Sweden is dependent on secure sea transport. Shorter disruption of imports of fuel and crude oil can be managed with an emergency stock, but a prolonged halt in imports creates problems. For industry, the vulnerability is greater. Fragmented production chains in combination with expenditure reductions in inventory causes a dependency on proper transport of intermediate goods in the manufacturing industry. A lengthy disruption thus involves disruption of production for both domestic consumption and for export goods containing imported parts.In order to secure shipping routes with a limited number of vessels, Mine Counter Measures (MCM) capacity is required, and according to the Armed Forces, developed with new sensors and autonomous vehicles. Sweden has acquired small AUV systems for MCM, and has plans to acquire larger and more advanced. Before any acquisition is implemented, a number of considerations have to be made. How does advanced AUV inflict on existing methods and systems? Is the result is better, is it faster, do we need to make adjustments? The essay aims to examine the military technology influence an AUV have on today's MCM operations. The results of the study can serve as part of the decision support for the Armed Forces and FMV before a purchase of an advanced AUV.The results of the thesis show that Advanced AUV:s, with the qualities they have , can affect the way the Armed Forces are conducting MCM today.

Detta självständiga arbete i militärteknik behandlar två simuleringsprogram för radarvågutbredning i syfte att undersöka konsekvenserna av dess nyttjande för den taktiske chefen till sjöss. Simuleringsprogrammens användbarhet mäts kvalitativt genom att respektive simuleringsprograms egenskaper ställs mot den taktiske chefens krav. Simulerings-programmen beskrivs utifrån teoretiska egenskaper i respektive program och utvärderas genom simuleringar av en typradar i tre olika vädertypfall. Den taktiske chefens krav grundas på personliga erfarenheter som fartygschef på korvett. Resultatet presenteras i form av positiva och negativa konsekvenser för den taktiske chefen vid nyttjande av respektive program. / This is a bachelor thesis in Military Technology which deals with two radar wave propagation simulation programs. The purpose is to examine the consequences of their use for the tactical commander at sea. The simulation programs usability is estimated qualitative by the programs quality and attribute versus the tactical commander demands. The simulation programs are described from their theoretical quality and attribute respectively and evaluated by three simulations of the study’s specific radar in three different weather cases. The tactical commander demands are based on personal experiences as commanding officer of a corvette. The result is presented as positive and negative consequences for the tactical commander when using the simulation programs respectively.

The military conflicts of the early 21st century have seen the introduction and rise of a new military technology: the armed drone. With the United States acting as the driving force behind this technological advancement, the U.S Air Force and intelligence agency CIA have madedrones their weapon of choice for pursuing suspected terrorists and insurgents in various remotelocations. American military leaders and policy makers assert that the armed drone’s high levelof accuracy make it the best available weapons platform for this task. However, new researchshows that the use of drones may result in more civilian casualties than previously thought, andmay in fact be more fallible than conventional aircraft in this respect. This paper examines this discrepancy between rhetoric and practice, and attempts to find potential causes for this in the development and early use of the first armed drone, the MQ-1 Predator. The paper cites statements from President Barack Obama and CIA director John Brennan and contrasts them with a recent research report on drone-caused civilian casualties, as well as examples of drone strikes where the wrong targets were struck. The analysis of the development and early use of the Predator Drone draws comparisons to Donald Mackenzie’s account of the development of accuracy for cold-war-era intercontinental ballistic missiles, applying the science and technology-concepts he uses to the case of the armed drone. The paper concludes with the argument that the accuracy of the early armed drones is fundamentally misunderstood or overestimated by U.S leaders, and that there are circumstances in the development-history of the system that may have contributed to this inconsistency.

This thesis attempts to challenge the way military historiography deals with the state of the Ottoman army between 1683 and 1792 and the military reform attempts prior to the Nizam-i Cedid army. Western military historians have ascribed to the inferiority of the Ottoman military technology the waning of the Ottoman military power in the post-1683 period. Any attempt at reform was allegedly obstructed by religious reaction against borrowing European methods and technology. This thesis argues that technology was not the decisive factor in the Ottoman failure against the Austrians and Russians since those two were not too far ahead of the Ottomans with regards to the level of military technology to justify such a conclusion. The comparison with the Russian army, the archenemy of the Ottomans in the period under question, reveals that the Russian success in such departments as conscription, logistics, military leadership and continuous tactical adjustments made to accommodate the needs of steppe warfare, rather than outright application of Western methods of warfare, resulted in victories against the Ottomans. The Ottomans in the meantime were bothered by instability at the Porte, which could neither provide the necessary leadership on the battlefield nor carry out the military reforms. As a result, the vestiges of the Ottoman military organization in its classical form continued to take up economic resources and block any attempts at reform. Religion in this process served as nothing more than a rallying cry for a certain group who vied for power in Istanbul at a time of state formation.

Möjligheten att bestämma sin position med ett par meters noggrannhet varhelst på jordklotetman befinner sig har med tillgången till GPS blivit möjligt för alla som investerar i en GPSmottagare,således även Försvarsmakten. GPS har dock begränsningar som gör att tillgångentill tjänsten kan blockeras med enkla medel av såväl systemets ägare som andra. I Försvarsmaktenfinns det anvisningar inför anskaffandet av satellitpositioneringssystem som gör gällandeatt detta endast skall utgöra ett komplement till andra redundanta metoder. För militäraändamål har GPS ofta integrerats tillsammans med tröghetsnavigering där de båda metodernakompletterar varandra. Utan tillgång till GPS kommer positionsfelet i ett sådant system efteren kortare tid växa sig stort. I följande studie görs en inventering av alternativa positioneringsmetodervilka utöver GPS kan integreras tillsammans med tröghetsnavigering. Studienvisar att det finns metoder vilka antas kunna integreras i ett positioneringssystem samtidigtsom noggrannheten bibehålls. / The ability to determine one’s position with a couple of meters accuracy anywhere on earthhas become possible for all who invest in a GPS receiver, even the Swedish Armed Forces.However GPS has limitations that make it possible to deny access to the service by simplemeans from the owner of the system as well as of others. There are regulations within theSwedish Armed Forces for the procurement of satellite positioning systems that states theseshall be considered as complement to other, redundant methods. For military purposes GPS isoften integrated with an inertial positioning system where the two methods complement eachother. Without access to GPS in such a system the error growth is unlimited also within alimited period of time. The following study makes a survey of complementary methods thatbesides GPS is possible to integrate together with inertial navigation. The work indicates thatthere are methods which are assumed to use in an integrated positioning system with retainedaccuracy. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP T 06-08

US Navy stötte under Kuwaitkriget 1991 på stora problem då de stod inför en motståndare som genomförde asymmetrisk krigföring med hjälp av sjöminor. Resultatet blev två min-sprängda fartyg och en inställd landstigningsoperation. Detta var inte första gången som USA ignorerat betydelsen av att kunna bedriva minkrig. USA håller nu på att transformera sin flotta från en renodlad ”Blue Water Navy” till att kunna uppträda i kustnära farvatten. US Navy måste därför kunna möta minhotet i dessa farvatten för att den operativa chefen skall få tillräckligt med handlingsfrihet med sitt förband. Nya doktriner har utvecklats och erfaren-heterna från Kuwaitkriget har gjort att man nu prioriterat upp minröjningsförmågan till en förmåga som skall innehas av alla enheter i en sjöstyrka, d v s förbandet skall inneha en organisk minröjningsförmåga. Detta är ett paradigmskifte jämfört med tidigare exklusiva dedikerade minröjningsenheter. Förutsättningen för att inneha denna organiska minröjnings-förmåga är utveckling av nya tekniskt avancerade minröjningssystem. Uppsatsen beskriver hur US Navy’s minröjningsförmåga utvecklats sedan Kuwaitkriget 1991. Fokus ligger på en beskrivning av de bakomliggande faktorerna till utvecklandet av det organiska minröjnings-konceptet samt en teknisk beskrivning av de organiska minröjningssystemet. I uppsatsen visas att införandet av ett organiskt minröjningskoncept ökar den operativa chefens handlings¬frihet samtidigt som det är viktigt att det dedikerade minröjningssystemet får leva kvar. Vidare visas att det är doktrinerna som styrt teknikutvecklingen även om tekniken inte ännu hunnit ikapp doktrinerna. / During the war in Kuwait in 1991, the US Navy had huge difficulties in defeating an oppo-nent who used asymmetric warfare using sea mines. The devastating result was that two naval ships were seriously damaged by mines and an amphibious assault was cancelled. This was not the first time that USA had ignored the importance of Mine Warfare. Changes in the world have forced the USA to start transforming their navy from a pure “Blue Water Navy” into a navy that can operate in littoral waters. To give the operational commander enough freedom of action in this environment, the US Navy must be able to deal with the mine threat in these waters. New doctrines have been developed dealing with manoeuvre from the sea to objectives inland. The lessons learned from the Kuwait War have resulted in a desire to make mine warfare a core capability in the US Navy and making an organic mine countermeasure (MCM) capability in expeditionary strike groups. This is a paradigm shift when compared to the present separate dedicated MCM capacity. However, organic MCM demands develop-ment of new advanced MCM systems. This essay describes how the MCM capability in the US Navy has developed since the Kuwait War in 1991. The main aim of the essay is to ex-plain why the US Navy had developed this organic MCM capacity and to describe the techni-cal MCM system needed for organic MCM. The essay shows that implementation of an or-ganic MCM concept will increase the commander’s freedom of action even though it is im-portant that dedicated MCM systems survive and that there is a proper balance between dedi-cated and organic MCM systems. It also shows that it is doctrine that controls the technical developments of new MCM products and not vice versa. There is, however, a risk that the US Navy will be short of MCM capability in the short term if dedicated MCM systems is phased out before organic MCM systems are fully operational. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP T 04-06

The purpose of this paper is to explore command and control at sub-unit level. Theoverarching method adopted by the Swedish Army is mission command, derived intodirective command and restrictive control. Although a new main battle tank with anoperational battle management system has been introduced, few changes can betraced with respect to methods of command and control. Starting out with describingthe prescribed way of command and control at sub-unit tank units, the effects whenutilizing alternative methods were explored. In order to do this, the theories of theLaw of Requisite Variety, the Viable System Model and theories on DynamicDecision Making were used to analyze data produced by a tank platoon. In order toexplore the effects of self-synchronization, five combat missions were conductedusing two different methods. A seminar discussion provided further insights inunderstanding the results. From the conclusion of these investigations, a hypothesisis derived, alleging the possible use of directive command at sub-unit level and inwhat context self-synchronization could be utilized. The relevance of the hypothesisis then discussed in a wider context referring to military operations on urbanizedterrain.The results indicate that initiative and the ability to explore given opportunities areexperienced as being greater if directive command is applied instead of thetraditionally restrictive control. Concerning the utilization of the battle managementsystem, my conclusion is that the potential of the system is not yet fully explored.The basis of this statement is the declared opinion of a lack of adequate training, andthere is also an outspoken discrepancy in willingness to use the system. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP T 03-05

Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur man skulle kunna öka effektiviteten i svenskpilotutbildning genom att effektivisera planeringen och schemaläggningen.Utbildningsplanering tillhör en typ av verksamhet som kan hänföras till kategorinschemaläggningsproblem. Det vill säga någon form av verksamhet där aktiviteter ska tilldelasresurser och planeras över tiden. Ett sätt att lösa denna typ av problem är att använda sig avoptimeringsmetoder. Det vill säga matematiska modeller och metoder som syftar till att hitta detbästa (optimala) alternativet i en beslutssituation.I uppsatsen jämförs planeringen av svensk pilotutbildning med en liknande turkisk verksamhet.Detta görs i syfte att undersöka om de optimeringsmetoder som används i Turkiet kan användasför att öka effektiviteten i den svenska utbildningsplaneringen.Uppsatsen visar att det är möjligt att erhålla stora effektivitetsökningar vid en lyckadimplementering av optimeringsmetoder men att det är svårt att direkt överföra erfarenheter frånett problem till ett annat. En viktig slutsats är att effektiviteten i planeringen i första hand ärberoende av organisation, arbetssätt och principer för resursutnyttjande snarare än användande avoptimeringsmetoder. / The aim of this thesis is to examine if it is possible to improve the efficiency in Swedish pilottraining by improving the planning and the scheduling.The planning of training belongs to a type of activities that can be categorised as schedulingproblems. That is, some kind of action where resources will be allocated to activities that will bescheduled over time. One way to solve these kinds of problems is to use optimisation methods.These are mathematical models and methods aimed at finding the best (optimum) alternative in adecision-making situation.In this thesis the planning of Swedish fighter pilot training is compared with a similar Turkishactivity. This is done with the purpose to examine if it is possible to use the Turkish optimisationmethods to increase the efficiency in the planning of the Swedish training.The thesis shows that it is possible to receive great improvement in efficiency if optimisationmethods are implemented in a successful way but that it is difficult to transfer experiences fromone problem to another. One important conclusion is that the efficiency in the planning isprimarily dependent on organisation, working methods and principles for resource utilisationrather than using optimisation methods. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-uppsHylla: Upps. ChP T 03-05

Denna uppsats avhandlar möjligheter och begränsningar vid användande avhögenergilaser för nedskjutning av luftmål. Uppsatsen har inte ambitionen attvara heltäckande över området utan presenterar några av de fördelar ochnackdelar som finns. / This essay will illustrate possibilities and limitations in the use of high energylaser to shoot down air targets. The essay has no ambition to cover the wholearea in this field, only to exemplify some possibilities. / ChpT 08-10

Huvudsyftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka vilka behov av satsning på reduktion avelektriska undervattenssignaturer som föreligger ur ett taktiskt perspektiv.Uppsatsen redovisar även bakgrunden till signaturerna samt vilka möjligheter som finns tillreduktion av desamma.En framtida hotbild innefattande minor och spaningssystem med sensorer avseendeelektriska signaturer ställer nya och högre krav på en fartygsplattform. Ett uppträdande inomramen för fredsbevarande operationer i kustnära områden med en undervattensmiljö skildfrån den på svenskt territorium ställer krav på möjlighet att mäta och om möjligt justera enplattforms elektriska signaturer i syfte att reducera undervattenshotet, inte minst i sambandmed minröjningsoperationer.En genomlysning av brittisk och svensk marin doktrin görs i syfte att finna tecken på attbehovet av signaturreducerande åtgärder återfinns i de dokument som tjänar som ledstjärnorför utnyttjande av marina stridskrafter i en nära framtid.Egenskyddet, samt säkerställande av egna systems prestanda, kommer att krävalågsignaturuppträdande ur alla aspekter. För att kunna utnyttja framtida tekniskasignaturreducerande system i ett taktiskt syfte krävs en förhöjd utbildningsnivå hos densjögående personalen. / The main purpose of this paper is to show the need for putting effort into reduction ofelectric underwater signatures from a tactical point of view. The paper also gives thetechnical background of the signatures and describes possibilities for signature reduction.A future threat assessment including sea mines and underwater reconnaissance systems,with sensors for electric signatures, puts new and higher demands on a naval platform.Acting in peacekeeping operations in littoral waters, involving an underwater environmentdifferent from those of Swedish territorial waters, demands the possibility to measure and, ifpossible, adjust the electric signatures of a platform in order to reduce the underwater threat,especially concerning mine-clearance operations.A perusal of the British and the Swedish maritime doctrines has been done in order to findsigns of need for measures concerning reduction of signatures, since these documents serveas guiding stars for the future use of the naval forces.In order to ensure self-protection and performance of own weapon- and reconnaissancesystems, acting with low signature is in all aspects necessary. There is also a need for higherstandards concerning level of training and education for onboard stationed personnelregarding subjects related to signatures and signature reduction. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP T 01-03