Background: Throughout the last century mergers and acquisitions have been categorized by changes in the global economy. Globalization and changes in legislations has brought forward so called waves that are rooted in the market for the United States. Where the act of acquisitions can be divided into both friendly and hostile takeovers, history shows that hostile takeovers are frequent in the US but less evident in the Swedish market. As for Sweden the existence of control enhancing mechanisms are utilized to enable control of a firm without owning a proportionate share of equity. While the trend of takeover activity is replicated elsewhere, the hostile aspect finds another route. The market for corporate control governs the hostile aspect where firms should be replaced with new managers if agency problems arise between the management and the shareholders. Thus looking at Sweden, corporate governance issues and the establishment of national laws are of certain importance. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the ownership structure in Swedish listed companies impacts on the occurrence of hostile takeovers and what implications a potential change in the corporate governance structure would have on it. Moreover we intend to map Sweden internationally to give a broad picture of the research area. Methodology: We have made use of a quantitative method for the empirical section and thereafter derived conclusions through the hypothetico-deductive approach. For testing the outcome of hostile bids in Sweden, chi-square tests for independence have been conducted and in regards of an international comparison we have implemented a correlation analysis. Conclusions: With the result at hand we concluded that the theory was partially aligned with the empirical data. The market for corporate control is not fully efficient in Sweden. The reason for that is the multiple voting rights implemented in the target firms which impede the successfulness in replacing a management. The hostile bid frequency has increased over the years, mainly due to potential agency problems among target firms. But parallel to this, which in some regards contradicts theory, is that firms neglects the prevalent ownership structure in Sweden and acquires a foothold as to make their hostile acquisition. In regards of the empirical data, concentrated ownership solely does not harm the market for corporate control in Sweden. Internationally, the correlation between ownership concentration and hostile bid frequencies proved to be negative where Sweden despite this attracts hostile acquirers.

<p>Background:</p><p>Family-business is considered to be the most frequent and complex form of business</p><p>organization around the world. However, recently there has been a large number of</p><p>corporate scandals in such firms especially at the board level (e.g. Parmalat). Within the</p><p>framework of two corporate governance models characterized by the Continental European</p><p>and the Anglo-Saxon model, boards of directors hold a central position. This position</p><p>becomes of great importance when talking about public companies and more specifically in</p><p>public family-controlled companies. The concentration of ownership is the main</p><p>characteristic of the Continental European, which is the most workable form of corporate</p><p>governance for family-controlled business. Nevertheless, family-controlled companies acting</p><p>under the Anglo-Saxon model have also been able to operate successfully. Therefore, we</p><p>will investigate if there is a convergence of corporate governance in family-controlled</p><p>companies across frontiers focusing mainly on boards’ structures and composition as well as</p><p>ownership, and the sub-committees.</p><p>Purpose:</p><p>The overall purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of Corporate</p><p>Governance in public Family-controlled firms which are in the Swedish and United</p><p>Kingdom stock market. More specifically, investigate whether the boards’ structures and</p><p>composition, as well as ownership and the existence of sub-committees show similarities or</p><p>not in Family-controlled firms acting within the framework of an Anglo-Saxon and</p><p>Continental model of Corporate Governance</p><p>Method:</p><p>A quantitative approach was used to fulfill the purpose of this thesis. Furthermore, the top</p><p>10 family-controlled companies with highest market-capitalization have been selected from</p><p>both countries to constitute our sample. The empirical material was gathered mainly from</p><p>the annual reports of the companies but also by contacting the companies by email or from</p><p>articles in online newspapers.</p><p>Conclusion:</p><p>This study found that in some aspects of corporate governance convergence exists while in</p><p>others it does not. Regarding board structures and composition, there is a convergence to</p><p>“one tier board” and the presence of family members and employee representation in boards.</p><p>On the other hand, when it comes to the sizes of the boards and number of independent</p><p>directors in the boards we argue that convergence is not present.</p>

<p>Background: During the past ten years an increasing trend of international representation in Swedish boards, referred to as board internationalization, has occured. Figures show that in 1994 foreign board members held 3,4% (Sundin & Sundqvist, 1995) of the seats in Swedish companies boards, today that figure is 14,2% (Fristedt & Sundqvist, 2005). This trend seems to continue as the nominations of this year is streaming in. Although this trend occurs Swedish business press is questioning why not more foreign directors are being appointed members to board (Almgren, 2006). Fahim (2005) also questions this and argues that companies need to realise that there is a profitability perspective on the subject of diversity. In many of the large Swedish companies the absence of foreign directors is noticed, but there is a few in the forefront which have appointed foreign directors. The reasons for internationalizing a board can be different and it interesting to investigate how forefront companies discuss internationalization in general and which reasons in particular that drives board internationalization.</p><p>Purpose: The thesis' purpose is to investigate the main rational for board internationalization.</p><p>Frame of reference: In the frame of reference, four possible influences on the internationalization of the board is presented, in order to be discussed and compared to the empirical findings; corporate governance, ownership structure, stakeholder pressure, and competitive advantage.</p><p>Method: In order to fulfill the purpose, a qualitative research method is chosen, based on in-depth interviews. The sample consists of ten interviews with chairmen of Swedish boards within companies that are represented by at least one foreign board member.</p><p>Conclusion: We have concluded that the main rational of board internationalization is the search for competitive advantage, which is believed to be created by a board with diverse competences and networks. Regarding ownership structure, foreign private owners are the only ones that are influencing the internationalization. Both the corporate governance development and the stakeholder pressure are identified in the empirical findings, but not believed to be an influence of internationalization.</p>

我國財務會計準則委員會於2004年7月1日發佈財務會計準則第35號公報《資產減損之會計處理準則》，此號公報允許公司可選擇於2004年提前認列資產減損，且公司擁有認列資產減損金額之裁量權。當公司擁有認列資產減損時點與金額的裁量權時，資產減損之認列可能成為一項新的盈餘管理工具。由於我國公司的代理問題是起因於控制股東剝削外部股東之財富，故本研究擬探討控制股東之股權結構與公司提前認列資產減損之關聯性。 / 本研究以2004年年報與2005年第一季季報宣告資產減損的上市櫃公司為研究對象。研究目的有三，首先探討控制股東之控制權偏離現金流量權引發的代理問題，是否會影響公司提前認列資產減損的可能性與金額。其次探討公司的控制股東持股質押的現象，是否會加深公司的代理問題，因而影響公司提前認列資產減損的可能性與認列減損的金額。最後本研究將探討市場對於宣告資產減損資訊的反應，是否會受到公司治理結構不同所影響。 / 研究結果發現，控制股東之控制權偏離現金流量權幅度愈大的公司，提前認列資產減損的可能性愈大，但是與提前認列資產減損的金額無顯著的關聯性。其次，控制股東有持股質押的公司，提前認列資產減損的可能性與金額皆愈大。最後，本研究並未發現股票市場對於不同公司治理結構的公司宣告資產減損的訊息有不同的反應。 / Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.35 “Accounting for Assets Impairments” was released on July first of 2004. The provision of this Statement should be effective for quarterly financial statements ending on or after first quarter of 2005, but earlier application on the forth quarter of 2004 is encouraged. In Taiwan, the agency problem arises from the divergence between controlling owner’ voting right and cash flow right. Thus the regulation on the early adoption provides controlling owner with stronger incentive to manage reported earnings by manipulating the recognition timing and amount of write-off of impaired assets. / The primary objective of this paper is examine the association ownership structures, measured as the control divergence and the percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners, and the likelihood of the early adoption of SFAS No. 35 and amount of assets impairments. Second, we further examine whether market valuation on assets impairment systematically varies depending on the agency problem level. / The results show that, as predicted, firms with greater control divergence and greater percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners are more likely to early recognize impartment of assts. In addition, we find that the amount of asset impairment is associated with the percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners, as predicted, but is not related to the control divergence. Finally, contrary to our prediction, we find no evidence that the market reaction to the announcement of asset impairments is significantly associated with the corporate governance structures.

Bakgrund: Thomsen och Pedersen (2007), Abrahamson och De Ridder (2014), Fama och Jensen (1983), Gilson (2006) samt Michel et al. (2013) kommer samtliga fram till att ett bolags ägarstruktur samt att en kontrollägare har en direkt positiv påverkan på ett bolags prestation och dess avkastning. Detta kan förklaras genom den agentproblematik som existerar i ett bolag. Eftersom det vid börsintroduktioner ofta sker stora ägarförändringar är studier av ägarstrukturens påverkan på avkastningen, särskilt intressanta just vid börsintroduktioner samtidigt som det saknas fördjupade studier gällande hur ägarstrukturen påverkar avkastningen i svenska bolag.     Syfte: Syftet med studien är att förklara hur ägarstrukturen påverkar avkastningen för IPO:s.   Metod: Studien omfattar ett urval om totalt 47 bolag, som introducerats på den svenska börsen under åren 2006 - 2013. Urvalet har kategoriserats efter intervall avseende ägarandelar och sedan analyserats. Korrelations-tester har använts för att se ifall det existerar ett samband mellan variablerna  samt regressionsanalyser har genomförts för att se hur den riskjusterade avkastningen förhåller sig till ett bolags ägarstruktur.  Med hjälp av buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) har regressionstesterna genomförts, som kontrollerats med inklusive och exklusive företagsspecifika kontrollvariabler.   Resultat: Våra resultat visar att ägarstrukturen har en viss men begränsad påverkan på avkastningen. I intervallet 20 – 80 procent finns dock en tydlig positiv påverkan på avkastningen. / Title: The ownership structure’s impact on revenue of IPOs – an analysis of the Swedish market   Background: Thomsen and Persson (2007), Abrahamson and De Ridder (2014), Fama and Jensen (1983), Gilson (2006) and Michel et al. (2013), all front that company's ownership structure and that a controlling shareholder has a direct positive impact on a company's performance and its returns. This can be explained by the agentproblem that exist in a company. As it often happens big changes in ownership at IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) are studies of ownership structure's impact on performance, particularly interesting just at IPOs. There are also no in-depth studies on how ownership structure affects the return of Swedish companies.   Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain how the ownership structure affects revenue for IPOs.   Method: This study looks at a total of 47 corporations, all of which were introduced to the Swedish market between 2006 - 2013. The selection of corporations has been categorised based on a range of ownership shares and then thoroughly analysed. Correlation tests have been completed in order to find a causal link between variables and also regression analysis to see how the risk adjusted return is related to a company's ownership structure. Through a Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) regressiontests has been made, and verified by including and excluding corporation-specific control variables.   Result: Our results suggest that the ownership structure has certain but limited effect on revenue. It does, however, indicate that ownership shares within 20-80 percent will have a positive impact on revenue.

Background: Family-business is considered to be the most frequent and complex form of business organization around the world. However, recently there has been a large number of corporate scandals in such firms especially at the board level (e.g. Parmalat). Within the framework of two corporate governance models characterized by the Continental European and the Anglo-Saxon model, boards of directors hold a central position. This position becomes of great importance when talking about public companies and more specifically in public family-controlled companies. The concentration of ownership is the main characteristic of the Continental European, which is the most workable form of corporate governance for family-controlled business. Nevertheless, family-controlled companies acting under the Anglo-Saxon model have also been able to operate successfully. Therefore, we will investigate if there is a convergence of corporate governance in family-controlled companies across frontiers focusing mainly on boards’ structures and composition as well as ownership, and the sub-committees. Purpose: The overall purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of Corporate Governance in public Family-controlled firms which are in the Swedish and United Kingdom stock market. More specifically, investigate whether the boards’ structures and composition, as well as ownership and the existence of sub-committees show similarities or not in Family-controlled firms acting within the framework of an Anglo-Saxon and Continental model of Corporate Governance Method: A quantitative approach was used to fulfill the purpose of this thesis. Furthermore, the top 10 family-controlled companies with highest market-capitalization have been selected from both countries to constitute our sample. The empirical material was gathered mainly from the annual reports of the companies but also by contacting the companies by email or from articles in online newspapers. Conclusion: This study found that in some aspects of corporate governance convergence exists while in others it does not. Regarding board structures and composition, there is a convergence to “one tier board” and the presence of family members and employee representation in boards. On the other hand, when it comes to the sizes of the boards and number of independent directors in the boards we argue that convergence is not present.

Aktieåterköpen har haft en stor utveckling globalt sett den senaste tiden och sedan det blev rättsligt tillåtet i Sverige år 2000 använder allt fler företag aktieåterköp som metod för att distribuera pengar till sina aktieägare. Tidigare forskning visar att företagsledningar innehar en stor handlingsfrihet när det gäller publicering av nyheter och de kan till stor del styra hur företagets interna nyhetsflöde utges till marknaden. Tidigare studier åskådliggör att företagsledningar utnyttjar denna handlingsfrihet och strategiskt publicerar information för att gynna sig själva. Manipulation av nyhetsflödet vid aktieåterköp är dock ett mycket outforskat område där de få studier som förekommer har genomförts i USA. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka och klargöra om och i vilken omfattning svenska företagsledningar manipulerar nyhetsflödet vid aktieåterköp med avsikten att gynna sig själva. Studien ska förklara om svenska företagsledningar medvetet ändrar innehållet och tidpunkten för deras nyheter i samband med aktieåterköp.  Tidigare amerikansk forskning påvisar att företagsledningar publicerar fler negativa nyheter innan ett aktieåterköp med intentionen att få en nedåtdrivande aktiekurs där aktierna återköps till ett lägre pris. Efter aktieåterköpet publiceras fler positiva nyheter för att driva upp aktiekursen igen. Uppsatsens studie visade att svenska företagsledningar publicerade fler negativa nyheter innan ett aktieåterköp och till viss del fler positiva nyheter efter ett aktieåterköp. Resultatet i uppsatsen innehöll en för hög signifikansnivå och därför var inte resultatet tillräckligt tillförlitligt för att vara statistiskt signifikant. Resultatet tolkas som att svenska företagsledningar inte manipulerar nyhetsflödet i samband med aktieåterköp i lika stor omfattning relativt företagsledningar i USA. Anledningarna till det är främst på grund av de påtagliga skillnaderna i ägarstruktur mellan Sverige och USA. Avslutningsvis diskuteras förslag till framtida forskning där det vetenskapliga arbetet om ämnesområdet skulle kunna utvecklas genom att utöka undersökningen till fler delar av Europa. På så sätt skapas en bredare bild över hur vanligt förekommande manipulation i samband med aktieåterköp är i olika delar av världen. / Share repurchases has increased a lot globally recently and since it was legally permitted in Sweden 2000, more companies use share repurchases as a method of distributing cash to their shareholders. Previous research implicates that corporate managers have a lot of control when it comes to publishing news and they can largely control the company's internal newsfeed that is published to the market. Previous studies illustrate that corporate managers trade on this control and strategic publishes information to benefit themselves. Manipulation of news feed when it comes to share repurchases is a largely unexplored area. The few studies that exist have been conducted in the United States. The purpose of this paper is to investigate and clarify if and to what extent Swedish corporate managers manipulate the news feed related to share repurchases with the intent to benefit themselves. The study will explain how the Swedish corporate managers consciously change the content and timing of their news related to share repurchases. Previous American research shows that corporate managers publish more negative news before a share repurchase with the intention of repurchase shares at a lower price. Following the share repurchase corporate managers published more positive news to push up the stock price again. This paper showed that Swedish company managers published more negative news before a share repurchase and some more positive news after a share repurchase. The result in this paper was not within the significance level and therefore was not the result reliable enough to be statistically significant. The result is interpreted as the Swedish corporate managers do not manipulate their newsfeed related to share repurchase as much as corporate managers in the United States. The reason for this is mainly due to the considerable differences in ownership structure between Sweden and the United States. Finally, we discuss suggestions for research in the future where the scientific work in the subject could be developed by extending the survey region to more parts of Europe. This would create a broader picture of how common manipulation related to share repurchase is in different parts of the world.

Korsägande definieras som en horisontell ägarstruktur och strukturen har fått ett ökande intresse inom den svenska fastighetssektorn. Finansinspektionen och större branschmagasin inom branschen har lyft fram den ökade risk som korsägande innebär. Därför syftar denna uppsats till att förtydliga definitionen av korsägande och de risker som ägarstrukturen medför. Utöver det kommer korsägandet mellan svenska noterade fastighetsbolag kartläggas och analyseras. Studien genomfördes med både kvantitativa och kvalitativa metoder. Kombinationen av de två tillvägagångssätten möjliggjorde en kartläggning av ägarstrukturerna som sedan kunde positioneras i direkt jämförelse med litteraturen och respondenter. Metoden innehåller en visualisering hämtad från ägardata och intervjuer med respondenter inom branschen. Av den information som samlats in i denna studie kan man sluta sig till att korsägande inte förekommer mellan de börsnoterade svenska fastighetsbolagen. Istället tillskriver branschen begreppet korsägande till en mer omfattande definition än vad den teoretiska gör. Vidare dras slutsatsen att de bakomliggande orsakerna till korsägande beror på flera faktorer. Det kan till exempel vara ett resultat av den starka marknadsutvecklingen där lönsamheten har bidragit till att en del av det tillgängliga kapitalet avleds till andra Fastighetsbolag inom branschen. Emellertid visar både teori och empiri också att det finns strategiska fördelar med korsägande, vilket också har ansetts vara en bakomliggande orsak. De primära riskerna är att det finns incitamentsproblem, systemrisker och minskad transparens. / Cross-ownership is defined as a horizontal ownership structure and has gained an increasing interest within the Swedish Real Estate sector. However, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority and major publications within the industry have highlighted the increased risk that cross-ownership entails. Therefore, this thesis aims to clarify the definition of cross-ownership and the risk it entails. Also, the cross-ownership between Swedish-listed real estate companies will be mapped and analyzed.  This study is conducted using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The combination of these two approaches provides the opportunity to chart the ownership structures and position the literature in direct comparison with the respondent’s answers. The method contains a visualization derived from ownership data and interviews with respondents within the industry. From the information collected in this study, it can be derived that cross-ownership does not occur between the listed Swedish real estate companies. Instead, the industry attributes the concept of cross-ownership to a more extensive definition than the theoretical does. Furthermore, it is concluded that the underlying causes of cross-ownership are due to several factors. For example, it can be a result of the strong market development where profitability has contributed to a portion of the available capital being diverted to other Real Estate companies within the industry. However, both theory and empiricism also show that there are strategic advantages to cross-ownership, which have also been considered an underlying cause. Lastly, there are several risks with cross-ownership, which are primarily attributable to incentive problems, systemic risks, and reduced transparency.

Cette thèse se compose de trois chapitres. Le premier chapitre analyse l'impact de la structure actionnariale et des réformes mises en œuvre dans les années 2000 sur l'efficacité des banques commerciales au Vietnam. Les résultats montrent que l'efficacité diffère selon le type de structure actionnariale ; les banques d'État ont des niveaux d'efficacité plus bas en comparaison avec les banques privées et les banques avec des actionnaires étrangers. Depuis la mise en œuvre de règles minimales de fonds propres plus strictes, la capitalisation des banques a également été un moteur important de l'efficacité de la banque. Le deuxième chapitre traite de la façon dont les banques au Vietnam fixent leurs marges d'intérêt avec un accent particulier sur la structure actionnariale des banques et la réglementation des taux d'intérêt par la banque centrale. Les résultats montrent que seules les banques privées et publiques transfèrent leurs coûts opérationnels à leurs clients. La capitalisation bancaire qui reflète l'aversion au risque des banques est un déterminant significatif pour les banques étrangères et d'Etat uniquement en cas de réglementation des taux d'intérêt; ces banques ont tendance à répercuter le coût élevé du capital sur les clients. Nous montrons aussi que, en l'absence de contrôle des taux d'intérêt, les banques étrangères fixent des marges plus élevées quand elles prennent un risque de crédit plus élevé alors qu'en présence de la réglementation des taux d'intérêt les banques privées font face à un risque de crédit plus élevé sans pouvoir augmenter leur marge en conséquence. Le dernier chapitre étudie l'impact de la politique monétaire et des conditions économiques sur les prêts bancaires pour les différents niveaux de capitalisation des banques. Les résultats indiquent que tous les types de chocs de politique monétaire ont un effet négatif sur les prêts, mais que l'augmentation de la liquidité bancaire conduit à une réduction plus faible de la croissance des prêts. Enfin, les banques dont la capitalisation est plus faible sont moins influencées par le cycle économique. / This dissertation is composed of three chapters. The first chapter analyzes the impact of ownership structure and the reforms implemented in the mid 2000's on the efficiency of commercial banks in Vietnam. The results show that the efficiency differs depending on ownership type; state-owned banks have the lowest efficiency levels in comparison with private banks and banks with foreign shareholders. Since the implementation of more stringent minimum capital rules, bank capitalization has also been an important driver of bank efficiency. The second chapter discusses how banks in Vietnam set their interest margins with a particular focus on bank ownership and interest rate regulation by the central bank. The results show that only private and state-owned banks transfer their operational costs to their clients. Bank capitalization which reflects bank risk aversion is a significant determinant for foreign and state owned banks only in presence of interest rate regulation; these banks tend to pass the high capital cost to customers. We also show that, in absence of interest rate control, foreign banks set higher margins when they take higher credit risk while in presence of interest rate regulation private banks cope with higher credit risk without being able to raise their margin accordingly. The last chapter investigates the impact of monetary policy and economic conditions on bank lending for different levels of bank capitalization. The results indicate that all types of monetary policy shocks have a negative effect on lending but that an increase in bank liquidity leads to a lower reduction in loan growth. Finally, banks with lower capitalization are less influenced by the business cycle.

Este trabalho relaciona a estrutura de propriedade das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto com a distribuição de Juros Sobre o Capital Próprio (JSCP), de 1997 a 2008, através de estimações Probit e Tobit com dados em painel. Uma das inovações deste estudo é analisar a distribuição de JSCP sob a ótica dos controladores (beneficiários), e não somente da empresa (investida). Constata-se que a distribuição de JSCP, apesar de reduzir a carga tributária no nível da firma, enseja alíquotas variáveis de acordo com a natureza jurídica dos acionistas. Os resultados empíricos sugerem que: a) a estrutura de propriedade afeta tanto a propensão quanto o montante distribuído de JSCP; b) a presença de investidores institucionais aumenta significativamente a distribuição de proventos em dinheiro através de JSCP vis-à-vis dividendos; c) desvios da relação “uma ação – um voto” estão positivamente relacionados com a distribuição de JSCP; d) empresas maiores, mais lucrativas, sujeitas a melhores práticas de governança corporativa e com maiores oportunidades de crescimento tendem a distribuir mais proventos em dinheiro via JSCP, prática esta que aumenta a riqueza dos acionistas. / This paper investigates the relationship between the ownership structure of Brazilian listed firms and the payout of Interest on Equity Capital (Juros Sobre o Capital Próprio – JSCP) in the period 1997 to 2008, employing panel data Probit and Tobit estimation. One major contribution of this study is the analysis of JSCP payout under the perspective of the shareholders instead of the usual firm-based perspective. We find that JSCP payout, despite reducing the tax burden at the firm level, gives rise to variable tax rates depending on the nature of the shareholder. Empirical results suggest that (a) the ownership structure influences both the propensity and the amount paid out as JSCP; (b) the presence of institutional investors significantly increases cash distributions under the form of JSCP vis-à-vis cash dividend payouts; (c) deviations from the “one-share-one-vote rule” are positively related to JSCP payout; (d) firms that are bigger, more profitable, present better governance practices, and have more growth opportunities tend to payout more cash as JSCP, a practice that increases shareholders’ wealth.