Cette thèse vise à bien faire ressortir la profonde originalité, par rapport à la tradition logique antérieure, de la logique de Leibniz et, à travers elle, de toute la logique de type mathématique ou symbolique inaugurée par les Modernes. La comparaison des enseignements de Leibniz avec ceux des logiciens de tradition aristotélicienne â propos des thèmes en apparence les plus traditionnels (syllogisme, démonstration, définition, énonciation, mot en logique) révèle de façon détaillée à quel point Leibniz s'écarte d'Aristote et avec quelle merveilleuse audace il engage la logique sur des voies nouvelles. Les innovations introduites par Leibniz n'acquièrent cependant leur pleine intelligibilité qu'une fois connus les motifs qui les ont suscitées. Aussi avons-nous fait précéder la comparaison de l'ancien et du moderne d'une investigation des différentes origines de la logique leibnizienne. Parmi les éléments extérieurs au système leibnizien comme tel, les développements dans les mathématiques ou les arts du calcul survenus à cette époque ont exercé une influence prépondérante. On observe chez Leibniz un mathématisme qui l'oriente vers un nouvel idéal de rigueur scientifique inspiré des déductions telles qu'on les retrouve dans le calcul algébrique et ses divers prolongements. La mathématisation de la physique, amorcée depuis peu, propose un nouveau modèle de la connaissance scientifique et suggère la recherche d'un nouvel organon logique. Cette recherche du nouveau est d'ailleurs fortement encouragée par la mentalité générale des premiers philosophes modernes. La logique leibnizienne tire également ses origines d'éléments intrinsèques au système leibnizien. Les enseignements de Leibniz sur le déroulement des opérations de l'esprit ainsi que sur la nature de la vérité et de l'être et son unité ne relèvent pas nécessairement de la logique comme telle, mais constituent des présupposés aux enseignements les plus proprement logiques du philosophe de Hanovre. Non pas bien sûr que Leibniz lui-même n'ait souvent développé ses opinions sur ces sujets sous l'influence d'idées qu'il avait déjà antérieurement sur la logique, mais il fallait de toutes façons révéler la cohérence logico-métaphysique du système leibnizien. Ainsi par exemple, ce n'est qu'une fois conçue à la fois comme correspondance de la chose et de l'intelligence, comme non contradiction et possibilité et comme identité que la vérité sur des êtres conçus comme complexes de monades pourra se dévoiler à l'intelligence logico-mathématisée.

Anachronistische Lektüren ziehen das Verstehen aus der Gegenwart in die Vergangenheit zurück und orientieren es neu: Was uns in Anbetracht des Interpretierten gewaltsam erscheint, ist es zugleich für die Interpretation, weil sich ihr Horizont nachhaltig verändert. Es ist das Paradox philosophiehistorischer Arbeit, daß die Gegenwart der Philosophie neu definiert wird, sobald man ihre Vergangenheit uminterpretiert. Es gibt keinen Zwang, beispielsweise Leibniz auszulegen, weder für Heidegger, noch für Deleuze oder sonst einen Philosophen. Er ist bereits interpretiert, in Monographien, Aufsätzen und Philosophiegeschichten. Eine neue und starke Interpretation verändert in jedem Fall diese Voraussetzungen und zugleich damit die Modelle der Geschichte der Philosophie. Es ist ein anderer Anachronismus, der Heideggers Leibniz-Evokationen auszeichnet, als der Rückgang Deleuzes auf den 'Denker des Barock'. Es ist auch ein jeweils anderes Modell der philosophischen Zeit und der Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der Philosophie.

Eine heftig geführte und lang dauernde philosophische Debatte wurde im 20. Jahrhundert um die Aufklärung geführt, um das wissenschaftliche Denken, um die Rationalität überhaupt. Das 20. Jahrhundert war das Jahrhundert der 'Kritik der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft', sowohl im Sinne einer Prüfung methodischer Rationalität wie auch als Absetzbewegung davon. In der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts hat dieser Streit oft die Form eines deutsch-französischen Zwists angenommen, mit Anklägern und Verteidigern beiderseits des Rheins. Descartes und die Philosophie der Subjektivität bildete oft den Einsatz in diesem Streit, Leibniz spielte dagegen kaum eine Rolle, obwohl er nicht minder als Vertreter des klassischen Rationalismus galt. Bemerkenswert ist auf französischer Seite zuletzt ein durchaus emphatisches Bekenntnis zum Leibnizianismus von Gilles Deleuze, der 1988 Leibniz als barocken Denker der Falte apostrophierte. Leibniz als postmoderner oder poststrukturalistischer Philosoph? Wo steht Leibniz im 20. Jahrhundert und in der Debatte um Rationalität? Diesen Fragen soll der folgende Text nachgehen. In diesem Zusammenhang ist mitzudenken, daß Martin Heidegger in langjähriger Auseinandersetzung mit Leibniz dessen Rationalismus ähnlich emphatisch wie Deleuze rezipierte, allerdings mit negativem Vorzeichen und als Teil seiner geschichtsphilosophischen Abwertung traditioneller Metaphysik. Heidegger überführt die klassische Vernunft mittels einer Kritik an Leibnizens 'Satz vom Grund' der philosophischen Unzulänglichkeit. So ist offenbar im Rationalismusproblem des 20. Jahrhunderts eine Leibniz-Rezeption versteckt, deren Streitwert noch gehoben werden muß.

Diss.--Zugl.: Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1986. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

The general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind. We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing. In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism. In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke's causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke's position suffers from the omission of concepts.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2007-07-27Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:27:02Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 vagna_r_me_mar.pdf: 434719 bytes, checksum: a428d91e5b541767ee3e4a6a8500c5a9 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Partindo do sistema leibniziano e tomando como fio condutor a questão da geração da vida, pretendemos indicar os motivos filosóficos que levaram Leibniz a apoiar os biólogos pré-formacionistas do século XVII. A idéia de embutimento (ou encaixamento) de um novo ser dentro do seu progenitor, defendida pela teoria pré-formacionista, traz como que um exemplo do mundo monádico leibniziano, no qual todos os acontecimentos futuros, inclusive a geração de novos seres, foram já estabelecidos por Deus no momento da criação. As investigações microscópicas desenvolvidas por biólogos da época, especialmente por Leeuwenhoeck, descrevem um mundo até então desconhecido e trazem uma comprovação experimental da concepção teórica leibniziana. / Coming from the Leibniz`s system and taking as thread the question of the generation of the life, we intend to indicate the philosophical reasons that had taken Leibniz to support the preformationist biologists from the 17th century. The idea of inlaying (or fitting) of a new being into its ancestor, defended by the preformationist theory, brings an example about Leibniz`s monads world, in which all the future events, also the generation of new beings, already had been established by God at the moment of the creation. Microscopic researches developed by biologists at this time, especially by Leeuwenhoek, describe an unknown world until then, and bring an experimental evidence of Leibniz`s theoretical conception.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Letras, Departamento de Línguas Estrangeiras e Tradução, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos da Tradução, 2014 / Submitted by Ana Cristina Barbosa da Silva (annabds@hotmail.com) on 2014-11-28T18:19:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JulianaCecciSilva.pdf: 966858 bytes, checksum: 43d1c20b5a3fc31c972dff9469fb4555 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2014-12-01T15:25:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JulianaCecciSilva.pdf: 966858 bytes, checksum: 43d1c20b5a3fc31c972dff9469fb4555 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-01T15:25:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JulianaCecciSilva.pdf: 966858 bytes, checksum: 43d1c20b5a3fc31c972dff9469fb4555 (MD5) / À luz do pensamento do rastro de Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), da desconstrução, e de nossa experiência com a leitura e a tradução de textos da Filosofia da Linguagem, sobretudo os do alemão Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), pretendemos apresentar algumas teses filosóficas (etimológicas e filológicas) de Leibniz sobre a questão da natureza da linguagem que contribuíram para a formação da Linguística Histórico-Comparativa e, do ponto de vista de Derrida, das teorias logocêntricas da Tradução. Teorias fundadas na busca pelo "sentido", isso é, em uma metafísica da linguagem. Para ilustrar tais considerações, apoiados nos fundamentos teóricos e metodológicos do tradutor Antoine Berman (1942-1991), em particular nos desenvolvidos em seu La Traduction et la Lettre ou l'alberge du lointain (2007), em primeiro lugar, faremos a "analítica" de alguns trechos da primeira tradução brasileira da obra Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain, par l'auteur du système de l'harmonie préetablie ( (1765) - do primeiro capítulo do livro III, o Des Mots, para sermos mais específicos - a fim de explicitar o "sistema de deformação" da "letra" que aí opera; em seguida, proporemos uma segunda tradução dos três capítulos iniciais, ou melhor, uma "retradução". Trata-se de capítulos em que Leibniz tece importantes considerações sobre os aspectos "materiais" da natureza da linguagem. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / In light of the thought of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) trace, of the deconstruction, and of our experience with the reading and the translating texts of the philosophy of the language, especially those of the German Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), we intend to presente some philosophical (etymological and philological) theses of Leibniz on the subject of the language’s nature that contributed to the formation of the Historical-comparative Linguistics and, from the Derrida’s point of view, to the logocentric theories of translation. Theories founded on the search for “the signification”, i.e., on a metaphysics of the language. To illustrate such considerations, supported by the theoretical and methodological foundations of the translator Antoine Berman (1942-1991), particularly in those developed in his La Traduction et la Lettre ou l’Alberge du lointain (2007), first, in order to explain the “letter’s system of deformation” that operates there, we will make the “analytical” of some passages of the first Brazilian translation of the work Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, par l’auteur du système de l’harmonie préétablie (1765) – the first chapter of the book III, Des Mots, to be more specific –; after that, we will propose a second translation of the three initials chapters, or better, a “retranslation”. These are chapters in which Leibniz weaves important considerations about the “material” aspects of the nature of language.

Orientador: Adma Fadul Muhana / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T15:02:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bonilha_AlexandredaCruz_M.pdf: 6211534 bytes, checksum: d29cfbdd121f6e09e43083b61c775e6e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / Resumo: Esta dissertação examina o prefácio de Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 ¿ 1716) que trata do estilo de discurso adequado à Filosofia, intitulado Dissertação sobre o estilo filosófico de Mario Nizzoli, de 1670, quando Leibniz reedita a obra de Mario Nizzoli (1498 ¿ 1566) Sobre os verdadeiros princípios e o verdadeiro método de filosofar (de 1553). Neste trabalho, avalio a concepção de Leibniz de discurso filosófico e sua inerência à Retórica, à pureza e elegância da linguagem, concepção que se revela ao Leibniz aprovar o projeto de Nizzoli de restauração da eloqüência filosófica. Por outro lado, destaco também a oposição de Leibniz a Nizzoli, quando este responsabiliza Aristóteles ¿ vinculando-o a seus intérpretes escolásticos ¿, pela corrupção da eloqüência filosófica. Deste modo, Leibniz, partidário de Aristóteles, planeja reabilitá-lo, afastando-o da barbárie escolástica, sem com isso pender para o ciceronianismo renascentista de Nizzoli. Este trabalho tem como objetivos: I ¿ Apresentar as circunstâncias de produção da Dissertação sobre o estilo filosófico de Mario Nizzoli e da reedição da obra de Mario Nizzoli, bem como sua relação com o debate filosófico renascentista da eloqüência x barbárie; II ¿ Relacionar a Dissertação com o debate filosófico renascentista da eloqüência x barbárie; III ¿ Expor as propostas e conceitos da Dissertação; IV ¿ Analisar retoricamente a Dissertação; V ¿ Traduzir a Dissertação / Resumé: Cette dissertation examine l¿avant-propos de Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 - 1716), qui porte sur le style de discours approprié à la Philosophie, intitulé Dissertation sur le style philosophique de Mario Nizzol, de 1670, quand Leibniz se charge de la réédition de l¿oeuvre de Mario Nizzoli (1498 ¿1566), Des vrais principes et de la vraie méthode de philosopher (1553). Dans ce travail, on apprécie la conception de Leibniz de discours philosophique et son inhérence à la Réthorique, la pureté et l¿élégance du langage. Cette conception se révèle par l¿approbation de la part de Leibniz du projet de Nizzoli qui a pour but la restauration de l¿éloquence philosophique. Par ailleurs, on relève aussi l¿opposition de Leibniz à Nizzoli dans la mesure où celui-ci accuse Aristote ? en l¿attachant à ses interprètes scolastiques ?de la corruption de l¿éloquence philosophique. Ainsi, Leibniz, partisan d¿Aristote, a l¿intention de réhabiliter celui-ci, en l¿écartant de la barbarie scolastique, sans pour cette raison pendre vers le cicéronisme renaissant de Nizzoli. Ce travail a pour but: I ¿ Présenter les circonstances de production de la Dissertation sur le style philosophique de Mario Nizzoli et de la réédition de l¿oeuvre de Mario Nizzoli; II ¿ Examiner la Dissertation au sein du débat philosophique à la Renaissance concernant la relation entre éloquence et barbarie; III ¿ Exposer les propos et les concepts de la Dissertation; IV ¿ Analyser réthoriquement la Dissertation; V ¿ Traduire la Dissertation / Mestrado / Teoria e Critica Literaria / Mestre em Teoria e História Literária

Orientador: Fátima Regina Rodrigues Évora / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-25T21:06:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Moreira_EdsonAdriano_D.pdf: 961513 bytes, checksum: f0259749256481cc107a396e735849f9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: Essa Tese analisa a controvérsia entre Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz e Isaac Newton acerca do estatuto adequado à gravitação universal newtoniana. Mais precisamente, ela procura esclarecer porque Leibniz critica a teoria newtoniana, acusando-a de postular um princípio milagroso ou uma qualidade oculta escolástica no domínio da filosofia natural, enquanto Newton, por sua vez, tentará defendê-la dessas críticas, afirmando ser a gravidade uma qualidade manifesta da matéria e o princípio que a expressa uma verdadeira lei da natureza. Para tanto, serão analisadas as cartas desses autores onde essas questões são pontualmente discutidas, quais sejam a Correspondência Leibniz-Clarke [1715-1716], a Correspondência Leibniz-Newton [1692-1693], a Carta de Leibniz a Hartsoeker [1711], a Carta de Newton ao editor das "Memoirs of Literature" [1712]; ademais, serão analisadas passagens importantes das três edições dos Princípios Matemáticos de Filosofia Natural [1687, 1713 e 1726], das cinco edições da Óptica [1704, 1706, 1717, 1721 e 1730 (edição póstuma)] e de alguns outros textos talvez menos conhecidos de Newton se comparados a estes dois, mas igualmente fundamentais para um bom entendimento das suas réplicas a Leibniz, a saber, a Carta de Newton a Bentley [1692], a Carta de Newton a Cotes [1713], a resenha que Newton publica anonimamente nas Philosophical Transactions da Royal Society sob o título de "An Account of the Book Entituled Commercium Epistolicum" [1714-1715] e uma "Conclusio" projetada por Newton para fazer parte da primeira edição dos Princípios Matemáticos de Filosofia Natural, a qual ele acabou não incluindo na versão final deste texto de 1687, mas que deu origem às considerações do famoso Escólio Geral, inserido na obra partir da sua segunda edição em 1713. Todo esse trabalho deverá, ainda, levar em conta os métodos e as entidades explicativas admitidos no panorama geral da ciência nos séculos XVI e XVII / Abstract: This Thesis analyzes the controversy between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Isaac Newton regarding the adequate statute to the Newtonian universal gravitation. More precisely, it tries to elucidate why Leibniz criticizes the Newtonian theory, accusing him of postulating a miraculous principle or a scholastic occult quality in the domain of Natural Philosophy, whereas Newton advocates his theory and protects it from such reviews claiming that gravity is a manifest quality of the matter and that the principle which expresses it is a true law of nature. To conduct this work, letters and texts written by these authors discussing such issues will be analyzed: The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence [1715-1716]; The Leibniz-Newton Correspondence [1692-1693]; The Letter from Leibniz to Hartsoeker [1711]; and The Letter from Newton to the Editor of the "Memoirs of Literature" [1712]. Besides these letters, other important texts will be studied: passages from three editions of the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy [1687, 1713 and 1726]; passages from five editions of the Optics [1704, 1706, 1717, 1721 and 1730 (a posthumous edition)]; and some other Newton¿s texts perhaps not as well-known as the other two, but equally fundamental for a good understanding of the author¿s replies addressed to Leibniz: The Letter from Newton to Bentley [1692], The Letter from Newton to Cotes [1713], the review Newton published anonymously in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society under the title of "An Account of the Book Entituled Commercium Epistolicum" [1714-1715] and a "Conclusio" projected by Newton to be part of the first edition of the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, which he did not include in the final version of this text from 1687, but which was the origin to the considerations presented in the famous General Scholium, appended to his work since its second edition in 1713. It should also be mentioned that this Thesis will take into consideration the methods and the explanatory entities admitted in the general panorama of science of the XVI and XVII centuries / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished