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<p> The abort mission refers to the mission where the landing vehicle needs to terminate the landing mission when an anomaly happens and be safely guided to the desired orbit. Missions involving crew on board demands for a robust and efficient abort strategy. This thesis focuses on solving the time-optimal abort guidance (TOAG) problem in real-time via the feature-based learning method. First, according to the optimal control theory, the features are identified to represent the optimal solutions of TOAG using a few parameters. After that, a sufficiently large dataset of time-optimal abort trajectories is generated offline by solving the TOAG problems with different initial conditions. Then the features are extracted for all generated cases. To find the implicit relationships between the initial conditions and identified features, neural networks are constructed to map the relationships based on the generated dataset. A successfully trained neural network can generate solution in real time for a reasonable initial condition. Finally, experimental flight tests are conducted to demonstrate the onboard computation capability and effectiveness of the proposed method. </p>

Våren 2007 offentliggjorde USA planerna på att upprätta ett missilförsvar i Polen och Tjeckien som ett skydd mot missilangrepp från Iran. Från Ryssland blev reaktionen mot planerna kraftfull. Retoriken från Moskva påminde om kalla krigets dagar. Vilka är de bakomliggande orsakerna till denna starka reaktion? Syftet med studien är att undersöka vilka orsaker, såväl externa som interna, det är som styr den ryska inställningen. Studien är teorianvändande med teorier inom den politiska realismen som verktyg. Analysen genomförs i två delar där först externa och därefter interna orsaker till motståndet kartläggs. Förklaringen till motståndet inom den externa dimensionen finns i att missilförsvaret med en framtida utbyggnad kan komma att utgöra ett hot mot rysk andraslagsförmåga och därmed hota Rysslands kapacitet till kärnvapenavskräckning. Interna orsaker till motståndet finns i att såväl den ryska makteliten som Rysslands befolkning anser att landet är utsatt för ett hot från USA. Då Ryssland är väl sammanhållet inom fyra avgörande interna områden ges möjligheten för den förda utrikespolitiken. / In the spring of 2007 the United States went public with its plans to build a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic as a protection to missile attacks from Iran. The Russian reaction to the plans was harsh. The Moscow rhetoric reminded of the Cold War days. What are the underlying reasons to this strong reaction? The purpose of this essay is to analyse what reasons there are, both external and domestic, that direct the Russian attitude. The essay uses theories from the political realism as tool. The analysis is done in two parts where first external and then domestic reasons to the attitude are surveyed. The reason to the attitude is in the external dimension to be found in the fact that the missile defence, if in the future extended, may poses a threat to Russian second strike capacity and by that poses a threat to Russian nuclear deterrence capacity. Domestic reasons to the attitude are to be found in the fact that both the ruling political elite in Russia as well as the Russian population believes that the country is subject to threat from the United States. As Russia is well united in four crucial domestic areas, the possibility for the current foreign policy is given.

<p dir="ltr">The research presented in this thesis presents methods to solve multi-agent task allocation and path planning problems in the application of on-orbit servicing.</p>

ITC/USA 2008 Conference Proceedings / The Forty-Fourth Annual International Telemetering Conference and Technical Exhibition / October 27-30, 2008 / Town and Country Resort & Convention Center, San Diego, California / The need for sophisticated tools in the expanding areas of Telemetry, Tracking and Control/Command (TT&C) and Communications (COMMS) system simulation, development, verification, analysis, maintenance, debug, and education is well understood. Emerging requirements for these toolsets include features, ease-of-use, performance, and price points that specifically address telemetry and signals work. And, while not yet as available, understood, or pervasively installed, these economical and focused tools are displacing high-cost, general-purpose Test and Measurement (T&M) equipment at an increasing rate.

Includes supplemental material. / Based on public law and Presidential mandate, ballistic missile defense development is a front-burner issue for homeland defense and the defense of U.S. and coalition forces abroad. Spearheaded by the Missile Defense Agency, an integrated ballistic missile defense system was initiated to create a layered defense composed of land-, air-, sea-, and space-based assets. The Ship Anti-Ballistic Response (SABR) Project is a systems engineering approach that suggests a conceptualized system solution to meet the needs of the sea portion of ballistic missile defense in the 2025-2030 timeframe. The system is a unique solution to the sea-based ballistic missile defense issue, combining the use of a railgun interceptor and a conformable aperture skin-of-the-ship radar system.

This thesis asks why Japan decided to procure BMD if it meant building an infrastructure which, because of its technological nature, had the potential to disrupt Japan’s preferred security strategy of hedging, that is, maintaining ambiguity of commitment, vis-à-vis China and the US. The investigation was divided into three parts dealing with the following questions – Why did Japan's BMD procurement matter? Who mattered? Why were the BMD and related decisions made? Such a structure of research was informed by “neoclassical realism,” according to which the relative material power of a country sets the parameters of its foreign policy, but the policy choices within these international constraints are made by political elites. A range of policymaking heuristics were used to investigate the domestic element of the approach. In addition to the conventionally specified policymaking actors such as MOD, MOFA, Prime Ministers, an original attempt was made to identify the possible influences of several elite networks. On the basis of the notes from the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference, two elite networks were analysed, namely the Japan’s Congressional National Security Research Group and Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange. It was concluded that they have probably had some influence on shaping Japan's BMD decisions. The conclusion of this research is that BMD was procured despite its disruptive potential because it was a tool of shifting Japanese policy from one hedging policy to another, that is, from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength. An analysis of international relations in East Asia in 1994-2007 and an analysis of the views of the security elites make Japan's transition toward a military strength-based hedging appear rational and confirm BMD's utility as a tool in this transition. Some negative consequences of a possible disruption to hedging, induced by BMD, can be contained exactly because of such a reformatting of hedging.

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to explain why states obtain nuclear weapons and the role various</p><p>actors and interests play in the making of states´ nuclear policies. The main questions are as</p><p>follows: (1) What big theories exist concerning states obtaining nuclear weapon and nuclear</p><p>armament in International Relations and what relevance do they have of the post cold-war period?,</p><p>(2) What is the meaning of the perspective of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC)?, and (3)Are</p><p>there empirical studies which supports the existence of a MIC in the United States?</p><p>The focus lies on actors and driving forces that are internal to states and it is also important to</p><p>investigate if the theories have relevance for the post 9/11-era. The study uses the method of</p><p>qualitative literature-study with some quantitative segments. It is claimed that states might be</p><p>interested in justifying their behaviour in a morally appealing way and that real reasons may be</p><p>hidden. There are many reasons for states to obtain and keep nuclear weapons and related</p><p>technology (which includes many of the most lucrative elements of the arms industry´s sales).</p><p>Among this reasons are that arms and related technology may be used to influence other states and</p><p>nuclear weapons-construction and modernisation might be used to protect the state from external</p><p>threats, stop unwanted interference from other actors, secure job and gain recognition and prestige</p><p>in world politics. For security reasons states might hold onto their own nuclear weapons and try to</p><p>hinder other actors from getting access to them. The internal actors and driving forces we look at</p><p>are bureaucratic, economical and political, and the MIC-perspective. The military can be said to</p><p>have interests in as much resources and capabilities as possible, which includes advanced</p><p>weaponary such as nuclear weapons and related technologies, at its disposal because of the goal to</p><p>defend the state from all possible threats and for officers career reasons. Much of its influence is</p><p>said to come from its expert knowledge and position and it is said to be especially influential in</p><p>matters of foreign policy, military spending and foreign policy. The major economical actors</p><p>mentioned are big corporations involved in military spending and these have interests in</p><p>maximizing profits. Nuclear weapons making and maintenance and the related areas of missile</p><p>defense and delivering methods for nuclear weapons seem to be areas with high changes of being</p><p>profitable for the involved major companies. The actors wield influence for example through</p><p>lobbying and campaign contributions. An economic driving force claim is that state spending is</p><p>necessary for stimulating the economy and defense spending is easily justified in other ways.</p><p>Political actors and driving forces concerns politicians interest in promoting the interests of</p><p>supporting groups, there are indications that the weapon industry is such a group. Research have</p><p>shown various results about the extent politicians tend to further the interests of supporting groups.</p><p>The MIC-perspective talks about groups with interest in high levels of military spending. Most</p><p>researchers seem to agree that the complex exists but there are different opinions about what actors</p><p>belongs to it and its power on various issues. There is some mention of the core of the complex</p><p>consisting of such internal actors as mentioned above. MIC-related empirical research has been</p><p>conducted and this author finds that the MIC is a relevant analytical tool for the post cold war – and</p><p>9/11 era.</p>

Sveriges ytstridskrafter hade länge en förmåga att hävda sig mot fiendens stridskrafter ute till havs på 1950- och 60-talen. Nedrustningsprogrammet av försvaret på 1960-talet innebar att teknikutvecklingen bromsade upp och flottans större fartyg kryssare, fregatter och jagare skulle bytas ut till en lätt flotta med små snabba enheter. Detta resulterade i att flottans taktik anpassades till ett tillbakadraget uppträdande längs med kustbandet och inom skärgården. Svenska officerare bevittnade på när Sovjetunionen rustade upp och utvecklade nya vapen och fartyg med robotar av högsta kvalité i Östersjöområdet. Detta hot medförde att officerarna i flottan ville satsa på ett långräckviddigt vapen för att bli mer jämbördig mot fiendens styrka ute till havs. Resultatet blev en svenskutvecklad sjömålsrobot, Robotsystem 15 (RBS 15), som infördes i marinen i början av 1980-talet. RBS 15:s höga kvalité och förmåga medförde en satsning på utvecklingen av flera tekniska kringutrustningar som behövdes för att fulländat utföra en sjörobotstrid. Studiens syfte är att studera RBS 15:s införande i den svenska flottan och vilken påverkan detta hade på taktiken. Fallet RBS 15 prövas utifrån hypoteser grundade från teorier om hur tekniken påverkar taktiken. Tekniken påvisas påverka taktiken via de hypoteser som bestyrks i studien. Slutsatser från studien är att RBS 15 påverkade taktiken genom att den: möjliggjorde ett offensivt handlande, initierade utvecklingen av nya tekniska resurser och var den avgörande faktorn för att den marina organisationen medvetet ville utveckla ytstridstaktiken. Den nya förmågan innebar en markant skillnad i det svenska taktiska uppträdandet. Flottans ytstridskrafter tillämpade ett mer framskjutet uppträdande och kunde bestrida fiendens kontroll till sjöss. / During the 1950’s and 1960’sSweden’s surface warships had an ability to match enemy forces at sea. The disarmament of the Swedish Defense in the 1960’s implied a retardation of technique development and major warships like cruisers, frigates and destroyers were planned to be changed to a lighter fleet consisting of small, fast units. The result of this change was that the Navy tactics were adjusted to a retired behavior. Swedish officers witnessed the rearmament of the Soviet Union that developed new weapons and vessels with high class long-range anti-ship missiles in theBaltic Searegion. The consequence of this threat was that the naval officers wanted to develop a long-range weapon to equal enemy forces at sea. The result was a Swedish innovation of an anti-ship missile system (RBS 15) which was introduced in the Swedish Navy in the beginning of the 1980’s. RBS 15’s high quality and ability also implied a development of several peripheral technical equipments that were necessary for perfection in naval missile combat. The aim of the current study is to clarify whether or not the introduction of RBS 15 into the Swedish Navy was affecting tactics. The case RBS 15 is tested by hypotheses outgoing from theories how technologies affect tactics. It is demonstrated that the technologies affect tactics from the hypotheses that are confirmed in the study. Conclusions from the study are that the RBS 15 affected tactics since it: Facilitated to take offensive action, initiated development of new technical resources and was the crucial factor implementing that the naval organization decided to develop the tactics for the new Swedish surface warships. This new capability implicated a marked difference in the Swedish tactical behavior at sea. Naval warships were applying a more offensive tactic and had the ability to fight the enemy’s control of the sea.