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This paper compares two models of the philosophy of mind: René Descartes' substance dualism and Daniel Dennett's multiple-drafts model. Descartes posits that the body and consciousness are distinct substances capable of independent existence, with the pineal gland serving as the point of interaction between the physical and conscious realms. Conversely, Dennett rejects this dualist approach, proposing that consciousness and all mental activities emerge from complex, multitrack neurophysiological processes distributed across various brain regions. Additionally, the paper examines the knowledge argument as a significantchallenge to physicalism. The study aims to demonstrate that Dennett's physicalist model, grounded in contemporary neuroscience, offers a more plausible explanation for the emergence of consciousness through neuronal activity, whereas substance dualism fails to elucidate the phenomenon and instead contributes to its mystification. / I denna uppsats jämförs två modeller av medvetandefilosofin, den substansdualistiska modellen av René Descartes och the multiple drafts model av fysikalisten Daniel Dennett. Descartes ser kropp och medvetande som två skilda substanser som kan existera oberoende av varandra. Enligt Descartes är tallkottkörteln den fysiska platsen där det fysiska och medvetandet kommer i kontakt med varandra. Dennett förkastar Descartes teori och beskriver uppkomsten av medvetande och alla former av mental aktivitet som ett resultat av komplexa flerspåriga neurofysiologiska processer på olika platser i hjärnan. Uppsatsen tar också upp och analyserar ett viktigt argument mot fysikalismen, kunskapsargumentet eller Mary i det svartvita rummet. Syftet med uppsatsen är att visa att Dennetts fysikalistiska modell är en samtida, neurovetenskapligt välgrundad och lämplig modell för att förklara uppkomsten av medvetandet som en produkt av neuronal aktivitet i hjärnan och att substansdualism inte ger förklaringar till fenomenet medvetande, utan snarare stöder ämnets mystifiering.

The ability to change one's beliefs in a rational manner is one of many facets of the abilities of an intelligent agent. Central to any investigation of belief change is the notion of an epistemic state. This dissertation is mainly concerned with three issues involving epistemic states: 1. How should an epistemic state be represented? 2. How does an agent use an epistemic state to perform belief change? 3. How does an agent arrive at a particular epistemic state? With regard to the first question, note that there are many different methods for constructing belief change operations. We argue that semantic constructions involving ordered pairs, each consisting of a set of beliefs and an ordering on the set of "possible worlds" (or equivalently, on the set of basic independent bits of information) are, in an important sense, more fundamental. Our answer to the second question provides indirect support for the use of semantic structures. We show how well-known belief change operations and related structures can be modelled semantically. Furthermore, we introduce new forms of belief change related operations and structures which are all defined, and motivated, in terms of such semantic representational formalisms. These include a framework for unifying belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning, new versions of entrenchment orderings on beliefs, novel approaches to withdrawal operations, and an expanded view of iterated belief change. The third question is. one which has not received much attention in the belief change literature. We propose to extract extra-logical information from the formal representation of an agent's set of beliefs, which can then be used in the construction of epistemic state. his proposal is just a first approximation, although it seems to have the potential for developing into a full-fledged theory. / Computing / D.Phil.(Computer Science)

Thesis (DPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / This thesis gives an historical overview of some of the issues connecting philosophy of mind and philosophy of langauge in the twentieth century, especially with regard to the relevance of both disciplines to theories of cognition. Specifically, the interrelation between the theories of Peirce,Chomsky, Derrida, and Deacon are discussed. Furthermore, an overview of twentieth century views on mind in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences is given. The argument is made that many of the apparently insurmountable issues that plague theories on mind and cognition today can be traced back to the metaphysical mould into which the philosophical questions at issue here were cast. Also, despite current resistance to the idea from many philosophical quarters, a case is made for approaching language and mind in terms of neo-Darwinist evolutionary theory.

Over the past thirty years, academic dialogues on the relationships between the sciences and religions have flourished, albeit primarily within Judeo-Christian historical, theological and philosophical contexts. Can a Hindu tradition be brought into this dialogue? The Bhagavata Purana is one of the most well-known sacred texts of India, and biology, Darwinism in particular, has become one of the most spirited areas of the science and religion dialogue in academia, as well as in the popular media. This thesis examines the possibility, scope and foundational topics involved in a dialogue between Vaisnava-Hindu theology as found in the Bhāgavata, and the theoretical, philosophical and theological issues surrounding contemporary biology. To examine the possibility and scope of a Bhāgavata-science dialogue, I focus on the theological, ontological, epistemological and teleological presuppositions that each tradition bring to the study of nature, outlining the similarities and differences in their approaches. I establish the grounds for further discussion through a comparative analysis of terms such as "consciousness," "knowledge" and "goal of knowledge" as they appear in the Bhagavata and noteworthy Darwinian texts. My argument is that although prima facie the two traditions appear different in their philosophical, scientific and theological approaches, there are a number of areas of common interest and parallels, especially in their epistemologies and teleologies. In the case of genuine differences, such as their views on the ontology of consciousness, I demonstrate the possibility of reconciliation. Clarifying the conceptual differences, establishing parallels and demonstrating areas of common interests opens the possibility and widens the scope for further dialogue.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

This thesis will show that, in its original form, “The Turn of the Screw” acted as a monument to the intellectual unity shared between Henry James and his brother William. Through evaluating James’ biography, memoirs, and letters with William, this thesis will illustrate the subtle collaborative inspirations that initially helped James write the first twelve-part serial edition of “The Turn of the Screw” for Collier’s Weekly, which ran from January 27, 1898 until April 16, 1898. I will also demonstrate the effect of William’s philosophy and his death on the revisions James’ made to his story as published in the twelfth volume of his New York Edition (NYE).

Based on Noam Chomsky’s argument that the faculty of language is primarily a tool of thought whose purpose is to interpret the world, this dissertation argues that reading literature provides a cognitive experience like John Gardner’s “Fictive Dream” that mimics our interpretive experience of the world. Literary experience exploits language as an epistemological faculty that makes aspects of the external world intelligible. Yet the faculty of language is also capable of evoking entirely mental worlds that do not reflect the mindexternal world. Because the literary experience is entirely mindinternal, even the cultural knowledge we bring into play for its understanding still relies on innate features of language. Thus, during the act of reading, we hold this cultural knowledge in abeyance, allowing the text to structure how we bring it to bear on the experience as a whole. A scientific approach to literature can help uncover principles to further elucidate the literaryepistemological experience. Whereas much literary criticism assumes that a critic’s purpose is to mine a text for its deeper meaning, this dissertation argues for a Cognitive Formalist approach in which criticism serves not simply to explain the experience evoked by any particular text according to linguisticepistemological principles, but also to evaluate the moral implications of that specific textual experience. As a means of demonstrating potential implications of a scientific cognitive approach to literary criticism based on linguisticepistemological understanding, the current study offers sample passages from J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings. These passages allow us to offer first approximations of some explanatory principles of the literaryepistemological experience, such as the importance of fictive time and fictional event sequences, which in turn gives us greater insight into how, for example, verb tense and aspect contribute to the evocation of the action of fiction in the reader’s mind. Ultimately, the fictive vantage point constructed by the text allows the reader access to a complex moral framework in which fictive characters are understood to make choices that will in turn set the stage for the reader’s own ethical reception of the text and the experience it offers. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2017. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Quels sont les principaux acquis de la psychologie médicale de l’époque de Freud qui ont contribué à l’émergence du mouvement psychanalytique ? Comment Freud les a-T-Il repris dans le cadre d’une construction originale ? Malgré l’abondante littérature consacrée à ces questions qui paraissent si simples, les réponses sont loin de faire l’unanimité. Cette difficulté n’est pas récente, elle est perceptible déjà chez Freud qui, en 1914 (dans Contribution à l’histoire du mouvement psychanalytique) et en 1925 (dans Ma vie et la psychanalyse), entreprit de retracer l’histoire de la psychanalyse, tout en évoquant les principaux acteurs qui ont, de manière directe ou indirecte, contribué à l’éclosion de ce corps de connaissances. Cependant, les découvertes faites par des chercheurs contemporains, dans les Archives des centres hospitaliers, où étaient internés certains patients de Freud, tout autant qu’une lecture attentive du contexte historique et des productions intellectuelles sur la maladie mentale, à la fin du XIX ème siècle, laissent planer des interrogations. Freud a-T-Il biaisé l’histoire de la psychanalyse pour en apparaitre comme le père fondateur ? Ces soupçons qui pèsent sur le travail d’historien entrepris d’abord par Freud, puis par ses collaborateurs, nous invite, en tant qu’historien des sciences, à réévaluer un certain nombre d’acquis en psychanalyse, au regard de l’abondance des découvertes récentes. En outre, les travaux de Freud n’entretiennent pas seulement des rapports avec les théories psychologiques de son temps. De nos jours, ils alimentent encore des discussions dans les « théories contemporaines de l’esprit », notamment dans les champs disciplinaires tels que la philosophie de l’esprit et les neurosciences cognitives. C’est ce que démontre la dernière partie de cette thèse qui, à titre de test, confronte la théorie freudienne de l’inconscient aux théories contemporaines. / What where the main types of psychological knowladge used by Freud which contributed to the emergence of psychoanalytic movement? How did Freud use these main types of psychological knowladge in the context of original construction? In spite of the abundant literature concerning these questions which appaer simple, the answers aren't uncontroversial. This difficulty isn't recent, Freud has been already studied this matter in Contribution to the History of Psychoanalysis movement (1914) and My life and Psychoanalysis (1925) retraced the history of psychoanalysis, mentioning the principal actors who have, directly or indirectly, contributed to the building this body of knowledge.However, the discoveries done by contemporary researchers, in the archives of hospitals, where some Freud’s patients were interned, with a careful reading of the historical context and the intellectual productions on mental illness, at the end of 19th century, raises important questions. Did Freud bias the psychoanalysis history in order to be considered as the real founding father? These suspicions have an impact on the historians working on the work of Freud and on his partisans as well. This invites us, as historians of sciences, to revaluate a certain number of hypotheses in psychoanalysis, according to recent discoveries.Besides, the work of Freud doesn’t not only have relationship with psychological theory of his time. In our days, Freud’s work enriches discussions as far it concerns “contemporary Theories of mind”, and in particular, in disciplinary fields such as Philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. This is what the last part of this thesis demonstrates, as a test case, it interacts Freudian theory of unconsciousness with contemporary theories.