Cette étude se penche sur les doctrines du droit parlementaire entendues comme les discours à prétention savante relatifs au droit des assemblées parlementaires. Elle s’attache à retracer l’apparition et l’évolution de ces discours en France et distingue trois groupes doctrinaux en fonction de la conception des rapports entre Droit et politique sur laquelle ils se fondent. Les trois parties de la thèse sont ainsi respectivement consacrées à chacun de ces groupes : la doctrine politique des « professeurs-parlementaires », la doctrine technique des « professeurs-administrateurs » et enfin à la doctrine juridique des « professeurs-universitaires ». La pertinence de cette typologie est éprouvée au regard de la notion de constitutionnalisation qui apparait particulièrement polysémique et dont l’application au droit parlementaire contemporain suscite des difficultés conceptuelles. Celles-ci s’expliquent notamment par le fait que chaque groupe doctrinal tend à développer une conception de la constitutionnalisation qui lui est propre en fonction de la théorie du Droit politique qu’elle adopte. La doctrine politique s’attache à une constitutionnalisation de conservation du droit parlementaire, la doctrine technique promeut une constitutionnalisation d’optimisation du droit parlementaire tandis que la doctrine juridique se rallie à une constitutionnalisation de subordination du droit parlementaire. / This study examines the doctrines of parliamentary law understood as scholarly speeches relating to the rules of parliamentary assemblies. It attempts to trace the appearance and evolution of these discourses in France and distinguishes three doctrinal groups according to the conception of the relations between Law and politics on which they are based. The three parts of the thesis are respectively devoted to each of these groups: the political doctrine of "parliamentary professors", the technical doctrine of "professors-administrators" and finally the legal doctrine of "university professors". The relevance of this typology is tested with regards to the notion of constitutionalization, which appears to be particularly polysemic and whose application to contemporary parliamentary law raises conceptual difficulties. These are explained in particular by the fact that each doctrinal group tends to develop its own conception of the notion of constitutionalization, according to the theory of the political right it adopts. The political doctrine focuses on a constitutionalization of the conservation of parliamentary law, the technical doctrine promotes a constitutionalization of optimization of parliamentary law while the legal doctrine is associated with a constitutionalization of subordination of parliamentary law.

A presente dissertação tem por objeto de estudo o instituto da cassação de mandato por quebra de decoro, conforme previsto no art. 55, II, da Constituição da República de 1988, que determina que perca o mandato o deputado ou senador cujo procedimento for declarado incompatível com o decoro parlamentar. Trata-se de um estudo no qual analisamos diversos aspectos jurídicos relevantes do instituto, entre esses podemos destacar a definição mínima do que podemos entender por comportamento ofensivo ao decoro parlamentar, a natureza jurídica dos processos de cassação, os limites do exercício dessa competência pelas Casas do Congresso Nacional, as regras específicas previstas nos regimentos internos, bem como os limites do controle exercido pelo Poder Judiciário. Muitas das análises elaboradas são polêmicas e de difícil solução e envolvem temas candentes, não só do ponto de vista jurídico, mas também político, já que a cassação de mandato por quebra de decoro diz respeito a uma forma de perda antecipada do mandato representativo, implicando num fenômeno que resvala em todo o sistema democrático. / This dissertation is a study about the expel proceding a parliament member in case of offense to decorum according to art. 55 II of Republic Constitution of 1988, which states that lose the mandate the deputy or the senator who proceed in disorderly behavior with parliamentary decorum. We analyze various legal issues relevant to the institute, among these we can highlight the minimal definition of what we can call as an incompatible behavior with parliamentary decorum, the juridical nature of the legislative process of expulsion, limits for that jurisdiction by the Congress, the special rules of the Congress internal regulations and the limits of control exercised by the Judiciary. Many elaborated analysis are controversial and difficult to solve, involving political and legal questions, since the expel by an incompatible behavior with parliamentary decorum is a way to lose beforehand the representative mandate, implying a phenomenon that echoes in all the democratic system.

A presente dissertação tem por objeto de estudo o instituto da cassação de mandato por quebra de decoro, conforme previsto no art. 55, II, da Constituição da República de 1988, que determina que perca o mandato o deputado ou senador cujo procedimento for declarado incompatível com o decoro parlamentar. Trata-se de um estudo no qual analisamos diversos aspectos jurídicos relevantes do instituto, entre esses podemos destacar a definição mínima do que podemos entender por comportamento ofensivo ao decoro parlamentar, a natureza jurídica dos processos de cassação, os limites do exercício dessa competência pelas Casas do Congresso Nacional, as regras específicas previstas nos regimentos internos, bem como os limites do controle exercido pelo Poder Judiciário. Muitas das análises elaboradas são polêmicas e de difícil solução e envolvem temas candentes, não só do ponto de vista jurídico, mas também político, já que a cassação de mandato por quebra de decoro diz respeito a uma forma de perda antecipada do mandato representativo, implicando num fenômeno que resvala em todo o sistema democrático. / This dissertation is a study about the expel proceding a parliament member in case of offense to decorum according to art. 55 II of Republic Constitution of 1988, which states that lose the mandate the deputy or the senator who proceed in disorderly behavior with parliamentary decorum. We analyze various legal issues relevant to the institute, among these we can highlight the minimal definition of what we can call as an incompatible behavior with parliamentary decorum, the juridical nature of the legislative process of expulsion, limits for that jurisdiction by the Congress, the special rules of the Congress internal regulations and the limits of control exercised by the Judiciary. Many elaborated analysis are controversial and difficult to solve, involving political and legal questions, since the expel by an incompatible behavior with parliamentary decorum is a way to lose beforehand the representative mandate, implying a phenomenon that echoes in all the democratic system.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jaqueline Fatima Roman.pdf: 737126 bytes, checksum: 08e98b205f6f03e2dc7ee17b8e74ff99 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-07-04 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work aims to investigate what are the legitimacy foundations of political law in the thoughts of Jean Jacques Rousseau. For the Geneva-born philosopher, the man is not a political being by nature, as politics is directly related to social life. Only in the social state it is possible to talk about such law. However, the present work starts with the study of the state of nature, and eventually it will approach the social state. This is justified by the fact that it is in this state that Rousseau, through the hypothetical natural man, builds the idea of what he considers to be a reference of human being. Leaning on the natural man, he finds arguments to differ artificial and natural features of man. The study of the state of nature is also important because in it there are feelings that will be necessary to form a society founded on the legitimate political law, as it is the case of love of oneself. This might be the starting point to understand the legitimacy foundation in Rousseau s political law. Starting from the study of the differences between the state of nature and the social state, it is possible to show why the pact between rich and poor, founded on the inequality, is considered illegitimate by Rousseau, and also reason about the necessary political foundations for the building of a legitimate civil pact. What are the necessary conditions for the man to live in society as free as before? In Rousseau s point of view, the man cannot renounce his freedom; otherwise he will lose his human condition, as each man has the same value as the others from his species, and therefore cannot dominate or obey others. Thus, a civil pact similar to the pact between rich and poor is completely illegitimate to Rousseau because it allows the domination of a man over another, denaturalizing him. The free man is the one that obeys only his own will. But how can we envisage life in society with the obedience of solely one s own will, that is, from what reference is it possible to found a legitimate pact and, consequently, Political Law? To solve this problem, our philosopher proposes a new civil pact, and in it the idea of popular sovereignty: people reunited in assembly are the only legitimate sovereign and apt to approve laws which they have to obey. These laws must be in accordance with the general will, which aims at the common well-being and the public utility. That way, each man votes according to his conscience, without any influences, and obeys only his own will, which is consequently reflected in the laws he has approved. Therefore, a man cannot relegate to a representative the power to approve laws, because the exercise of sovereignty is inalienable. This is the legitimate way that Rousseau found for the man to obey but not to serve. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo investigar quais são os fundamentos de legitimidade do direito político no pensamento de Jean Jacques Rousseau. Para o filósofo genebrino, o homem não é um ser político por natureza, tendo em vista que a política está diretamente relacionada com a vida social. Somente no estado social se pode falar em tal direito. No entanto, o presente trabalho inicia com o estudo do estado de natureza, para posteriormente, abordar o estado social. Tal fato se justifica, porque é nesse estado que Rousseau, através do homem no estado de natureza, constrói a ideia do que considera ser um referencial de ser humano. É debruçado sobre o homem no estado de natureza que ele encontra argumentos para diferenciar características artificiais e naturais do homem. O estudo do estado de natureza também é importante porque nele já existem sentimentos que serão necessários para a formação de uma sociedade fundamentada em um direito político legítimo, como é o caso do amor de si. Talvez seja esse o ponto de partida para a compreensão dos fundamentos de legitimidade do direito político em Rousseau. A partir do estudo das diferenças entre o estado natural e o estado social, é possível demonstrar porque o pacto dos ricos, fundamentado na desigualdade, é considerado ilegítimo para Rousseau, e ainda discorrer sobre os fundamentos políticos necessários para a construção de um pacto civil legítimo. Quais são as condições necessárias para que o homem se mantenha em sociedade tão livre quanto antes? Na visão de Rousseau, o homem não pode renunciar a sua liberdade, sob pena de perder a condição humana, porque cada homem possui o mesmo valor que os demais de sua espécie, e por isso não pode dominar ou obedecer. Assim, um pacto civil nos moldes do denominado pacto dos ricos é para Rousseau completamente ilegítimo, porque legaliza a dominação de um homem sobre o outro, desnaturando-o. O homem livre é aquele que obedece somente a sua própria vontade. Mas como equacionar a vida em sociedade com a obediência somente aos seus próprios desígnios, ou seja, a partir de que referência se torna possível fundamentar um pacto legítimo e, por conseqüência, o Direito Político? Para resolver esse problema, nosso filósofo propõe um novo pacto civil, e nele a ideia da soberania popular: o povo reunido em assembléia é o único soberano legítimo e apto para aprovar leis que tem de obedecer. Essas leis devem estar de acordo com a vontade geral, que sempre visa o bem comum e a utilidade pública. Assim, cada homem vota de acordo com sua consciência, sem influências, e obedece somente a sua própria vontade, que consequentemente esta refletida nas leis que aprova. Desta forma, o homem não pode delegar a um representante o poder de aprovar as leis, porque o exercício da soberania é inalienável. Essa é a forma legítima que Rousseau encontrou para o homem obedecer sem servir.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniela Kalil.pdf: 1708469 bytes, checksum: 351e62fde2a6802246162bf1c86afa06 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-28 / Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie / The preamble of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988, called Citizen Constitution states that representatives of the Brazilian people gathered in the National Constituent Assembly to institute a Democratic State. This democratic state founded on some fundamental principles constitutionally expressed, including, sovereignty and citizenship, which are prerequisites for citizens' political participation in public affairs. All these concepts are interrelated, complementing each other and constitute a set of principles, rights and duties, which provides the practical existence of democratic political order. The challenge of Brazilian society, as well as of other contemporary democratic societies, is to promote the improvement and accomplishment of popular participation in the State s life, which reveals a very complex task from the moment one understands that, first, it is imperative that become effective the rights and guarantees proclaimed in the Constitution. Aside from this need, it is essential, also, that people dispose of participatory mechanisms, which enjoy a truly legal and political framework that aims at the achievement, execution and result. In a country whose highest law prescribes that all power emanates from the people, who may exercise it in a direct form, popular participation is a prerequisite for the fulfillment of the purposes of a democratic State under law. The plebiscite comes as a fundamentally valuable tool for the achievement and consolidation of participatory democracy. / O preâmbulo da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, denominada Constituição Cidadã, declara que representantes do povo brasileiro reuniram-se em Assembléia Nacional Constituinte para instituir um Estado Democrático. Esse Estado Democrático de Direito alicerça-se em alguns princípios fundamentais constitucionalmente expressos, dentre eles, a soberania e a cidadania, que são pressupostos para a participação política dos cidadãos nos negócios públicos. Todos esses conceitos estão interligados, complementando-se mutuamente, e constituem um conjunto de princípios, direitos e deveres, que propicia a existência prática da ordem política democrática. O desafio da sociedade brasileira, assim como das demais sociedades democráticas contemporâneas, é promover o aprimoramento e a concretização da participação popular na vida do Estado, o que se revela tarefa de grande complexidade a partir do momento que se compreende que, antes, é imprescindível que se efetivem os direitos e garantias fundamentais previstos na Constituição. Afora essa necessidade, é essencial, ainda, que o povo disponha de mecanismos participativos, que usufruam de uma estrutura genuinamente legal e política que vise à sua aplicação, execução e resultado. Em um país cuja Lei Maior prescreve que todo o poder emana do povo, que poderá exercê-lo de forma direta, a participação popular é requisito para o cumprimento dos propósitos do Estado Democrático de Direito. O plebiscito surge como um instrumento fundamentalmente valioso para a realização e consolidação da democracia participativa.

C’est en 1758 que Rousseau constate qu’il ne peut achever rapidement les Institutions Politiques, et décide d’en séparer le Contrat social et Lettre à d’Alembert sur les spectacles. En 1761, Il finit de travailler sur une partie des textes de l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre qui lui permis d’avoir une approche claire avec les relations internationales. Ce texte dit extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de l’abbé de Saint-Pierre se veut une solution de sortie de crise politique dans laquelle les États européens s’étaient engouffrés. Les premières notions telles l’idée d’une citoyenneté européenne ou d’une confédération voyaient le jour. / It is in 1758 that Rousseau finds that he can quickly complete the Political Institutions, and decided to separate the Social Contract and Letter to d'Alembert on the shows. In 1761 he finished work on a part of the texts of the Abbot of St. Peter which allowed him to have a clear approach to international relations. This text says excerpt of perpetual peace project of the Abbot of Saint-Pierre wants a political crisis solution in which European states were engulfed. The first such concepts the ideas of European citizenship or a confederation were emerging.

Le modèle réformiste de la Constitution de l’Angleterre a intellectuellement dominé la France du XIXe siècle. Synthèse des aspirations françaises visant la stabilité politique, cette représentation mêle un historicisme de l’accomplissement libéral du gouvernement représentatif et une adhésion à la légitimation coutumière de l’innovation. Elle procède d’un jeu de projections contradictoires sur la Constitution anglaise. D’une part, les libéraux romantiques identifient dans ses institutions, les conditions propres à préserver l’individu des abus du pouvoir et à permettre le développement de la démocratie. D’autre part, les traditionalistes perçoivent dans la continuité historique de l’Angleterre, les bienfaits structurants de la hiérarchie sociale et de la liberté aristocratique. Plus particulièrement, les Doctrinaires décèlent, dans la morphologie civilisationnelle de l’Angleterre, une société déployant la liberté dans l’ordre. C’est dans le parlementarisme, produit historique de l’évolution institutionnelle anglaise, que la doctrine politique finit par identifier le régime politique susceptible de clore les tensions révolutionnaires françaises. Pensé comme une matrice libératrice des énergies individuelles et conservatrice de l’ordre politique et social, il dépossède le chef de l’Etat de son pouvoir personnel, dans la mesure où il le rend irresponsable. En outre, il consacre le règne de l’opinion publique par la prédominance de la chambre élective et par la reconnaissance de la responsabilité politique des ministres. Enfin, il encadre l’action politique par les usages historiques hérités de la monarchie représentative. Fondé sur un projet politique, le parlementarisme français donne corps à une philosophie prudentielle du droit constitutionnel. Celle-ci conçoit la constitution comme un cadre institutionnel au sein duquel l’agir politique doit pouvoir adapter la société à son stade de développement historique. Le laconisme des Lois constitutionnelles de la Troisième République témoigne de l’enracinement de ce réformisme constitutionnel. Plus qu’un compromis politique de circonstances, il cristallise en effet une politique constitutionnelle libérale et conservatrice. Ce travail entend montrer qu’elle résulte de la modélisation française de la Constitution anglaise au XIXe siècle. / The reformist model of the English Constitution was intellectually predominant in nineteenth century France. As a synthesis of French yearnings for political stability, this representation historicises the liberal achievement of representative government and endorses the legitimacy of innovation through custom. It results from contradictory visualisations of the English Constitution. On the one hand, romantic liberals identify in its institutions the necessary elements to protect individuals from abuses of power and to allow the development of democracy. On the other hand, traditionalists perceive in England’s historical continuity the structuring benefits of social hierarchy and aristocratic freedom. More particularly, French Doctrinaires see through the morphology of the English civilization a society that secures freedom within order. French thinkers recognise in parliamentarism, as a product of England’s institutional evolution, the political regime capable of putting an end to French revolutionary tensions. As a mould that both liberates the energies of individuals and protects the political and social order, it renders the Head of State irresponsible and thus strips him of personal powers. Furthermore, it establishes the reign of public opinion through the superiority of the elected chamber and the recognition of government responsibility. Finally, it disciplines political action through the historical practices inherited from representative monarchy. Based on a political project, parliamentary government in France gives substance to a prudential philosophy of constitutional law. This philosophy views the constitution as an institutional framework within which political action must be able to adapt society to its historical phase of development. The laconism of the constitutional laws of the Third Republic reflects this constitutional reformism. Rather than a circumstantial political compromise, it crystallizes a liberal and conservative constitutional policy. The present study aims to show that it is the result of how the English Constitution has been modeled in France during the nineteenth century.