The thesis argues, in lie main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by Kripke, that is destructive of a realist account of rules and contends that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in an understanding of the rule. In addition to these consequences, this negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dummett's charge of radical conventionalism (a charge that also, but differently, applies to certain mid-period views and this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by Kripke's sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding of a rule of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able to follow a rule correctly. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect of this appearance, involves what Wittgenstein calls following a rule "blindly" in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, of following a rule blindly, involves developing an account of an alternative rational response to rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but all the same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule application.

Qu’est-ce qui légitime un discours éthique ? Se distingue-t-il des autres discours ? Pouvons-nous nous entendre sur un tel sujet ? Voilà quelques questions choisies auxquelles nous allons tenter de répondre. Notre étude se nourrit des réflexions de Ludwig Wittgenstein. La position de ce dernier concernant l’éthique présente plusieurs aspects de ce thème. Pendant une période de son parcours intellectuel, elle apparaît à la fois fondamentale et taboue, alors que dans une autre, elle trouve une place dans le discours, mais s’évanouit dans un certain relativisme. En disposant une trame où l’éthique s’enchevêtre, le discours se révèle un médium crucial. Au sein de cet espace, notre enquête déterminera la cohérence de la relation entre l’éthique et la signification. En scrutant un type de discours particulier (l’éthique médicale), nous confronterons ultimement l’apport wittgensteinien sur cette question. Il nous sera alors envisageable de pointer la possibilité d’une cohérence de l’éthique au sein du langage. / What legitimizes an ethical speech? Does it distinguish itself from other speeches? Can we agree on such subject? Here are some selected questions which we will try to answer. Our study is nourished by Ludwig Wittgenstein thoughts. The latter’s position concerning the ethics presents several aspects of this thematic. For a period of his intellectual journey, it seems fundamental and taboo and for another one, it finds a place in the speech, but falls into certain relativism. By setting a background where the ethics is entwined, the speech appears as a crucial medium. Within this space, our investigation will determine the coherence of the relation between ethics and meaning. By scrutinizing a particular speech type (medical ethics), we shall confront ultimately the wittgensteinian contribution on this question. It will then be possible for us to point the possibility of a coherence of the ethics within the language.

I Harry Martinsons rymdepos Aniara: En revy om människan i tid och rum (1956) fäster språket uppmärksamhet vid sig självt. Eposet är bitvis skrivet på ett fiktivt språk och inrymmer metaspråkliga kommentarer som kan sägas vittna om språkets förbistring, mutationer och gräns. Syftet med uppsatsen har därför varit att göra en tematisk analys av språket i Aniara, såsom det framträder i verket och gestaltas ombord på goldondern. Verket läses i ständig dialog med olika språkfilosofiska teoretiker, däribland Ludwig Wittgenstein. På så sätt blir det möjligt att urskilja ett samspel mellan språkets utveckling och skeppets resa ut i rymden. I takt med att Aniara avlägsnar sig från jorden tycks språket förlora sin meningsfullhet.

This article tries to approach Helmut Lachenmann’s music from the perspective of the cognitive sciences. The first part examines important theoretical concepts developed in Lachenmann’s own writings such as »polyphony of allocations« (Polyphonie von Anordnungen), »structure sound« (Strukturklang), »family« (Familie), »screening process« (Abtast-Prozess), modes of listening (»(Hin-)Hören« vs. »Zu-Hören«) and points at their cognitive implications. The second part discusses interrelations between Lachenmann’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concepts of »family«. These concepts share an anti-essentialist perspective and argue that »families« might assemble highly heterogeneous mixtures of components. Theories of cognitive categorization based on Wittgenstein’s notion of »family resemblance« include Irene Deliège’s concept of »cue-abstraction«, based on the identification of salient features in musical contexts and their similarity, and Adam Ockelford’s »zygonic model« that criticizes this emphasis on similarity-relations; according to Ockelford, members of a category (or family) do not necessarily share a single property (or essence), but might be connected by association or contiguity. In the third part, two analytical examples related to Lachenmann’s concept of a »musique concrète instrumentale«, Pression (1969/70) and Allegro Sostenuto (1986/88), exemplify the composer’s intuitive use of cognitive principles, based mainly on Gestalt laws. The consistency of cognitive features in Pression for solo violoncello provides counter evidence against Hans-Peter Jahn’s thesis that the order of sections in this piece is arbitrary. Allegro Sostenuto demonstrates Lachenmann’s inventive play with Gestalt principles that serve as tools for categorical transformation: reference pitches, for example, provide clear levels of listening orientation for sounds that metaphorically »extinguish« or »mask« each other. The conclusion argues that Lachenmann’s theoretical ideas and theories of cognitive categorization tend to converge and might be transformed into a theory of musical context that is crucial for an adequate understanding of Lachenmann’s works.

No description available.

<p>The philosophical work of Ludwig yvittgenstein divides into two periods. His earlier philosophy is found in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and his later philosophy is most clearly presented in the Philosophical Investigations. In this dissertation I present an interpretation of these two works which demonstrates a fundamental continuity between them concerning the essential relationship of language and reality. The origins of my argument lie in a recent discussion of the question of the nature of religious belief which has been called 'Wittgensteinian Fideism'. The 'Fideists' offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy which asserts that language constitutes an epistemologically prior framework which forms a linguistic community's view of reality. In this sense language and its grammar are said to be autonomous from reality and construct an essentially formless world.</p> <p>I argue against this interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work by showing that in both periods of his life he taught that language and its structural principles are one with reality and that this unity is established in human nature. Wittgenstein argues that language is an objective order of facts in the real world, and that the human production of linguistic facts shows the essential unity of all language as well as the essential unity of language and reality. The assumption that human beings are the source of linguistic facts also enables Wittgenstein to argue for an ethical-religious view of man's place in the world. By means of this interpretation of Wittgenstein's works I am able to refute the epistemological approach to Wittgenstein's later work as well as to offer an alternative view of the implications of his philosophy for understanding religion.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Cotutelle avec l'Université Panthéon Sorbonne - Paris I / Bien que Wittgenstein ait toujours douté de l’intérêt philosophique de ce genre de constat historique, il est généralement admis que l’auteur des Recherches philosophiques est l’inventeur d’une critique dévastatrice du «mythe de l’intériorité », qui représente l’une des tentations les plus constantes de la philosophie moderne. À l’encontre des pensées de la réflexion qui assignent pour tâche à la philosophie de clarifier la signification des concepts obscurs de notre langage (vérité, signification, pensée, etc.) en portant une attention réflexive à nos états mentaux (Locke et James sont de bons exemples de ce paradigme), Wittgenstein a montré qu’une telle entreprise philosophique repose sur une profonde incompréhension du fonctionnement du langage ordinaire et de sa grammaire. Wittgenstein n’est pas le premier à se lancer dans une initiative du genre, mais les moyens utilisés pour s’en acquitter expliquent la place qu’il a occupée dans les débats que n’a cessé de susciter la question de l’intériorité tout au long du vingtième siècle : on ne peut croire à la valeur d’un recours à l’introspection en philosophie qu’en se méprenant profondément sur la nature et le fonctionnement du langage nous permettant d’exprimer notre vie mentale. Étant donné que la phénoménologie husserlienne se propose de résoudre les problèmes philosophiques en adoptant pour méthode la réflexion et la description de l’expérience vécue, il est très tentant de voir en Husserl un héritier de cette tradition philosophique qui se trouve ruinée par les arguments de Wittgenstein. En partant du présupposé que la déconstruction du «mythe de l’intériorité» enclenchée par Wittgenstein est juste en son principe, il s’agira de montrer que l’on ne peut trouver chez Wittgenstein une réfutation implicite de la conception phénoménologique de l’intériorité qu’en faisant une lecture superficielle des Recherches logiques et des Idées directrices. En effet, si l’on sait porter attention aux détails des textes pertinents, on peut déceler chez Husserl une réflexion très fine sur la nature du langage qui débouche éventuellement sur une critique de la conception moderne et empiriste de l’intériorité du sujet très similaire à celle mise en chantier par les i Recherches philosophiques, critique qui, de surcroît, a l’avantage de désamorcer certaines difficultés rencontrées par Wittgenstein. Une telle étude comparative et polémique permettra de tirer deux grandes conclusions à l’égard de la méthode devant être employée en philosophie. Premièrement, il sera démontré que la réflexivité exigée par le discours philosophique se reflète dans l’usage que Husserl et Wittgenstein font des guillemets. Cette observation en apparence triviale permettra d’établir que le discours philosophique repose sur l’usage d’un dispositif typographique banal appartenant à la grammaire de notre langage ordinaire. Ensuite, la supériorité de la méthode « généalogique » de la phénoménologie génétique de Husserl sera mise en relief. Cette dernière a le mérite d’éviter les apories du conventionnalisme de Wittgenstein tout en désamorçant les difficultés soulevées par l’essentialisme de la phénoménologie statique des Idées directrices. / Wittgenstein is typically thought to have put forth a devastating critique of one of the most constant temptations of modern philosophy: the so-called "myth of interiority". Against philosophies of reflexion, which attempt to clarify the meaning of obscure philosophical concepts (e.g. truth, significance, thought, etc.) by reflecting upon our mental states (Locke and James come to mind as examples of this paradigm), Wittgenstein showed that such a philosophical project is premised on a profound misunderstanding of how ordinary language and its grammar function. Although Wittgenstein might not have been the first to propose this kind of criticism, his central role in the last century's debates over the problem of interiority is due to the distinctive means through which he carried out this criticism: believing in the value of introspection within philosophical inquiry requires a profound misunderstanding of the nature and operation of the language through which we express our mental life. Since Husserl's phenomenology purports to solve philosophical problems through description and reflection upon lived experience, it is extremely tempting to see him as an inheritor of the philosophical tradition that Wittgenstein's arguments demolished. Taking as its starting point the assumption that the deconstruction of the "myth of interiority" instigated by Wittgenstein is well founded, this project will attempt to show that Wittgenstein's arguments can only appear to refute Husserl's conception of interiority on the basis of a superficial reading of the Logical Investigations and of the Ideas I. Indeed, upon a close examination of the relevant texts, Husserl's reflexions on the nature of language can be shown to lead him to a critique of the modern and empiricist conception of interiority very similar to Wittgenstein's, a critique that turns out to have the resources to avoid some of the major difficulties that the latter faces. This comparative and polemical study will defend two more general theses about the method that philosophical inquiry ought to rely upon. First, it will be argued that the reflexiveness required for philosophical discourse is illustrated in both Husserl and Wittgenstein's use of quotation marks. This seemingly trivial observation will support the claim that philosophical discourse relies on the use of a banal i typographical devise belonging to the grammar of ordinary language. Second, a case will be made for the the superiority of the "genealogical" method of Husserl's genetic phenomenology, for it manages to avoid the pitfalls of Wittgenstein's conventionalism while also steering clear of the problems incurred by the essentialism of the Ideas I static phenomenology.

Bien que Wittgenstein ait toujours douté de l’intérêt philosophique de ce genre de constat historique, il est généralement admis que l’auteur des Recherches philosophiques est l’inventeur d’une critique dévastatrice du «mythe de l’intériorité », qui représente l’une des tentations les plus constantes de la philosophie moderne. À l’encontre des pensées de la réflexion qui assignent pour tâche à la philosophie de clarifier la signification des concepts obscurs de notre langage (vérité, signification, pensée, etc.) en portant une attention réflexive à nos états mentaux (Locke et James sont de bons exemples de ce paradigme), Wittgenstein a montré qu’une telle entreprise philosophique repose sur une profonde incompréhension du fonctionnement du langage ordinaire et de sa grammaire. Wittgenstein n’est pas le premier à se lancer dans une initiative du genre, mais les moyens utilisés pour s’en acquitter expliquent la place qu’il a occupée dans les débats que n’a cessé de susciter la question de l’intériorité tout au long du vingtième siècle : on ne peut croire à la valeur d’un recours à l’introspection en philosophie qu’en se méprenant profondément sur la nature et le fonctionnement du langage nous permettant d’exprimer notre vie mentale. Étant donné que la phénoménologie husserlienne se propose de résoudre les problèmes philosophiques en adoptant pour méthode la réflexion et la description de l’expérience vécue, il est très tentant de voir en Husserl un héritier de cette tradition philosophique qui se trouve ruinée par les arguments de Wittgenstein. En partant du présupposé que la déconstruction du «mythe de l’intériorité» enclenchée par Wittgenstein est juste en son principe, il s’agira de montrer que l’on ne peut trouver chez Wittgenstein une réfutation implicite de la conception phénoménologique de l’intériorité qu’en faisant une lecture superficielle des Recherches logiques et des Idées directrices. En effet, si l’on sait porter attention aux détails des textes pertinents, on peut déceler chez Husserl une réflexion très fine sur la nature du langage qui débouche éventuellement sur une critique de la conception moderne et empiriste de l’intériorité du sujet très similaire à celle mise en chantier par les i Recherches philosophiques, critique qui, de surcroît, a l’avantage de désamorcer certaines difficultés rencontrées par Wittgenstein. Une telle étude comparative et polémique permettra de tirer deux grandes conclusions à l’égard de la méthode devant être employée en philosophie. Premièrement, il sera démontré que la réflexivité exigée par le discours philosophique se reflète dans l’usage que Husserl et Wittgenstein font des guillemets. Cette observation en apparence triviale permettra d’établir que le discours philosophique repose sur l’usage d’un dispositif typographique banal appartenant à la grammaire de notre langage ordinaire. Ensuite, la supériorité de la méthode « généalogique » de la phénoménologie génétique de Husserl sera mise en relief. Cette dernière a le mérite d’éviter les apories du conventionnalisme de Wittgenstein tout en désamorçant les difficultés soulevées par l’essentialisme de la phénoménologie statique des Idées directrices. / Wittgenstein is typically thought to have put forth a devastating critique of one of the most constant temptations of modern philosophy: the so-called "myth of interiority". Against philosophies of reflexion, which attempt to clarify the meaning of obscure philosophical concepts (e.g. truth, significance, thought, etc.) by reflecting upon our mental states (Locke and James come to mind as examples of this paradigm), Wittgenstein showed that such a philosophical project is premised on a profound misunderstanding of how ordinary language and its grammar function. Although Wittgenstein might not have been the first to propose this kind of criticism, his central role in the last century's debates over the problem of interiority is due to the distinctive means through which he carried out this criticism: believing in the value of introspection within philosophical inquiry requires a profound misunderstanding of the nature and operation of the language through which we express our mental life. Since Husserl's phenomenology purports to solve philosophical problems through description and reflection upon lived experience, it is extremely tempting to see him as an inheritor of the philosophical tradition that Wittgenstein's arguments demolished. Taking as its starting point the assumption that the deconstruction of the "myth of interiority" instigated by Wittgenstein is well founded, this project will attempt to show that Wittgenstein's arguments can only appear to refute Husserl's conception of interiority on the basis of a superficial reading of the Logical Investigations and of the Ideas I. Indeed, upon a close examination of the relevant texts, Husserl's reflexions on the nature of language can be shown to lead him to a critique of the modern and empiricist conception of interiority very similar to Wittgenstein's, a critique that turns out to have the resources to avoid some of the major difficulties that the latter faces. This comparative and polemical study will defend two more general theses about the method that philosophical inquiry ought to rely upon. First, it will be argued that the reflexiveness required for philosophical discourse is illustrated in both Husserl and Wittgenstein's use of quotation marks. This seemingly trivial observation will support the claim that philosophical discourse relies on the use of a banal i typographical devise belonging to the grammar of ordinary language. Second, a case will be made for the the superiority of the "genealogical" method of Husserl's genetic phenomenology, for it manages to avoid the pitfalls of Wittgenstein's conventionalism while also steering clear of the problems incurred by the essentialism of the Ideas I static phenomenology. / Cotutelle avec l'Université Panthéon Sorbonne - Paris I

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3094.pdf: 2356538 bytes, checksum: c4e0d2086748f9a3497a2ab4f7178b12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-22 / This thesis analyzes the grammar of the psychological vocabulary with the idea that inner world (the subjectivity) and external world (the behavior) are connected by grammatical relations which must be clarified through a conceptual inquiry and not through empirical findings. To reach to the objective we analyzed the common point of view that we have of our inner world and traces the linkings between our affirmations about the inner world and how they acquire meaning from this common point of view. The following step was to analyze the conception of privacy that the common point of view attributes to the events of the inner world. After this we argue that the common conception does not could be a base for the construction of a philosophical explanation of the inner world. Therefore the objective of the common vision of our interior world is not to elaborate a scientific explanation. At the same time we conclude that our common conception of the psychological vocabulary is not a proto-theory that must be developed by the philosophical investigations. From this we open the way to present the philosophical point of view of Ludwig Wittgenstein about the psychological vocabulary. We explain this point of view to clarify our objective. Subsequently we presents the conception of language of Wittgenstein and we link his conception with the way for which he treated or understanding of the psychological vocabulary. With this explanation we show that when we are dealing with the affirmations of our inner world - our psychological vocabulary - we are not contending with a dichotomy between behaviorism and Cartesianism. Wittgenstein shows that we have another form to explain our language about the inner world. According to Wittgenstein's philosophy of the psychology our behavior is an expression of the inner world, that is, the inner if express world through the behavior despite if it does not reduce to the behavior. With such idea, Wittgenstein admits that the relation enters our affirmations on the interior world cannot be understood in isolated way of our behavior. At the same time, our behavior alone is not the criterion for understanding of the inner world, is necessary that the behavior be considered inside of a specific language game that is our use of our concepts of the psychological vocabulary. / Ao partir do princípio de que o mundo interior (a subjetividade) e o mundo exterior (o comportamento) estão ligados entre si por relações gramaticais, esta tese analisa a gramática do vocabulário psicológico. Propõe que estas relações gramaticais devem ser esclarecidas através de uma investigação conceitual, e não por investigações, empíricas. Para que alcancemos o objetivo desejado, foi analisado o ponto de vista comum que temos de nosso mundo interior. Tal visão traça as ligações entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior e como elas adquirem significado a partir deste ponto de vista comum. O passo seguinte consistiu em analisar a concepção de privacidade que o ponto de vista comum atribui aos eventos do mundo interior. Demonstramos, após estas análises, que a concepção comum não serve de base para a construção de uma explicação filosófica do mundo interior e das afirmações que dele fazemos. Isto porque o objetivo da visão comum de nosso mundo interior não é a de elaborar uma explicação científica. Ao mesmo tempo, mostramos que nossa concepção comum do vocabulário psicológico não é uma proto-teoria que deve ser desenvolvida pela Filosofia. Com isto, abrimos caminho para apresentar o ponto de vista filosófico de Ludwig Wittgenstein sobre o vocabulário psicológico. Para que este ponto de vista fosse explicativo em relação ao nosso objetivo, apresentamos a concepção de linguagem de Wittgenstein, ligando esta concepção com o modo como Wittgenstein tratou o vocabulário psicológico. Através desta análise, mostramos que, ao tratarmos com as afirmações de nosso mundo interior nosso vocabulário psicológico não estamos diante de uma dicotomia entre behaviorismo e cartesianismo. Isto, pelo fato de termos outra possibilidade de tratar nossa linguagem quando nos referimos ao mundo interior. Segundo a Filosofia da Psicologia, de Ludwig Wittgenstein, o comportamento é uma expressão do mundo interior, isto é, o mundo interior se expressa através do comportamento, ainda que a este não se reduza. A partir de tal ideia, Wittgenstein propõe que a relação entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior não podem ser compreendidas de maneira isolada de nosso comportamento. Juntemos a isto que tão somente o nosso comportamento não é critério para compreensão do mundo interior Portanto, há necessidade, de que o comportamento seja considerado dentro de um jogo de linguagem específico, que consiste no uso de nossos conceitos do vocabulário psicológico.

Ämnet för denna vetenskapliga essän är simultan flerspråkighet, det vill säga individer som växer upp med två eller fler modersmål från födseln. Essän har sin utgångspunkt i en berättelse. Berättelsen gestaltar en svår situation från mitt arbete som fritidshemslärare där ett pedagogiskt dilemma uppstår. I del ett undersöker jag vad språkforskning säger om simultan flerspråkighet och språkutveckling. Del två handlar om flerspråkighet ur ett pedagogisk perspektiv. Där berörs hur känslor är sammanflätade med språk samt hur det påverkar fritidshemsläraren och lärarens roll och ansvar för flerspråkighet i en skola med enspråkig norm. I del tre undersöker jag flerspråkighet ur ett språkfilosofisk perspektiv och fördjupar min analys med hjälp av ett resonemang om erfarenhet, kunskap och språkbruk. Det framkommer att simultan flerspråkighet kan innebära en viss försening av språket under de första åren men sedan är till fördel för elevens språkutveckling. Barn kan vara mer känslomässigt förenade med ett av sina två språk i vissa situationer. Slutligen framgår det att i en skola där enspråkighet är en norm bär pedagoger ett stort ansvar i att välkomna flerspråkighet. / The subject for this scientific essay is simultaneous multilingualism. This is where an individual learns to speak two languages from birth. The essay has its beginning with a story. The story is based on experiences at my work as a Leisure time teacher where a pedagogical dilemma occurs. In part one I examine what linguistic research says about simultaneous multilingualism and language development. Part two is about multilingualism from an educational perspective, and how emotions are intertwined with language. This paper analyzes the leisure-time teacher and the teacher's role and responsibility for multilingualism in a school with a monolingual norm. In part three I examine multilingualism from a philosophical perspective and immersed myself in the view of experience, knowledge, and use of language. It appears that simultaneous multilingualism could mean a certain delay in language development for the first few years but in the end is beneficial to the pupils language development. Children may be more emotionally connected to one of the two languages in certain situations. Finally it appears that in a school where monolingualism is the norm the educators carry a great responsibility to welcome multilingualism.