The U.S. Army conducts extensive training on its core values beginning with initial entry training (IET), commonly referred to as basic training, in order to shape soldiers' behavior and decision making in combat and noncombat situations. This mixed methods study addressed the problem of limited empirical research on the effects of U.S. Army IET on soldiers' moral and character development. The purpose was to explore the effects of Military Police (MP) IET on soldiers in training through a mixed methods quantitative and qualitative model. The theoretical framework for this study was based on Rest's four component model (FCM) of moral development, Hart's model of moral identity, the schemas of the Defining Issues Test (DIT), and the U.S. Army's moral code consisting of the Army values, the Soldiers Creed, and the Warrior Ethos. The DIT was administered at the beginning and conclusion of MP IET to determine change in soldiers' moral judgment. Focus groups of MP IET soldiers identified perceptions of change in moral development. Data analysis using ANOVA and matched pair t tests of DIT scores revealed no significant changes in overall scores, no differences among age groups, and limited differences among genders and educational levels. Results showed significant decline in personal interest scores among females. Focus group results using qualitative content analysis revealed the relationship with drill sergeants as having a significant impact on moral development. This study provides feedback to trainers and leaders on designing effective moral and character education. Soldiers influence societies at home and abroad. This research shows that positive social change is more likely as soldiers receive moral and character education which focuses on developing moral expertise, not just memorization of rules, and which results in moral and trustworthy behavior.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-02-19T10:58:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 diegoazevedoleite.pdf: 913531 bytes, checksum: 466952d4427ef1c64ec1fe3adf0d4604 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-02-26T13:45:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 diegoazevedoleite.pdf: 913531 bytes, checksum: 466952d4427ef1c64ec1fe3adf0d4604 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-02-26T13:45:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 diegoazevedoleite.pdf: 913531 bytes, checksum: 466952d4427ef1c64ec1fe3adf0d4604 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-18 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Muitas ideias de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) a respeito da psicologia são ainda entendidas, em geral, de forma bastante incompleta ou com distorções e más interpretações na literatura secundária especializada, mas, principalmente, em manuais de história da psicologia. Um dos grandes problemas encontrados é a não consideração ou o exame superficial da relação existente entre a psicologia empírica e a antropologia pragmática. Por conta disso, há ainda muitos problemas interpretativos que permanecem sem uma solução apropriada. Um deles é a falta de clareza a respeito de uma afirmação feita por Kant, em sua obra de 1781, referente à relação entre a psicologia empírica e a antropologia. O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de compreender melhor tal afirmação e, além disso, através do exame detalhado da relação entre estes dois campos, apresentar de forma mais completa as concepções de Kant a respeito da psicologia. A tese geral defendida é a de que essa relação precisa ser considerada e examinada com profundidade para se compreender de forma adequada o que Kant realmente quis dizer na obra de 1781 e a amplitude de suas concepções sobre a psicologia. / Many ideas of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) about psychology are still understood, generally, in a very incomplete way or with distortions and misinterpretations in the specialized secondary literature, but mainly in textbooks about history of psychology. A major problem encountered is that there is no consideration or just a superficial examination of the relationship between empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology. Because of this, there are still many interpretative problems that remain without a proper solution. One of them is the lack of clarity regarding a statement made by Kant in his work of 1781, concerning the relationship between empirical psychology and anthropology. This study aims to better understand this statement and, moreover, through the detailed examination of the relationship between these two fields, to present more fully Kant’s conceptions about psychology. The general thesis defended is that this relationship needs to be considered and examined in depth for the adequate understanding of what Kant really meant in his work of 1781 and the range of his conceptions concerning psychology.

Submitted by Geandra Rodrigues (geandrar@gmail.com) on 2018-01-25T14:03:25Z No. of bitstreams: 0 / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2018-01-26T10:55:34Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 0 / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-26T10:55:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2017-03-24 / CNPq - Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / O entendimento atual do papel desempenhado pela psicologia do filósofo alemão Christian Wolff (1679-1754) na história da psicologia é problemático, e isto em razão da persistência de algumas questões gerais a seu respeito tanto na historiografia da psicologia quanto na Wolff scholarship. Estas questões são: 1- Qual é a relação entre os escritos psicológicos alemães e latinos de Wolff? 2- Em que consiste a separação wolffiana entre psicologia empírica e racional? 3- Wolff adota uma perspectiva monista ou dualista em sua psicologia? Visando ao avanço do conhecimento a respeito da psicologia de Wolff, e de seu papel na história da psicologia, o presente estudo busca responder a estas questões, lançando mão de três hipóteses: (1) os escritos psicológicos de Wolff constituem uma unidade; (2) o sistema psicológico de Wolff constitui uma unidade; (3) monismo e dualismo constituem uma unidade na psicologia de Wolff. Após a explicação detalhada na Introdução do problema e dos procedimentos do estudo, nos Capítulos 1 e 2 é desenvolvida uma análise histórico-filosófica dos principais escritos psicológicos alemães e latinos de Wolff. Contrastando os dados desta análise com diversas teses da literatura secundária, no Capítulo 3 é realizada a avaliação das hipóteses. Na Conclusão, são retomadas as questões iniciais do estudo, e estimado o seu valor para a historiografia da psicologia e para a Wolff scholarship. / The current understanding of the role played by the psychology of German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754) in the history of psychology is problematic. And the main reason is that, both in the historiography of psychology and in Wolff scholarship, some general questions remain unanswered: 1- What kind of relationship is there between Wolff‟s German and Latin psychological writings? 2- What does the Wolffian separation between empirical and rational psychology consist in? 3- Which perspective does Wolff adopt in his psychology: monist or dualist? Our study intends to answer these questions, and to contribute to the improvement of the available knowledge about Wolff‟s psychology and the role played by it in the history of psychology. Three hypotheses are presented here as possible answers: (1) Wolff‟s psychological writings form an unity; (2) Wolff‟s psychological system is an unity; (3) Wolff establishes an unity between monism and dualism in his psychology. After a thorough explanation of the research problems and procedures in the Introduction, Chapters 1 and 2 display a historical and philosophical analysis of Wolff‟s German and Latin main psychological writings. Chapter 3 contains the evaluation of the hypotheses, which is developed by means of the confrontation of the results from chapters 1 and 2 with several theses from the secondary literature. The Conclusion addresses once more those questions presented at the Introduction, and finishes with some general considerations regarding the value of this study to the historiography of psychology and to Wolff scholarship.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-05-23T19:34:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 lucascarneirodelimaesilva.pdf: 1915858 bytes, checksum: 5836be114eca696e3f624250c537c45a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-07-02T11:23:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 lucascarneirodelimaesilva.pdf: 1915858 bytes, checksum: 5836be114eca696e3f624250c537c45a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-02T11:23:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 lucascarneirodelimaesilva.pdf: 1915858 bytes, checksum: 5836be114eca696e3f624250c537c45a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-24 / FAPEMIG - Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais / Esta dissertação aborda o problema endêmico de unidade que a psicologia atravessa desde seu nascimento como ciência moderna até os dias atuais. Esse problema pode ser caracterizado pela falta de consenso em relação aos pressupostos ontológicos, epistemológicos e metodológicos adotados pelas diferentes abordagens psicológicas e a crescente fragmentação do campo em diversas teorias e práticas totalmente distintas. Dentro dessa temática mais ampla, tem-se como objeto específico a descrição e análise crítica de como essa problemática vem sendo tratada por teóricos na psicologia brasileira. Pretender-se-á aqui mapear o debate e descrever os aspectos básicos que caracterizarão a discussão sobre o problema da unidade da psicologia na literatura nacional para que, posteriormente, possa-se avaliá-los e discuti-los. Por fim, concluiu-se que a produção nacional apresenta três características principais: presença hegemônica do que chamamos de Teóricos da Dispersão (conjunto de teóricos que avaliam a dispersão do campo psicológico como irremediável e sua unificação impossível e adotam uma estratégia cética ou valoração positiva); a falta de sistematicidade na discussão do tema e o pouco desenvolvimento institucional. Com relação às teses e aos argumentos utilizados por estes teóricos para sustentar seus posicionamentos, concluímos que estes são, na sua maioria, filosoficamente inconsistentes e não oferecem obstáculos significativos ao trabalho teórico necessário para uma possível unificação da psicologia. / This dissertation addresses the endemic problem of unity that Psychology goes through from birth as modern science to the present day. This problem can be characterized by a lack of consensus regarding the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions adopted by different psychological approaches, and the growing fragmentation of the field in various completely different theories and practices. Within this broader theme, it has the specific purpose of being a description and critical analysis of how this problem is being addressed by brazilian theorists in Psychology. Here we are going to map the debate and describe the basic aspects that characterize the discussion of the unit problem in the national literature in order to subsequently evaluate it and discuss it. Lastly, it was concluded that the brazilian production is characterized by three main features: hegemonic presence of what we call theoreticians of dispersion (set of theoreticians that evaluate the dispersion of the Psychological field as irremediable and its unification impossible, adopting a skeptical strategy or positive valuation), the lack of systematic in the argumentation of the theme and poor institutional development. Regarding the theses and the arguments of these theoreticians to support their thesis and positions, we concluded that these are mostly philosophically inconsistent and under no circumstances they hinder a possible unification of Psychology, or even less, definitely settle the subject.

No description available.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3094.pdf: 2356538 bytes, checksum: c4e0d2086748f9a3497a2ab4f7178b12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-22 / This thesis analyzes the grammar of the psychological vocabulary with the idea that inner world (the subjectivity) and external world (the behavior) are connected by grammatical relations which must be clarified through a conceptual inquiry and not through empirical findings. To reach to the objective we analyzed the common point of view that we have of our inner world and traces the linkings between our affirmations about the inner world and how they acquire meaning from this common point of view. The following step was to analyze the conception of privacy that the common point of view attributes to the events of the inner world. After this we argue that the common conception does not could be a base for the construction of a philosophical explanation of the inner world. Therefore the objective of the common vision of our interior world is not to elaborate a scientific explanation. At the same time we conclude that our common conception of the psychological vocabulary is not a proto-theory that must be developed by the philosophical investigations. From this we open the way to present the philosophical point of view of Ludwig Wittgenstein about the psychological vocabulary. We explain this point of view to clarify our objective. Subsequently we presents the conception of language of Wittgenstein and we link his conception with the way for which he treated or understanding of the psychological vocabulary. With this explanation we show that when we are dealing with the affirmations of our inner world - our psychological vocabulary - we are not contending with a dichotomy between behaviorism and Cartesianism. Wittgenstein shows that we have another form to explain our language about the inner world. According to Wittgenstein's philosophy of the psychology our behavior is an expression of the inner world, that is, the inner if express world through the behavior despite if it does not reduce to the behavior. With such idea, Wittgenstein admits that the relation enters our affirmations on the interior world cannot be understood in isolated way of our behavior. At the same time, our behavior alone is not the criterion for understanding of the inner world, is necessary that the behavior be considered inside of a specific language game that is our use of our concepts of the psychological vocabulary. / Ao partir do princípio de que o mundo interior (a subjetividade) e o mundo exterior (o comportamento) estão ligados entre si por relações gramaticais, esta tese analisa a gramática do vocabulário psicológico. Propõe que estas relações gramaticais devem ser esclarecidas através de uma investigação conceitual, e não por investigações, empíricas. Para que alcancemos o objetivo desejado, foi analisado o ponto de vista comum que temos de nosso mundo interior. Tal visão traça as ligações entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior e como elas adquirem significado a partir deste ponto de vista comum. O passo seguinte consistiu em analisar a concepção de privacidade que o ponto de vista comum atribui aos eventos do mundo interior. Demonstramos, após estas análises, que a concepção comum não serve de base para a construção de uma explicação filosófica do mundo interior e das afirmações que dele fazemos. Isto porque o objetivo da visão comum de nosso mundo interior não é a de elaborar uma explicação científica. Ao mesmo tempo, mostramos que nossa concepção comum do vocabulário psicológico não é uma proto-teoria que deve ser desenvolvida pela Filosofia. Com isto, abrimos caminho para apresentar o ponto de vista filosófico de Ludwig Wittgenstein sobre o vocabulário psicológico. Para que este ponto de vista fosse explicativo em relação ao nosso objetivo, apresentamos a concepção de linguagem de Wittgenstein, ligando esta concepção com o modo como Wittgenstein tratou o vocabulário psicológico. Através desta análise, mostramos que, ao tratarmos com as afirmações de nosso mundo interior nosso vocabulário psicológico não estamos diante de uma dicotomia entre behaviorismo e cartesianismo. Isto, pelo fato de termos outra possibilidade de tratar nossa linguagem quando nos referimos ao mundo interior. Segundo a Filosofia da Psicologia, de Ludwig Wittgenstein, o comportamento é uma expressão do mundo interior, isto é, o mundo interior se expressa através do comportamento, ainda que a este não se reduza. A partir de tal ideia, Wittgenstein propõe que a relação entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior não podem ser compreendidas de maneira isolada de nosso comportamento. Juntemos a isto que tão somente o nosso comportamento não é critério para compreensão do mundo interior Portanto, há necessidade, de que o comportamento seja considerado dentro de um jogo de linguagem específico, que consiste no uso de nossos conceitos do vocabulário psicológico.

No description available.

This thesis provides a fresh investigation of a collection of Roman imperial biographies conventionally known as the 'Historia Augusta'. The thesis supports the authenticity of the texts included in this corpus, in particular the claims they make about their dates, authorship, and scope, through philological, literary, prosopographical, and historical arguments. It shows that this corpus of texts, if the main conclusions are accepted, potentially improves our understanding of the tetrarchic-Constantinian era. It also explores the wider implications for the historiography of the fourth century; the transmission and formation of multi-author corpora in antiquity and the middle ages. It also suggests that the canon of Latin imperial biographies be widened. The thesis has two parts. Part I explores the actual state of the corpus, its textual transmission, and relation to other texts. It shows that the ancient and medieval paratexts presented the corpus as a collection of imperial biographies. The paratexts are compatible with the authorial statements in the main text. It then explores the corpus' medieval transmission, and the interest medieval scholars had in such texts. This part suggests that the corpus’s current state explains well the inconsistencies found in it. Finally, it shows that words and phrases, once thought peculiar to the corpus and the holy grail of the forgery argument, are intertextual links to earlier texts. Part II explores chronological statements and historical episodes relevant to the Diocletianic-Constantinan period. It establishes the actual dates of each author, and suggests that the confusion found in these biographies is similar to that of other contemporaries. The few apostrophes are shown to be authentic, and the historical and prosopographical passages are shown to represent, and improve our understanding of, the zeitgeist and history of the period. The final conclusion weaves the various arguments together, and emphasises the authenticity and significance of the corpus' texts. It suggests separating the composition of the texts from the disinterested formation of the corpus as a whole, as part of a new hypothesis and further lines of enquiry.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Victoria University (Melbourne, Vic.), 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.