Este trabalho tem como tema central a relação entre a República Popular Democrática da Coreia (Coreia do Norte) e a Republica da Coreia (Coreia do Sul) com seus vizinhos (China, Japão, Rússia) e com atores regionais (Estados Unidos da América), e as implicações destas relações sobre o equilíbrio regional. O objetivo central do mesmo é analisar as implicações que decorrem da instabilidade na península coreana para o equilíbrio regional. Assim, buscará analisar em que medida a modificação no padrão de cooperação ou conflito entre as duas Coreias altera ou interfere na relação entre todos os atores envolvidos, nomeadamente China, Japão, Rússia e Estados Unidos. Destarte, este trabalho analisará o quanto uma mudança brusca na estabilidade securitária na península influencia na dinâmica regional de segurança. O trabalho está estruturado em três capítulos. O primeiro capítulo trata da evolução histórica da dinâmica regional de segurança, abordando os aspectos estratégicos e políticos que conduziram ao status quo atual na península coreana. É nesse capítulo que se verifica a emergência da industrialização sul-coreana, central para o atual processo de modernização do país, e as origens do programa nuclear norte-coreano, eixo das questões securitárias no Leste Asiático. O segundo capítulo tem como objetivo analisar o contexto regional de segurança e a Política Externa e de Segurança das Grandes Potências, nomeadamente China, EUA, Japão e Rússia, para o Leste Asiático. O terceiro capítulo analisa a Política Externa e de Segurança da República Democrática Popular da Coreia e da República da Coreia. Nesse sentido, verifica os principais fatores que tem pautado a inserção internacional desses países e os condicionantes que podem vir a ser centrais para eventuais mudanças na estabilidade regional. / This work is focused on the relationship between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) with their neighbors (China, Japan, Russia) and regional actors (United States) and the implications of these relationships on the regional balance. The main purpose is to analyze the implications arising from the instability on the Korean peninsula for the regional balance. This way, it seeks to examine to what extent the change in the pattern of cooperation or conflict between the two Koreas alters or interferes the relationship between all actors involved, including China, Japan, Russia and the United States. Thus, this paper examines how an abrupt change in the security stability on the peninsula influences in the regional security dynamics. The work is structured in three chapters. The first chapter deals with the historical evolution of the regional security dynamics, addressing strategic and political factors that led to the current status quo on the Korean peninsula aspects. This chapter verifies the emergence of South Korean industrialization - that is central to the current process of modernization of the nation - and verifies the origins of the North Korean nuclear program, which is the securitarian axis of the issues in East Asia. The second chapter aims to analyze the regional security context and Foreign and Security Policy of the Great Powers, including China, USA, Japan and Russia for East Asia. The third chapter analyzes the Foreign and Security Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. In this sense, it checks the main factors that have guided the international integration of these countries and the conditions that may be central to any changes in regional stability.

The thesis focuses on the relationship between China and the Korean Peninsula. It examines China's view on the peninsula, its ties to and influence over this region and its conceptions for the future of the peninsula. The thesis concentrates on the relations between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, the relationship between them is analyzed in the context of the Chinese long-term strategy for the Korean Peninsula. The primary Chinese interests related to North Korea are identified together with instruments that can China use to accomplish them. Special focus is given to the assessment of the economic influence that China has over North Korea. However, the Chinese economic leverage is examined in connection with political and military relations between those two countries and in broader context of the development of international relations in Northeast Asia.

北韓研發核武與彈道飛彈對東北亞區域安全造成嚴重衝擊，自1994年以來的北韓核武危機至今仍未獲得解決。在2002年北韓承認持續發展核武後，中共在核武危機中擔任調解人的角色，分別舉行了「三方會談」以及六輪「六方會談」。中共希望透過多邊主義中的談判方式，和平地解決北韓核武發展問題，並提高自身在朝鮮半島議題上以及國際社會中的影響力。但北韓至今仍未放棄核武發展，且從2006年以來一連串的核子試爆、長程火箭與飛彈試射使東北亞安全情勢極度惡化。 平心而論，中共目前是世界上對北韓影響力最大的國家。除了因為韓戰所建立的傳統「血盟關係」，以及在1961年兩國之間所締結之「中朝友好合作互助條約」之外，近年來，中共也提供北韓大量的經濟援助，包括糧食、重油與其他的戰略性物資。但北韓自2006年以來的彈道飛彈試射與地下核武試爆，確實已經對中共的國家安全造成嚴重威脅。北韓研發核武的問題若不解決，將會動搖現行「核不擴散」機制的權威與可信度，甚至造成東北亞區域各國，例如日本、韓國，甚至台灣競相研發核武的可能性，進而引發區域軍備競賽與核武擴散，對中共的國家安全造成損害。其次為北韓研發核武若引起美國的軍事先制攻擊，其難民問題對中共東北邊境所造成的威脅。最後則是北韓的核武研發與常規軍力對中共所造成的直接威脅。此外，北韓研發核武也對中共在於1996年出台之「新安全觀」造成衝擊，尤其中共官方在未來評估東北亞區域安全問題時，勢必將對「新安全觀」作一定程度的修正。在中共的綜合國力以及在亞太地區影響力不斷提升的前提下，中共將藉由北韓這根國際政治權力槓桿，與美國共同形塑未來朝鮮半島的全新權力格局。本研究即欲探討做為北韓傳統支持者與核武危機調停者的中共，如何處理北韓研發核武對其國家安全所造成之威脅。 關鍵詞：中共、朝鮮半島、北韓核武危機、新安全觀、彈道飛彈、軍備競賽 / North Korea developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles pose a serious impact on Northeast Asia, since 1994 the North Korean nuclear crisis has yet to be resolved. North Korea admitted in 2002, continued to develop nuclear weapons, PRC in the nuclear crisis as a mediator, were held “tripartite talks” and “six-party talks.”PRC hopes of multilateralism in the negotiation and peaceful resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue and improve their own issues on the Korean peninsula and the international community's influence. But North Korea has yet to give up nuclear weapons development and since 2006 a series of nuclear tests, long-range rocket and ballistic missile launch to worsen the security situation in Northeast Asia. In all fairness, the PRC is currently the world's greatest influence on North Korea's state. Apart from the tradition established by the Korean War "clan relations", as well as between the two countries in 1961, concluded the “Sino-Korean friendship and cooperation treaty”, the recent years, and that China provides North Korea substantial economic aid, including food, heavy oil and other strategic materials. But North Korea since 2006 ballistic missile and nuclear test pose a serious threat to national security of PRC. This study anticipates exploring the trend and change of the Korean Peninsula Policy and New Security Concept of PRC. The main research goal: to discuss North Korea`s traditional supporter and mediator, PRC, and how to handle North Korea's development of nuclear weapons posed to their own national security threats. Keyword: PRC, Korean Peninsula, North Korea Nuclear Crisis, New Security Concept, Ballistic Missiles, the Arms Race.

在2002年朝核危機引發後，中共居中折衝尊俎，舉辦「三方會談」及數輪「六方會談」，使朝核危機相關諸國得以齊聚北京協商處理朝核問題，揭開朝鮮半島歷史之新頁。中共雖非當事國，然涉入與影響之程度均較前次危機為深，其政策及角色皆有研究之必要。「新安全觀」提出迄今已近十年，做為中共國際關係的「理論」，直接指導其外交政策，其意涵著重於與冷戰思維的差異，以「互信、互利、平等、協作」及對「非傳統安全」的關照為其理論核心，在實踐上則以多邊安全合作為最要，而近歲於朝鮮半島發展之多邊安全合作正為「六方會談」。是故，本論文冀望能從「新安全觀」意涵在「六方會談」的實踐與挑戰，探析中共朝鮮半島政策之走向。主要的研究目的包括：（一）詮釋中共「新安全觀」的動機與意涵；（二）具體呈現中共與各國在朝核問題的立場及互動作為；（三）評估「新安全觀」在「六方會談」中的實踐與挑戰，並分析其朝鮮半島政策取向。 / 「新安全觀」在「六方會談」中體現於以下幾項作為：（一）穿梭籌辦歷輪會談；（二）戮力於會談制度化；（三）保障參與各方權益。然而，「新安全觀」同時也面臨許多挑戰，最值得關切者有冷戰時期所遺留下來的軍事同盟、朝核危機當事兩國的立場分歧、「中國威脅論」的陰影等。大體上，中共對於朝核問題的政策立場有三：（一）朝鮮半島非核化；（二）區域的和平與穩定；（三）以外交談判解決。此外，還強調在解決朝核問題的同時，必須照顧到北韓的生存利益，而為因應諸多挑戰，中共的朝鮮半島政策可能將朝以下方向發展：（一）擴大多邊安全合作；（二）鞏固大國共同利益；（三）強化南韓合作關係；（四）引導北韓經濟改革。因此，就現階段政策取向而言，中共應會並用多邊與雙邊外交途徑，在朝鮮半島持續勸和促談，扮演多重建設性角色，而「新安全觀」若要被徹底落實，將取決於中共的國家利益能否持續與「新安全觀」所訴諸的理念相結合。 / This study anticipates exploring the trend of the Korean Peninsula Policy of China by understanding the implementation and challenge of New Security Concept (NSC) in the Six-Party Talks. The main research goal includes: to interpret the motivation and meaning of NSC, to present China’s position and behavior with other nations in terms of 2002 North Korea nuclear issue, and to evaluate the practice and challenge of NSC in Six-Party Talks. In the past rounds, NSC has been embodied in holding meetings, endeavoring to institutionalize, and ensuring the right and interest of all participants. Even so, NSC has been confronted some challenge in the meantime; embracing the military alliances remained from the cold war era, the gap between North Korea and United States, and so-called “China Threat.” / Briefly speaking, China has three positions in 2002 North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Denuclearization, peace and stability, and solutions through the negotiation in Korean Peninsula. China also emphasizes that every decision dealing with the crisis should be given consideration to North Korea’s interest. It is highly likely to blossom into what follows for the sake of replying these challenges: To extend multilateral corporation, to consolidate the common interest with other powers, to strengthen the relation with South Korea, and to guide North Korea to reform its economy. Therefore, China might use multilateral and bilateral approach simultaneously; continue to mediate and to play a multiple role in the constructive way. The further implementation of NSC depends on the extent of combining with China’s national interest and the ideal of NSC.

The overall purpose of this dissertation is to provide an empirical study of the post-Cold War EastAsian security setting, with the aim of understanding why there is an East Asian peace. The EastAsian peace exists in a region with a history of militarised conflicts, home to many of the world'slongest ongoing militarised problems and a number of unresolved critical flashpoints. Thus, thepost-Cold War East Asian inter-state peace is a paradox. Despite being a region predicted to be ripefor conflict, there have not only been less wars than expected, but the region also shows severalsigns of a development towards a more durable peace. The dominant research paradigm –neorealism – has painted a gloomy picture of post-Cold War East Asia, with perpetual conflictsdominating the predictions. Other mainstream international relations theories, too, fail to accountfully for the relative peace. One of the greatest problems for mainstream theories, is accounting forpeace given East Asia's lack of security organisations or other formalised conflict managementmechanisms. Given this paradox/problem, this dissertation sets out to ask "Why is there a relativepeace in the East Asian security setting despite an absence of security organisations or otherformalised mechanisms to prevent existing conflicts from escalating into violence?" In order to answer this question, the case of East Asian peace is approached by comparingthree embedded case studies within the region: the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea, and theKorean nuclear conflict. It explores the full range of informal and formal processes plus the ConflictPrevention and Peacebuilding Mechanisms (CPPBMs) that have been important for the creation ofa continuing relative peace in East Asia between 1990 and 2008. The study furthermore focuses onChina's role in the three cases, on an empirical basis consisting of interviews conducted with keypersons during more than 1.5 years fieldwork in China. The three cases show that informal processes exist, and that they have furthermore beenimportant for peace, both by preventing conflicts from escalating into war, and by buildingconditions for a stable longer-term peace. Their impact on the persistence of peace has been tracedto a range of different CPPBMs. Returning to the level of the East Asian case, a common feature ofmany of the identified processes is that they can be understood as aspects or manifestations of theEast Asian regionalisation process. Specifically, elite interactions (personal networks, track twodiplomacy), back-channel negotiations, economic interdependence and integration, and functionalcooperation have together with (China's acceptance of) multilateralism and institutionalisation (ofpeaceful relations) been of high importance for the relative peace. Whereas formalised conflictmanagement mechanisms and the U.S. presence have also contributed to peace, this dissertationshows their contribution to be much more limited.

朝鮮半島由於地理位置特殊，在戰略上極具重要性，長久以來一直為列強覬覦爭奪之地。第二次世界大戰之後，朝鮮半島亦籠罩在兩極對峙的氣氛裡，首先是南北韓的分裂，而韓戰的發生，使美蘇在東亞地區的對抗局面更為激化，冷戰時期的朝鮮半島遂成為東亞地區內兩極對峙氣氛最為明顯的「火藥庫」，因而獲得「東方的巴爾幹」的稱號。隨著東歐變天、蘇聯瓦解，雖然冷戰時期的兩極對峙局面已不復見，國際瀰漫一片和解氣氛，然而東亞地區並未因此脫離冷戰的陰影，尤其是朝鮮半島的南北對抗依然持續、北韓引發的核武危機更使東亞地區陷入隨時可能爆發衝突的臨界點。由於朝鮮半島的局勢不僅攸關區域安全，亦與東亞列強間的權力平衡息息相關，後冷戰時期朝鮮半島已然成為國際關注的焦點，不論是區域傳統強權──美國與俄羅斯，抑或東亞新興的力量──中共與日本，皆極力爭取在朝鮮半島事務的發言權，一方面確保自身國家利益，另一方面更意圖在區域內發揮影響力，提升國際地位。 綜觀諸強權對朝鮮半島的政策，以美國最為大眾所知，各種期刊與學者論著足以證明美國影響之深度與廣度。中共與日本的參與和影響，亦有諸多學者研究，然而關於俄羅斯與朝鮮半島關係之研究卻少之又少。事實上俄羅斯在冷戰前後對於朝鮮半島的政策有相當幅度的變化，也是朝鮮半島穩定局勢的重大變數之一。從冷戰時期為與美國制衡、確保區域強權地位，極力與北韓維持密切關係，並刻意斷絕與南韓的接觸，到八０年代為求內部經濟發展，極力塑造周邊環境的穩定，開始與南韓接觸，乃至蘇聯解體後為求取經濟資源向南韓一面倒、以及1996年之後為維持在朝鮮半島的影響力而採取「等距離外交」，皆對朝鮮半島局勢產生相當程度的影響。基於意識型態與國家利益，對朝鮮半島所採取的政策因時而異，筆者欲就後冷戰時期俄羅斯的朝鮮半島政策作一番通盤整理，將莫斯科在朝鮮半島政策上的變化加以分析。 本文主要目標係探討後冷戰時期俄羅斯對朝鮮半島的政策，因此對於冷戰時期蘇聯對兩韓的政策著墨不多，僅以少部分篇幅對戈巴契夫主政前各蘇聯領導人的朝鮮半島政策作一番概述，提供讀者了解莫斯科當局在決定對兩韓政策時的歷史背景。筆者除了對葉爾欽時期俄羅斯對朝鮮半島的政策詳細加以整理與歸納之外，由於朝鮮半島的安全穩定攸關東亞區域的安全，並涉及周邊列強的國家利益，筆者認為在探究俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策時，亦須對美國、中共、日本的朝鮮半島政策有基本認知，因此亦以一個章節來討論列強在此地的競逐與制衡。俄羅斯長期以來為維持周邊環境的穩定，推動亞太安全不遺餘力，而朝鮮半島事務是當前俄羅斯最能發揮區域影響力的議題，本文亦將探討俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策對亞太安全的影響，諸如兩韓統一、核武問題皆在研究範圍之內。 本文共分七章，第一章為緒論，第二章先概述冷戰時期朝鮮半島的地緣政治與蘇聯的關係，並以蘇聯領導人作為區隔，就戈巴契夫主政前蘇聯與兩韓的關係加以探討。第三章分析戈巴契夫新思維對蘇聯亞太政策產生的衝擊，並分析朝鮮半島在戈氏新思維當中扮演的角色，此外更詳述戈巴契夫時期對朝鮮半島政策的調整。第四章為本論文的主要章節，筆者先就俄羅斯內部自蘇聯解體後持續進行的對外政策激辯過程加以概述，分析俄羅斯對外政策的重大變化，並探究朝鮮半島政策受到的影響，以及俄羅斯與南北韓關係的發展；其次筆者就俄羅斯1996年之後對朝鮮半島政策的調整過程加以分析，「等距離外交」的執行與障礙亦為研究重點。第五章係討論有關朝鮮半島周邊列強在此地的競逐與制衡，筆者分別就美國、中共與日本的朝鮮半島政策加以論述。第六章俄羅斯對兩韓統一與核武問題的立場有詳細說明，此外讀者亦可自本章得知俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策與亞太安全的關聯，第七章為結論。 第一章　　緒論 第一節 研究動機與目的..................................1 第二節 研究方法與限制..................................2 第三節 論文架構........................................3 第二章 冷戰時期蘇聯的朝鮮半島政策 第一節 二次大戰結束後的東亞局勢與韓國的處境...............5 第二節 蘇聯的東亞政策與朝鮮半島地緣政治...................6 第三節 第二次世界大戰結束後蘇聯與南北韓的關係............11 第三章 戈巴契夫時期蘇聯的朝鮮半島政策 第一節 戈巴契夫「新思維」與俄羅斯外交政策之轉變..........33 第二節 戈巴契夫初期蘇聯對朝鮮半島的政策..................42 第三節 蘇聯對兩韓政策之轉變..............................45 第四章 葉爾欽時期的朝鮮半島政策 第一節 蘇聯解體與俄羅斯對外政策大辯論.................69 第二節 「新東方政策」與朝鮮半島..........................74 第三節 俄國對兩韓的等距離外交............................96 第五章 朝鮮半島周邊其他列強之角逐 第一節 美國朝鮮半島政策……………………………………..131 第二節 中共朝鮮半島政策……………………………………..145 第三節 日本朝鮮半島政策……………………………………..161 第六章 俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策與亞太安全 第一節 俄羅斯對兩韓統一之看法………………………………175 第二節 俄羅斯對核武問題之立場………………………………182 第三節 俄國朝鮮半島政策對亞太安全之意義………………..192 第七章 結論…………………………………………………………..213 參考書目……………………………………………………………………217 / Summary Based on the specialty of its location, the Korean Peninsula has been extremely important on strategy, and the surrounding major powers have fought for it for a long time. After the World War II, the Korean Peninsula was also under the atmosphere of confrontation like other regions and the Korean War made the confronting situation more irrigated. Although the international society has been filled with reconciliation since the sudden change of Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, East Asia didn’t get rid of the shadow of the Cold War. The situation of confrontation between North and South on the Korean Peninsula has still existed, and the nuclear crisis caused by DPRK made the East Asia Region involved in a critical point, at which various of conflicts would burst out at any time. The situation of the Korean Peninsula not only affects the regional security, but also concerns about the balance of power among the East Asian major powers. In the post-Cold War Era the Korean Peninsula has been an international focus, concerned by both the traditional regional powers, such as U.S.A. and Russian, and the new powers, such as PRC and Japan. All the surrounding nations are trying to have the floor in the Korean Peninsula affairs, not only to secure their own national interests, but also to produce a marked effect in the region and promote national status. The intent of the thesis is trying to study Russia’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the post-Cold War Era. In order to introduce the historical background of Moscow’s policy making toward Korea, the thesis is classified into several parts according to various Kremlin leaderships. After a series of arrangement and analysis, we can find that Moscow’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula since 1945 has been influenced by the changes of the international environment, but also by the development of domestic politics and economy in Russia. In addition, the latter affects Moscow’s foreign policy in the post- Cold War Era much more than the former. Based on the need of democratic policy and economic reform after the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, Russia decided to approach the West to get political and economic support. Therefore, getting along with ROK, which has democratic experience and strong economic capability, while cutting original ties with DPRK gradually, is the best choice for Moscow. As for ROK, Russia’s influence on DPRK can promote direct dialog between the two sides, and then secure the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Under the consideration of economy and politics, Russia and ROK accordingly established formal diplomatic relations on September 30, 1991, and the bilateral relationships has been developed smoothly. On the other hand, based on the differences of political structure and economic system, Russia and DPRK have departed for a long distance. Although Moscow insisted to develop full-scale relations with ROK without regarding to the objection of DPRK, the achievement of developing relations with ROK couldn’t fit the expectation of Russian people. The bare economic situation hadn’t been improved, and at the same time, Russians felt be treated as a debtor by ROK. Based on the poor economy and the declining nation status in the international society, Russia had been filled with a conservative atmosphere since 1993. The extreme complaint about the domestic and external affairs provoked the Communism and Nationalism, and the foreign policy inclining to the West suffered from fierce critics. Judging from the distribution of the Duma in 1993 and 1995, we can easily find the dramatic change of Russian domestic politics. To preserve national interest and dignity, Kremlin decided to change its policy toward the Korean Peninsula in 1996. The former policy inclining to ROK has been given up, and Moscow makes efforts to regain close relationships with DPRK while developing normal ties with ROK to maintain Russia’s importance and floor not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also in East Asia affairs. In addition, keeping in touch with DPRK and providing any possible assistance will prevent the sudden collapse of Pyongyang Government, which might result in dramatic turbulent in the region. In short, maintaining close ties with North and South at the same time not only promote peace and stability in the region, but also fit Russia’s national interests.

The EU’s notable transformation over the past five decades is obviously an event of modern state concepts. However, the EU’s matter of concern has placed too much emphasis on economic and trade issues, while its capability and power have achieved remarkable growth with far-reaching ramifications in both economic and political affairs. This also means that studies of the EU foreign policy have hardly reached North East Asia because of geographical limit between them, the EU’s weak institutional capacity and vestige of the Cold War. Therefore the EU and the Korean Peninsula did not have chance to build a critical relationship. This time could be defined as ‘standstill’ between Europe and the Korean Peninsula or ‘quiet diplomacy’. 1993 marked a turning-point in relations between the EU and the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, European countries have launched the Maastricht Treaty since they had signed in 1992. The Treaty implies the EU’s more strengthened international role in the political and economic area in accordance with its increased capability and reinforced power. Secondly, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993 and then the Korean Peninsula was compelled to face a political crisis. Since the EU took unofficial Humanitarian Aids for North Korea in 1994-1995, KEDO and the EU in 1997 agreed to the terms and conditions of the accession to KEDO of its nuclear regulatory body. This was the first challenge of the EU political engagement of the Korean Peninsula question. In the context, this research seeks to answer the question of “What are the EU priorities in its strategy for Korean Peninsula?” that includes broadly the EU’s regional strategy for North East Asia in line with its foreign policy agenda. To tell the conclusion, the EU’s intervention to North Korea was firstly encouraged in dimension of economic interests through vitalization of international trade after the Korean Peninsula would be reunified. The EU considered that Asian nuclear market is an important factor in order to build nuclear technical standard as well as to obtain commercial interests although the European nuclear firms did not obtain chance enough to construct for North Korea nuclear facilities construction. The EU’s political incentives for political change-seeking in North East Asia must also be considered. Actually, the EU diplomatically opened the door of Pyongyang and led the isolated regime to a channel that communicates with international community although the EU did not take a seat at Six-Party Talks to engage itself in the Korean Peninsula question. As a result, the EU could increase the image of a ‘peaceful mediator’ or an ‘honest blocker’ in the term of ‘reputation’ through engagement continued for the Korean Peninsula Crisis. The EU’s foreign policy has been partly successful in context that Europe succeeds in promoting its existence as a global actor. Therefore, its foreign policy would gradually be reinforced to bolster the EU’s credibility and influence in the Korean Peninsula. The EU’s role is surely reduced in the Korean Peninsula issues with the termination of the KEDO project. However, the EU’s role is expected to be performed in different ways under its confidence and capability. The EU’s next engagement depends on where its new incentives will be, and then its question will be how to realize them in accordance with its institutional conditions and actual capacity. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished