<p>The number of LBOs in Sweden has increased during the last years and the current market trend is positive. MostLBOs involves private companies, but a few concerns public corporations on the national share market. In this thesis we will examine the conditions of a LBO of Cloetta Fazer AB. The purpose is to study existing conditions of Cloetta Fazer AB and to examine pros and cons with the deal. Based upon information presented in the frame of reference and in the empirical part, two cash flow valuations have been carried out. The first valuation is a regular discounted cash flow valuation while the other is a specific LBO valuation. In a LBO valuation the debt terms and the changed capital structure is taken into consideration. The valuations are followed by an analysis where LBO conditions as well as pros and cons are examined.</p><p>Positive conditions for Cloetta Fazer AB are insensitiveness of market fluctuations, a strong market position, stable cash flows, low risk and strong product trademarks. There is also a possibility of increasing the expected rate of return with more leverage since the current financial structure can take on more debt. We argue that a LBO of a public corporation is surrounded by limited information due to legal restrictions such as insider rules. Limited information makes it difficult to motivate value creation. Other factors that obstruct a LBO of Cloetta Fazer AB is increased market competition, indistinct possibility of rationalising the business and a high EV/EBITDA multiple. We have also found that the IRR value is too low. Due to the fact that a LBO requires a premium of at least 20 % over market value, it is difficult to argue for a LBO of Cloetta Fazer AB.</p>

The number of LBOs in Sweden has increased during the last years and the current market trend is positive. MostLBOs involves private companies, but a few concerns public corporations on the national share market. In this thesis we will examine the conditions of a LBO of Cloetta Fazer AB. The purpose is to study existing conditions of Cloetta Fazer AB and to examine pros and cons with the deal. Based upon information presented in the frame of reference and in the empirical part, two cash flow valuations have been carried out. The first valuation is a regular discounted cash flow valuation while the other is a specific LBO valuation. In a LBO valuation the debt terms and the changed capital structure is taken into consideration. The valuations are followed by an analysis where LBO conditions as well as pros and cons are examined. Positive conditions for Cloetta Fazer AB are insensitiveness of market fluctuations, a strong market position, stable cash flows, low risk and strong product trademarks. There is also a possibility of increasing the expected rate of return with more leverage since the current financial structure can take on more debt. We argue that a LBO of a public corporation is surrounded by limited information due to legal restrictions such as insider rules. Limited information makes it difficult to motivate value creation. Other factors that obstruct a LBO of Cloetta Fazer AB is increased market competition, indistinct possibility of rationalising the business and a high EV/EBITDA multiple. We have also found that the IRR value is too low. Due to the fact that a LBO requires a premium of at least 20 % over market value, it is difficult to argue for a LBO of Cloetta Fazer AB.

This paper examines the main drivers of leverage in leveraged buyouts, and provides an explanation for the significant decrease in leverage in the aftermath of the financial crisis. We test market-varying factors by regressing leverage measures on potential drivers and find that leverage is largely driven by debt market conditions and private equity market activity. In particular, we argue that liquid debt markets impact buyout leverage more than other macro-factors, such as future view on equity markets and interest rates. Private equity market activity being a driver implies that leverage increases when markets are characterised by fierce competition. Moreover, the results also suggest that leverage determinants changed as a consequence of the financial crisis. Leverage is in recent years highly related to debt market liquidity and equity markets, but independent of private equity market activity. We argue that this is a consequence of increased macro awareness and more conservative views on company outlooks.

Les pays de la zone OHADA observent, depuis une dizaine d’années, un accroissement significatif des opérations de capital-investissement. Les perspectives économiques encourageantes, la relative stabilité politique dans la région ainsi que les prévisions démographiques font de la zone OHADA une cible de premier choix pour les fonds d’investissement, qui y trouvent de formidables opportunités d’investissement et de croissance. Cette nouvelle dynamique nous appelle à nous interroger sur la faculté du droit OHADA à répondre aux exigences juridiques exprimées par ces nouveaux acteurs économiques lors de la conduite de leurs opérations. Cette thèse se propose d’analyser, dans une perspective comparative avec le droit français, les principaux enjeux juridiques du capital-investissement en droit OHADA. Ainsi, y seront étudiés les outils juridiques de prise de participation, la gestion des sociétés cibles, notamment à travers la pratique des pactes d’actionnaires, et enfin, les modalités de sortie de l’investissement. L’objectif annoncé est de déceler les forces et les faiblesses du régime actuel du droit OHADA à l’épreuve des exigences du capital-investissement / In the last decade, the OHADA countries have seen a significant increase in private equity transactions. The OHADA region’s economic outlook, relative political stability and projected population growth make the region of prime interest to investment funds due to tremendous growth and investment opportunities. This new dynamic makes it important to consider OHADA law’s ability to meet the legal requirements of private equity funds in structuring and conducting their operations.This thesis (i) analyses the main legal issues for private equity under OHADA law and (ii) compares the handling of such issues under OHADA law with their handling under French law. As such, this thesis addresses the legal instruments for taking ownership interests, management rules for target companies (including shareholder agreements), and exit strategies. The objective of such analysis is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current OHADA law regime from a private equity perspective

Cette thèse aborde l’impact du private equity sur la gouvernance des entreprises (chapitres 1 et 2) et les déterminants du capital risque (chapitre 3). Les deux premiers chapitres examinent les changements que les capital-investisseurs introduisent dans la gouvernance des entreprises (en termes de remplacement du dirigeant) suite à une opération Public-to-Private. Les résultats empiriques montrent que (i) les entreprises soutenues par private equity exercent un suivi plus actif et sont plus susceptibles de licencier le dirigeant que les compagnies cotées (chapitre 1) (ii) les entreprises soutenues par des firmes de private equity plus spécialisées (en termes de secteur d’activité) ont moins tendance à licencier leur dirigeant que les entreprises soutenues par des firmes de private equity plus généralistes (chapitre 2). Du point de vue de la théorie, les résultats montrent que le taux de remplacement du directeur général et la sensibilité du départ du dirigeant à la performance sont plus élevés dans les entreprises soutenues par private equity que dans les compagnies cotées (chapitre 1). Ce résultat va dans le sens de l'hypothèse de contrôle, qui affirme que la structure de propriété plus concentrée des entreprises soutenues par private equity induit un contrôle plus fort des actionnaires et un remplacement plus fréquent du dirigeant en cas de faible performance que la structure de propriété dispersée des entreprises cotées. Pour les entreprises ayant des structures de propriété concentrées similaires (i. e., notre échantillon de compagnies soutenues par private equity du Chapitre 2), nos résultats empiriques confortent plutôt l’hypothèse de « l'information interne » avancée par Cornelli et Karakas (2015). Cette théorie suggère que les investisseurs sophistiqués (en particulier les firmes de private equity spécialisées) sont plus enclins à utiliser de l’information «soft» (interne) pour évaluer la compétence du directeur général et pour décider de son remplacement. A contrario, les investisseurs moins sophistiqués auraient tendance à privilégier de l’information «hard», par exemple la performance financière relative de l'entreprise (par rapport à des firmes similaires). Enfin, le Chapitre 3 est lié aux débats sur les déterminants du développement du capital-risque. Nous essayons d'évaluer la façon dont les mécanismes de soutien gouvernemental à l'innovation ont un impact sur les investissements en capital-risque. Nous examinons également l’effet modérateur de l'environnement institutionnel sur la relation entre les dépenses gouvernementales en recherche et développement (R&D) et le capital-risque. Nos résultats montrent qu'un niveau plus élevé de dépenses gouvernementales en R&D entraîne un niveau plus élevé d'investissements en capital-risque. Nous trouvons également une relation positive entre la qualité des institutions formelles et le montant des investissements en capital-risque early-stage. Contrairement aux résultats attendus, la qualité de l’environnement institutionnel a un effet modérateur négatif sur la relation entre les dépenses gouvernementales en R&D et le niveau des investissements en capital-risque. Ce résultat suggère qu’en présence d'institutions formelles hautement développées les opportunités technologiques mesurées par les dépenses gouvernementales en R&D n'ont aucun effet stimulant sur le développement du capital-risque. / This PhD thesis addresses the effects of private equity on corporate governance (Chapter 1 and 2) and the determinants of Venture Capital (VC) investments (Chapter 3). The first two chapters examine the changes that private equity investors introduce in the governance of their portfolio companies (in terms of CEO turnover) after a Public-to-Private (PTP) operation. Our empirical results show that (i) PE-backed companies exert a more active monitoring, and are more likely to dismiss their CEO than public firms (Chapter 1) (ii) PE-backed companies with more specialized investors are less likely to dismiss their CEO than other PE-backed companies (Chapter 2). From a theory perspective, the findings that CEO turnover rate and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity are higher in PE-backed companies comparing with public firms (Chapter 1) seem to support the ‘control hypothesis’, i.e., the contention that the concentrated (and illiquid) ownership structure of PE-backed companies provides stronger shareholder monitoring and a tighter control for poor performance than the dispersed ownership structure of public firms. For companies with similar concentrated ownership structures (i.e., our sample of PE-backed companies in Chapter 2), our results rather support the ‘inside information hypothesis’ of boards advanced by Cornelli and Karakas (2015). This theory suggests that sophisticated investors (e.g. specialized PE firms) are more likely to use ‘soft’ (inside) information when they evaluate the CEO’s competence and the decision to dismiss the CEO. In contrast, less sophisticated investors are more likely to base their decision on ‘hard’ information, e.g., the firm’s performance relative to its peers. Finally, Chapter 3 is related to debate on the determinants of venture capital development. We try to assess how particular mechanisms of governmental support to innovation impact VC investments, and whether the institutional environment moderates the relationship between governmental R&D and VC investments. Our results show that higher level of governmental R&D expenditures lead to higher level of VC investments. We found also that higher quality of formal institutions is associated with higher level of early stage VC activity. Contrary to what was expected, the quality of the institutional environment has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between governmental R&D expenditures and VC activity. A possible interpretation of this result is that in the presence of highly developed formal institutions the technological opportunities measured by governmental R&D expenditures have no stimulating effect on venture capital development.

Le terme de paradis fiscal est souvent employé dès lors qu’on aborde le thème des montages financiers utilisant une ou des sociétés offshore. Les spécialistes lui préfèrent celui de pays ou zone à fiscalité avantageuse ou privilégiée. Certaines personnes différencient deux catégories de territoires fiscalement favorables. L’expression « zone à fiscalité privilégiée » est souvent employée comme un euphémisme qui renvoie à des pays tels que la Belgique, l'Irlande, le Luxembourg, les Pays Bas, le Portugal, la Suisse, la Tunisie, Hong-Kong, la Malaisie, Singapour, notamment, alors que sont considérés comme « paradis fiscaux » Andorre, Jersey et Guernesey, Gibraltar, le Liechtenstein, Anguilla, Aruba, les Bahamas, la Barbade, les Bermudes, les îles Caïmans, Panama, etc. Il s’agit d’une classification assez vague, relative, en creux, classant séparément les zones dans lesquelles la fiscalité est relativement faible, souvent par rapport à la France ou l’Allemagne, et celles dans lesquelles elle est quasiment inexistante. Les difficultés que posent cette classification sont nombreuses et mettent en évidence l’insuffisance d’un tel raisonnement, souvent journalistique. La notion de paradis fiscal n’a qu’une valeur relative, d’où la difficulté de dégager une définition unique et universelle caractérisant ce phénomène. Il est nécessaire de recourir une définition basée sur un certain nombre de critères. Aussi, généralement, les paradis fiscaux se caractérisent par une absence ou un faible niveau d'imposition des revenus, du capital, et des transactions, ce qui constitue en général la motivation de leur utilisation. Ces avantages fiscaux ne concernent pas nécessairement l'ensemble des personnes qui y établissent leur domicile : le régime fiscal applicable peut différer pour les personnes physiques et morales, pour les résidents et les non résidents. La fiscalité de Jersey par exemple présente surtout un avantage pour des sociétés non résidentes ; Monaco est à l'inverse un paradis fiscal pour les personnes physiques, mais non pour les sociétés. On peut alors parler de pour certains de ces pays de « zones à fiscalité privilégiée ». Pour autant, la définition des zones à fiscalité privilégiée dans le droit français limite également l’usage de cette notion. Le droit français utilise donc une seule expression, dont le critère de détermination principal est mathématique. C’est une définition englobant toutes les notions généralement utilisées : paradis fiscal, centre offshore, etc.. C’est cette définition que nous retiendrons dans notre étude des zones à fiscalité privilégiée. L’optimisation fiscale, dont il est difficile de donner une véritable définition, pourrait se définir comme la mise en œuvre par un contribuable de moyens licites lui permettant de réduire son assiette d’imposition ou le poids de son impôt. C’est une stratégie financière courante et tout à fait légale. La fraude fiscale et l’évasion fiscale quant à elles, consistent, pour la première à une transgression intentionnelle de la règlementation fiscales de façon à minimiser son impôt par diverses techniques (omission volontaire de déclaration, minoration de recettes, majorations de charges, travail clandestin), et pour la seconde à déplacer tout ou partie de son patrimoine ou son activité vers un zones à fiscalité privilégiée, de façon illicite, encore une fois dans le but de se soumettre à l’impôt. / The end of tax havens is often used as it addresses the issue of the financial arrangements using one or more offshore companies. Specialists prefer country or area tax advantageous or privileged. Some people distinguish two categories of tax-friendly territories. The term 'zone to privileged taxation' is often used as a euphemism referring to countries such as the Belgium, the Ireland, the Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, Tunisia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, inter alia, that are considered to be "tax havens" Andorra, Jersey and Guernsey, Gibraltar, the Liechtenstein, Anguilla, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Panama, etc. It is a classification pretty vague, relative, intaglio, separately classifying the areas where tax is relatively low, compared to the France or the Germany.The difficulties posed by this classification are numerous and have highlighted the lack of such reasoning, often journalistic. The concept of tax haven has only a relative value, hence the difficulty to identify a single, universal definition characterizing this phenomenon. It is necessary to use a definition based on a number of criteria. Also, generally, tax havens are characterized by an absence or low taxation of capital income, and transactions, which is usually the motivation of their use. These tax benefits are not necessarily all of the people who will establish their home: the income tax regime can differ for the physical and legal persons, residents and non-residents. Jersey taxation for example advantage especially for non-resident companies; In contrast, Monaco is a tax haven for people.However, the definition of areas of taxation in French law also limits the use of this concept. French law therefore uses a single expression, which the main determining criterion is mathematical. It is a definition encompassing all commonly used concepts: tax haven, offshore Center, etc. It is this definition that we will retain in our study areas in privileged taxation. Tax optimization, which it is difficult to give a real definition, could be defined as the implementation by a taxpayer of lawful means to reduce its tax base or the weight of its tax. It is a common and quite legal financial strategy. Tax fraud and tax evasion as they are, for the first intentional transgression of the tax regulations to minimize its tax by various techniques (voluntary omission of declaration, minorazation).Privileged tax areas have potential for externalities that can serve the cause of economic efficiency. The proper conduct of the business areas in privileged taxation can stimulate investment and complementary business in other countries. Thats what we gather under the expression "economic backup." Our problem will therefore be as follows: is it possible to imagine a financing package of tax optimization based partly in a privileged but taxation area whose primary objective is the realization of an investment in the service of the economy of the country of origin, and therefore outside the scope of tax evasion? In the first part, we tacherons to define the scope of the possible (first part: fixtures and their suppression), engaging first to different assemblies and types of tax structures (title I), then to the French and European instruments to combat tax evasion . In a second part, we will study the existing sanctions and will demonstrate that an Assembly whose purpose is not only tax allows to counteract part II: the main sanctions and a possible countermeasure).

The private equity industry has experienced a decade marked by substantial growth. However, as the investment landscape for capital providers has become more complex, the leadership team of private equity firms plays a more crucial role in navigating significant challenges. Focused on two themes, this dissertation explores the background of top management teams (TMTs) in private equity firms, its correlation with fund performance, and the backgrounds of deal lead partners and their risk assessment of leveraged buyout (LBO) investments. The first essay investigates TMT diversity, emphasizing its multi-dimensional connection with fund performance. The study differentiates between socio-demographic and occupational diversity, uncovering various effects on fund outcomes. The second essay constructs a diversity index based on a comprehensive methodology to maximize the correlation between TMT diversity and private equity fund performance. The third essay explores the risk profiles of private equity partners in LBO investment decisions, establishing a link between socio-demographic backgrounds and distinct risk assessment archetypes. This dissertation contributes to the literature in the intersection of private equity and TMT, providing insights for scholars and practitioners alike.

In the present diploma thesis named "Acquisition of Shares and Subsequent Merger in Logistics Company" is given a broad overview of difficult processes of mergers and acquisitions as a useful tool for establishing a leveraged buyout (LBO) in terms of Czech business practice. The goal of the thesis is to analyze the specific acquisition process of obtaining a 100% stake in the company and subsequent merger. The thesis also aims to give readers a comprehensive guide of each step of a complex business transformation process through merger and simultaneously propose the optimal structuring of an acquisition of shares from other shareholders, resulting in a 100% stake in the company. In the form of present thesis readers get a manual with specific instructions how to proceed in the case of strategic decisions about leveraged buyouts (LBO) and subsequent merger.

L'émergence de lasers de plus en plus puissants et compacts et le développement de leurs applications engendrent des problèmes de tenue au flux des composants optiques et tout particulièrement des cristaux non linéaires. Dans ce contexte, cette thèse s'attache à l'étude de l'endommagement laser en régime nanoseconde dans les cristaux non linéaires utilisés principalement pour la conversion de fréquence (KTP, KDP, LBO) et les applications électro-optiques (RTP, KDP). Les effets spécifiques aux cristaux liés à leur anisotropie et leurs non linéarités ont imposé le développement d'une métrologie de l'endommagement laser adaptée. Cette métrologie a ensuite été appliquée à l'étude détaillée des cristaux isomorphes de KTP et RTP, et du cristal de LBO. L'influence sur leur tenue au flux laser de multiples paramètres, tels que la longueur d'onde d'irradiation, la polarisation, la direction de coupe du cristal, a pu être étudiée permettant de mieux comprendre les mécanismes responsables de l'endommagement laser dans ces cristaux. L'importance de la caractérisation de la tenue au flux laser de ces cristaux sous irradiation multiple et dans leurs conditions fonctionnelles d'utilisation a été mise en évidence. Par exemple, la coexistence de plusieurs longueurs d'onde au sein du matériau modifie de façon importante la tenue au flux laser du composant

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:22:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 66070100197.pdf: 310163 bytes, checksum: 3b9928fac26ea1cdec9c73ead81d55d9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-01T00:00:00Z / This work seeks to analyze the efficiency of the investment committees of the FIPs (Fundos de Investimento em Participações), the most relevant investment vehicle of the Brazilian private equity industry, taking into consideration that acquisitions made by these vehicles are not leveraged. Such analysis is made by comparing it with the American model, which usually delegates the investment decision to the general partner and employs a significant amount of leverage when acquiring a target. Initially, a non-exhaustive review of the Brazilian papers on private equity is conducted. Next, the particularities of the Brazilian model are pointed out, specially the investment decisions shared by fund managers and investors, and the scarce usage of leverage in the acquisitions, and it is shown how these characteristics affect the equilibrium of Axelson, Strömberg and Weisbach’s model. The conclusion is that the particularities of the FIPs model offer: (i) better protection to the limited partners’ interests and (ii) allow the general partners to take advantage of the period when the transactions occur at lower multiples, resulting in a more efficient investment model with a countercyclical nature. However, such conclusions are subject to the compliance of the following premises: (i) the investment committee must have qualifications as good as, or better than, those of the general partner, (ii) it must have enough time and personnel availability to analyze the opportunities as deeply as the general partner does, (iii) the existence of the investment committee must not result in a competitive disadvantage for the limited partner in terms of agility in the negotiation processes. Finally, some potential situations of conflicts of interests of the committee members are raised. / Este trabalho objetiva analisar a eficiência dos comitês de investimento no modelo de investimento em private equity através de FIPs (Fundos de Investimento em Participações) que não utilizam alavancagens em suas aquisições. Tal análise é feita através de uma comparação com o modelo americano, no qual tipicamente o gestor do fundo tem o poder de decisão sobre os investimentos e as aquisições são realizadas utilizando financiamento de terceiros. A dissertação é iniciada com uma revisão bibliográfica não-exaustiva dos trabalhos da academia brasileira sobre o tema de private equity. Em seguida, levanta-se as particularidades do modelo dos FIPs, principalmente a decisão de investimento feita em conjunto pelo gestor e seus investidores através de comitês de investimento e a rara utilização de alavancagem nas aquisições, e demonstra-se como o impacto destas características altera o equilíbrio do modelo proposto por Axelson, Strömberg e Weisbach. Conclui-se que as particularidades do modelo dos FIPs que não utilizam alavancagens nas aquisições oferecem: (i) melhor proteção aos interesses dos investidores, e uma representativade similar aos conselhos de administração de companhias abertas, e (ii) permitem que o gestor aproveite os períodos nos quais as transações ocorrem a um múltiplo mais baixo, resultando num modelo mais eficiente de investimento e que evita a multiplicação dos ciclos econômicos. Tais conclusões, no entanto, estão sujeitas à observação das seguintes condições: (i) o comitê deve ter qualificação igual ou superior ao do gestor; (ii) o comitê deve ter disponibilidade de tempo e corpo suficientes para analisar os investimentos nas mesma profundidade que o gestor, (iii) a existência do comitê de investimento não deve acarretar numa desvantagem para o gestor em termos de agilidade de resposta nas negociações. Finalmente, são levantadas algumas situações de ponteciais conflitos de interesse nas quais os membros dos comitês de investimento podem se encontrar.