Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:48:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Paulo Boscoli.pdf: 540539 bytes, checksum: 032e8de8b7007486d8846d4f168e8280 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-05-20 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This research has objectives like: show the arguments of the Optimum Currency Areas theory, experiences on currency union (their motivations, architecture e consequences), the discussion on a currency union to Mercosul and, last, conclusions from the linkage of these arguments. Our final objective is to verify if a Mercosul´s currency union is viable, desirable and realistic, them to wonder possibilities to Brazil from this monetary arrangement. We justify this work with the importance the integration movements are getting and establishing in recent years, with many agreements and tracts on regional and global scope. All of these movements are presented to Brazil, partially, as the Mercosul. This is the most important agreement (manly because of its achievements) of which Brazil is a member. There for, all the skepticism over Mercosul nowadays can be relaxed and, thus, justify our work. To answer the questions made above, we will be based on a literature review on these issues and we will use some data base (such as the ECLAC statistical yearbook and the on-line data base for European Union, the Eurostat). We will show the arguments from the Optimum Currency Areas theory, from experiences on currency union and from the discussion on a currency union to Mercosul and we will try to establish some links between them. With some auxiliary statistic data, we ll illustrate, confirm or refute arguments from this debate. After it we found out that, generally, the a Mercosul´s currency union is viable, at the planning level since now, in short run, and at the implementation level only when the Mercosul´s countries pass safely through the practical and theorical challenges shown to them. However the option to a currency union way or an autonomous way appears to be a politics matter and should be the beginning of such process / Este trabalho tem como objetivos apresentar os argumentos da teoria das Áreas Monetárias Ótimas, experiências em uniões monetárias (suas motivações, arquitetura e conseqüências), o debate sobre uma união monetária para o Mercosul e, por fim, as conclusões derivadas do cruzamento da argumentação de cada uma dessas apresentações. Nosso objetivo final é o de verificar se uma união monetária para o Mercosul é viável, desejável e realista, além de aventar possibilidades que o Brasil poderia obter em tal arranjo monetário. Nossa justificativa é baseada na importância que os movimentos de integração vêm ganhando e consolidando, com vários tratados e acordos entre países em âmbitos regionais e mundial. Todo esse movimento é apresentado para o Brasil, em parte, na forma do Mercosul. Esse bloco é o acordo de integração mais ambicioso (nas suas conquistas, principalmente) que o Brasil participa. É dessa forma que todo o ceticismo que cerca hoje em dia esse bloco econômico pode ser relativizado e, por tanto, justificar nosso estudo. Para respondermos às questões anteriores, nos apoiaremos na revisão bibliográfica desses temas e usaremos bancos de dados (como o Anuário Estatístico da CEPAL e o banco de dados on-line sobre a União Européia, o Eurostat). Apresentaremos os argumentos da teoria das Áreas Monetárias Ótimas, das experiências de uniões monetárias e do debate para o Mercosul, faremos a sua sobreposição, com o intuito de constatar conexões e contradições. Com o auxílio de alguns dados estatísticos, ilustraremos, validaremos ou refutaremos alguns argumentos desse debate. Por fim, constatamos, de maneira geral, que uma união monetária para o Mercosul é viável em seu planejamento desde já, no curto prazo, e, em sua implementação, somente quando os países integrantes tiverem, satisfatoriamente, ultrapassado os desafios práticos e teóricos que se apresentam, sendo que a opção por uma união monetária ou um caminho autônomo de políticas monetárias, parece ser uma opção política e deve ser o início de tal processo

Cette thèse contribue à la littérature sur le défaut souverain en offrant une nouvelle approche d'analyse, réconciliant les approches statistiques et structurelles. Avec comme fil rouge le lien entre crises financières, accumulation de dette et défaut souverain, ce travail répond à trois questions principales.En premier lieu, quand les pays font-ils défaut ? En posant un simple regard sur les principales variables macroéconomiques et les composantes cycliques des défauts souverains, je montre que le défaut se produit quand le pays subit un retournement brutal de croissance, ajouté à un large choc discontinu sur son ratio de dette sur PIB, apporté en majorité par une crise de change ou une crise bancaire.En second lieu, en quoi le risque souverain au sein d'une zone monétaire (par exemple la zone euro) diffère de celui d'une petite économie ouverte en change flexible, majoritairement décrit dans la littérature ? Je construis un modèle DSGE néo-keynésien dans lequel j'introduis du risque souverain ; je mets l'accent sur le rôle clé des comportements de consommation, à la fois dans la préférence pour l'union monétaire et dans la décision de défaut. Je regarde également l'efficacité de certaines politiques fiscales sur la réduction du risque souverain dans une zone monétaire.Enfin, les instruments de politique monétaire ont-ils été efficaces pendant la crise pour réduire les taux souverains ? J'évalue la transmission de la politique monétaire de la BCE, à la fois conventionnelle et non-conventionnelle, aux taux et aux volumes d'émissions de titres souverains pour les quatre plus importantes économies européennes. Je montre que seule la transmission du taux directeur vers les taux souverains a été effective ; les instruments non-conventionnels ont eu des résultats contrastés et essentiellement sur les taux d'intérêt. / This thesis offers a new approach to sovereign default analysis, by tackling both statistical and the structural approaches to sovereign default. Starting from the link between financial crises, debt accumulation and sovereign default, it answers three main questions.First, when do countries default? Taking a simple look at macroeconomic variables and business cycles around default, I show that economic defaults occur when the country experiences a switch from a boom to a bust, combined with a large discontinuous shock on its debt-to-GDP ratio, brought mainly by a currency or a banking crisis.Second, how sovereign risk in a monetary union (e.g. the Eurozone) differs from sovereign default risk in a small open economy usually described in default literature? Constructing a New-Keynesian DSGE model with sovereign default risk, I exhibit the key role of habit persistence in the preference for a monetary union and the default decision. I am also able to test the efficiency of various policy tools on sovereign risk.Third, have monetary policy tools been efficient to reduce sovereign spreads in the Eurozone? I assess the transmission of ECB monetary policies, conventional and unconventional, to both interest rates and bond issuance for the four largest economies of the Euro area. The main result is that only the pass-through from the ECB rate to interest rates has been effective. Unconventional policies have had uneven effects and primarily on interest rates.

The thesis analyzes measures adopted and applied by the EMU crisis management in years 2010 to 2012, that means at a time when debt and currency crisis was affecting the euro area countries the most. The main focus is dedicated to the rescue mechanism EFSF and expansive monetary policy of ECB as these crisis management tools were used for stabilization of the debt situation in Ireland, Portugal and Greece. Analyzing of these tools leads to assess their contribution to selected country and to European monetary union as a whole. The final part is devoted to possible solutions for the debt crisis and to the future of the eurozone and the common currency.

[pt] Este estudo define um modelo de dois países que seguem a estrutura exposta em Gertler-Karadi (2011) e formam uma união monetária. Estudamos o impacto de fricções financeiras e os efeitos de políticas monetárias não convencionais implementadas com escopo individual e geral nos países membros desta união. Mostramos que, se os parâmetros usados para limitar o balanço das instituições financeiras forem calibrados para permitir uma alavancagem mais alta, o maior acesso a capital leva a um produto que é, ao mesmo tempo, mais alto no steady state e mais frágil a choques de qualidade de capital. Também mostramos que níveis elevados de Home Bias levam a menos compartilhamento de riscos e a uma disseminação menor de choques idiosincráticos. Por fim, esse estudo também mostra que políticas monetárias não convencionais com escopo individual podem aumentar o bem-estar consideravelmente quando o Home Bias no sistema financeiro é elevado. / [en] This study lays-out a model with two countries that follow the DSGE framework with financial intermediaries set by Gertler-Karadi (2011) and form a monetary union. We study the impact of financial frictions and the effects of union-wide and country-specific unconventional monetary policies in the union s member countries. We show that, if the parameters used to limit balance sheet size are calibrated in a way to allow for higher leverage in the banking system, the easier access to capital leads to an Output level that is, at the same time, higher in the Steady State and more fragile to Capital Quality Shocks. It s also shown that high levels of home-bias lead to lower risk-sharing and lower dissemination of idiosyncratic shocks, which helps explaining why idiosyncratic shocks may cause highly persistent effects in the member countries. Finally, this study also shows that country-specific unconventional monetary policies can be considerably welfare increasing when home-bias in the financial system is high.

La présente thèse vise à décrire et analyser l’évolution ambigüe du rapport Souveraineté-Intégration dans les cadres européen et africain. A cet effet, elle révèle qu’un tel rapport est part d’un antagonisme de principe entre Souveraineté et Intégration mais débouche cependant sur des réalités différentes qui sont fonction du contexte précis de mise en application de cette relation. En effet, si au départ, on peut noter une certaine convergence de vue en Europe et en Afrique sur la nature antagonique des rapports entre Souveraineté et Intégration ; à l’arrivée, la pratique de l’intégration ne semble pas avoir conduit aux mêmes effets quant au sort de la souveraineté étatique dans les cadres européen et africain. En réalité, alors que la souveraineté de l’Etat a été fortement amoindrie par l’intégration dans l’UE, confirmant ainsi largement leur antagonisme de départ ; du côté africain, cette hypothèse initiale d’antagonisme a plutôt été compromise par la pratique car dans l’UEMOA et l’OHADA, l’opposition entre souveraineté et intégration s’est avérée largement ineffective. / This thesis aims to describe and analyze the ambiguous evolution of the Sovereignty-Integration report in the European and African frameworks. To this end, it reveals that such a relation started from an antagonism of principle between Sovereignty and Integration but nevertheless leads to different realities that depend on the precise context of the application of this relation. Indeed, while at the outset one can note a certain convergence of view in Europe and in Africa on the antagonistic nature of the relations between Sovereignty and Integration; the practice of integration seems to have led to contradictory effects on the fate of state sovereignty in the European and African frameworks. In facts, whereas sovereignty of States has been greatly diminished by integration in the EU, thus largely confirming their initial antagonism ; on the African side, this initial hypothesis of antagonism has rather been compromised by practice because in UEMOA and OHADA, the opposition between sovereignty and integration has proved largely ineffective.

Cette thèse est articulée autour de deux questions centrales visant à expliquer pourquoi et comment devrait être organisée la Complémentarité entre les Banques et les institutions spécialisées dans la Microfinance (CBM), afin de financer efficacement le développement dans les pays de l’UEMOA : l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine. Les aspects bancaires de la théorie de rattrapage économique de Gerschenkron sont adaptés au contexte de la prépondérance de l’économie informelle dans l’UEMOA. L’analyse empirique montre, quant à elle, que les secteurs bancaires et microfinanciers de l’UEMOA sont respectivement réfractaires et peu performants - en termes de rentabilité et d’impact social - pour l’autonomisation du processus de CBM. Relativement à la mise en oeuvre de la CBM, le cadre néoinstitutionnaliste de l’hybridité de la firme est mobilisé en vue d’intégrer et d’expliciter le rôle de l’autorité publique vis-à-vis des acteurs financiers privés, dont ceux du « mobile banking ». Par ailleurs, les « best practices » internationales dans la microfinance servent également de références empiriques et typologiques aux pays de l’UEMOA, en vue d’une coordination publique indirecte ou directe de la CBM. / This thesis is based on two central questions whose purpose is to explain why and how the institutional complementarity should be organized between banks and microfinance institutions (MFIs) to effectively finance the development process of WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) countries. The banking aspects of Gerschenkron’s catch-up theory are adapted to the large informal context of the WAEMU economies. At empirical level, the independent and private processes of Complementarity between Banks and Microfinance institutions (CBM) are scarce in WAEMU as long as banks avoid risks associated with adaptation to microfinance customers, and MFIs are not efficient for infrastructure modernization and expansion. Thus, to implement CBM processes, the neo-institutionalist framework of hybridity of the firm and the international best practices in microfinance are mobilized in order to clarify the role of public authorities towards private financial actors, including the mobile banking operators.

Chapter I - Derivative Market Competition: OTC Markets Versus Organized Derivative Exchanges  Recent regulatory initiatives in the United States have again raised the issue of a ''level regulatory and supervisory playing field'' and the degree of competition globally between over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and organized derivative exchange (ODE) markets. This chapter models some important aspects of how an ODE market interrelates with the OTC markets. It analyzes various ways in which an ODE market can respond to competition from the OTC markets and considers whether ODE markets would actually benefit from a more level playing field. Among other factors, such as different transaction costs, different abilities to mitigate credit risk play a significant role in determining the degree of competition between the two types of markets. This implies that a potentially important service ODE markets can provide OTC market participants is to extend clearing services to them. Such services would allow the OTC markets to focus more on providing less competitive contracts/innovations and instead customize their contracts to specific investors’ risk preferences and needs.  Chapter II – Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adaptation Efforts at crisis resolution that succeed in reducing potential inefficiencies and instability in the international financial system are in the interest of both the private and the public sector. Unlike in the domestic context, in the international context, in the absence of clearly established rules of the game, the approaches adopted toward crisis resolution, and the extent to which they are interpreted by market participants as setting a precedent, can have profound implications for the nature and structure of international capital flows. The key conclusion of this chapter is that recent experiences with payment suspensions and bond restructurings are limited as guides to determining the future success or failures of these initiatives, as the private sector most likely has adapted in order to minimize any unwanted public sector involvement. Chapter III - European Equity Market Integration: Cyclical or Structural? Reviewing the empirical evidence of equity market integration in the European Union, the chapter finds a significant increase in the importance of global sector factors for a number of industries. Unlike most past studies, which only covered developments during the bull market of the late nineties, the results presented in this chapter suggest that the degree of Euroland equity market integration has declined gradually following the bursting of the TMT bubble. This seems to suggest that the findings of previous studies that Euroland equity markets were nearly fully financially integrated is worth revisiting. There are, however, several good reasons to believe that the structural factors driving European equity market integration have yet to play themselves out fully. Institutional investors both outside the Euroland area and within have substantial untapped capacity to take on Euroland exposures and invest additionally in Euroland equities. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004

《穩定暨成長協定》（Stability and Growth Pact, SGP）作為歐洲經濟暨貨幣同盟（Economic and Monetary Union, EMU）財政紀律框架之核心規範，其有效實行是確保EMU會員國財政穩定並使EMU穩健運作之重要關鍵。本研究之研究目的，即在於透過對SGP的立法背景、實行成效與SGP在2005年及2010年經歷的兩次改革內容進行分析，以了解EMU財政紀律發展趨勢及政策啟示。 本研究之研究成果顯示，自1997年SGP制定至今，EMU財政規範始終是以「補漏洞」的方式進行。歐盟非中央化的財政政策是EMU財政規範的有效實行必須期待各會員國善意遵守的根本原因。這項缺陷也使得部分EMU會員國重新思考建立財政同盟的可能。然由於財政同盟代表的是要求EMU各會員國進一步放棄國家主權中的財政自主權，在仍有會員國對此表示疑慮的前提下，歐盟財政治理未來的發展趨勢仍值得吾人持續觀察。 / As a key rule of the fiscal governance frameworks of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the effective implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is a guarantee of both the fiscal stability of the EMU Member States and the well-function of the EMU. The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the trends of the EMU fiscal disciplines and the messages the EMU fiscal policies deliver through analysis of the background of the SGP, the practice of the SGP and the two modifications to SGP in 2005 and 2010 respectively. The result of this thesis shows that the EMU fiscal governance has been keeping fixing problems ex post facto since the SGP entered into force. And the decentralised fiscal policies explain why the effective implementation of SGP is relying on the willingness of the EMU Member States to follow the rules. This defect makes some of the EMU Member States to reconsider to build a fiscal union, which means to yield the fiscal sovereignty to the EU. Since there are still some EMU Member States concerning over the idea, the future of the EMU fiscal governance is still developing.

The study examines the European coverage in four leading Nordic newspapers during two periods in 1993 and in 1996. During the first period, three countries were negotiating for membership in the European Union. During the second period, work on a new European Constitution was ongoing, to be negotiated by the Intergovernmental Conference at the end of the period. Two of the applicant countries, Finland and Sweden, were then members of the union since Jan 1, 1995. Voters in the third country, Norway, opted to stay outside the union. Norway is, however closely linked to the union by the previous EEA agreement. Finally, the fourth country, Denmark, had limited its longstanding membership in four important areas. Results of the main study in 1993 indicate a great difference in the degree of Europeanness of the coverage of European affairs, as indicated by the share of European issues, sources, players, institutions etc. The Danish paper, the Politiken, was on all counts genuinely European in its coverage. This could, to begin with, be understood in terms of a relational context - Denmark was a member of the European Community, the other countries were not. In 1996, as could be expected, the Norwegian paper, the Aftenposten, reduced its coverage of European affairs to about half the previous volume, the Finnish and Swedish papers, the Hufvudstadsbladet and the Dagens Nyheter, increased their volumes to new highs. The Danish paper maintained its previously comparatively high volume of European coverage, and was still distinctly more European in its outlook on transnational politics. This could be understood in terms of a new Maturity proposition - it may take a long time for the national media to come to terms with a new political environment. The study also puts forward the proposition that Danish political culture requires a different coverage of European affairs, and also requires an opportunity to discuss and evaluate European politics. On a theoretical level, the study supports the idea that national experience, historical and relational contexts influence media content. National agendas powerfully determine the orientation of transnational political communication . Three in-depth studies by and large confirm results from the content analysis. A separate exercise inspired by Grounded Theory gives rise to three theoretical concepts that seem to be fundamental dimensions of European political communication: Legitimacy (media coverage contributes to status conferral and encourages deliberation of cooperation as an idea), Participation (media coverage as expressions of intrinsical and instrumental motives for joining and taking responsibility towards European cooperation), and Mondialization/Universalism (media coverage of Europe's efforts in the global arena) / digitalisering@umu

Why has not Britain joined euro until now? This is an attractive issue. The purpose of this paper is to realize the real reasons. Hence, this paper analyzes the euro policies of Thatcher Government, Major Government and Blair Government. Before interpreting British euro policies, this paper explains the process of British EU membership. In addition, this paper introduces the story of EMU which is relative to euro. Most importantly, here this paper takes ¡§Europeanization¡¨ framework as a study tool to examine British euro policies. Through ¡§Europeanization¡¨ framework, this paper proposes many factors affecting British euro policies, including ¡§goodness of fit,¡¨ ¡¨veto players,¡¨ ¡§timing,¡¨ ¡¨political beliefs and organizational cultures,¡¨ ¡§the costs of institution changing¡¨ and so on. Thus, this paper concludes that Britain hasn¡¦t joined euro until now owing to many factors.