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L’OHADA et le Mercosur sont deux organisations régionales qui ont été créées afin d’accentuer l’intégration et de favoriser la sécurité judiciaire et juridique pour les opérateurs du commerce international. En d’autres mots, leur objectif est d’aider au développement économique des pays membres. Dès le fonctionnement de ces deux organisations, le recours à l’arbitrage a été privilégié comme mode de règlement des différends liés au commerce international. Partant de là, il nous est apparu envisageable d’établir un lien entre la notion de développement et celle arbitrage commercial international. Presque vingt ans après la création de l’OHADA et du Mercosur, cette étude se propose d’évaluer les liens entre l’arbitrage et le développement. Cette évaluation se base sur l’observation de l’influence de l’arbitrage sur le processus d’intégration et sur l’apport de cette technique aux efforts d’amélioration de la sécurité judiciaire et juridique dans le milieu du comme international. / OHADA and Mercosur are two regional organizations that were created to enhance the integration and promote judicial and legal certainty for international traders. In other words, their goal is to help the economic development of member countries. From the operation of these two organizations, arbitration was favored as a means of resolving disputes in international trade. From there, it became possible to establish a link between the concept and the development of international commercial arbitration. Almost twenty years after the creation of OHADA and Mercosur, this study aims to assess the relationship between arbitration and development. This assessment is based on the observation of the influence of arbitration on the integration process and the contribution of this technique towards the improvement of judicial and legal certainty in international affairs.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Frederico Araujo Seabra de Moura.pdf: 1669819 bytes, checksum: 70dd93ee53c67de98ef34bcabe0f5e4e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-09-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The dissertation serves as a research of the function of complementary law amongst the Brazilian tax law context and it emphasizes controversial topics such as its general guidelines while it analyzes doctrinal tendencies developed - dichotomic and trichotomic views - pointing theirs theoretical bases, values and conclusions. In accordance with and utilizing Brazilian law as its main pillar, it formulates hermeneutical alternatives to the theories proposed while utilizing both perspectives partially. Still on this context, it reaches the primary and secondary functions of the tax general guidelines, bringing them before Brazilian fundamental laws and principles such as the federative, autonomy of States and Counties, equality and judicial security. Furthermore, it dissects the correlation between complementary laws, general guidelines, tax constitutional limitations and conflicts of competence. Thereupon, it infers with the towering pertinence of the influence of the general guidelines amongst tax payers, leviers and the Brazilian Federation / A dissertação objetiva pesquisar o papel desempenhado pela lei complementar no direito tributário brasileiro, com ênfase nas polêmicas normas gerais . Analisa as duas tendências doutrinárias que se formaram sobre a matéria correntes dicotômica e tricotômica , aponta suas bases teóricas, valores envolvidos e conclusões alcançadas. A partir daí, com base no direito positivo brasileiro, formula alternativa hermenêutica àquelas teorias, que aproveita parcialmente tanto uma, quanto outra perspectiva. Nesse contexto, aborda as funções primárias e secundárias das normas gerais em matéria tributária, diante de princípios intensamente prestigiados pelo direito brasileiro, como o federativo, o da autonomia dos Estados e Municípios, o da igualdade e o da segurança jurídica. Além disso, examina minuciosamente a correlação entre as leis complementares, as normas gerais, as limitações constitucionais ao poder de tributar e os conflitos de competência. Com isso, conclui pela alta relevância que aquelas normas desempenham na esfera dos contribuintes, dos entes tributantes e, em conseqüência, da própria Federação brasileira

L’alinéa 1er de l’article 2 de l’AUA consacre l’aptitude des personnes morales de droit public à compromettre. À ce titre, elles peuvent être parties à l’arbitrage au même titre que les personnes privées. Aussi, l’alinéa 2 du même article exclut le recours au droit interne pour contester la validité de la convention d’arbitrage ou la capacité de compromettre. À partir d’une analyse téléologique de cet alinéa, il apparaît que le législateur OHADA exclut de l’arbitrage impliquant les personnes publiques l’exercice des prérogatives étatiques. Mais il apparaît que les personnes publiques continuent d’exercer de jure ou de facto certaines prérogatives dérogeant au Droit commun de l’arbitrage. Cela amène à penser que le législateur n’a pas réussi à concilier l’arbitrage avec les prérogatives exorbitantes des parties publiques. Il se pose alors la question de la conciliation de l’arbitrage avec le statut exorbitant des personnes publiques. Il résulte de l’analyse que les privilèges des personnes publiques sont manifestement irréconciliables avec les exigences de l’arbitrage. Les contradictions sont générées par l’insuffisance du cadre juridique avec des effets mettant à mal l’arbitrage. Mais il est possible de les concilier par une réduction encadrée des privilèges exorbitants des parties publiques. Il est question de l’aménagement d’un régime spécifique à l’arbitrage impliquant les personnes publiques fondé sur l’équilibre des pouvoirs des parties à l’arbitrage. À cette fin, il faut réorienter le fondement de l’arbitrage vers les valeurs du procès équitable. De fait, les personnes publiques peuvent contractuellement renoncer à leurs privilèges ou affecter un bien en garantie à l’exécution de la sentence arbitrale. / Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the AAU enshrines the capacity of legal persons governed by public law to compromise. As such, they may be parties to arbitration on the same basis as private persons. Paragraph 2 of the same article thus excludes recourse to domestic law to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement or the capacity to compromise. On the basis of a teleological analysis of this paragraph, it appears that the OHBLA legislator excludes from the arbitration involving public entities the exercise of State prerogatives. Two arguments support this interpretation. On the one hand, the objectives of legal and judicial security are incompatible with any derogation from the requirements of arbitration. On the other hand, the prerogatives of national public authorities are defined by national laws. By prohibiting recourse to domestic law, the legislature implicitly prohibits the opposition of derogatory privileges to the common law of arbitration.But it appears that public persons continue to exercise de jure or de facto certain prerogatives derogating from common arbitration. This suggests that the legislature has failed to reconcile arbitration with the exorbitant prerogatives of the public parties. The question then arises of the conciliation of arbitration with the status of parties to exorbitants under common law.It follows from the analysis that the legislature has ensured access to arbitration to public entities. But his indifference to the privileges they enjoyed made the system of public participation in arbitration an unfinished business. This regime is manifestly characterized by various contradictions. These are generated by the inadequate legal framework of subjective arbitrability of public persons. Thus, the effects of these contradictions make it possible to measure the extent of the inadequacy of privileges to the standards of arbitration. But it is possible to reconcile the requirements of arbitration with the specifics of public parts. The balance between the two institutions will have to be realized by a framed reduction of the exorbitant privileges of the public parts. To this end, the basis of arbitration must be revised: moving from the autonomy of the will to the values of a fair trial. Consequently, the privatization of these prerogatives can be envisaged by different contractual mechanisms.