Este trabalho tem por objetivo promover um estudo sobre a vida e obra política de Júlio de Castilhos, político do Rio Grande do Sul que nos primórdios da República, entre 1895 e 1898, governou aquele Estado instituindo ali um regime republicano de base autoritária segundo os preceitos da doutrina do Positivismo formulada pelo pensador francês Augusto Comte, mas que naquele momento colocava-se em aberta oposição à tradição do pensamento brasileiro fundado no ideário liberal. Uma trajetória política ainda mais significativa, pois presta-se ao estudo inicial da questão que dá sentido maior aos nossos estudos e que vem a ser as bases do autoritarismo brasileiro inscrito na História do país por dois episódios de governos autoritários em 1937 e 1964. Os governos estes que apresentam identificação com o projeto político de Júlio de Castilhos. / This paper aims to promote a study of the life and political work policy of Júlio de Castilhos, a politic from Rio Grande do Sul who, in the early days of the republic, between 1895 and 1898, ruled that state there instituting a regime Republican authoritative basis according to the precepts the doctrine of positivism formulated by the french philosopher Auguste Comte, but that moment was placed in open opposition to the Brazilian tradition of thought founded on liberal ideals. A political career even more significant as it lends itself to the initial study of the question that gives greater meaning to our studies and that becomes the basis of the Brazilian authoritarianism inscribed in the history of the country for two episodes of authoritarian governments in 1937 and 1964. These governments that have identification with the political project of Júlio de Castilhos.

Submitted by Cássia Santos (cassia.bcufg@gmail.com) on 2014-09-08T13:42:22Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertacao Mohana R Barbosa.pdf: 539532 bytes, checksum: 57beaeb1d45ba9a4985699e40a245922 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-09-08T13:42:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertacao Mohana R Barbosa.pdf: 539532 bytes, checksum: 57beaeb1d45ba9a4985699e40a245922 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This work aims to understand the definition given by Alexandre Koyré for the experimental science of the seventeenth century, exploring the importance of this concept within the historiography of science. Assuming that the opposition made by Koyré of Auguste Comte’s positivism, theoretical conception dominant in the history and philosophy of sciences in the first half of the twentieth century, engenders a new meaning for science and its course. In his work as a historian of science, developed primarily between 1930 and 1961, Koyré formulates precise concepts for various elements considered essential to the history and philosophy of sciences, such as: scientific revolution, experimentation, tools and instruments. I intend to demonstrate the intellectual trajectory and epistemological debates present in the formation of these concepts. / Este trabalho tem por objetivo compreender a definição atribuída por Alexandre Koyré à ciência experimental do século XVII, explorando a importância deste conceito no interior da historiografia das ciências. Entende-se que a oposição feita por Koyré ao positivismo de Auguste Comte, concepção teórica dominante na história e filosofia das ciências na primeira metade do século XX, engendra um novo significado para a ciência e seu curso. Em seus trabalhos como historiador das ciências, desenvolvido fundamentalmente entre 1930 e 1961, Koyré formula conceitos precisos para vários elementos considerados essenciais para a história e filosofia das ciências, tais como: revolução científica, experimentação, instrumentos e ferramentas. Procuro demonstrar a trajetória intelectual e os debates epistemológicos presentes na formação desses conceitos.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:48:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mauro Ferreira de Souza.pdf: 707171 bytes, checksum: c611eaae510b7d395b1a985d26725a36 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-25 / The purpose of this essay is to show that the Federal Constitution of 1891 consecrated a model of lay state, or else, unattached to any religious confessions. And that this model is very important to defending the fundamental human rights and of a Democratic Law State, plural and respecting diversity. The constitutional story of Brazil shows that it was not always like this, because until the Proclamation of the Republic, in 1889, and the new Constitution of 1891, people used to live in a Monarchic and Confessional State, which adopted the Catholic religion as official one. When the State wants to adopt a religion officially, even if it is of a group in its majority dominant and hegemonic, is inevitable their compromise with beliefs, moral principles, ideologies of a certain group comparing to others, making it difficult the accomplishment of respect towards minorities, towards human rights and the consolidation of a Law Democratic State. This essay intends to foment even more the secularist model of State while studying the Brazilian religious field from a historical process, political and ideological that led to the separation of the Catholic Church from the Brazilian State in the first Republican Constitution of 1891. The first chapter is contextual of the period in which the fact occurred, religious, political, ideological and juridical context and in the following chapter, the Church State relation as a relational substrate (century power and religious power). In the third chapter, the philosophical intellectual fundament that led to the divorce between the Church and the State, which did not occur in an unexpected or abrupt way, but passed through a historical process of great discussions in Brazil. At last, it is intended to contribute theoretically to broad discussions in the relations Church-State. / O objetivo deste trabalho é demonstrar que a Constituição Federal de 1891 consagrou um modelo de Estado laico, ou seja, desvinculado de quaisquer confissões religiosas. E que esse modelo é imprescindível para a defesa dos direitos humanos fundamentais e de um Estado Democrático de Direito, plural e respeitador da diversidade. A história constitucional do Brasil demonstra que nem sempre foi assim, pois até a proclamação da República, em 1889, e a nova Constituição de 1891, vivia-se num Estado Monárquico e Confessional, que adotava a religião Católica como Oficial. Ora quando o Estado resolve adotar uma religião oficialmente, ainda que seja a de um grupo majoritariamente dominante ou hegemônico, é inevitável o seu comprometimento com crenças, princípios morais, ideologias de um determinado grupo em detrimento de outros, tornando difícil a efetivação do respeito às minorias, aos direitos humanos e a consolidação de um Estado democrático de Direito. Este trabalho pretende fomentar ainda mais o modelo laicista de Estado ao estudar o campo religioso brasileiro a partir do processo histórico, político e ideológico em que culminou na separação da Igreja Católica Romana do Estado brasileiro na primeira Constituição Republicana de 1891. O primeiro Capítulo é contextual do período em que ocorreu o fato. Contexto religioso, político, ideológico e jurídico. No segundo capítulo, a relação Igreja- Estado como substrato relacional (poder secular e poder religioso). No terceiro capítulo, discorre sobre o fundamento intelectual-filosófico que culminou no divórcio da Igreja com o Estado, o qual não ocorreu de maneira inesperada ou abrupta, mas passou por um processo histórico de grandes discussões no Brasil. Por fim, pretende-se dar uma contribuição teórica nas amplas discussões das relações Igreja-Estado.

Thomas Hobbes é considerado o pai do conceito moderno de Estado. O núcleo de seu pensamento nasce do esforço de construir as bases da convivência a partir da demonstração dos fundamentos racionais da autoridade política. O liame entre o debate contemporâneo, polarizado entre interpretativistas e positivistas, e o pensamento moderno, simbolizado pelo pensamento hobbesiano, identifica-se com a seguinte pergunta: sob qual justificativa devemos obedecer os mandamentos da autoridade ainda que eles nos pareceram injustos? / Thomas Hobbes is considered the father of the modern concept of state. The core of his thinking arises from the effort to build the foundations of acquaintanceship from the demonstration of the rational foundation of political authority. The link between the contemporary debate which is polarized between positivists and interpretativists and the modern thought, which is symbolized by hobbesian thinking relates to the following question: \'Under which justification must we obey the commandments of the authority even if they seemed unfair to us ?

Le droit naturel a servi tout au long de la Troisième République d’outil épistémologique qui a permis de discuter le droit de manière rationnelle. La doctrine civiliste a fourni à cette époque de multiples séries des discours examinant les prises de position juridico-politiques dans le langage du droit naturel. L’intérêt d’écrire l’histoire d’un concept, celui du droit naturel, conçu le plus souvent comme éternel, universel et absolu, est non seulement de découvrir les mutations et les incohérences existant dans les discours portant sur ce concept mais aussi de constater ce que nous pouvons apprendre à propos des interactions entre l’histoire socio-politique, l’histoire juridique, et l’histoire doctrinale. Les usages de la notion démontrent à quel point ceux-ci varient selon les époques et selon les auteurs qui la mettent forme. L’idée du droit naturel implique l’existence d’un système juridique idéal et universel. Les législations nationales, considérées à la lumière du droit naturel, ne peuvent être que des créations arbitraires limitées par les frontières d’un État. Par conséquent, la recherche scientifique du droit ne devrait plus se borner à l’examen des textes législatifs. Les règles coutumières et jurisprudentielles sont devenues aussi la source du droit. Cette démarche, en réalité, a accordé à la doctrine le pouvoir de décider la source et l’interprétation du droit. Partant d’une telle observation, nous nous intéressons sur le rôle du droit naturel dans les discours des juristes face aux crises politiques, sociaux, mais aussi scientifiques. / If “natural law” is understood as a set of principles, legal or moral, that is eternal, immutable and universal, human understandings of this idea never cease to change in different time and location. These understandings, existing in form of discourse, enters into the interaction in context and circumstance. The dissertation examines the usages of natural law in the Third French Republic. It argues that French jurists use the idea of universal and ideal law as the response to socio-political issues: the establishment of republican regime and its anticlericalism, the rise of social sciences and social problems, and the construction of an international order after the WWI. Their responses, in turn, enrich the conceptions of natural law: metaphysically secular justifications of natural law are made by lawyers who are deeply catholic. This old idea is made compatible with social progress, and the universalism and idealism consisted in this idea are used to serve the patriotic cause.

No description available.

En retraçant la trajectoire de l’évolution du concept de SIEG vers la notion juridique de SIEG,notre recherche met l’accent sur l’évolution d’un concept juridique aux contours flous et à laportée incertaine, notamment pour les juristes français, dans sa perception initiale, vers unenotion juridique porteuse d’un idéal social ; le modèle social Union européen. Ainsi, cettethèse aboutit-elle, premièrement, à redessiner les contours de la notion de SIEG en prenant encompte sa capacité à faire peau neuve de la notion d’intérêt général, familière au droit publicfrançais, progressivement devenue « intérêt économique général — ou intérêt généraléconomique » dans le cadre strict du concept qui nous retient ; intérêt économique généraladossé par ailleurs aux idéologies et principes juridiques européens de la concurrence (article106-2 TFUE) et de régulation économique (article 106-3 TFUE) (Partie 1).En second lieu, la recherche explore ce que l’on pourrait dénommer les « vertus » du régimejuridique des SIEG longtemps passées sous silence par la doctrine : protections juridiquesofferte aux acteurs et consommateurs des prestations de SIEG et position axiologique dumodèle social Union européenne des SIEG consacrée par les articles 14 TFUE et le Protocolenuméro 26 sur les services d’intérêt général qui nous semble contenu dans la notion même deSIEG ou pour le moins en découler fonctionnellement (Partie 2). / Retracing the evolutionary trajectory of the Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI)concept concept to the legal notion of SGEI, my research focuses on the evolution of a legalconcept with uncertain outlines as initially perceived, particularly with reference to the Frenchpublic law theory, towards a juridical notion which carries a social ideal: the European Unionsocial model. The thesis thus leads, first, to the redrawing of the concept of SGEI taking intoaccount its ability to revamp the notion of general interest, a notion familiar to French publiclaw, gradually becoming "economic interest" generally or "general interest economicallyspeaking" within the strict framework of the principles of EU Law relating to competition(Article 106 (2) TFEU) and economic regulation (Article 106-3 TFEU) (Part 1).Secondly, my research explores what might be called the "virtues" of the legal regime ofSGEIs that have long been ignored by the doctrine: legal protection offered to actors andconsumers of SGEI services and the axiological position of the European Union social modelof SGEI enshrined in Articles 14 TFEU and Protocol 26 on services of general interest, whichseems to us contained in the concept of SGEI or at least functional (Part 2)

The object of this dissertation is to describe the opinions about the limits of natural science in their social and cultural context There exist two antagonistic positions to this matter restrictionism and expansionism. Restrictionism assumes that the natural sciences have no influence on metaphysics. Expansionism, on die other hand, argues that the natural sciences can legitimise the positions of beliefs and values. During the 1870b a restrictionist attitude on scientific knowledge established itself among influential German and British scientists. Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Rudolf Virchow, Hermann von Helmholtz and Thomas Henry Huxley were some of the famous scientists who rejected attempts to adduce science in religious and metaphysical matter. This restrictionism was rejected by other scientists and philosophers who believed that the modern natural sciences constituted a complete Weltanschauung, hostile to obsolete Christianity and philosophy. The thesis primarily deals with the debate on the limits of scientific knowledge in Sweden. We follow the development of the discussion from the 1870's to the years after the First World War. At the end of the 19th century Swedish scientists freed themselves from dominant natural philosophy and natural theology. Restrictionism was later on supported, in different ways, by recognized scientists, theologians, conservative critics, and philosophers. At the turn of the centuiy the restrictionist view of science was turned against metaphysical materialism, monism, naturalism, and an emergent, radical counter-culture. The controversies continued as long as the mechanical world picture dominated the natural sciences. With social and cultural changes, and the new physics of Rutherford, Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenberg, the debate slowly faded. / digitalisering@umu

La plupart des philosophes s’entendent aujourd’hui pour affirmer qu’il y a une crise de sens en Occident. J.-F. Mattéi l’a démontré sans équivoque dans son ouvrage intitulé La crise de sens (2006). Selon lui, la crise se traduirait par cinq aspects: crise spirituelle, crise religieuse, crise de l’art, crise économique et finalement, crise de la culture. À notre avis, cela est exact, mais incomplet, car Mattéi néglige d’évoquer la crise la plus importante : la crise écologique. L’argument qui nous amène à en postuler la plus haute importance est simple : s’il n’y a plus d’environnement favorable au maintien de la vie humaine, c’est la fin de l’humanité. L’aspect environnemental de la crise ne peut donc pas être occulté de la réflexion concernant son ensemble, car pour nous, elle est l’occasion d’un questionnement philosophique appelé à répondre à cette crise. Dans un livre intitulé Écologie, éthique et création (1994), Dominique Jacquemin nous oriente en ce sens en y posant les trois questions suivantes : 1. Est-il possible de qualifier éthiquement ce à quoi nous convie aujourd’hui la préoccupation écologique? 2. Quel rapport au monde et à l’avenir la préoccupation écologique est-elle à même d’instaurer? 3. Quelles sont les possibilités pour que la démarche écologique devienne un lieu éthique à même d’instaurer un rapport homme-nature dans le présent et l’avenir? Ainsi, le questionnement que soulève la crise écologique amène à réfléchir sur le sens et la finalité de la vie humaine et sur la conception même de l’être humain dans son rapport au monde. Le propos de ce mémoire est de répondre à ces dernières questions en nous inspirant des principes éthiques mis en avant dans Le Principe Responsabilité (1990) de Hans Jonas, et cela, dans le but d’en faire ressortir sa pertinence face au défi environnemental actuel. En d’autres termes, nous tâcherons de répondre à la question suivante : Pour la société actuelle et son prolongement, quels sont les aspects les plus pertinents de la thèse de Hans Jonas (1903 – 1993) dans son Principe Responsabilité (1990) concernant la résolution de la crise de sens? À cette fin, le mémoire comporte deux chapitres dont le premier, qui forme le cœur du mémoire, comporte trois parties principales liées aux trois questions posées précédemment. Le deuxième et dernier chapitre comporte premièrement une analyse critique du Principe responsabilité et par la suite son appréciation critique. Méthodologiquement, nous entendons éclairer la nécessité de la responsabilité éthique face à la crise écologique en mettant l’accent sur les thèmes de l’altérité et de la solidarité. C’est de cette manière que nous espérons montrer que la crise écologique actuelle ouvre des avenues possibles à la résolution, au moins partielle, de la crise de sens à laquelle nous sommes actuellement confrontés. / Most philosophers agree today that there is a crisis of meaning in the Western world. J.-F. Mattei, for example, in La crise de sens (2006), unequivocally demonstrates this. According to him, this crisis has five dimensions: spiritual, religious, artistic, economic, and finally, cultural. This is true in my view, although incomplete, because Mattéi does not address the most important crisis: the ecological crisis. The argument that leads me to postulate the utmost importance of this ecological crisis is simple: if the environment is no longer able to sustain human life, humans cease to exist. The environmental aspect of the crisis can thus not be subtracted from a reflection on the overall crisis since, in my view, it offers an opportunity for a philosophical questioning to address this crisis. In the book entitled Écologie, éthique et création (1994), Dominique Jacquemin orients us in this direction by raising the following three questions : 1. Is it possible to frame our ecological concerns in ethical terms? 2. How can ecological concerns affect our relationship with the world and with the future? 3. How can the present ecological reflection establish an ethically viable link between man and nature, both now and in the future? The questions raised by the environmental crisis thus lead us to think about the meaning and the finality of human life and also about the concept of human beings in their relationship to the world. The purpose of this memoir is to address these questions by finding inspiration in the ethical principles outlined in The Imperative of Responsibility (1979, English 1984) by Hans Jonas (1903 – 1993), in order to bring out their relevance for the current environmental challenge. In other words, I will answer the following question: In today's society and for the future, what are the most important aspects in Hans Jonas' book on “The Imperative of Responsibility” with regards to the resolution of the crisis of meaning? To accomplish this, the memoir is divided in two chapters. The first is the body of the memoir which contains three main parts related to the three questions raised above. The second and final chapter contains an initial critical analysis of The Imperative of Responsibility followed by an appreciation by Hans Jonas. Methodologically, I intend to shed light on the need for ethical responsibility in face of the ecological crisis by focusing on the themes of otherness and solidarity. In this way, I hope to show that the ecological crisis opens up possible avenues for the resolution, at least in part, of the crisis in meaning we are now facing.

In 1966, the High Court of Uganda legitimised the new nation's first coup d'etat. After two decades of civil war, Ugandans enacted their first popular constitution in 1995. However, the judiciary's dominant positivist ideology, Matovu's ghost, still haunts the new legal order. The author sets out this ideology's presumptions and then critiques them against an alternative, pluralist map of laws in Uganda. / The constructive analysis of recent case law (or lack thereof) that follows shows how this ideology undermines the constitution's promises of equality and freedom. This pluralist methodology is also essential to explain contemporary crises like the Lord's Resistance Army, arms proliferation in Karamoja and Museveni's "no-party" rule. In conclusion, exorcising Matovu's ghost is a priority for Ugandans and the process deserves considered thought for legal scholars advocating the "rule of law" or interventions by the International Criminal Court.