Biodiversity is a concept that plays a key role in both scientific theories such as the species-area law and conservation politics. Currently, however, little agreement exists on how biodiversity should be defined, let alone measured. This has led to suggestions that biodiversity is not a metaphysically robust concept, with major implications for its usefulness in formulating scientific theories and making conservation decisions. A general discussion of biodiversity is presented, highlighting its application both in scientific and conservation contexts, its relationship with environmental ethics, and existing approaches to its measurement. To overcome the limitations of existing biodiversity concepts, a new concept of biocomplexity is proposed. This concept equates the biodiversity of any biological system with its effective complexity. Biocomplexity is shown to be the only feasible measure of biodiversity that captures the essential features desired of a general biodiversity concept. In particular, it is a well-defined, measurable and strongly intrinsic property of any biological system. Finally, the practical application of biocomplexity is discussed.

This dissertation seeks to examine the essential nature of time--both the concept in physics, biology, and philosophy, and the phenomenon in life and culture--with the ultimate goal of deepening our understanding of the empirical manifestation of time in human mental experience. It thus engages with both philosophy and with empirical science, natural as well as humanistic, in the paradigms of history, social theory, fundamental (or philosophical) anthropology, as well as with human neuroscience. The central argument is that while time is not an empirical phenomenon in physics - time itself is not an absolute quality of matter - one can make a certain argument for the real existence of time in biology, and still a different argument for a unique, linear phenomenon of time that derives from the specific human, cultural, experience. To make these arguments the dissertation devotes attention to the analysis of both the concept of time and the empirical phenomenon to which it refers successively in physics, biology, philosophy and history/sociology. Arriving at the conclusion that the linear concept of time (the causally significant relationship between the past, present and future) reflects a phenomenon that is uniquely human and suggests the ways in which this experience is necessarily reflected in the brain. / 2022-02-26T00:00:00Z

In this dissertation I criticize and reconfigure the ontological framework within which discussions of the organization, ontogeny, and evolution of organic form have often been conducted. Explanations of organismal form are frequently given in terms of a force or essence that exists prior to the organism’s life in the world. Traits of organisms are products of the selective environment and the unbroken linear inheritance of genetically coded developmental programs. Homological traits share unbroken vertical inheritance from a single common ancestor. Species are the product of exclusive gene flow between conspecifics and vertical genetic inheritance. And likewise, race is ascribed on the basis of pre-existing essential features. In place of this underlying preformationism which locates the source of form either in the informational program of inherited genes or within a selecting environment, I suggest form is the product of an organism’s self-construction using diverse resources. This can be understood as a modification of Kant’s view of organisms as self-organizing, set out in his Critique of Judgment (1790). Recast from this perspective the meaning and reference of “trait,” “homology,” “species,” and “race” change. Firstly, a trait may be the product of the organism’s self-construction utilizing multiple ancestral resources. Given this, homologous traits may correspond in some but not all of their features or may share some but not all of their ancestral sources. Homology may be partial. Species may acquire epigenetic, cellular, behavioural, and ecological resources both vertically and horizontally. As such, they are best conceived of as recurrent successions of self-constructed and reconstructed life cycles of organisms sharing similar resources, a similar habitus, similar capacities for sustaining themselves, and repeated generative processes. Lastly, race identity is not preformed but within the control of human organisms as agents who self-construct, interpret, and ascribe their own race identities utilizing diverse sets of dynamic relationships, lived experiences, and histories.

Le concept de gène est central en biologie. Certains ont avancé (Ruse (1971, 1976)) que la génétique classique pouvait être réduite à la génétique moléculaire. Dans le même ordre d'idée, Richard Dawkins, dans The Extended Phenotype, offre une double définition de son concept de gène qui présuppose qu'il soit possible d'opérer cette réduction. Nous comptons montrer que la génétique moléculaire et la génétique des populations ont chacune leurs problématiques propres en reconstituant l'histoire de la génétique depuis Darwin. Ensuite, nous expliciterons la position de Dawkins et soulignerons les contradictions auxquelles il parvient en raison de cette réduction infondée. À la suite de quoi, nous nous attarderons aux nouvelles découvertes moléculaires qui montrent qu'il n'est pas possible d'opérer la réduction d'un des concepts à l'autre. Nous terminerons en soulignant que la thèse génocentriste de Dawkins n'est pas mise en péril par l'abandon de la réduction, mais qu'il est nécessaire de tempérer ces prétentions. La conclusion globale de ce mémoire est qu'il est possible d'admettre le concept de Dawkins, mais pas la manière dont il l'utilise. Le concept est bon, il n'est tout simplement pas dans le bon cadre théorique. / The concept of gene is of great importance in biology. Some philosophers asserted (Ruse (1971, 1976)) that classical genetics can be reduce to molecular genetics. Similarly, in The Extended Phenotype, the definition of the gene Richard Dawkins is giving presupposes such a reduction. By reconstituting the history of genetics since Darwin, we will show that population genetics and molecular genetics are interested in problems of their own. Then, we will explain Dawkins' position and stress contradictions which follow from that illegitimate reduction. Afterward, we'll show that new molecular researches refute the possibility of reducing the concept of population genetics to a concept of molecular genetics. One of our conclusion is that the gene's eye view has not to be dropped out. It is only necessary to temper these claims. The most important conclusion of this memoire is that the concept Dawkins is using is legitimate, but not the way he is using it. The concept does not fit in Dawkins' conceptual framework.

Considerando explicações sobre o fenômeno polinização a partir de narrativas biológicas, este estudo foi norteado pela seguinte pergunta: até que ponto alguns termos, aparentemente finalistas, podem ser usados em textos científicos sem que ocorra um prejuízo no entendimento de questões ontogenéticas e filogenéticas? Diante esta questão, os objetivos desta pesquisa foram: i) apresentar uma discussão sobre as explicações funcionais na biologia, especificamente em relação ao fenômeno polinização e ii) contribuir para reflexões epistemológicas no ensino de Biologia. Foram selecionados dois filósofos para definições e análises sobre linguagens funcionais, Larry Wright e Robert Cummins. Para análise dos textos científicos sobre o fenômeno polinização, foi realizado o recorte de dois momentos históricos, um do século XVIII, quando se iniciou os estudos sobre polinização, e outro do século XIX, quando a teoria da evolução estava em discussão. As duas interpretações filosóficas defendem, embora de uma maneira distinta, a existência de uma ideia explanatória do conceito de função para a biologia. A concepção de Larry Wright (1973) sustenta que a função explica por que algo existe e a de Robert Cummins (1975) considera que o poder explicativo da função está na avaliação de sua contribuição para o sistema do qual faz parte, não sendo relevante para sua compreensão a informação sobre sua origem evolutiva. As duas obras científicas primárias selecionadas para análises, de Christian Sprengel (1750-1816) e Charles Darwin (1809-1882), apresentaram alguns termos aparentemente finalistas, ou seja, com conotação de caráter teleológico. A análise dos dados permite dizer que a questão sobre função na biologia é bastante inquietante. Tanto a ciência quanto a filosofia estão em processos de desvelar quais as melhores formas de tratamento de termos finalistas que satisfaçam os problemas de seu uso sem que ocorra um prejuízo no entendimento das questões evolutivas do fenômeno estudado. Este estudo sugere uma redução do uso de termos teleológicos em textos científicos, uma vez que há diferentes visões sobre este conceito, o que pode gerar interpretações incorretas. Além disso, as implicações deste estudo para a Didática da Biologia são apresentadas por meio de inserções filosóficas-epistemológicas em aulas de Biologia com o intuito de permitir o desenvolvimento dos conteúdos biológicos de forma mais reflexiva e contextualizada. / Considering explanations about the phenomenon of pollination from biological narratives, this study was guided by the question: at what extent some terms, supposedly finalists, can be used in scientific texts without losses of ontogenetic and phylogenetic meaning? Therefore, the objectives of this research were: i) to present a discussion around functional explanations in biology, specifically in relation to the phenomenon of pollination; and ii) to contribute to epistemological reflections in Biology education. Two philosophers were selected for definitions and analysis of functional languages, Larry Wright and Robert Cummins. To the analysis of the scientific texts about the phenomenon of pollination, two historical moments were framed, one from the XVIII century, when the studies of pollination started, and another from the XIX century, when the theory of evolution was under discussion. Both philosophical interpretations defend, though in distinct ways, the existence of an explanatory idea of the concept of function to biology. Larry Wrights (1973) conception of function is that it explains why something exists, while Robert Cummins (1975) considers that the explicatory power of the function lies in the evaluation of its contribution to the system it belongs, but the information of its evolution history is not relevant to comprehend the function. Both primary scientific works selected for analysis, from Christian Sprengel (1750-1816) and Charles Darwin (1809-1882), presented some terms apparently finalists, which means, with teleological connotative character. The data analysis allowed saying that the inquiry about function in biology is quite intriguing. Science and philosophy are in process of unveiling the best approaches to finalist terms that would satisfy their usage problems without comprehension losses of the evolutive processes of the studied phenomenon. This study suggests a reduction of the use of teleological terms in scientific texts, since there are different analyses about the concept that may lead to misinterpretation. Moreover, the implications of this study to the Didactics of Biology are presented by means of philosophycal-epistemological inserts in Biology classes in order to enable the development of the biological contents in a more flexible and contextualized way.

This dissertation proposes an exploration of a variety of themes in philosophy of science through the lens of a case study in evolutionary biology. It draws from a careful analysis and comparison of the hypotheses from Bill Martin and Tom Cavalier-Smith. These two scientists produced contrasted and competing accounts for one of the main events in the history of life, the origin of eukaryotic cells. This case study feeds four main philosophical themes around which this dissertation is articulated. (1) Theorizing: What kind of theory are hypotheses about unique events in the past? (2) Representation: How do hypotheses about the past represent their target? (3) Evidential claims: What kind of evidence is employed and how do they constrain these hypotheses? (4) Pluralism: What are the benefits and the risks associated with the coexistence of rival hypotheses? This work both seeks to rearticulate traditional debates in philosophy of science in the light of a lesser-known case of scientific practice and to enrich the catalogue of existing case studies in the philosophy of historical sciences.

No description available.

Le concept de plasticité est progressivement devenu un concept théorique essentiel dans la biologie depuis le début du XXe siècle. Les biologistes s'y réfèrent aussi bien en biologie du développement, pour caractériser la potentialité des cellules à se diviser et à se différencier, en écologie, pour décrire la pluralité des formes observables pour une espèce donnée en fonction des environnements dans lesquels elle se développe, ou encore en génétique, pour préciser la manière dont l'information génétique peut être régulée. Certains auteurs en sont même venus à se demander si le concept de plasticité n'avait pas acquis aujourd'hui l'importance théorique qui avait été accordée au concept de gène en biologie au début du siècle précédent. Dans cette étude, nous proposons une analyse historique et épistémologique du concept de plasticité dans les sciences du vivant. Nous montrons que si le concept opératoire de plasticité sert à caractériser un paradigme épistémique donné - c'est-à-dire le maintien d'un usage singulier, désormais daté, du concept, fortement lié à l'émergence de la génétique -, la récurrence de l'idée générale de plasticité, tout au long de l'histoire des sciences du vivant, signale son caractère essentiel pour envisager certains phénomènes du vivant. Cette étude montre également que si le concept de plasticité est devenu un élément-clé pour penser une « synthèse étendue» de l'évolution, son importance heuristique pour la biologie contemporaine ne se limite pas à cette seule ambition: tel qu'il est mobilisé dans la biologie contemporaine, le concept de plasticité cherche le plus souvent à rendre compte d'une spécificité du vivant. / Since the early twentieth century, plasticity has gradually become an important theoretical concept in biology. Biologists refer to it either in developmental biology, to characterize cells potential to divide and differentiate, or in ecology to describe the diversity of observable forms for a given trait in environments in which the species develop, or even in genetics to describe how genetic information can be regulated. Some authors have even come to wonder whether the concept of plasticity have not nowadays acquired the theoretical importance that was given to the concept of the gene in biology at the beginning of the previous century. In this study, we propose a historical and epistemological analysis of plasticity in life sciences. We show that if the operating concept of plasticity characterizes a given epistemic paradigm - that is to say, the continuity of a certain use, now dated, of the concept, closely linked to the emergence of genetics - the recurrence of the general idea of plasticity, throughout the history of life sciences, indicates its essential role in the way we think of life processes. The study also shows that although plasticity has become a key element in order to think about an "Extended Eynthesis" in evolution, its heuristic importance for contemporary biology is not limited to this single ambition: as it is mobilized in contemporary biology, the concept of plasticity most often seeks to account for the specificity of living systems.

A hereditariedade e a variação biológica são centrais para a evolução biológica. Apesar das diferentes abordagens sobre esse tema, sempre se mostra recorrente no discurso de cientistas, filósofos, historiadores e sociólogos da ciência a problematização do genecentrismo. Desse modo, uma questão relevante é entender o lugar do genecentrismo no pensamento evolutivo - é preciso perguntar como e por que esse tema tem sido problematizado de uma determinada maneira. Essa dissertação tem como objetivo principal, portanto, procurar as condições históricas que possibilitaram a organização do genecentrismo no pensamento evolutivo. A principal ideia defendida nesse estudo é de que a constituição do genecentrismo, e seu lugar central na teoria evolutiva, foram possibilitados pela emergência da racionalidade genética e pela construção de uma identidade genética intrínseca no início do século XX. A partir de evidências históricas, defendo também que a emergência da racionalidade genética permitiu enunciar muitas proposições novas, formando saberes e produzindo discursos, como a demonstração da seleção natural e uma síntese teórica da evolução biológica. Mas também a partir dela se operou “constrições” no conhecimento evolutivo, como a exclusão da Embriologia e a diminuição da importância de fatores ontogenéticos e ambientais. / Heredity and variation are central focus of evolutionary studies. Despite the different approaches to heredity and evolution, the gene-centered version of evolution is a central theme in the discourse of philosophers, historians and sociologists of science. Thereby, my aim here is to understand the place of gene-centered view in the evolutionary thought and to trace the historical conditions of possibility which set up this discourse. The main idea of this dissertation is that the origin of gene-centered view of evolution was made possible by the emergence of genetic rationality and the creation of ‘genetic identity’ at the turn of the twentieth century. Historical evidence is presented to support that the emergence of genetic rationality allowed new propositions to be made, forming knowledge and producing discourse in the evolutionary theory, as the demonstration of natural selection and a theoretical synthesis. But also from the genetic rationality there are effects of “evolutionary constriction", as the exclusion of Embryology from the Evolutionary Synthesis and the decrease importance of ontogenetic and environmental factors.

A hereditariedade e a variação biológica são centrais para a evolução biológica. Apesar das diferentes abordagens sobre esse tema, sempre se mostra recorrente no discurso de cientistas, filósofos, historiadores e sociólogos da ciência a problematização do genecentrismo. Desse modo, uma questão relevante é entender o lugar do genecentrismo no pensamento evolutivo - é preciso perguntar como e por que esse tema tem sido problematizado de uma determinada maneira. Essa dissertação tem como objetivo principal, portanto, procurar as condições históricas que possibilitaram a organização do genecentrismo no pensamento evolutivo. A principal ideia defendida nesse estudo é de que a constituição do genecentrismo, e seu lugar central na teoria evolutiva, foram possibilitados pela emergência da racionalidade genética e pela construção de uma identidade genética intrínseca no início do século XX. A partir de evidências históricas, defendo também que a emergência da racionalidade genética permitiu enunciar muitas proposições novas, formando saberes e produzindo discursos, como a demonstração da seleção natural e uma síntese teórica da evolução biológica. Mas também a partir dela se operou “constrições” no conhecimento evolutivo, como a exclusão da Embriologia e a diminuição da importância de fatores ontogenéticos e ambientais. / Heredity and variation are central focus of evolutionary studies. Despite the different approaches to heredity and evolution, the gene-centered version of evolution is a central theme in the discourse of philosophers, historians and sociologists of science. Thereby, my aim here is to understand the place of gene-centered view in the evolutionary thought and to trace the historical conditions of possibility which set up this discourse. The main idea of this dissertation is that the origin of gene-centered view of evolution was made possible by the emergence of genetic rationality and the creation of ‘genetic identity’ at the turn of the twentieth century. Historical evidence is presented to support that the emergence of genetic rationality allowed new propositions to be made, forming knowledge and producing discourse in the evolutionary theory, as the demonstration of natural selection and a theoretical synthesis. But also from the genetic rationality there are effects of “evolutionary constriction", as the exclusion of Embryology from the Evolutionary Synthesis and the decrease importance of ontogenetic and environmental factors.