並取得東亞整合的主導權。中國並無意在傳統安全議題與領土爭端和周邊國家與其他亞太主要強國妥協，並利用多邊傳統安全國際建制達成地緣政治安排，促成亞太地緣政治均衡。中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略雖然限於中國的海上戰略交通線控制能力，最終目的並不在取代美國成為體系中的新海權，但卻能嚴重威脅美國的海權地位，以及其他亞太主要強國和中國周邊中小型濱海國家的地緣政治利益。因此安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作除了在北線地緣之外，皆激起其他次體系主要大國與東協的競爭性權力平衡反應。此種戰略反饋又使中國增強本身的競爭性權力平衡作為，難以形成達成均衡必要的協作性權力平衡。因此，中國的地緣戰略仍是傳統爭奪控制戰略交通線與要地的類型，不是為了追求和諧世界與地緣政治均衡的新類型，故無法促進目前不存在均衡的亞太地緣政治次體系達成均衡，反而可能升高與周邊國家甚至美國的衝突機率。 但是，中國受制於本身有限的戰略交通線控制能力，目前仍無法形成其他次體系主要強國真正的傳統安全威脅，更為了繼續實施經濟建設，必須盡力維持周邊國際環境的穩定。其他亞太主要強國為了繼續藉由與中國的交往獲得的龐大經濟利益，在中國還未成為真正戰略威脅的情況下，亦不願意真正與中國敵對，導致亞太地緣政治次體系的局勢將逐漸走向中國與海洋國家之間政治上經常引發緊張關係，但其他方面互動熱絡，不致立即引發武裝衝突危機的「冷和平」狀態，無法形成真正的地緣政治均衡。 關鍵字：中國、亞太地緣政治次體系、權力平衡、地緣政治均衡、地緣政治密碼、戰略文化、地緣戰略 / The research question of this dissertation is that whether China might seek to apply coercive measures to create an East Asia Geostrategic Realm and to dominate the turf by itself, which just like what pre-modern China’s Empires did. Because of the increasing possibility of armed conflicts between China and other regional powers, including the United States, these measures will put the international security of the Asia-Pacific region in jeopardy. Furthermore, this is not according to what China’s claim on “peaceful development/rising” or the so-called “harmonious world.” Modern Chinese strategic elites inherit three main geo-strategic legacies such as the Chinese traditional concept of “Tianxia” (天下觀), domestic-oriented strategic culture, and national land-power nature in China’s history. China also receives the European thought of continental-oriented naval strategy from the Soviet Union while Maoist China built its navy which supported by the Soviet’s help in the 1950s. These legacies and foreign naval strategic thought not only shape modern China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy,” but also affect the nature, gravity, directions, and the major operations of the geo-strategy. Base on China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization, the self-confidential Chinese elites gradually transform the traditional concept of Tianxia into the new “Sino-centricism,” which stress on the superiority of China’s culture and politico-economic systems. In terms of the geopolitical codes of modern China, they pursue the realization of territorial claims for the purpose of “union” on the local level; overwhelming the competitions of leadership in East Asia from Japan, India, and the ASEAN for creating a Chinese-dominated East Asian Geostrategic Realm on the regional level; pursuing multi-polarization of the international system and, establishing new international politico-economic orders on the systemic level, and dispel the influence of United States in East Asia by transforming the Asia-Pacific geopolitical structure into a bipolarity on the sub-systemic level. Over all, these three levels of geopolitical codes and the new “Sino-centricism” would not make China be a status-quo power in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. Additionally, with regard to the domestic-oriented strategic culture, although it stresses the priority of domestics, it also values power politics and the effectiveness of forces in the international politics. The domestic-oriented strategic culture of China, therefore, has the strong characteristics of hard “realpolitik” and “parabellum”. China’s traditional land-power nature aside, its continental-oriented naval strategy is developed from the thought of the Soviet naval strategy and put the gravity and directions of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” in East Asian continent. China does not go beyond the “Asia-Pacific Rim” actually. What China does is using the “two island-chain” defense in West Pacific as a “Great Wall at Sea,” and the seas around the island chains as strategic buffer zone to distinguish the sphere of influence between China and the United States. China applies the strategic principles of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast” to organize the region in the west of the island chains and shaping its dominance in the East Asian Geostrategic Realm. The dissertation argues that since China cannot organize the East Asian Strategic Realm by political and military means at present, China’s participations in East Asian integrations are indirect strategic behavior. The purposes of indirect approaches are to utilize China’s economic interests and to obtain the leadership of East Asian integrations. China would not like to compromise with its neighbors and other Asia-Pacific Powers on highly sensitive traditional security issues, like territorial disputes essentially. Nor does China attempt to shape multi-pole geopolitical arrangements to achieve the geopolitical equilibrium of Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Sub-system by applying multi-pole international regimes. Furthermore, the purpose of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” is not to replace the United States as the Sea Power in the system just because China lacks the ability of controlling global strategic sea lines of communications. The Chinese naval strategy of active layer defense can still seriously threaten the Sea Power status of the United States and the important geopolitical interests of China’s neighbors. Therefore, the implementations of aforesaid geo-strategy of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast,” seriously raise “adversary balance of power” in both West and Southeast fronts due to the convergences of geopolitical interests between China and other powers. Nevertheless, the adversary balancing feedback of other Asia-Pacific powers and even the ASEAN countries enhance China’s adversary behavior as well. This reciprocal process cannot create the necessary “associational balance of power” of geopolitical equilibrium. In other words, China’s geo-strategy belongs to the “traditional” type, which stresses the importance of controlling strategic communication in the Asia-Pacific region. It is not the “new” type of pursuing “harmonious world” and geopolitical equilibrium. Therefore, China’s geo-strategy cannot advance the equilibrium of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. On the contrary, it may raise the possibility of conflicts between China and Asia-Pacific countries, even the United States. China is not deemed as major traditional threat by other major Asia-Pacific regional powers due to lacking the capabilities of controlling strategic communication of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. China must do its best to maintain the stability of the surrounding international environment to continue its economic development. Other major Asia-Pacific powers would like to obtain huge economic interests by engaging with China. As a result, the security of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system will gradually develop into a “cold peace” situation, but not the situation of geopolitical equilibrium. The “cold peace” is a situation not only can fill with geopolitical tensions between China and other major Asia-Pacific powers, but also can interact closely with each other on social, economic, cultural and other dimensions, which prevent the crisis of the outbreak of immediate armed conflicts in the region. Key Words: China, Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Subsystem, Balance of Power, Geopolitical Equilibrium, Geopolitical Code, Strategic Culture, Geo-strategy

La crise de Suez de 1956 est avant tout synonyme d'une opération militaire menée par les Français et les Anglais, dont l'échec retentissant a sonné le glas de la politique colonialiste des deux États. Mais Suez 1956 représente aussi et surtout un véritable tournant dans les relations internationales pour plusieurs raisons. Tout d'abord parce que, pour la première fois depuis l'avènement de la Guerre froide, l'URSS et les USA vont faire front commun contre les puissances occidentales associées à Israël. Ensuite parce que concomitamment, les Soviétiques répriment l'insurrection hongroise, battant en brèche leur toute nouvelle théorie de la coexistence pacifique. Enfin parce que le Tiers-monde trouve naissance dans cet affrontement, et devient l'objet de conquête idéologique, notamment au Moyen-Orient. En quoi la crise a-t-elle modifié les interactions au niveau diplomatique, l’équilibre des institutions internationales, les relations géopolitiques, les relations bilatérales dans l'univers de la Guerre froide, les relations intra blocs Est-Ouest ? Quelles conséquences la crise aura-t-elle eue sur la stratégie et les objectifs politiques des différents acteurs ? / The Suez crisis of 1956 is generally synonym for a military operation led by the French and the English army, whose resounding failure sounded the end of the colonialist policy of both States. But Suez 1956 represents also and above all a real turning point in the international relations for several reasons. Firstly, because, for the first time since the advent of the cold war, the USSR and the USA are going to join forces against the western powers associated with Israel. Then, because concomitantly, the Soviet power repress the Hungarian revolution, damaging their quite new theory of the peaceful coexistence. Finally, because the Third World finds birth in this confrontation, and becomes the object of ideological conquest, especially in the Middle-East In what did the crisis modify the interactions at the diplomatic level, the balance of the international institutions, the geopolitical relations, the bilateral relations in the universe of the Cold war, the relations intra East-West blocks? What consequences the crisis will generate on the strategy and the policy of the various actors?

Les Hauts-de-Seine constituent, depuis leur création en 1964, la place forte de la droite francilienne. L’enjeu politique est de taille, car ce « département-métropole » est souvent qualifié de « département le plus riche de France après Paris ». A l’image du pôle de La Défense, devenu le premier quartier d’affaires d’Europe, les Hauts-de-Seine ont connu ces dernières décennies de profondes transformations urbaines et d’importants bouleversements sociologiques et économiques. L’analyse géopolitique s’avère fructueuse pour comprendre ces mutations. En effet, elles sont étroitement liées à un ensemble de stratégies territoriales dont le but est le contrôle politique des Hauts-de-Seine. La droite a donc imaginé, mis en place et développé un système géopolitique local très efficace, que nous avons nommé la « banlieue bleue » et qui, par bien des aspects, constitue le double inversé de la banlieue rouge. Dans un premier temps, cette thèse montre la formation géopolitique de la « banlieue bleue » des Hauts-de-Seine. Puis, elle s’intéresse au fonctionnement et aux acteurs du système géopolitique local en insistant sur la dimension éminemment géopolitique des politiques publiques d’aménagement urbain qui ont transformé la physionomie des villes du département. Elle revient enfin sur les rivalités de pouvoirs à l’échelle métropolitaine. Face au risque d’absorption des départements de petite couronne dans la nouvelle Métropole du Grand Paris, le département développe un projet géopolitique d’envergure, la fusion des Hauts-de-Seine et des Yvelines, qui, si elle aboutit, ferait de ces deux départements une « banlieue bleue » XXL. / Since they were created in 1964, the Hauts-de-Seine have been a stronghold of the Ile-de-France's right wing. The political stakes are high as this 'departement-metropole' is often qualified as the second richest after Paris. Like the hub of La Defense, which has become Europe's first business centre, the Hauts-de-Seine have lately undergone deep sociological and economical changes as well as consequent urban transformations. The geopolitical analyse proves itself meaningful to understand these mutations. They indeed are tightly connected to a set of territorial strategies, the aim of which is the political control of the Hauts-de-Seine. The right-wing thus contrived, set up and developped a local geopolitical system which, to many aspects, is the mirror image of the red suburb. This dissertation first shows how the Hauts-de-Seine's blue suburb was organized. It then focuses on how the actors of the local geopolitical system operate by insisting on the outstanding geopolitical dimension of the public policies of the urban planning and on how this transformed the aspect of the department's cities. It also focuses on the competition for power at a metropolitan scale. Confronted to the risk of being assimilated by the Greater Paris, the departement is developping a large-scale geopolitical project, the merging between the Hauts-de-Seine and the Yvelines which, if put in practice, would make these suburbs a major blue suburb.

Au lendemain de son indépendance, l’Algérie était confrontée au problème du développement de son potentiel gazier. Pour se soustraire à l’emprise de la France sur ses hydrocarbures, elle décida de placer son gaz dans le marché américain. Cette option visait à développer l’industrie du GNL et à optimiser la rente pour pouvoir financer le développement économique du pays. Après l’échec de ce choix, l’Algérie s’est retournée vers le marché européen. Depuis, les échanges se sont intensifiés au point où l’Algérie est considérée aujourd’hui comme un partenaire énergétique stratégique de l’Union européenne. Cette situation lui donnera-t-elle la possibilité de continuer à approvisionner l’Europe en gaz ? Au regard des contraintes liées à la gestion du secteur de l’énergie, la concurrence des deux gaz russe et qatari et l’entrée prévisible en production des gisements en Mediterrannée orientale, la part du gaz algérien dans la sécurité énergétique de l’Europe constitue-t-elle un enjeu géopolitique ? La présente thèse a pour objectif de confirmer ou d’infirmer la réalité de cet enjeu. Pour cela, elle pose des questions inhérentes aux différentes politiques initiées par l’Algérie durant plus d’un demi-siècle, à sa marge de manœuvre pour se maintenir au troisième rang des fournisseurs de gaz à l’Europe, et à la dépendance de cette dernière en matière de gaz et à ses perceptions géopolitiques à l’égard de ses fournisseurs (principalement, la Russie et les pays producteurs de la rive Sud). / After the National Independence (1962), Algeria was dealing with the difficulties of developing its gas potential. In order to escape the French hegemony of its hydrocarbons resources, Algeria decided to place and invest its gas resources in the US market. This economic option was motivated by the urgent need to develop the LNG industry and to maximize incomes in order to improve the national economic development. After the failure of this economic option, Algeria got back to the European market. Since then, EU – Algeria economic relations have been intensified. Nowadays, Algeria is considered as a strategic EU partner, in the field of energy resources. Does this situation enable Algeria to supply the European economy with gas for a long time? Given the international constraints related to the management of the energy sector, competition from both Russia and Qatar and the new discovered gas reserves in Eastern Mediterranean basin, does the Algerian gas and its importance in EU energy security represent a geopolitical issue?This thesis aims to examin the pertinence of this issue. It seeks to respond to questions related to the various policies initiated by Algeria for more than half a century, to Algeria’s strategy to maintain its position as the third strategic gas supplier of Europe, and to the European energy dependence and its geopolitical perceptions towards its suppliers (especially Russia and the South side of Mediterranean basin producers).

全球化、相互依賴是21世紀的發展潮流，中美兩大經濟體系（G2）的競合，更是主導國際體系發展的方向，2014年中共國家主席習近平，提出「亞洲新安全觀」的亞洲共識，中國大陸扮演更負責任的區域大國角色，對區域穩定、和平發展有所貢獻，期盼美國放棄冷戰時期的對抗意識形態。 從地緣政治分析政治、經濟、軍事安全面各向，窺視中美競合中多邊與雙邊關係，理解中國大陸的「亞洲新安全觀」倡議與美國「亞太再平衡」政策競合下的消長與發展趨勢。 期能理解在東、西方不同文明、體制的思維，過去意識形態對抗的謬誤本質與潛藏危機，發掘「亞洲新安全觀」對區域和平與穩定發展的契機與永續經營之道。 / 全球化、相互依賴是21世紀的發展潮流，中美兩大經濟體系（G2）的競合，更是主導國際體系發展的方向，2014年中共國家主席習近平，提出「亞洲新安全觀」的亞洲共識，中國大陸扮演更負責任的區域大國角色，對區域穩定、和平發展有所貢獻，期盼美國放棄冷戰時期的對抗意識形態。 從地緣政治分析政治、經濟、軍事安全面各向，窺視中美競合中多邊與雙邊關係，理解中國大陸的「亞洲新安全觀」倡議與美國「亞太再平衡」政策競合下的消長與發展趨勢。 期能理解在東、西方不同文明、體制的思維，過去意識形態對抗的謬誤本質與潛藏危機，發掘「亞洲新安全觀」對區域和平與穩定發展的契機與永續經營之道。

Under the current intensive development of the world economy, there is a significant increase in integration of strategic sectors in countries towards the regional and international networks. Therefore, the potential of pipeline transport begins to take special foreign economic and geopolitical importance. The current status and development of this field is the object of an increased interest of all parties that are involved in the transport of raw materials. The more trades there are with oil and gas, the more issues related to its transport are occurred which all parties involved in the transport system faced to deal with. In the context of rapidly developing interconnection of global economies on regional level along with its undeniable reflection on international situation, it makes the functioning of already existing system of pipelines and realization of new projects related to construction of pipelines, with issues of economic, ecological and technical character that play an important role in delivering strategic energy products to world markets. At the same time the strong competition for the construction of pipeline facilities increases its geopolitical significance.

Pays où se croisent influences occidentale et arabe, le Liban est un laboratoire heuristique pour analyser la question patrimoniale. Son système politique confessionnel, sa société communautaire et sa situation stratégique au Moyen Orient en font un enjeu géopolitique. La construction nationale a approprié le regard orientaliste pour postuler une identité libanaise assise sur des mythes fondateurs ; elle a mobilisé les Libanais autour des valeurs communes de la nation afin de diluer les identités communautaires. La guerre civile a réactualisé ces identités et les communautés se sont emparées de leurs particularismes religieux au profit des acteurs divers qui s’affrontent au Moyen Orient et qui instrumentalisent la carte communautaire libanaise dans leurs confrontations. Le Liban a traversé deux périodes de construction identitaire : nationale et communautaire ; chacune de ces périodes a sécrété un patrimoine particulier. À Baalbek, ville connue par l’Occident à travers les récits des voyageurs, la construction nationale désigne le site archéologique comme patrimoine national. Or, ce site se caractérise par une sédimentation de couches culturelles qui sollicite une lecture patrimoniale différente selon des échelles : alors que le regard occidental y voit des temples romains, la population locale y voit une Qalaa (citadelle) arabe. Entre la romanité et l’arabité du site, l’État libanais a opté pour sa dimension phénicienne qui affirme que les Libanais sont les descendants des Phéniciens. Avec la remontée du pouvoir communautaire chiite dans la ville, un nouvel objet patrimonial émerge : le mausolée de Sit Khawla répond par son référentiel identitaire et la dynamique économique qu’il induit dans la ville, aux aspirations de la population locale recomposée communautairement. Il s’ensuit deux pôles patrimoniaux qui coexistent dans l’espace de Baalbek. Cette bipolarité patrimoniale renvoie à des enjeux, des logiques d’acteurs et des acceptions du patrimoine que cette thèse s’attache à analyser. / A country influenced by both the Western and Arab world, Lebanon is a heuristic laboratory to analyze heritage questions. Its confessional political system, community social structures and strategic location in the Middle East contribute to make it an important geopolitical stake. The Lebanese nation-building process appropriated the Orientalist gaze to force a national identity based on several founding myths. It sought to gather the Lebanese around national common values, and so weaken the community identities by promoting the image of a socio-cultural mosaic. The civil war refreshed these identities, and the communities seized their specific religious particularisms, which the regional powers in the Middle East manipulated for their power game. Lebanon witnessed two periods of identity-building: national and community, each of them inventing a particular heritage object. In Baalbek, a city that was familiar to the West thanks to travellers, nation-building process appointed the archaeological site as a national heritage. However, the site is characterized by sedimentation of several cultural layers, each participating in different scales of heritage interpretation: while the Western gaze sees Roman temples, the local gaze sees an Arab Qalaa (citadel). In addition to the Roman and Arab identity of the site, the Lebanese state stressed its Phoenician dimension favourable to its national discourse which affirms that the Lebanese are the descendants of Phoenicians. With the rise of Shiite community power in the city, a new heritage object attracts the local level: the mausoleum of Sit Khawla responds to the aspirations of local population, by its referential identity and its economic dynamics which it has induced in the city, now recomposed on a community basis. As a result, two heritage centres coexist in Baalbek’s space. This bipolarity underlines heritage issues, the actors’ logics and the different significance of the conception of heritage, which this thesis attempts to analyze.

Thesis abstract: Geopolitical Rivalry in Central Asia and Turkmenistan's power as a weak state Charles University, Institute of International Studies, MAS programme 2019 Emma Welsink English Abstract Research on weak states and their position in the international system has been a widely discussed topic for decades, especially in relation to the Cold War bipolar system that revolved around Russia and the United States as great powers. Yet what is lacking is a contemporary analysis that concentrates on the current multipolar system in which the importance of economic alliances and power surpass military power, and how this affects weak states' foreign policy behavior and trade opportunities. This research therefore offers an empirical analysis on great power geopolitical competition between Russia and China over Turkmenistan's economic allegiance, specifically regarding its natural gas export, and seeks to explain how this geopolitical competition has affected Turkmenistan's foreign energy policy behavior as a weak state vis-á-vis these great powers. Additionally, this research seeks to examine how Turkmenistan has even instrumentalized this competition to further its national interest of energy export diversification. More specifically, this research shows that great power competition has played a...