No presente trabalho, nos propomos a investigar a relação entre os princípios da filosofia primeira de Christian Wolff, a saber, os princípios de contradição e de razão suficiente, com as teses apresentadas por Immanuel Kant em sua Nova Dilucidatio. Para tanto, nosso primeiro capítulo aborda brevemente as concepções de filosofia e de método adotadas por Wolff. Particularmente importante, nesse sentido, foi a análise dos textos wolffianos Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere e sua chamada Lógica Latina. Nosso segundo capítulo é dedicado ao tratamento fornecido por Wolff do princípio de contradição; a fim de analisarmos esse aspecto da filosofia wolffiana, além do exame de seus tratados de ontologia, foi mais uma vez útil considerarmos o que a Lógica Latina sustenta a respeito da relação entre a contradição e a falsidade. Em nosso terceiro capítulo, voltamos nossa atenção para a discussão wolffiana do princípio de razão suficiente; aqui, buscamos reconstruir o argumento de Wolff, bem como apontamos algumas fraquezas de sua argumentação. Também procuramos expor o sentido da “suficiência” do princípio de razão mediante a consideração de algumas noções que ocorrem em trechos posteriores da Ontologia. Em nosso último capítulo, examinamos como a Nova Dilucidatio de Kant discute os princípios da filosofia primeira de Wolff. Constatamos aqui que Kant rejeita pressupostos da ontologia wolffiana, e propõe as rationes veritatis e exsistentiae. Finalmente, discutimos brevemente em que consiste a prova para a existência de Deus apresentada na Proposição VII do texto kantiano, bem como o sentido de sua conformidade com as razões de verdade e de existência introduzidas pela Nova Dilucidatio. / In the present study, we propose ourselves to investigate the relation between Christian Wolff’s principles of philosophy, namely, the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason, with the theses presented by Immanuel Kant in his Nova Dilucidatio. Accordingly, our first chapter briefly treats the conceptions of philosophy and method adopted by Wolff. Particurlarly important, in this sense, was the analysis of the Wolffian texts Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere and his so-called Latin Logic. Our second chapter is dedicated to the treatment rendered by Wolff of the principle of contradiction; in order to analyze this aspect of the Wolffian philosophy, it was once again useful to consider what the Latin Logic holds about the relation between contradiction and falsity. In our third chapter, we turned our attention to the Wolffian discussion of the principle of sufficient reason; here, we tried to reconstruct Wolff’s argument, just as we pointed out some weakness of his argumentation. We have also tried to expose the meaning of “sufficiency” of the principle of reason by means of a consideration of some notions which occur in later passages of the Ontologia. In our last chapter, we examined how Kant’s Nova Dilucidatio discusses Wolff’s principles of first philosophy. Here we found that Kant rejects some presuppositions of Wolffian ontology, and proposes rationes veritates and exsistentiae instead. Finally, we briefly discussed the proof to the existence of God presented in the Proposition VII of the Kantian text, just as the sense of its conformity with the reasons of truth and of existence introduced by Nova Dilucidatio.

Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The central idea developed in this thesis is that meaningful work provides the normative standard of what work should be for all human beings, based on the normative idea that being human entails a realization of one’s potential and the expression of one’s intellect and creativity as a necessary part of living a full and flourishing life. Thus the key ethical foundation upon which my argument was built rests primarily upon classic Aristotelian ethical theory as well as more contemporary adaptations thereof. In reality, however, research reveals that up to eighty percent of people engage in work that is not meaningful in the sense that they are unable to experience both excellence and enjoyment through their work. This problem has been labeled as “employee disengagement” and has been acknowledged by organizations as a disturbingly growing trend particularly because of the financial cost it carries through lost productivity. My objective in this thesis was to outline the scope of the problem, and to make a strong case for the recognition of employee disengagement as a moral problem, and not simply as an economic one. Thus a major focus of this thesis was to unpack the concept of meaningful work and to argue for its moral value. Throughout my thesis, the importance of understanding meaningful work as a balance between both the subjective and objective elements that make work meaningful for the individual was emphasized. Having established employee disengagement as a moral problem, my attention then turned towards analyzing the potential causes of the problem at a systemic, organizational and individual level. My primary conclusion was that the modern paradigm facilitated a certain way of organizing business activity as well as a certain way of construing the relationship between work and life that has ultimately had a deep seated causal effect upon the absence of meaningful work. Thus addressing the problem entails a detachment from this paradigm and challenging some of the basic assumptions about organizational life. Finally, I proposed a business model that serves as a framework for a new way of working which has the capacity to be more fulfilling to the human spirit. This model assumes the tenets of virtue ethics as its core. In this model, individual employees, the organization as a community and leaders in the business all have specific roles and responsibilities to bring the model to life, and thus the quest for meaningful work has to be undertaken as a collaborative effort. The field of business ethics, with a refreshed Aristotelian mindset, has a lot of value to add in offering much needed ethical guidance to help steer this radical, yet exciting workplace transformation process in the right direction. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die kerngedagte van hierdie tesis is dat betekenisvolle arbeid die normatiewe standaard sou skep van wat werk vandonderstel is om vir die mensdom te beteken. Dit berus op die veronderstelling dat menswees meebring dat die individu se volle potensiaal, intelligensie en kreatiwiteit sal lei tot ‘n betekenisvolle bestaan. Die sleutelargument steun primêr die klassieke Aristoteliese etiese teorie asook hendendaagse aanpassings daarvan. Navorsing bewys egter dat tot 80% van die arbeidsmag betrokke is in betekenislose (sinlose) arbeid in die sin dat hulle geen genot of uitnemendheid ervaar nie. Die probleem word geetiketteer as “werknemersonttrekking” en word deur maatskappye beskou as ‘n onstellende tendens ten opsigte van die finansiële impak en die gepaardgaande verlies van produktiwiteit. Die oogmerk van die tesis is om die omvang van die probleem uit te lig en om redes aan te voer dat werknemers onttrekking as ‘n morele vraagstuk aangespreek moet word en nie net gesien sal word as ‘n finansiële dilemma nie. Die beweegrede van die tesis is om die begrip van betekenisvolle arbeid te ondersoek en om die morele aspek daarvan te debatteer. Die belangrikheid van die begrip, betekenisvolle arbeid, as ‘n balans tussen beide die subjektiewe en objektiewe beginsels word deurgaans onderstreep. Aangesien “werknemersonttrekking” as ‘n morele probleem beskou word is die oogmerk om die oorsake van die probleem te analiseer, op ‘n sistematiese, organisatoriese en individuele vlak. Die gevolgtrekking is dan dat die moderne paradigma ‘n sekere invloed het op die organisasie se besigheidsaktiwiteite en is ook ‘n metode om die verhouding tussen werk en bestaan te bepaal, wat uiteindelik ‘n diepgesete redegewende invloed het in die afwesigheid van sinvolle arbeid. ‘n Skeiding van die voorbeeld en die basiese veronderstelling van georganiseerde bestaan word benodig om begenoemde begrip te bevraagteken. Laastens is daar ‘n besigheidsmodel wat dien as ‘n raamwerk vir ‘n nuwe manier van werk, wat sal meebring dat werk meer vervulling aan die menslike gees sal bied. Díe model, veronderstel die beginsel van eerbare etiek as die grondslag. Werknemers van organisasies, die organisasie as ‘n gemeenskap en besigheidsleiers het spesifieke rolle en verantwoordelikhede, om lewe te gee aan die model. Daarvolgens moet die soeke na sinvolle arbied as ‘n kollektiewe poging beskou word. Die gebied van besigheidsetiek , met ‘n vernuwende Aristoteliese denkwyse, het tot voordeel , ‘n waardevolle bydrae tot ‘n onmisbare etiese leiding, om hierdie radikale maar opwindende transformasie in die werkplek mee te bring.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:28:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Aurelio Sposito Lima.pdf: 1157908 bytes, checksum: ff037a1601342b5a06004c85f7eb2b6b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-10-30 / The present work will study two possible perspectives regarding the Kantian view. We will analyze the possible approximation of the humanist Kantian view and the relativist individualism present in this society. Then we will analyze the appropriation made by Hannah Arendt of the Kantian aesthetic judgment, considering such judgment from the point of view of the whole mankind. We shall study the Introduction and the first half of Immanuel Kant s Critique of Judgment . Then, we will analyze the appropriation by Hannah Arendt of said judgment by studying her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy ; in this book, Arendt uses the reflective judgment to lay the basis for a judgment in which the corner stone is the observation of a particular event from the point of view of the whole of humanity. Such judgment is only possible when employed the broaden thought / O presente trabalho estudará duas possíveis perspectivas do sujeito kantiano. Analisaremos a possível aproximação entre o sujeito kantiano humanista e o individualismo relativista presente em nossa sociedade. Depois analisaremos a apropriação realizada por Hannah Arendt do juízo estético kantiano, tendo em vista um julgamento do ponto de vista de toda a humanidade. Trata-se de uma perspectiva humanista do sujeito kantiano, que entende possível o seu resgate para a pós-modernidade. Estudaremos a introdução e a primeira metade da Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo de Immanuel Kant. Depois analisaremos a apropriação realizada por Hannah Arendt do juízo reflexivo, a partir de um estudo de suas Lições sobre a Filosofia Política de Kant . Nesta obra, Arendt aproveitará do juízo reflexivo para lançar bases a um julgamento que tenha como ponto central a observação de um acontecimento particular do ponto de vista de toda a humanidade. Tal julgamento é possível apenas a partir do pensamento alargado

Neste trabalho é apresentada e defendida a tese segundo a qual o projeto filosófico de Arthur Schopenhauer deve ser entendido como o estabelecimento de um sistema de filosofia transcendental, constituído de uma teoria da experiência coordenada a uma teoria geral das faculdades cognitivas e a um “primeiro princípio”, que apresentamos e discutimos. Assim compreendida, a filosofia de Schopenhauer guarda uma relação peculiar de continuidade com a filosofia transcendental de Kant: herda e reformula o projeto de Karl Leonhard Reinhold, articulado em resposta aos céticos Salomon Maimon e Gottlob Ernst Schulze, edificando um sistema de filosofia transcendental que contempla as ambições fundacionistas presentes no projeto de Reinhold, as críticas que esse projeto recebera e críticas endereçadas à própria teoria da experiência de Kant no contexto de recepção da Crítica da Razão Pura. / In this work is presented and defended the thesis according to which Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical project should be understood as aiming at putting forward a system of transcendental philosophy. That system comprises a theory of experience coordinated to a general theory of cognitive faculties and to a “first principle” which we present and discuss. So understood, Schopenhauer’s philosophy exhibits a peculiar relationship of continuity with Kant’s transcendental philosophy: it inherits and reformulates Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s project as it was conceived in response to the skeptics Salomon Maimon and Gottlob Ernst Schulze, building a system of transcendental philosophy which encompasses the foundationalist ambitions of Reinhold’s project and the criticisms which that project had received, as much as some criticisms which was addressed at Kant’s theory of experience itself in the context of reception of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Esta dissertação apresenta a concepção de juízo político de Hannah Arendt. Afastando-se de uma leitura ortodoxa dos textos kantianos, Arendt vislumbra no juízo reflexionante estético de Kant a estrutura do juízo político. Em um constante diálogo com a obra kantiana a autora se apropria de vários conceitos, tanto conceitos constantes na Crítica da faculdade do juízo, que é a obra que ela afirma conter a verdadeira filosofia política de Kant, como conceitos de outras importantes obras kantianas. No decorrer deste texto, quando entendemos que ocorre uma apropriação conceitual buscamos situar minimamente o conceito no contexto da obra kantiana para compreendermos a concepção e o gesto interpretativo de Arendt. Através da análise de seus escritos mostramos como ela compreende o modo de funcionamento da faculdade humana de julgar os eventos políticos, por meio da exposição e discussão dos principais conceitos envolvidos em sua teoria. Assim, apresentamos as condições de possibilidade do juízo representadas pelas faculdades da imaginação e do senso comum, bem como as duas perspectivas pelas quais essa faculdade se manifesta no mundo público, o juízo do ator e o juízo do espectador. Depois, analisamos a conexão entre as faculdades de pensamento e juízo para extrair as implicações éticas da faculdade humana de julgar. Estas reflexões são uma tentativa de compreender como, para Arendt, opera a faculdade de julgar; por que ela considera esta faculdade a mais política das habilidades espirituais do homem, e qual é a relevância política desta atividade do espírito. / This dissertation presents the conception of Hannah Arendt’s political judgment. Moving away from an orthodox reading of Kantian texts, Arendt glimpses in the aesthetic reflective judgment of Kant, the structure of the political judgment. In one constant dialogue with Kantian Work the author appropriates several concepts, as concepts constant in the Critique of judgment, which is the Work that she affirms that contains the true Kant’s political philosophy, as concepts of other important Kantian Works. In elapsing of this text, when we understand that a conceptual appropriation occurs, we try to situate the concept in the context of the Kantian Work to understand Arendt’s conception and the interpretation gesture. Through the analysis of her writings we show as she understands the way of functioning of the human faculty to judge the political events, by the exposition and debate of the main involved concepts in her theory. So, we present the conditions of judgment possibility represented by the faculties of the imagination and the common sense, as well as the two perspectives for which manifests this faculty in the public world, the judgment of the actor and the judgment of the spectator. After that, we analyze the connection between the faculties of thought and judgment to extract the ethical implications of the human faculty to judge. These reflections are an attempt to understand how does the faculty of judge operate for Arendt; why does she consider this faculty the most political of men’s mental abilities, and what is the politic relevance of this spirit’s activity.

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Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissENM.pdf: 789409 bytes, checksum: 13140320bfc6c0010c46798a60d7c738 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-06-15 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / Kant with Sade represents an important moment of Lacan s theoretical trajectory and the way he understood the relevance of psychoanalysis as a discipline of modernity. According to Lacan, Freud promoted the foundation of a pioneer way to the problem of subjectivity, which, as it included the concept of unconscious, revolutionized all the approaches to ethics until that moment. It would not be possible, after Freud, to understand ethics without the imaginary dimension of fantasy. On the other hand, Kant with Sade is revealed as the symptom of an important impasse at Lacan s theoretical trajectory, especially concerning the relations among law, jouissance, and desire. This work intends to indicate the antecedents of the problem of ethics in Lacan s work that culminates in the production of the article in 1962. / Kant com Sade representa um importante momento do percurso teórico de Lacan e da forma como entendia a relevância da psicanálise como uma disciplina da modernidade. O que Freud promoveu, no seu entender, foi a fundação de uma via pioneira para o problema da subjetividade que, ao incluir o conceito de inconsciente, revolucionava toda abordagem da ética até aquele momento. Não seria possível, depois de Freud, compreender a ética sem a dimensão imaginária da fantasia. Por outro lado, Kant com Sade se revela como o sintoma de um impasse importante na trajetória teórica do próprio Lacan principalmente no que diz respeito às relações entre a lei, o gozo e o desejo. Este trabalho pretende apontar os antecedentes de uma problemática da ética na obra de Lacan que culminariam na produção do artigo em 1962.

Esta dissertação apresenta a concepção de juízo político de Hannah Arendt. Afastando-se de uma leitura ortodoxa dos textos kantianos, Arendt vislumbra no juízo reflexionante estético de Kant a estrutura do juízo político. Em um constante diálogo com a obra kantiana a autora se apropria de vários conceitos, tanto conceitos constantes na Crítica da faculdade do juízo, que é a obra que ela afirma conter a verdadeira filosofia política de Kant, como conceitos de outras importantes obras kantianas. No decorrer deste texto, quando entendemos que ocorre uma apropriação conceitual buscamos situar minimamente o conceito no contexto da obra kantiana para compreendermos a concepção e o gesto interpretativo de Arendt. Através da análise de seus escritos mostramos como ela compreende o modo de funcionamento da faculdade humana de julgar os eventos políticos, por meio da exposição e discussão dos principais conceitos envolvidos em sua teoria. Assim, apresentamos as condições de possibilidade do juízo representadas pelas faculdades da imaginação e do senso comum, bem como as duas perspectivas pelas quais essa faculdade se manifesta no mundo público, o juízo do ator e o juízo do espectador. Depois, analisamos a conexão entre as faculdades de pensamento e juízo para extrair as implicações éticas da faculdade humana de julgar. Estas reflexões são uma tentativa de compreender como, para Arendt, opera a faculdade de julgar; por que ela considera esta faculdade a mais política das habilidades espirituais do homem, e qual é a relevância política desta atividade do espírito. / This dissertation presents the conception of Hannah Arendt’s political judgment. Moving away from an orthodox reading of Kantian texts, Arendt glimpses in the aesthetic reflective judgment of Kant, the structure of the political judgment. In one constant dialogue with Kantian Work the author appropriates several concepts, as concepts constant in the Critique of judgment, which is the Work that she affirms that contains the true Kant’s political philosophy, as concepts of other important Kantian Works. In elapsing of this text, when we understand that a conceptual appropriation occurs, we try to situate the concept in the context of the Kantian Work to understand Arendt’s conception and the interpretation gesture. Through the analysis of her writings we show as she understands the way of functioning of the human faculty to judge the political events, by the exposition and debate of the main involved concepts in her theory. So, we present the conditions of judgment possibility represented by the faculties of the imagination and the common sense, as well as the two perspectives for which manifests this faculty in the public world, the judgment of the actor and the judgment of the spectator. After that, we analyze the connection between the faculties of thought and judgment to extract the ethical implications of the human faculty to judge. These reflections are an attempt to understand how does the faculty of judge operate for Arendt; why does she consider this faculty the most political of men’s mental abilities, and what is the politic relevance of this spirit’s activity.