俄羅斯與西方在南奧塞梯及科索沃宣布獨立問題上採取截然不同的立場，科索沃宣布獨立後，俄羅斯表示堅決反對科宣布獨立，此舉破壞國際法準則及地區穩定，國際社會不應奉行雙重標準，也不能出於政治考慮有選擇地利用國際法。 俄羅斯在協助南奧塞梯的獨立運動支持喬治亞分離主義的同時，卻強硬鎮壓其境內的車臣與印古什獨立運動，前者可以幫助俄羅斯擴大在前蘇聯境內的影響力，後者可以確保俄羅斯境內不會產生分離主義的骨牌效應，支持前者、鎮壓後者都確保俄國在歐亞政治板塊中的地緣政治優勢。 俄羅斯在對南奧塞梯及科索沃獨立態度上，可就下列面向比較討論：(1)當南宣布獨立時，俄國立即宣布承認，並認為其有權決定自己命運；當科宣布獨立時，俄則認為其獨立破壞國際法準則及地區穩定，負面影響如車臣(2)國際法方面：對南的態度是根據局勢發展做出的決定符合有關國際文件；對科則要求安理會遵守1244號決議，並認定其單方面宣布獨立無效(3)考量因素：對南則是捍衛在喬治亞戰略、政治利益、經濟與生態維護利益；對科則是俄與塞同為斯拉夫民族，科在沙皇時期為俄傳統勢力範圍，另以經濟角度來看，巴爾幹是俄對歐出口能源通道。 南奧塞梯和阿布哈玆問題反應國家主權與民族自決權的獨立。維護國家主權和領土完整是國際關係的一個普遍原則，然而現在美國歐盟與俄羅斯卻都出現雙重標準，在科索沃獨立問題上，西方國家強調民族自決權，俄羅斯則譴責美歐破壞塞爾維亞主權將帶來嚴重後果。而在俄喬衝突中，俄羅斯支持南、阿獨立。在此兩事件中，在國家主權及民族自決權雙重標準下，造成國際關係的動盪。在科索沃和南奧塞梯的問題上，美國、俄羅斯和歐盟正是依民族自決權原則為依據，先塞爾維亞後喬治亞，通過對別國的干涉而維護自己的利益。 / Russia and the West take different positions on the issue in declaration of independence on South Ossetia and Kosovo. After Kosovo's declaration of independence, Russia is firmly opposed Kosovo's declaration of independence, and this action effect destabilize regional and norms of international law. The international community should not take double standard, and use international law selective out of political considerations. Russia helped to support Georgia secessionist movement and South Ossetia's independence, but it had tough crackdown in Chechnya and Ingushetia independence movement. The former can help Russia to expand the territory of the former Soviet Union's influence, which can ensure that Russia will not produce a domino effect separatism. This will ensure that the Russian preserve geopolitical advantage in the Eurasian areas. Russia's attitude towards the independence of South Ossetia and Kosovo, we can compare in the following aspects: (1) When the South Ossetia declared independence, Russia announced to recognize immediately, while Kosovo declared independence this action effect destabilize regional and norms of international law such as Chechnya (2) in the international law: Russia made a decision according with the situation toward South Ossetia; and Russia required to comply with UN Security Council resolution 1244, and concluded its unilateral declaration of independence is invalid (3) consideration factors: to protect the political, economic and ecological interests of the South Ossetia, while in Kosovo, with the economic perspective, the Balkan is a Russian exports to the EU energy channels. South Ossetia and Abkhazia issues react the national sovereignty and national self-determination of independence. Maintaining national sovereignty and territorial integrity is a general principle of international relations, however, the EU, Russia, and the United States had double standards on the issue of Kosovo's independence. In Western countries they stressed national self-determination, but Russia condemned the United States and Europe undermine the sovereignty of Serbia and it will bring serious consequences. Russia supported the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in this incident. With the double standard in national sovereignty and national self-determination, it will cause turbulence in international relations. On the issue of Kosovo and South Ossetia, the United States, Russia and the EU are on the base of according to the principle of national self-determination, to protect their own interests by the interference of other countries.

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This master thesis deals with the mapping and analysis of Russian-Georgian relations in the period between 2004-2011. It focuses primarily on the development of relations after the onset of the new Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and after his transformation of Georgian Policy. The work is divided into chronological historical axis of events, from the history of Georgia and Georgian people, the author gets to the problems of August war in 2008. The main objective of this work is to find the causes of the war between Russia and Georgia, to map out its long-standing hostile relations and try to find its solutions. Starting point of this work is the assumption that Georgia and Russia have always been nations culturally very similar and therefore its friendly relations are essential for the regulation of conflicts on Georgia's borders. Russia as a powerful neighbor, has always had a superiority over Georgia. Therefore, in subsequent chapters is enhanced the need for intervention by international organizations such as NATO, OSCE, EU, etc. issues in Russian-Georgian conflict, in order to offset the forces of power on both sides. In the last chapters the thesis deals with the intervention of the international community, whether their pressure on Russia will be still intense and if in the future...

L’ascension de Vladimir Poutine à la présidence de la Russie fut un point tournant dans l’histoire de la Russie et de ses relations avec l’occident. Lorsqu’il est comparé aux politiques plus pro-occidentales de son prédécesseur, Boris Eltsine, le nouveau nationalisme russe de Poutine changea la relation de la Russie avec l’Occident. Ce texte utilise des articles publiés dans quatre journaux influents de l’Occident—le Washington Post, le New York Times, le Guardian et l’Independent—pour montrer comment l’Occident percevait la Russie entre 1999 et 2008. Poutine fut longuement critiqué pour avoir transformé la « démocratie », instauré par l’Occident dans les années postsoviétiques, en autocratie qui reflétait plus le contexte politico-social traditionnel russe. La Russie refusa de se soumettre aux intérêts de l’Occident. Les médias populaires occidentaux, reflétant les intérêts de leurs gouvernements respectifs, ont rondement critiqué la nouvelle direction de la Russie. L’obligation perçue par les médias occidentaux de promouvoir la « démocratie » autour du globe les a menés à condamner Poutine et la Russie, ce qui créa un sentiment de « russophobie ». / The ascension of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency was a turning point in the history of Russia. Using articles from four influential western newspapers—the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Guardian and the Independent—this text will show the West perceived Russia during Putin’s between 1999 and 2008. Putin was heavily criticized as he was moving the country away from the “democracy” installed by the West after the Cold War, to a path more in line with traditional Russian principles. Russia refused to be subservient to Western interests. The western mainstream media reflected their government’s interests and critiqued Russia’s new path. The western media’s perceived obligation to promote “freedom” and “democracy” around the world has led it to condemn Russia and Putin and to create a sense of “russophobia” in the West.

2008年的俄喬戰爭是俄羅斯自解體以來第一次境外用兵，本文試圖透過守勢現實主義 ( defensive realism ) 的角度來解釋這一場俄羅斯的對外衝突。守勢現實主義國家的行為模式包括維持守勢現狀、對外尋求合作，因此得以處理安全困境難題，而在威脅等級過高時可能採取預防性戰爭來消除威脅。本文藉由守勢現實主義的觀點與行為模式來解釋俄羅斯的外交行為，透過檢視俄羅斯自解體以來的國家行為模式確立俄羅斯為守勢現實主義國家。再者藉由探討俄喬衝突中分離主義問題與俄喬關係中的矛盾以說明衝突的遠因與近因。最後探討俄羅斯在外高加索地區的利益與衝突以解釋俄羅斯在俄喬戰爭中的出兵動機。俄羅斯在解體之後的外交政策大多採取不衝突與合作的策略，隨著喬治亞的政權更替，俄羅斯對喬治亞的關係從合作走向以政策制衡，最後基於俄羅斯南部的地緣安全與北約東擴等等來自西方的威脅之下，俄羅斯採取了協助喬治亞分離地區的軍事行動來解決自身威脅。本論文認為俄羅斯不僅在2008年前屬於守勢現實主義國家，以守勢現實主義的觀點來看，俄喬戰爭更是一場為了應對歐美威脅的防禦性戰爭。 / The 2008 Russo – Georgian war was the first military action outside borders since the collapse of USSR. In this thesis, I describe the conflict using the perspective of Defensive Realism. The behavior of a state using a defensive realism perspective includes remain status-quo of defensive, seeking cooperation, therefore are able to manage the security dilemma. When the threat level is too high, a state using a defensive realism perspective may launch a preventive war to eliminate the threat. First, by examining Russia’s state behavior between 1992 to 2008. We are able to determine that Russia follows defensive realism behavior. Secondly, by studying the separatism of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and the change of relationship between Russia and Georgia, we are able to elucidate the factors that caused the Russo-Georgian war. Finally, we explore Russia’s interests and threats in South Caucasus area that reveal the motivation for Russia the launch the counter strike against Georgia. Russia has tended to take the non-conflict route and cooperative strategy in diplomacy after Soviet-era ended. Due to the regime change in Georgia, Russia changed its policy toward Georgia from cooperative to containment. Finally, as the threat from the West rose and another round of NATO enlargement occurred, while it’s threating the geopolitical security of the southern border, Russia decided to launch a preventive war to assist the separatist states within Georgia. In conclusion, not only Russia is a defensive realism state, from the perspective of defensive realism, the 2008 Russo-Georgia war is a preventive war against the threat of the West.

This paper explores the current understanding of the right of peoples to self-determination and its impact on international relations. A number of new states have gained international recognition outside the scope of decolonisation, several of which have not fulfilled the usual criteria for statehood, based on existing state practice. In addition, the parent states of Bangladesh, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo have not consented to the secession of these territories. The main purpose of this paper is to determine whether based on the stipulations of international documents and mainly on existing state practice, it is possible to verify the existence of a customary law enabling peoples to unilaterally secede. Such a right would pose a threat to the future application of the principle of territorial integrity as one of the basic principles of international relations. In order to answer this question I compare case studies of successful and unsuccessful nations striving for their own state outside the realm of decolonisation. Based on this comparison I analyse the current understanding of the right to self-determination and its impact on international relations. I conclude by stating that it is not possible to unambiguously confirm the existence of such a right. However, in practice the principle of territorial integrity is being breached nonetheless, due to persisting uncertainties regarding the possible application of secession by peoples whose internal right to self-determination was not respected. Together with the fact that the current concept of self-determination ignores collective rights of national groups, this poses a threat to international stability.

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The aim this thesis is to analyse whether or not Georgia can be considered to have had legitimate reasons for involvement in the five-day war in South Ossetia in August of 2008. This topic is relevant today for two predominant reasons one being that August of 2018 marks the 10th anniversary of the outbreak of the war between Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian forces. Who’s to blame for the outbreak of the war has, in the last decade, been widely discussed and analysed from different standpoints. This thesis’ main intention is to evaluate the Georgian point of view and find out Georgia’s responsibility for the conflict. This analysis is based on the theoretical framework called “Just War Theory”, an ancient tradition which, through centuries, have set up guidelines over how a war should be initiated, conducted and handled after ceasefire and thereafter. In this theoretical framework there is 6 criteria which establish moral, ethical and legitimate reasons for a state to wage war called “Jus ad bellum”. These 6 criteria are used as the factual theoretical base for the analysis.The condition of the chosen theoretical framework requires that all the criteria needs to be fulfilled in order for a state to be considered to have lawful reasons to wage war against another. Based on this framework, it is concluded in this thesis that Georgia did not have rightful reasons to engage in the five-day war in August 2008.

To predict and prevent future armed conflicts like Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022, there is more value in knowing how these wars occurred rather than why they occurred. The Russian Playbook is built from three distinct “plays” employed by Moscow and organised in the theoretical framework of Historical Institutionalism through Path Dependence modelling. This research focuses on Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova as cases for comparison by building on the Soviet legacy in each state which forms the antecedent historical conditions of the Playbook’s Path Dependence. Where Play 1 focuses on offensive and defensive influence seeking as a form of structural persistence, Play 2’s shaping and weaponisation acts to counter reactive sequences. Both Plays function within path dependency’s punctuated equilibrium and appear consistently throughout Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova following the collapse of the Soviet Union. When Play 1 and Play 2 are overpowered by reactive sequences that cannot be countered, Moscow deems the disequilibrium as irremediable and the path towards conflict begins. Play 3 refers to the start of lock-in effects towards conflict, beginning with “pre-crisis” conditions. Play 3’s Lock-in Effectsserve as the period in which a predictable conflict outcome is likely to occur, though lock-in refers to the path adherence in preparation for future conflict. This Play occurs in both Georgia and Ukraine at the time of this research, though its future employment within Moldova should not be excluded. These actions, in the form of the Russian Playbook and its Plays act as a guide for operationalising and implementing Russia’s grand strategy. This research goes beyond individual figureheads of Russia or specific institutions and instead focuses on patterns that exist throughout historical cases. These patterns show there is nothing particularly “new” in how Russia operates despite the vast number of newly coined phrases including “hybrid” leading people to believe otherwise. As such, Putin did not create the Russian Playbook, he inherited it. / <p>Master's of Political Science with a Specialisation in International and European Relations.</p>