The purpose of this essay is to critically examine the current legal status of animals in the United States and offer possible alternatives to the current legal rights for animals. This essay examines the failures of the legal system in protecting animals that have abilities very similar to our own. With an examination of these types of animals, this essay will explain why some animals merit the status of legal personhood to protect them from being carelessly used by others. Ultimately, this essay is an attempt to open the field of legal protection for many animals starting with a few through legal personhood.

The issues raised in this thesis concern the adverse effects of EU's wildlife trade regulations, mainly the unequal treatment of captive and wild-born endangered animals. The nature of these regulations is analyzed from an animal law perspective. The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether the regulations are anthropocentric and, if so, what issues arise from it. Previous research has studied the legal personhood of animals in relation to animal welfare. This thesis continues that discussion by examining legal animal rights as a potential solution to the issues of wildlife trade. The analysis is pragmatic and employs a non-formalistic view of law. Consequentially, it uses a doctrinal and legal philosophical approach, meaning that sources outside of law are integral to the discussion. The results of the analysis show that EU’s wildlife trade regulations are anthropocentric and that this has led to severe issues regarding the welfare of endangered animals. In addition, the practical enforcement of the regulations has proven defective. Legal rights for animals seem to provide a viable solution to these issues, yet their practical implementation is complicated. The reasons for this are primarily financial and opinion-based. Therefore, a step-by-step approach, starting with limited fundamental rights and resulting in full legal personhood for animals, is recommended for this approach to be successful.

Artificial intelligence as a challenge to private law Abstract The subject of this master thesis is private law and artificial intelligence. The main goal of this thesis is the analysis of private law aspects of artificial intelligence and the evaluation of current laws regarding this technology. Therefore, the thesis mainly deals with the legal status of artificial intelligence within the current law and the possible granting of the status of an electronic person. It also deals with the issue of appropriate regulation of artificial intelligence in the future. The first part of the thesis is focused primarily on the concept of artificial intelligence, its importance for society and law and its risks. The primary goal of this chapter is to acquaint the reader with the functioning of artificial intelligence as a technology, while considering its differences from other technologies, especially its autonomy. The second part of the thesis is then focused on a critical analysis of artificial intelligence in terms of current law, according to which artificial intelligence can be considered a thing in the legal sense, a product or an author's work. Part of this chapter is also focused on the issue of protection of works or inventions created by artificial intelligence and on the considerations of artificial...

A lei atual foi forjada sobre a premissa de que a humanidade está no centro do mundo e de que o homem é o único e legitimado senhor de todos os seres vivos. Desde que Darwin revelou para o mundo uma então chocante realidade sim, nós viemos de um símio ancestral os princípios filosóficos do antropocentrismo começaram a ruir. E os animais, que nós sempre pensamos como objetivos de uso e consumo humano, como sofás, mesas e cadeiras? E os seres que nós descobrimos serem tão relacionados a nós que os chamamos de primos ou humanlike? Eles ainda são bens móveis nas palavras fora de moda do direito posto? Pois agora que uma nova realidade está implodindo os antigos tabus de irracionalidade e instinto pavloviano, muitos juristas e filósofos passaram a defender a existência de direitos fundamentais (como à vida, à liberdade, e à integridade física) a vários animais, baseados na sua igualdade substancial aos seres humanos. Para os que sustentam tais ideias, os animais, como a maioria de nós, têm interesses considerados relevantes, o que significa que eles podem pensar racionalmente, evitando a dor e o sofrimento, e procurando o bem-estar, mas somente o pequeno grupo chamado de grandes primatas (no qual se incluem o próprio homem e, além dele, os outros hominoides e antropoides, isto é, os chimpanzés, gorilas, orangotangos e bonobos) conhecem os rudimentos (blocos construtores) da moralidade. Aos grandes primatas podem ser reconhecidos direitos subjetivos? A resposta pode ser encontrada tanto no jusnaturalismo (na teoria do direito natural), que concebe direitos inatos, partilhados, segundo Justiniano, entre todas as criaturas vivas, quanto na teoria do interesse de Ihering, em oposição à teoria da vontade de Windscheid. Conjuntamente, eles podem explicar um novo conceito de personalidade jurídica mínima para os grandes primatas. / Modern Law is founded over the premise that mankind is in the center of the world; that man is the sole master and ruler of all living beings. Since Darwin brought into the eyes of humanity a brand new shocking reality yes, we came from the apish ancestor philosophy principles of anthropocentrism have collapsed. What about those animals we always thought as mere objects like sofas, tables or chairs? What about those beings we have now discovered so close related to us that we are used to call them as kin or humanlike creatures? Are they still goods by the old-fashioned words of written law? For a new reality is overcoming ancient taboos of irrationality and pavlovian instincts, there are now many jurists and philosophers who defend basic rights (such as life, liberty and bodily integrity) to lots of animals, based on their substantial equality to humans. For those who claim in their favor, animals, like most of us, have interests considered relevant, which means that they can think rationally, avoiding pain and suffering, and seeking for wellness of living, but only the small group called the great apes (in which we include the man himself as also the other hominoids or anthropoids: chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos) know the building blocks of morality. Are they so entitled to have rights? The answer lies in both jusnaturalism (theory of natural rights), which conceives inherent rights of living, commonly shared, according to Justinian, by all living creatures, and in Ihering theory of interest opposed to Windscheids of will. Combined together they can provide a new concept of minimum notion of legal personhood for the great apes.

A lei atual foi forjada sobre a premissa de que a humanidade está no centro do mundo e de que o homem é o único e legitimado senhor de todos os seres vivos. Desde que Darwin revelou para o mundo uma então chocante realidade sim, nós viemos de um símio ancestral os princípios filosóficos do antropocentrismo começaram a ruir. E os animais, que nós sempre pensamos como objetivos de uso e consumo humano, como sofás, mesas e cadeiras? E os seres que nós descobrimos serem tão relacionados a nós que os chamamos de primos ou humanlike? Eles ainda são bens móveis nas palavras fora de moda do direito posto? Pois agora que uma nova realidade está implodindo os antigos tabus de irracionalidade e instinto pavloviano, muitos juristas e filósofos passaram a defender a existência de direitos fundamentais (como à vida, à liberdade, e à integridade física) a vários animais, baseados na sua igualdade substancial aos seres humanos. Para os que sustentam tais ideias, os animais, como a maioria de nós, têm interesses considerados relevantes, o que significa que eles podem pensar racionalmente, evitando a dor e o sofrimento, e procurando o bem-estar, mas somente o pequeno grupo chamado de grandes primatas (no qual se incluem o próprio homem e, além dele, os outros hominoides e antropoides, isto é, os chimpanzés, gorilas, orangotangos e bonobos) conhecem os rudimentos (blocos construtores) da moralidade. Aos grandes primatas podem ser reconhecidos direitos subjetivos? A resposta pode ser encontrada tanto no jusnaturalismo (na teoria do direito natural), que concebe direitos inatos, partilhados, segundo Justiniano, entre todas as criaturas vivas, quanto na teoria do interesse de Ihering, em oposição à teoria da vontade de Windscheid. Conjuntamente, eles podem explicar um novo conceito de personalidade jurídica mínima para os grandes primatas. / Modern Law is founded over the premise that mankind is in the center of the world; that man is the sole master and ruler of all living beings. Since Darwin brought into the eyes of humanity a brand new shocking reality yes, we came from the apish ancestor philosophy principles of anthropocentrism have collapsed. What about those animals we always thought as mere objects like sofas, tables or chairs? What about those beings we have now discovered so close related to us that we are used to call them as kin or humanlike creatures? Are they still goods by the old-fashioned words of written law? For a new reality is overcoming ancient taboos of irrationality and pavlovian instincts, there are now many jurists and philosophers who defend basic rights (such as life, liberty and bodily integrity) to lots of animals, based on their substantial equality to humans. For those who claim in their favor, animals, like most of us, have interests considered relevant, which means that they can think rationally, avoiding pain and suffering, and seeking for wellness of living, but only the small group called the great apes (in which we include the man himself as also the other hominoids or anthropoids: chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos) know the building blocks of morality. Are they so entitled to have rights? The answer lies in both jusnaturalism (theory of natural rights), which conceives inherent rights of living, commonly shared, according to Justinian, by all living creatures, and in Ihering theory of interest opposed to Windscheids of will. Combined together they can provide a new concept of minimum notion of legal personhood for the great apes.

Dans un contexte où la reconnaissance de droits légaux à certaines entités non humaines apparaît comme une évolution juridique de plus en plus plausible, ce mémoire se veut une exploration de la littérature philosophique et juridique en faveur de l’octroi de la personnalité juridique aux animaux. Tout d’abord, nous offrirons un bref tour d’horizon historique de la notion de personne et pourrons constater que si celle-ci a fortement été associée à l’autonomie morale dans l’histoire du droit et de la philosophie, cette définition de la personnalité souffre d’importantes incohérences lorsque vient le temps de justifier l’extension de la personnalité aux êtres humains dépourvus de cette autonomie morale. C’est le cas, par exemple, des enfants, des êtres humains plongés dans le coma, des handicapés mentaux ou encore de certaines personnes âgées. Nous pourrons également constater que le geste qui consiste à octroyer des droits légaux à ces individus tout en refusant de reconnaître ces mêmes droits aux animaux repose sur des bases théoriques fragiles qu’il convient de revoir l’aide d’une analyse approfondie des théories des droits des animaux proposées depuis les années 1970. Ces théories, et plus particulièrement celles proposées par Peter Singer, Tom Regan et Gary Francione, feront l’objet d’un examen qui permettra de faire ressortir leurs forces et faiblesses respectives. Enfin, dans le dernier chapitre de ce mémoire, nous nous pencherons sur le rôle que peuvent jouer les appels aux droits moraux dans l’attribution de droits légaux. Nous y brosserons aussi une esquisse des différentes formes de personnalité juridique et de statut politique que pourraient se voir octroyer les animaux non humains. / In a context where the recognition of legal rights to certain nonhuman entities appears to be an increasingly plausible legal development, this master’s thesis proposes an exploration of the philosophical and legal literature in favor of granting legal personhood to animals. First, I will provide a brief historical overview of the notion of “person.” I will also note that, while it has been strongly associated with moral autonomy in the history of law and philosophy, this definition of personhood suffers from substantial inconsistencies in justifying the granting of legal personhood to non-autonomous human beings. It is the case, for instance, of children, comatose human beings, the mentally disabled, and the elderly. We will also see that granting legal rights to these individuals while refusing to recognize these same rights to nonhuman animals is based on fragile theoretical foundations that need to be rectified with a thorough analysis of the theories of animal rights proposed since the 1970s. These theories, specifically the ones put forward by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione, will be examined to identify their respective strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the final chapter of this research will examine the decisive role that appeals to moral rights can play in granting legal rights to animals. It also outlines the various forms of legal personhood and political status that might be attributed to nonhuman animals.

[pt] Este trabalho utiliza o caso do desastre de Mariana (2015) como casogatilho para analisar a abordagem jurídica das corporações no contexto de produção econômica de falhas em barragens de rejeito. A personalidade jurídica de corporações carrega o mistério de ser similar a uma pessoa física, juridicamente, ao mesmo tempo em que completamente diferente de uma pessoa humana quando vista por fora da dimensão jurídica. Assim sendo, é analisado o conceito de personalidade jurídica corporativa conforme as teorias hegemônicas do direito, revelando suas insuficiências para abordar o caso do desastre de Mariana. Em seguida, são a avaliadas alternativas teóricas nos estudos de Evguieni Pachukanis e alguns autores que fazem referência aos seus conceitos. Os limites e potencialidades identificados na construção teórica pachukaniana conduzem à elaboração preliminar do conceito de personalidade jurídica corporativa e suas dinâmicas internas em dois passos. Primeiro, revisitando as teorias do fetichismo do capital e da forma-valor, que levam à uma melhor compreensão de formas mais desenvolvidas e fetichizadas como no caso do capital portador de juros, bem como o papel das transações jurídicas no circuito do capital. Segundo, revisitando a construção histórica da forma corporativa e dos seus atributos legais nos Estados Unidos da América e Reino Unido. Finalmente, são propostas algumas características e dinâmicas para interpretação da personalidade jurídica corporativa, considerando as variáveis descritas na análise prévia do desastre de Mariana. / [en] This work uses the Mariana mining disaster (2015) as a trigger case to analyze how corporations are legally perceived in the context of disasters, specifically, tailings dam failures. The legal personality of corporations carries the mystery of being similar to a natural person judicially at the same time that are completely different from a human person when analyzed outside of the legal realm. Under that puzzle, the corporate legal personality nature was analyzed before the hegemonic theories of Brazilian legal scholars, revealing their insufficiencies to approach the Mariana Mining Disaster. Subsequently, an alternative approach is assessed through the studies of Evguieni Pashukanis and some recent authors that endorse his main ideas. Pashukanis reveals potentialities and limits that led to a proper elaboration of the corporate legal personhood concept and its internal dynamics in two steps. Firstly, revisiting the capital fetishism and the value-form theories, which led to a better understanding of the most developed and fetishized forms of capital, the interest bearing capital, as well as the contradictory developments between the capital and productive circuits. Secondly, revisiting the historic construction of the corporate form and its legal features in both USA and United Kingdom, in order to perceive the ascension of the corporate legal personality concept. Finally, some the corporate legal personhood concept characteristics and dynamics are proposed. / [de] Diese Dissertation nimmt den Fall der Tragodie von Mariana (2015) als Ausgangspunkt, um zu analysieren, wie Unternehmen im Zusammenhang von Naturkatastrophen – insbesondere von Dammbrüchen – rechtlich wahrgenommen werden. Unternehmen als juristische Personen tragen ein Geheimnis in sich: Einerseits sind sie rechtlich gesehen den natürlichen Personen ahnlich, andererseits sind sie aber auberhalb des rechtlichen Raums ganz anders als menschliche Personen. Zunachst wird der von den vorherrschenden Rechtstheorien vertretene Begriff der Rechtspersonlichkeit des Unternehmens herausgearbeitet und dessen Unzugänglichkeiten bei der Analyse der Tragodie von Mariana werden aufgezeigt. Anschliebend wird der alternative Ansatz von Evguieni Pashukanis und seinen Nachfolgern analysiert. Die bei Pashukanis identifizierten Grenzen und Potenziale fuhren zu der Formulierung eines neuen Begriffs der Rechtspersonlichkeit des Unternehmens und deren internen Dynamiken, und zwar in zwei Schritten. Erstens werden die Konzeption des Kapitalfetischismus und die der Wertform wieder aufgegriffen, was zu einem besseren Verstandnis der entwickeltesten und fetischisiertesten Auspragungen des Phänomens führt, namlich des Falles des verzinslichen Kapitals sowie der Rolle juristischer Transaktionen im Kapitalkreislauf. Zweitens wird die historische Konstruktion der Unternehmensform und deren rechtlichen Eigenschaften sowohl in den USA als auch in Grobbritannien rekonstruiert. Zum Schluss werden einige Merkmale und Dynamiken zur Deutung der Rechtspersonlichkeit des Unternehmens vorgeschlagen, wobei die Variablen berücksichtigt werden, die in der vorherigen Analyse der Tragodie von Mariana beschrieben wurden.