The thesis comprises three foundational studies on the topics named in its title, together with an introduction. Ch. 1 argues against a popular combination of views in the philosophy of language: Propositionality, which says that the semantic values of natural language sentences (relative to contexts) are the propositions they express (in those contexts) and Compositionality, which says that the semantic value of a complex expression of a natural language (in a context) is determined by the semantic values its immediate constituents have (in that same context) together with their syntactic mode of combination. Ch. 1 argues that the Naïve Picture is inconsistent with the presence of variable-binding in natural languages. Ch. 2 criticizes the strategy of using “operator arguments” to establish relativist conclusions such as: that the truth values of propositions vary with time (Time Relativism) or that they vary with location (Location Relativism). Operator arguments purport to derive the conclusion that propositions vary in truth value along some parameter P from the premise that there are, in some language, sentential operators that operate on or “shift” the P parameter. I identify two forms of operator argument, offer a reconstruction of each, and I argue that both they rely on an implausible, coarse-grained conception of propositions. Ch. 3 is an assessment of the prospects for semantic internalism. It argues, first, that to accommodate Putnam’s famous Twin Earth examples, an internalist must maintain that narrow semantic content determines different extensions relative to agents and times. Second, that the most thoroughly worked out version of semantic internalism – the epistemic two-dimensionalism (E2D) of David Chalmers – can accommodate the original Twin Earth thought experiments but is refuted by similar thought experiments that involve temporally or spatially symmetric agents.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Evandro Oliveira de Brito.pdf: 1543996 bytes, checksum: cccc072c2cbdc0314293f7946a776aac (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-04-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This thesis aims to compare two of Brentano‟s formulations regarding the notion of moral values and analyze them from the philosophy of the mind that serves as their base. I will explain in this way, how the reformulation of the notion of moral values arose from the development of descriptions of the activity of consciousness, presented (or assumed) by Brentano in the first stage of his intellectual development (1874-1892). I will explain, therefore, that moral values, as it was formulated by Brentano in the work Psychology from an empirical standpoint(1874), was the result of an Aristotelian-thomist solution aimed at solving a problem of modern epistemology. As such, the moral value would be only a moral sentiment. I will explain, however, that in The origin of the knowledge of right and wrong (1889) Brentano reformulated this notion by proposing a non-subjectivist moral epistemology, that guided by the works that made up the Descriptive psychology (1888-1892), considered the moral value analogous to a evident judgment. This thesis is supported by the assumption that the theory of moral knowledge, formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889, resulted from two specific changes. On one hand, this theory led to the concept of intentional object being abandoned, taken as the Archimedean point in the formulation of Psychology from an empirical standpoint. On the other hand, it resulted in the formulation of the concept of intentional act, presented in the context of the formulation of Descriptive psychology. The justification of this interpretive hypothesis will be presented through the following arguments: (1) I will present the Brentano‟s theory of moral knowledge, published in 1889 in the work The origin of the knowledge of right and wrong, and (2) I will describe the basic epistemological assumptions of Descriptive psychology who hold this theory of moral knowledge, characterized as conceptual reformulations made by Brentano in Psychology from an empirical standpoint. (3) This hypothesis will be supported by interpretive presentation of the incompatibility between the ethics of moral sentiment and ethics of moral knowledge. This incompatibility also will be supported by comparing the descriptions of Brentano‟s psychic act of moral feeling, present in Psychology from an empirical standpoint, and of Brentano‟s psychic act of moral knowledge characterized as preference, present in The origin of the knowledge of right and wrong. (4) My analysis will lead to the following conclusion. By abandoning the assumptions of the Psychology from an empirical standpoint, Brentano‟s theory of moral knowledge was based on the assumption that the notion of intentional act established an intrinsic and immediate relationship called the consciousness of moral‟s preference, or, the psychic phenomenon of preference. Author: Evandro Oliveira de Brito / Esta tese de doutorado tem como propósito comparar duas formulações brentanianas da noção de valor moral e analisá-las a partir da filosofia do psíquico que lhes serve de base. Explicitaremos, desta maneira, o modo como as reformulações da noção de valor moral decorreram do desenvolvimento das descrições da atividade da consciência, apresentadas (ou pressuposta) por Brentano na primeira etapa de seu desenvolvimento intelectual (1874-1892). Explicitaremos, assim, que valor moral‟, tal como foi apresentada por Brentano na obra Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico (1874), seria o resultado de uma solução aristotélico-tomista que visava resolver um problema epistemológico moderno. Como tal, o valor moral seria exclusivamente um sentimento. Explicitaremos, no entanto, que na obra Origem do conhecimento moral (1889) Brentano reformulou tal noção ao propor uma epistemologia moral não subjetivista que, orientada pelos trabalhos que compuseram a Psicologia descritiva (1888-1892), considerava o valor moral um conhecimento análogo ao juízo evidente. Esta tese está sustentada sobre a hipótese de que a teoria do conhecimento moral, formulada por Franz Brentano em 1889, resultou de duas mudanças específica. Por um lado, esta teoria resultou do abandono do conceito de objeto intencional, tomado como ponto arquimediano na formulação da Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico. Por outro lado, ela resultou da formulação do conceito de ato intencional, apresentado no contexto da formulação da Psicologia descritiva. A justificação desta hipótese interpretativa será apresentada por meio dos seguintes passos argumentativos. (1) Apresentaremos a teoria brentaniana do conhecimento moral publicada em 1889, na obra Origem do conhecimento moral, e (2) descreveremos os pressupostos epistemológicos fundamentais da Psicologia descritiva que sustentam esta teoria do conhecimento moral, caracterizados como reformulações conceituais efetuadas por Brentano na Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico. (3) Esta hipótese interpretativa será corroborada pela apresentação da incompatibilidade entre a ética do sentimento moral e a ética do conhecimento moral. Esta incompatibilidade, ainda, será evidenciada por meio da comparação entre as descrições brentanianas do ato psíquico de sentimento moral, vigente na Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico, e do ato psíquico de conhecimento moral caracterizado como preferência, vigente na Origem conhecimento moral. (4) Nossa análise implicará a seguinte conclusão. Ao abandonar os pressupostos da Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico, a teoria brentaniana do conhecimento moral baseou-se no pressuposto de que a noção de ato intencional estabelecia uma relação intrínseca e imediata chamada de consciência da preferência

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T14:23:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciana Akemi Nakabayashi.pdf: 390381 bytes, checksum: a5f04f61e556536db3c6dfab97227bb0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-12 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The current research has as central theme investigate the concept of intelligence, and specifically of Artificial Intelligence (AI), derived from the Computer Science and its effect on research of Philosophy of Mind. It tries to consider and to understand such perspective to the light of Technoscience and Cybernetics, in view of the concepts that look for to understanding the human mind by the imitation of its behavior, applying the concepts to the investigation and simulation of dialogues: called Chatterbots. The research stars from a methodological and bibliographic study diverse from the concepts of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the concepts of Philosophy of Mind, focusing on the prominence of the issue in its interdisciplinary aspects. Discusses the prospects consolidated in the community about the issue, especially the approaches of Searle (1984, 1992, 1997), Gardner (1994, 1995) and, in the Brazilian landscape, from Teixeira (1990, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008), focusing on relations between the concepts of intent, brain, mental and cognitive experiment, as well as some trends of criticism and defense of its formal limits. Drawing up of previous searches on the subject and methodology that merges computing elements and philosophy of mind, analyzes the conceptual experiment of the Chinese Room of Searle (in aspects of syntax and semantics). From this experiment and its results, it presents the prospect of Artificial Intelligence (AI) investigation as belonging to the nature of cognition, supported by the theory of cognition, particularly for phenomena such as categorization and identification of objects, problem solving, decision and conscience. The search culminates in the analysis of the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Philosophy of Mind, proposed as a noematic element, being constituted as prerequisite for the production of scientific knowledge, implemented in the areas of Intelligence Technology and Digital Design. Applies the concepts and achievements to the definition and extension of the concept of hypertext, taking it as a computational mechanism capable of structuring hierarchical dialogues, indexed, so as to the formulation of Robot Primo (2001) and Roth Coelho (2001). Finally, the assumptions investigated are shown in results observed in the so-called Chatterbots in the area of Artificial Intelligence (AI), highlighting its characteristics and its importance in the current context of its computer utilization in cyberspace / A presente pesquisa tem como tema central investigar o conceito de Inteligência e, especificamente, de Inteligência Artificial (IA), derivado das Ciências da Computação e sua repercussão nas pesquisas da Filosofia da Mente. Procura conceituar e entender tal perspectiva à luz da Tecnociência e da Cibernética, tendo em vista os conceitos que buscam compreender a mente humana pela imitação de seu comportamento, aplicando os conceitos à investigação e simulação de diálogos: os chamados chatterbots. A pesquisa parte de um estudo metodológico e bibliográfico diversificado dos conceitos de Inteligência Artificial (IA) e das concepções de Filosofia da Mente, enfocando a proeminência do tema em seus aspectos interdisciplinares. Discute as perspectivas consolidadas na comunidade acerca do tema, especialmente as abordagens de Searle (1984, 1992, 1997), Gardner (1994, 1995) e, no panorama brasileiro, de Teixeira (1990, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008), incidindo nas relações entre os conceitos de intencionalidade, cérebro, experimento mental e cognitivismo, bem como algumas tendências críticas e de contestação de seus limites formais. Valendo-se de pesquisas anteriores sobre o tema e de metodologia que mescla elementos computacionais e de filosofia da mente, analisa o experimento conceitual do quarto chinês de Searle (em seus aspectos de sintaxe e semântica). A partir deste experimento e seus resultados, apresenta a perspectiva da investigação da Inteligência Artificial (IA), como pertencente à natureza da cognição, apoiada na teoria da cognição, nomeadamente de fenômenos como categorização e identificação de objetos, resolução de problemas, decisão e consciência. A pesquisa culmina na análise do conceito de Inteligência Artificial (IA), na Filosofia da Mente, proposto como um elemento noemático, constituindo-se como condição para a produção do conhecimento científico, aplicado este nas áreas de Tecnologia da Inteligência e Design Digital. Aplica os conceitos e resultados alcançados à definição e extensão do conceito de hipertexto, tomando-o como um mecanismo computacional capaz de estruturar diálogos hierarquizados, indexados, ao modo da formulação de Robot de Primo (2001) e Roth Coelho (2001). Por fim, os pressupostos investigados são apresentados em resultados observados nos chamados chatterbots na área de Inteligência Artificial (IA), destacando suas características e sua importância no atual contexto de sua utilização computacional no ciberespaço

In a world bombarded with advertisements, it may be difficult for the development of an authentic self. Authenticity is a mode of existence in which there is ownership in the sense of self, while at the same time being able to present this sense of self to others. To be authentic is to act and live in a way that expresses a genuine concern for the self in which projects and goals pursued. The sense of self is the feeling of genuineness of the self and representing this self requires actions that correlate to these feelings. Advertisements act as communication to the public in an attempt to persuade people to purchase products. The tactics that advertising agencies use cause people and society to internalize these messages, in effect, influencing the way people experience the world. Thus, advertising can have a harmful effect on an individual by hindering the development of an authentic self. I will first explain the concept of authenticity, following a discussion of how people organize experience by means of George Mead’s concept of the ‘I’ and the ‘me.’ I will then provide a description of Martin Heidegger’s account on authenticity in juxtaposition with Sartre’s contrasting forms of inauthenticity by means of bad faith. Finally, I will discuss the damaging effects that advertising has to authenticity, and suggest ways to successfully exist in a world full of these advertisements.

Doctor of Philosophy / Aim. This study aims to investigate self-understanding in young males with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and to determine whether self-understanding is related to social functioning and theory of mind (ToM). In addition, this study aims to examine the characteristics and abilities of young males with high-functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger’s disorder (AD) to determine whether there are significant differences in selfunderstanding and whether self-understanding is related to social functioning and ToM between these two groups. The results have important implications for social skills interventions for young people with ASD. Method. Forty three young males diagnosed with one of the ASD (25 diagnosed with HFA and 18 diagnosed with AD) were compared with 38 TD males. Participants were assessed using the Autism Diagnostic Interview- Revised (ADI-R), the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT), the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (VABS), the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test- Third Edition (PPVT-III), Damon and Hart’s Self-understanding Interview, and two false-belief ToM tasks. Results. Children with ASD had difficulties recognising and attributing their own mental states and failed to integrate various aspects of the self. Specifically, the ASD group produced fewer self-statements that reflected agency (the awareness and understanding that one is in control of their actions), social aspects of self (such as personality characteristics and group membership) and psychological aspects of self (such as emotions, thoughts and cognitive processes). Instead, children with ASD produced more concrete physical self-statements (such as body characteristics and material possessions). A significant positive relationship was found between selfunderstanding and social functioning for the ASD group. Within the ASD group, the relationship held for the HFA group only. In terms of ToM, children with ASD were less able to correctly answer the second-order false-belief ToM question compared to the TD group. For the ASD group, there was a significant positive correlation between self-understanding and ToM. Within the ASD group, the relationship held for the HFA group only. Conclusions. The results show young males with high-functioning ASD are less aware of their own and others’ mental states perhaps reflecting a general delay in the development of self-understanding and ToM. Furthermore, a more developed self-understanding may translate to improved social functioning and ToM ability for young males with high-functioning ASD. For young males with HFA, self-understanding and ToM may stem from a common underlying cognitive framework. Consequently, treatments aimed at improving self-understanding may simultaneously improve ToM, or vice versa. For individuals with AD there may be a separate cognitive mechanism responsible for self-understanding and another for ToM. Therefore, different interventions may be required; one to improve self-understanding and another to improve the understanding of others’ minds. Overall, these results may assist in the development of practice parameters for social skills training for those with ASD.

The return to body awareness, or embodiment, is necessary for individual and communal harmony. A reflection on the use of dance in tribal societies suggests their importance in creating community and identifies how they were prohibited during colonization and thereafter. Subsequently, an investigation into current American culture in the 21st century finds a disembodied culture, as defined by the lack of awareness to the body as a living entity. Embodiment practices are suggested for a return to individual harmony and communal dancing as the solution for community harmony. Lastly, a personal exploration into the making and creating of danced rituals suggests the power of dance to heal, transform, and unite humanity.

Implicit association of racial stereotypes is brought about by social conditioning (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006). This conditioning can be explained by attractor networks (Sharp, 2011). Reducing implicit bias through meditation can show the effectiveness of reducing the rigidity of attractor networks, thereby reducing subjectivity. Mindfulness meditation has shown to reduce bias from the use of one single guided session conducted before performing an Implicit Association Test (Lueke & Gibson, 2015). Attachment to socially conditioned racial bias should become less prevalent through practicing meditation over time. An experimental model is proposed to test this claim along with a reconceptualization of consciousness based in meditative practice.

According to the dominant tradition in Christianity and many other religions, human beings are both knowers and actors: beings with conscious beliefs about the world who sometimes act intentionally guided by these beliefs. According to philosopher of mind Robert Cummins the “received view” among philosophers of mind is epiphenomenalism, according to which mental causation does not exist: neural events are the underlying causes of both behavior and belief which explains the correlation (not causation) between belief and behavior. Beliefs do not, in virtue of their semantic content, enter the causal chain leading to action, beliefs are always the endpoint of a causal chain. If that is true the theological anthropology of many religious traditions is false. JP Moreland draws attention to two different ways of doing metaphysics: serious metaphysics and shopping-list metaphysics. The difference is that the former involves not only the attempt to describe  the phenomena one encounter, it also involves the attempt of locating them, that is explaining how the phenomena is possible and came to be given the constraints of a certain worldview. For a physicalist these constraints include the atomic theory of matter and the theories of physical, chemical and biological evolution.   Mental properties are challenging phenomena to locate within a physicalist worldview, and some physicalists involved in “serious metaphysics” have therefore eliminated them from their worldview. Most however accept them, advocating “non-reductive physicalism” according to which mental properties supervene on physical processes. Even if one allow mental properties to supervene on physical processes, the problem of mental causation remains. If mental properties are irreducible to and therefore distinct from physical properties, as the non-reductive physicalists claim, they cannot exert causal powers if one accepts the causal closure of the physical domain – which one must, if one is a “serious physicalist” according to physicalist philosopher of mind Jaegwon Kim.   Alvin Plantinga, in his Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, shows that if mental properties, such as the propositional content of beliefs, are causally inefficacious, then evolution has not been selecting cognitive faculties that are reliable, in the sense of being conducive to true beliefs. If the content of our beliefs does not affect our behavior, the content of our belief is irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint, and so the content-producing part of our cognitive faculties are irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint. The “reliability” – truth-conduciveness – of our cognitive faculties can therefore not be explained by evolution, and therefore not located within the physicalist worldview. The only way in which the reliability of our cognitive faculties can be located is if propositional content is relevant for behavior.   If we however eliminate or deny the reliability of our cognitive faculties, then we have abandoned any chance of making a rational case for our position, as that would presuppose the reliability that we are denying. But if propositional content is causally efficacious, then that either – if we are non-reductive physicalists and mental properties are taken to be irreducible to physical properties – implies that the causal closure of the physical domain is false or - if we are reductive physicalists and not eliminativists regarding mental properties - it shows that matter qua matter can govern itself by rational argumentation, in which we have a pan-/localpsychistic view of matter. Either way, we have essentially abandoned physicalism in the process of locating the reliability of our cognitive faculties within a physicalist worldview. We have also affirmed the theological anthropology of Christianity, in so far as the capacity for knowledge and rational action is concerned. Keywords: Philosophy of mind, mental causation, reductionism, physicalism, the evolutionary argument against naturalism, the myth of nonreductive materialism, Alvin Plantinga, Jaegwon Kim

Doctor of Philosophy / Aim. This study aims to investigate self-understanding in young males with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and to determine whether self-understanding is related to social functioning and theory of mind (ToM). In addition, this study aims to examine the characteristics and abilities of young males with high-functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger’s disorder (AD) to determine whether there are significant differences in selfunderstanding and whether self-understanding is related to social functioning and ToM between these two groups. The results have important implications for social skills interventions for young people with ASD. Method. Forty three young males diagnosed with one of the ASD (25 diagnosed with HFA and 18 diagnosed with AD) were compared with 38 TD males. Participants were assessed using the Autism Diagnostic Interview- Revised (ADI-R), the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT), the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (VABS), the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test- Third Edition (PPVT-III), Damon and Hart’s Self-understanding Interview, and two false-belief ToM tasks. Results. Children with ASD had difficulties recognising and attributing their own mental states and failed to integrate various aspects of the self. Specifically, the ASD group produced fewer self-statements that reflected agency (the awareness and understanding that one is in control of their actions), social aspects of self (such as personality characteristics and group membership) and psychological aspects of self (such as emotions, thoughts and cognitive processes). Instead, children with ASD produced more concrete physical self-statements (such as body characteristics and material possessions). A significant positive relationship was found between selfunderstanding and social functioning for the ASD group. Within the ASD group, the relationship held for the HFA group only. In terms of ToM, children with ASD were less able to correctly answer the second-order false-belief ToM question compared to the TD group. For the ASD group, there was a significant positive correlation between self-understanding and ToM. Within the ASD group, the relationship held for the HFA group only. Conclusions. The results show young males with high-functioning ASD are less aware of their own and others’ mental states perhaps reflecting a general delay in the development of self-understanding and ToM. Furthermore, a more developed self-understanding may translate to improved social functioning and ToM ability for young males with high-functioning ASD. For young males with HFA, self-understanding and ToM may stem from a common underlying cognitive framework. Consequently, treatments aimed at improving self-understanding may simultaneously improve ToM, or vice versa. For individuals with AD there may be a separate cognitive mechanism responsible for self-understanding and another for ToM. Therefore, different interventions may be required; one to improve self-understanding and another to improve the understanding of others’ minds. Overall, these results may assist in the development of practice parameters for social skills training for those with ASD.

Thesis (doctoral)--Göteborgs universitet, 2005.