My art distills my relationship to spirituality, digital culture, and the practices and side-effects therein, into a simplified visual language. The work manifests in the form of paintings, drawings, and light sculptures. Meditation and mindfulness training are a large part of my influence and interests. I often wonder how mindfulness practice can be mirrored in my artwork, not only in my process for creating the work, but also with what the resulting imagery does for the viewer. My intention is to provide an art form that invites one to look and experience one’s own capacity to observe, without the need for immediate intellectualization. I wish to offer people an opportunity to focus their attention on the phenomenological sensations that emanate from the art, to take a step back from the conceptual part of the mind, and step into a part that’s more fundamental to our moment to moment reality.

Nesta tese, desenvolve-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo fundamentada na noção de mônada, ou substância simples, como elemento ontológico estruturante de um enfoque contemporâneo da mencionada relação. Na primeira parte da tese, de natureza crítica, analisam-se as teorias fisicistas contemporâneas da mencionada relação, a saber, a teoria de superveniência da mente, da emergência e da causação mental, com vistas a justificar a proposta de assunção de uma premissa dualista que visa, principalmente, propor, em contraste com o cenário epifenomenalista do fisicismo contemporâneo, uma ontologia da mente que seja compatível com as intuições realistas do senso comum e da psicológica popular sobre a força causal da mente no universo físico. Na segunda parte, de natureza positiva, propõe-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo partindo-se, para tanto, de uma assunção e duas premissas. A assunção afirma que a mente tem o mesmo importe ontológico da matéria física, sendo estes considerados como elementos composicionais, afirmação a qual se denomina dualismo elementar. No que se refere às premissas, propõe-se duas, a saber, a tese composicional holística, que afirma que a mente e a matéria são partes constitutivas de um todo chamado substância simples, e a tese composicional mereológica, que afirma que as substâncias simples ou mônadas compõem mereologicamente, por superveniência, a relação mente-corpo. Examinam-se também algumas objeções ao argumento monadista proposto. / This thesis offers an explanatory argument concerning the mind-body relation, an argument that is grounded on the notion of monad, or the simple substance, as an ontological element for proposing a contemporary approach to the mind-body relation. In the first part, a critique of the current physicalist theories of mind is given, namely, supervenience, emergence and mental causation, in order to justify the proposal of a dualist premiss which aims at an ontology of mind which satisfies the realistic intuitions of common sense and of folk psychology on the causal efficacy and relevance of the mind amid the physical, in opposition to the epiphenomenalist view of contemporary physicalist theories. In the second part, the positive one, we propose an explanatory argument for monadism about mind-body relations, based on an assumption and two premises. The assumption says that the mind has the same ontological import of the physical matter, and they, mind and matter, are considered to be elements entering the composition of psychophysical relations, an assumption called elementary dualism. Regarding the premises, we propose two, namely, the holistic compositional thesis, which asserts that mind and matter are parts entering the composition of true wholes called substances, and the mereological compositional thesis, which says that such simple substances compose, via supervenience, the mind-body relations. Some objections to the proposed monadist argument are examined and rejoindered as well.

Cette thèse, qui relève de la philosophie de l'esprit, consiste en la défense d'une version de la théorie auto-représentationnelle de la conscience. En acceptant d'une part la notion d'état mental possédant un certain contenu qui peut être conscient ou inconscient, et d'autre part l'hypothèse plausible que le contenu de tout état mental consiste en une représentation, alors le problème de la manifestation de la conscience s'appliquant au contenu de CERTAINS états mentaux acquiert intelligibilité dans ce cadre. Il peut être compris comme la recherche d'une structure de représentation qui donne lieu à cette manifestation. Pour certains auteurs (Fred Dretske, Michael Tye et dautres), des conditions particulières dans la représentation directe de l'objet y suffisent, pour d'autres (en particulier David Rosenthal) il y faut une méta-représentation de l'objet sous certaines conditions. Ni l'une ni l'autre de ces structures ne s'avère cependant suffisante pour justifier la démarcation entre états mentaux conscients et inconscients, et pour caractériser la phénoménalité de la conscience. En prenant alors au sérieux l'intuition forte d'auto-référentialité de la conscience (présente déjà chez Aristote - suivant certaines interprétations -, reprise par Brentano, Sartre, et ces dernières années, par Uriah Kriegel et plusieurs autres), on est conduit à proposer, pour les états mentaux conscients, une structure d'auto-représentation (de la représentation) de l'objet qui sous-tend une intentionnalité consciente duale dirigée vers l'objet et en même temps vers elle-même. on résout ainsi les problèmes de la théorie méta-représentationnelle, mais il faut monter que ce schéma est intelligible, que le risque de régression à l'infini dans les capacités repésentationnelles de la conscience n'existe pas, et que de robustes intuitions sont ainsi éclairées, telles que la structuration du champ conscient entre premier plan et arrière-plan, et le lien entre conscience d'arrière plan, ou marginale, et conscience de soi. Ce lien dérive du fait que la conscience marginale, dans la perspective de l'auto-représentation, est la conscience de la conscience d'objet, et se qualifie aussi comme conscience subjective, c'est à dire conscience "pour moi" de l'objet. Et la conscience de soi se construit à partir des épisodes de conscience subjective. L'étude du rapport entre structures de représentation mentale consciente et configurations neuronales spatio-temporelles qui les produisent dans le cerveau est hors du domaine du présent travail, mais la présence nécessaire de ces relations demeure à l'arrière-plan, et affleure dans la réflexion quand cela peut être éclairant. / This work illustrates a version of the self-representational theory of consciousness. If one accepts on the one hand the notion of mental states that have a given content - conscious or unconscious - and on the other hand the plausible hypothesis that the content of all mental states consists in a representation, then the problem of the manifestation of consciousness for (the content of) SOME states becomes intelligible within this frame. This problem can be understood as the research of the representational structure which gives rise to this manifestation. For some authors ( Fred Dretske, Michael Tye, and others) certain particular conditions in the direct representation of the object are sufficient, for others (particularly David Rosenthal) a meta-representation is necessary, under given conditions. However neither of those structures results sufficient to justify the demarcation between conscious and unconscious states and to characterize the phenomenality of consciousness. If one then takes seriously into account the strong intuition of self-referentiality of consciousness (already present in Aristotle - following some interpretations -, taken up again by Brentano, Sartre, and lately by Uriah Kriegel and several others) one is conducted to propose a self-representational structure for conscious mental states which involves a dual conscious intentionality targeting the object and itself at the same time. The problems of the meta-representational theory are thus resolved, but it remains to be shown that this scheme is intelligible, that the risk of infinite regress of the representing capacity of consciousness does not exist, and that strong intuitions are thus acknowledged : such as the distinction in the conscious field between foreground and background, and the link between background, or marginal consciousness, and self consciousness. Within the self-representational view, this link originates from the fact that marginal consciousness is the consciousness of the consciousness of the object, and qualifies itself as subjective consciousness, that is to say, consciousness "for me" of the object. Self consciousness is then constructed from the episodes of subjective consciousness. The relationship between conscious mental representational structures and the spatio-temporal neuronal configurations which produce them in the brain, is outside the domain of the present work, but it is necessarily present in the background, and it is considered when useful for the argument.

This thesis examines key concepts from philosophers Nishida Kitaro, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Fredriche Nietzsche and applies them to elements of Michael Chekhov’s practice of acting. The three philosophers, in different ways, suggest an ‘optimal’ state, beyond a dualistic separation of the fictive from the real and the visible from the invisible, that challenges seemingly unbridgeable dualisms between inner and outer, subject and object, being and becoming and experiencer and experienced. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and understand these selected ‘optimal’ modes of consciousness in performance and, therefore, open up new ways of thinking about Michael Chekhov’s acting processes; in particular the ‘Psychological Gesture’. The thesis asks the following questions: 1. How can the application of selected philosophical paradigms to the Psychological Gesture through theory and practice further our understanding of Michael Chekhov’s work? 2. How do selected aspects of the fields of phenomenology, post-phenomenology, cognitive sciences, consciousness studies and philosophy of mind, aid in developing an articulation and understanding of an ‘optimal’ state of consciousness as a necessary aspect of the actor’s performance in Michael Chekhov’s work and theatre practice? 3. How can this project develop the way we are able to talk about Michael Chekhov’s work and wider acting processes?

In this thesis I examine various theories of humor to establish an account of the functional roles of humor in social interaction and agentive development. These roles are integrated into a view of agency developed by G.H. Mead, and further refined by the recognition theory of Axel Honneth. The core thesis is: Humor is under-examined as an aspect of human interaction, because it plays such an integral role in individual agency and social development. Understanding how humor works helps to explain how agents are formed through the internalization of the expectations of others via processes of recognition, either positively or negatively. Through the explication of the core humor theories—superiority, relief, incongruity, and play—insight is offered into the various processes of basic human interaction, understanding, and identity. The work has theoretical application by proving Mead's and Honneth's emphasis on recognition for development is justified, while also correcting an overly positive view of recognition by outlining the social policing function of humor. But the thesis has also obvious practical value in day to day human interaction, as it shows that humor is able to address issues that are very difficult through other modes of communication and understanding. Humor’s role in agentive interaction and formation cannot be overstated, both as a mode of expression and coping, but also since the threat of embarrassment through ridicule underpins and motivates a great deal of human interaction. The negative ethical implications of the role of humor, which are often overlooked, are extensively outlined and developed through the conceptual frameworks of social power (punching-up and punching down) as well as act-centered vs. agent-centered views of discriminatory humor. The thesis offers and analyzes ready examples from the work of Chris Rock and Bill Cosby, and looks at the implications of each through the theoretical lenses fleshed out in previous chapters. Through this it is clearly demonstrated, not only how these theories interconnect, but as well how such knowledge is of obvious, and practical value in day-to-day human interaction.

Through discursive essays and poetic narrative, Antithetical Commentaries on X, Y and the Disruption of Being explores the tenuous relationship between modes of measurement and the struggle for human relevance in the post-contemporary digital age. In the introductory essay, “Not the Feather, but the Bird”, I give an overview of the inherent problems of object-oriented ontology, and how it relates to aesthetics and social issues of our times. In the Developmental Overview, I detail how I developed my installation approach and techniques, particularly with regard to the three-way dynamic of the artist:work:viewer relationship and how it can encourage a ‘transgression’ that leads to the possibility of a transformative awareness of being. Subsequently, I present a series of ‘antithetical’ commentaries that neither explain nor expand the installation, rather, they create a non-binary duality that, through an entirely non-linear anti-narrative, work to erode the overlay of personal, civic and collective grids present in the memory space/time referenced in the video, TAG. Finally, in “Grid: Towards a Transgressive Humanism.” I propose a path by which installation art might serve to create transgressive opportunities for viewers, rather than the transcendence sought through religious rituals, which often reinforce stigmas, fears and authoritarian social dynamics, or worse, the reductive loop, of many contemporary approaches to art which proclaim their detachment in wordy displays, essentially leading to a form of aesthetic nihilism. This Transgressive Humanism is not presented as a dogma, but rather a revitalization of the work as a vessel of possibilities, an agent of creative growth for the artist and the viewer.

Working through methods of abstraction and comedic mimicry I choreograph awkwardly balanced sculpture with objects of adornment as a means to defuse personal sensitivities surrounding my experiences of gender, desire, and home. The research that follows is concerned with the adjacent, the in between, above and underneath, because I feel that this kind of looking means that you are, to some degree, aware of what lies at the edges. Maybe this is what Gertrude Stein means to act as though there is no use in a center—because this concerns a way of relating, though there are many things in the room. ‘A spectacle and nothing strange’ is an arrangement of gestures, of made difference, of kinships, of orientations and possible futures, sustained tension, coded adornment, big dyke energy, shifts in hardness, leaning softness, much more than flowers, ...and in any case there is sweetness and some of that.

There exists a broad inclination among those who theorize about mental representation to assume that the meanings of linguistic units, like words, are going to be identical to, and work exactly like, mental representations, such as concepts. This has the effect of many theorists applying facts that seem to have been discovered about the meanings of linguistic units to mental representations. This is especially so for causal theories of content, which will be the primary exemplars here. It is the contention of this essay that this approach is mistaken. The influence of thinking about language and mental representation in this way has resulted in the adoption of certain positions by a broad swathe of theorists to the effect that the content of a concept is identical to the property in the world that the concept represents, and that because of this a concept only applies to an object in the world or it does not. The consequences of such commitments are what appear to be insoluble problems that arise when trying to account for, or explain, misrepresentation in cognitive systems. This essay presents the position that in order to actually account for misrepresentation, conceptual content must be understood as being very much like measurements, in that the application of a content to an object in the world is akin to measuring said object, and that conceptual content ought be understood as being graded in the same way that measurements are. On this view, then, concepts are the kinds of things that can be applied more, or less, accurately to particular objects in the world, and so are not identical to whatever it is that they represent.

There exists a broad inclination among those who theorize about mental representation to assume that the meanings of linguistic units, like words, are going to be identical to, and work exactly like, mental representations, such as concepts. This has the effect of many theorists applying facts that seem to have been discovered about the meanings of linguistic units to mental representations. This is especially so for causal theories of content, which will be the primary exemplars here. It is the contention of this essay that this approach is mistaken. The influence of thinking about language and mental representation in this way has resulted in the adoption of certain positions by a broad swathe of theorists to the effect that the content of a concept is identical to the property in the world that the concept represents, and that because of this a concept only applies to an object in the world or it does not. The consequences of such commitments are what appear to be insoluble problems that arise when trying to account for, or explain, misrepresentation in cognitive systems. This essay presents the position that in order to actually account for misrepresentation, conceptual content must be understood as being very much like measurements, in that the application of a content to an object in the world is akin to measuring said object, and that conceptual content ought be understood as being graded in the same way that measurements are. On this view, then, concepts are the kinds of things that can be applied more, or less, accurately to particular objects in the world, and so are not identical to whatever it is that they represent.

Nesta tese, desenvolve-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo fundamentada na noção de mônada, ou substância simples, como elemento ontológico estruturante de um enfoque contemporâneo da mencionada relação. Na primeira parte da tese, de natureza crítica, analisam-se as teorias fisicistas contemporâneas da mencionada relação, a saber, a teoria de superveniência da mente, da emergência e da causação mental, com vistas a justificar a proposta de assunção de uma premissa dualista que visa, principalmente, propor, em contraste com o cenário epifenomenalista do fisicismo contemporâneo, uma ontologia da mente que seja compatível com as intuições realistas do senso comum e da psicológica popular sobre a força causal da mente no universo físico. Na segunda parte, de natureza positiva, propõe-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo partindo-se, para tanto, de uma assunção e duas premissas. A assunção afirma que a mente tem o mesmo importe ontológico da matéria física, sendo estes considerados como elementos composicionais, afirmação a qual se denomina dualismo elementar. No que se refere às premissas, propõe-se duas, a saber, a tese composicional holística, que afirma que a mente e a matéria são partes constitutivas de um todo chamado substância simples, e a tese composicional mereológica, que afirma que as substâncias simples ou mônadas compõem mereologicamente, por superveniência, a relação mente-corpo. Examinam-se também algumas objeções ao argumento monadista proposto. / This thesis offers an explanatory argument concerning the mind-body relation, an argument that is grounded on the notion of monad, or the simple substance, as an ontological element for proposing a contemporary approach to the mind-body relation. In the first part, a critique of the current physicalist theories of mind is given, namely, supervenience, emergence and mental causation, in order to justify the proposal of a dualist premiss which aims at an ontology of mind which satisfies the realistic intuitions of common sense and of folk psychology on the causal efficacy and relevance of the mind amid the physical, in opposition to the epiphenomenalist view of contemporary physicalist theories. In the second part, the positive one, we propose an explanatory argument for monadism about mind-body relations, based on an assumption and two premises. The assumption says that the mind has the same ontological import of the physical matter, and they, mind and matter, are considered to be elements entering the composition of psychophysical relations, an assumption called elementary dualism. Regarding the premises, we propose two, namely, the holistic compositional thesis, which asserts that mind and matter are parts entering the composition of true wholes called substances, and the mereological compositional thesis, which says that such simple substances compose, via supervenience, the mind-body relations. Some objections to the proposed monadist argument are examined and rejoindered as well.