This study examines differences and similarities in how two animal ethicists living in different times have argued for a liberation of the animals, the basis for the study is Lewis Gompertz Moral Inquiries: On the Situation of Man and of Brutes (1824) and Peter Singers Animal Liberation (1975). The analysis has been conducted with a historical perspective where close reading and contextualization have been used to further understand both the sources and the authors. The investigation is limited to four themes: animal's ability to experience, to kill animals, using animals and products of animals, and finally the idea of equality. The study concludes that there are significant similarities between the arguments Gompertz and Singer use, and that their ideas are rooted in a view of equality where the ability to suffer and have needs should be fundamental for our moral caring towards other creatures. A significant difference between the authors is their relationship to reason, where Gompertz highlights the animals' ability to reason as a cause to treat them well while Singer dismisses the idea that such abilities are of any interest for our moral considerations. The study also points out that the differences in the authors' conclusions and arguments can be understood on the basis of the scientific and intellectual context they operate in, where Gompertz can be described as an enlightenment philosopher with a strong belief in the developable reason within creatures, while the modern-day philosopher Singer rather sees reason as excluding, not only of animals but also of human beings. For animals to be liberated from man's oppression, both writers argue that it is necessary for man to eat a vegetarian diet.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AnselmoCO_DISSERT.pdf: 1468756 bytes, checksum: 13c794c8c2ed091a0986d24349272b48 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-11 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / This research aims to reconstruct and explain the argument proposed by Peter Singer to justify the principle of equal consideration of interests (PECI). The PECI is the basic normative principle according to people should consider the interests of all sentient beings affected when somebody taking a moral decision. It is the join that Singer proposes between universalizability and the principle of equal consideration of interests that constitutes a compelling reason to justify it. The universalizability requires to disregard the numerical differences, putting yourself in other people s shoes, and to consider preferences, interests, desires and ideals of those affected. Singer joins universalizability to normative principle and molds the form and content of his theory. The first chapter introduces the discussion will be developed in this essay. The second chapter deals the historical and philosophical viewpoint from which Singer starts his studies. The third chapter is about the Singer s critiques of naturalism, intuitionism, relativism, simple subjectivism and emotivism. The fourth chapter exposes the design of universal prescriptivism proposed by R. M. Hare. The universal prescriptivism indicates, in the Singer s viewpoint, a consistent way to create the join between the universalizability and PECI. It highlights also the criticism designed by J. L. Mackie and Singer himself to universal prescriptivism. The second part of this chapter shows briefly some of the main points of the classical conception of utilitarianism and its possible relationship with the theory of Singer. The fifth chapter introduces the Singer s thesis about the origin of ethics and the universalizability as a feature necessary to the point of view of ethic, and the way which this argument is developed to form the PECI. The sixth chapter exposes the main distinctions that characterize the PECI. Finally the seventh chapter provides a discussion about the reasons highlighted by Singer for one who wants orient his life according to the standpoint of ethics. This structure allows explaining the main ideas of the author concerning the theoretical foundations of his moral philosophy / Esta investiga??o tem como objetivo reconstruir e explicitar o argumento proposto por Peter Singer para justificar o princ?pio de igual considera??o de interesses (PICI). O PICI ? o princ?pio normativo b?sico segundo o qual as pessoas devem considerar igualmente os interesses de todos os seres sencientes afetados ao tomarem uma decis?o moral. ? o v?nculo que Singer estabelece entre a universalizabilidade e o princ?pio de igual considera??o de interesses que se constitui em uma raz?o convincente para justific?-lo. A universalizabilidade consiste na exig?ncia de desconsiderar as diferen?as num?ricas, de colocar-se no lugar do outro e de considera??o igual pelas prefer?ncias, interesses, desejos e ideais dos afetados. Singer ao vincular a universalizabilidade e o princ?pio normativo estabelece a forma e o conte?do da sua teoria. No primeiro cap?tulo, introduzimos a discuss?o que ser? desenvolvida nesta disserta??o. No segundo cap?tulo, apresentamos o panorama hist?rico-filos?fico no qual Singer inicia suas investiga??es. No terceiro cap?tulo, apresentamos a sua cr?tica ao naturalismo, intuicionismo, relativismo e subjetivismo simples e, por fim, ao emotivismo. No quarto cap?tulo, expomos a concep??o do prescritivismo universal proposta por R. M. Hare. O prescritivismo universal indica, para Singer, uma forma consistente para estabelecer o v?nculo entre a universalizabilidade e o PICI. Apontamos, tamb?m, as cr?ticas feitas por J. L. Mackie e pelo pr?prio Singer ao prescritivismo universal. Na segunda parte do cap?tulo, apresentamos resumidamente alguns pontos centrais da concep??o cl?ssica do utilitarismo e uma poss?vel rela??o com a teoria de Singer. No quinto cap?tulo, apresentamos a tese de Singer sobre a origem da ?tica e sobre a universalizabilidade como uma caracter?stica necess?ria do ponto de vista da ?tica, bem como o argumento que ? desenvolvido para estabelecer o PICI. No sexto cap?tulo, expomos as principais distin??es que caracterizam o PICI. Encerramos no s?timo cap?tulo com uma discuss?o sobre as raz?es apresentadas por Singer para que uma pessoa oriente a sua vida de acordo com o ponto de vista da ?tica. Essa estrutura permite-nos explicitar as principais ideias do autor naquilo que concerne aos fundamentos te?ricos da sua filosofia moral

Analytic ethics often neglects the exploration and appreciation of morality as it is actually practised on a day-to-day basis. But by looking at how, in a practical sense, we are able to interact with others in a morally appropriate way we can construct a compelling picture of what some of our most pervasive obligations are. This thesis takes such an approach through the concept of understanding – understanding essentially taken here to involve those processes involved in detecting and correctly responding to beings typically possessing inherent moral significance. In the first two chapters ‘understanding' and the understanding approach are themselves explicated, and placed in the context of several other related approaches in the English-speaking tradition – Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, Nel Noddings' ethics of care and Richard Hare's preference utilitarianism. This approach is then used to provide us with an alternative idea about what our moral reasoning suggests to be of fundamental ethical significance, and of what kinds of activity morality recommends to us. The activity explored in most detail here is that of engaging with fiction – or more broadly, fictive imaginings. While understanding shows us that fictional characters and events themselves cannot have an inherent moral valence or significance, it also shows us when and how it is possible and appropriate to ethically assess fictive engagement, be it as creator or consumer. This is seen after exploring how and in what ways our moral understanding can be appropriately applied to and exercised by fictions at all, and why fiction should be of particular interest to the understanding agent, looking at the work of Martha Nussbaum, Jenefer Robinson, Peter Lamarque and others on aesthetic cognitivism. Ultimately this leads us to discern a minimal ethical constraint on our interpretation of fiction and art in general, further proving understanding's usefulness.

Dans un contexte où la reconnaissance de droits légaux à certaines entités non humaines apparaît comme une évolution juridique de plus en plus plausible, ce mémoire se veut une exploration de la littérature philosophique et juridique en faveur de l’octroi de la personnalité juridique aux animaux. Tout d’abord, nous offrirons un bref tour d’horizon historique de la notion de personne et pourrons constater que si celle-ci a fortement été associée à l’autonomie morale dans l’histoire du droit et de la philosophie, cette définition de la personnalité souffre d’importantes incohérences lorsque vient le temps de justifier l’extension de la personnalité aux êtres humains dépourvus de cette autonomie morale. C’est le cas, par exemple, des enfants, des êtres humains plongés dans le coma, des handicapés mentaux ou encore de certaines personnes âgées. Nous pourrons également constater que le geste qui consiste à octroyer des droits légaux à ces individus tout en refusant de reconnaître ces mêmes droits aux animaux repose sur des bases théoriques fragiles qu’il convient de revoir l’aide d’une analyse approfondie des théories des droits des animaux proposées depuis les années 1970. Ces théories, et plus particulièrement celles proposées par Peter Singer, Tom Regan et Gary Francione, feront l’objet d’un examen qui permettra de faire ressortir leurs forces et faiblesses respectives. Enfin, dans le dernier chapitre de ce mémoire, nous nous pencherons sur le rôle que peuvent jouer les appels aux droits moraux dans l’attribution de droits légaux. Nous y brosserons aussi une esquisse des différentes formes de personnalité juridique et de statut politique que pourraient se voir octroyer les animaux non humains. / In a context where the recognition of legal rights to certain nonhuman entities appears to be an increasingly plausible legal development, this master’s thesis proposes an exploration of the philosophical and legal literature in favor of granting legal personhood to animals. First, I will provide a brief historical overview of the notion of “person.” I will also note that, while it has been strongly associated with moral autonomy in the history of law and philosophy, this definition of personhood suffers from substantial inconsistencies in justifying the granting of legal personhood to non-autonomous human beings. It is the case, for instance, of children, comatose human beings, the mentally disabled, and the elderly. We will also see that granting legal rights to these individuals while refusing to recognize these same rights to nonhuman animals is based on fragile theoretical foundations that need to be rectified with a thorough analysis of the theories of animal rights proposed since the 1970s. These theories, specifically the ones put forward by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione, will be examined to identify their respective strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the final chapter of this research will examine the decisive role that appeals to moral rights can play in granting legal rights to animals. It also outlines the various forms of legal personhood and political status that might be attributed to nonhuman animals.

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