[pt] A pesquisa concentra-se em torno da noção de consciência, mais precisamente, em torno da redescoberta dessa noção na Filosofia da Mente contemporânea. Antes, porém, mostra- nos, através de uma revisão histórica dos estudos sobre a mente, que a referida noção passa por transformações importantes do século XVII ao final do século XIX, sendo caracterizada, em momentos distintos, como reflexividade,como intencionalidade e como memória. Em seguida, após analisar o processo de enfraquecimento dos estudos sobre a consciência no começo do século XX, a pesquisa aborda a retomada desses estudos na Filosofia da Mente contemporânea, registrando seus principais programas de pesquisa, bem como os impasses criados a partir das controvérsias entre as teorias reducionistas da consciência e as teorias subjetivistas, partidárias de um anti- reducionismo. Ao final, analisando a hipótese do fechamento cognitivo, nas versões do naturalismo não-construtivo e da teoria da diafaneidade,a pesquisa aponta-nos uma solução para os impasses acerca do problema da consciência no cenário contemporâneo, procurando ressaltar algumas implicações importantes para uma compreensão da consciência para além de um domínio intencional. / [en] This thesis brings the notion of consciousness into focus. A critical study is undertaken about the historical fact of the rediscovery of such a notion along the last decades of the twentieth century, within the area of philosophy known as Philosophy of Mind. In order to prepare the study of such an event, a propedeutic historical survey of consecutive philosophical conceptions of consciousness, first as reflexivity, then as intentionality and then as memory is presented, along with the analysis of the eclipse of such notion in the behaviouristic psychology and psychoanalysis of the beginning of the twentieth century. To this survey it follows a critical exposition of the research programmes agenda of the (then) new area of the Philosophy of Mind from the fifties, its controversies and impasses. Finally a possible solution for such impasses is suggested to lie in the proposal of two dimensions of consciousness, one intentional, the other non- intentional, as an implication of both the naturalistic and the transparency hypothesis of the cognitive closure research programme. / [fr] La recherche est concentrée au tour de la notion de conscience, particulièrement, de la reprise de cette notion dans la Philosophie Contemporaine de lEsprit. Avant, cependant, le recherche nous montre, dans le contexte d`une révision historique des études sur lesprit, que la notion référée passe par des transformations importantes dès le XVII siècle jusquà la fin du XIX siècle, transformations caracterisées par des moments différents, dans lesqueles la conscience apparait comme réflexion, intention et mémoire. Puis, après lanalyse du processus daffaiblissement des études sur la conscience au début du XX siècle, la recherche montre la reprise des études sur la conscience dans la Philosophie Contemporaine de lEsprit, en registrant ses principaux programmes de recherche, aussi bien que les difficultées crées à partir des controverses entre les théories réductionistes et les théories subjectivistes partisanes dun anti réductionisme. Finallement, en analysant lhypothèse de la fermeture cognitive dans les conceptions du naturalisme non- constructif et de la théorie de la transparence, la recherche nous indique une solution pour les impasses sur ce sujet dans la scène contemporaine, en recherchant à mettre laccent sur quelques implications importantes de lhypothèse de la fermeture cognitive pour la compréhension de la conscience qui depasse le domaine intentionnel.

Many philosophical subjects attempt to analyze the basis of human welfare. Theories of desert, distribution of property, and happiness tend to dominate philosophical discourse. Mental credit, which is the mental acquisition of credit for one’s accomplishments and the satisfaction one derives from this credit, is absent from this discourse despite its underlying role in the way people think about their lives. Mental credit is an eternal cognitive good that deserves thoughtful attention and pious decisions for implementation. The following theory of mental credit seeks to serve as a unifying theory for the mental calculations that guide life’s most imperative decisions, satisfaction, and impact one has on the world.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Thesis (doctoral)--Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [165]-175).

The ability to change one's beliefs in a rational manner is one of many facets of the abilities of an intelligent agent. Central to any investigation of belief change is the notion of an epistemic state. This dissertation is mainly concerned with three issues involving epistemic states: 1. How should an epistemic state be represented? 2. How does an agent use an epistemic state to perform belief change? 3. How does an agent arrive at a particular epistemic state? With regard to the first question, note that there are many different methods for constructing belief change operations. We argue that semantic constructions involving ordered pairs, each consisting of a set of beliefs and an ordering on the set of "possible worlds" (or equivalently, on the set of basic independent bits of information) are, in an important sense, more fundamental. Our answer to the second question provides indirect support for the use of semantic structures. We show how well-known belief change operations and related structures can be modelled semantically. Furthermore, we introduce new forms of belief change related operations and structures which are all defined, and motivated, in terms of such semantic representational formalisms. These include a framework for unifying belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning, new versions of entrenchment orderings on beliefs, novel approaches to withdrawal operations, and an expanded view of iterated belief change. The third question is. one which has not received much attention in the belief change literature. We propose to extract extra-logical information from the formal representation of an agent's set of beliefs, which can then be used in the construction of epistemic state. his proposal is just a first approximation, although it seems to have the potential for developing into a full-fledged theory. / Computing / D.Phil.(Computer Science)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3094.pdf: 2356538 bytes, checksum: c4e0d2086748f9a3497a2ab4f7178b12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-22 / This thesis analyzes the grammar of the psychological vocabulary with the idea that inner world (the subjectivity) and external world (the behavior) are connected by grammatical relations which must be clarified through a conceptual inquiry and not through empirical findings. To reach to the objective we analyzed the common point of view that we have of our inner world and traces the linkings between our affirmations about the inner world and how they acquire meaning from this common point of view. The following step was to analyze the conception of privacy that the common point of view attributes to the events of the inner world. After this we argue that the common conception does not could be a base for the construction of a philosophical explanation of the inner world. Therefore the objective of the common vision of our interior world is not to elaborate a scientific explanation. At the same time we conclude that our common conception of the psychological vocabulary is not a proto-theory that must be developed by the philosophical investigations. From this we open the way to present the philosophical point of view of Ludwig Wittgenstein about the psychological vocabulary. We explain this point of view to clarify our objective. Subsequently we presents the conception of language of Wittgenstein and we link his conception with the way for which he treated or understanding of the psychological vocabulary. With this explanation we show that when we are dealing with the affirmations of our inner world - our psychological vocabulary - we are not contending with a dichotomy between behaviorism and Cartesianism. Wittgenstein shows that we have another form to explain our language about the inner world. According to Wittgenstein's philosophy of the psychology our behavior is an expression of the inner world, that is, the inner if express world through the behavior despite if it does not reduce to the behavior. With such idea, Wittgenstein admits that the relation enters our affirmations on the interior world cannot be understood in isolated way of our behavior. At the same time, our behavior alone is not the criterion for understanding of the inner world, is necessary that the behavior be considered inside of a specific language game that is our use of our concepts of the psychological vocabulary. / Ao partir do princípio de que o mundo interior (a subjetividade) e o mundo exterior (o comportamento) estão ligados entre si por relações gramaticais, esta tese analisa a gramática do vocabulário psicológico. Propõe que estas relações gramaticais devem ser esclarecidas através de uma investigação conceitual, e não por investigações, empíricas. Para que alcancemos o objetivo desejado, foi analisado o ponto de vista comum que temos de nosso mundo interior. Tal visão traça as ligações entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior e como elas adquirem significado a partir deste ponto de vista comum. O passo seguinte consistiu em analisar a concepção de privacidade que o ponto de vista comum atribui aos eventos do mundo interior. Demonstramos, após estas análises, que a concepção comum não serve de base para a construção de uma explicação filosófica do mundo interior e das afirmações que dele fazemos. Isto porque o objetivo da visão comum de nosso mundo interior não é a de elaborar uma explicação científica. Ao mesmo tempo, mostramos que nossa concepção comum do vocabulário psicológico não é uma proto-teoria que deve ser desenvolvida pela Filosofia. Com isto, abrimos caminho para apresentar o ponto de vista filosófico de Ludwig Wittgenstein sobre o vocabulário psicológico. Para que este ponto de vista fosse explicativo em relação ao nosso objetivo, apresentamos a concepção de linguagem de Wittgenstein, ligando esta concepção com o modo como Wittgenstein tratou o vocabulário psicológico. Através desta análise, mostramos que, ao tratarmos com as afirmações de nosso mundo interior nosso vocabulário psicológico não estamos diante de uma dicotomia entre behaviorismo e cartesianismo. Isto, pelo fato de termos outra possibilidade de tratar nossa linguagem quando nos referimos ao mundo interior. Segundo a Filosofia da Psicologia, de Ludwig Wittgenstein, o comportamento é uma expressão do mundo interior, isto é, o mundo interior se expressa através do comportamento, ainda que a este não se reduza. A partir de tal ideia, Wittgenstein propõe que a relação entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior não podem ser compreendidas de maneira isolada de nosso comportamento. Juntemos a isto que tão somente o nosso comportamento não é critério para compreensão do mundo interior Portanto, há necessidade, de que o comportamento seja considerado dentro de um jogo de linguagem específico, que consiste no uso de nossos conceitos do vocabulário psicológico.

Les cinq études détaillées au cours de cette thèse interrogent divers aspects de la théorie de l’esprit, de la conscience de soi ainsi que du lien (multiple ou unique) qui unit ces deux capacités sociocognitives si particulières. Les deux premières études mettent en évidence différentes variables qui peuvent – ou non- influencer l’attribution d’intention et de fausse croyance à autrui. La troisième étude porte plus précisément sur les différents composants de la conscience de soi et sur leur trajectoire développementale. La quatrième étude interroge le lien développemental entre la théorie de l’esprit et la conscience de soi, alors que la dernière étude questionne la présence de ce lien chez les chimpanzés (Pan Troglodytes). Nous démontrerons, tout au long de cette thèse, que la théorie de l’esprit et la conscience de soi sont composées de différents éléments et que leur acquisition est graduelle. / Doctorat en Sciences Psychologiques et de l'éducation / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / The empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory states that individuals with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) can be identified by a deficit in empathy (social skills, communication skills, and theory of mind) and a propensity for systemizing (islets of ability, obsessions with systems, and repetitive behavior). This theory has been tested in various contexts, but never with adolescents between the ages of 12 and 16. The EQ-A (Empathizing Quotient for Adolescents) and the SQ-A (Systemizing Quotient for Adolescents) were administered to 47 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 16 who had been diagnosed with ASC and 97 adolescents with no reported physical or mental disorders to discover differences in empathizing and systemizing. To test the specific elements and predictions of the E-S theory, the EQ-A was divided into a set of three subscales derived by conceptually mapping items to factors corresponding to the concepts theoretically underlying the scale. The SQ-A was divided into subscales using factor analysis. It was found that all four subscales resulting from the factor analysis on the SQ-A were associated with obsessions with systems. A weak positive correlation was found between the SQ-A and the EQ-A. Although the EQ-A was able to differentiate significantly between individuals with an ASC and those without, the SQ-A was not. In addition, although the EQ-A and EQ-A subscales scores correlated with similar subscales scores of the GARS-2 (a well-validated existing autism screening test), the SQ-A and its subscales did not. Implications for the E-S Theory are discussed.

<p>This dissertation argues for a number of theses related to responsibility, norm psychology, and personhood. Although most of the papers argue for “standalone” theses, in the sense that their truth does not depend the truth of the others, the five papers collectively illustrate a broader view of humans as (a) responsible agents who are (b) self-governing and (c) equipped with a capacity for norms, and whose agency (d) centers on dynamic responsiveness to corrective feedback. Drawing on this broader picture, the dissertation sheds light on ethical questions about our social practices and technologies, as well as descriptive questions about the nature of substance use disorder. </p> <p>Most centrally, the dissertation argues that forward-looking considerations are relevant for responsibility, not merely because the consequences of our responsibility practices are desirable, but primarily because of a connection which I argue exists between relationships, norms, and learning. On the view I defend, an agent is a responsible agent only if she can learn from being held responsible, so as to regulate herself according to norms of which she presently falls short. I argue that, if it were not for the capacity of humans to learn from <i>social corrective feedback</i>, such as normative responses like praise and blame, humans would be unable to participate in norm-governed relationships and communities. It is in virtue of their participation in these relationships and communities that humans are subject to interpersonal norms, such that they can fulfill or violate these norms and be praiseworthy or blameworthy for doing so. So, without the kind of learning that makes participation in these relationships a possibility, humans could never be praiseworthy or blameworthy for anything that they do. </p> <p>The dissertation also argues that human norm psychology has implications for how we should relate to “social robots”—artificial agents designed to participate in relationships with humans. I argue that, like humans, social robots should be equipped with a capacity to recognize and respond to normative feedback. Lastly, the dissertation resists a common narrative about addiction as being a form of akrasia in which agents act against their own better judgment. While this is certainly a central aspect of many cases of addiction, I argue that it fails to appreciate the ways in which addiction sometimes interacts with a person’s identity and goals, especially in cases where the agent believes that the things she values would not be feasible if she did not continue to engage in addictive behavior.</p>

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