In line with the principle of local self-governance, Swedish municipalities have a high degree of discretion to manage the goals and execution of public management. However, in recent years, the national influence over local governments has increased, especially the use of targeted government grants. This shows a pattern of ambiguity as the state strive for national equality but the principle of local self-governance allows for local variation in the public welfare. Thus, this study is intended to provide insight into how Swedish municipalities under different conditions perceive and interpret the influence of the national government through economic instruments. In order to explore how the local governments perceive their degree of discretion to manage state grants, this study compares the implementation in four different municipalities of a targeted government grant denominated the “Elderly Care Boost”. By conducting interviews, this study shows that economic incentives make municipalities more susceptible to the national government’s investments and goals, but only if the municipalities view the grant as something supporting their own work. Furthermore, this study shows a paradox or dilemma as the municipalities view the clear instructions for the grant as favourable while, at the same time, these clear instructions also restrict the local government’s discretion. In addition, the study indicates that the municipalities use “framing” and thus attempt to reinterpret the governing of the national parliament as they deem favourable.

In international corruption indexes, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Sweden often ranks as one of the least corrupt countries in the World. Despite this, the country still experiences corruption scandals, particularly in local government. In the wake of a scandal, municipalities tend to react swiftly and initiate anti- corruption reforms. However, despite such actions, new scandals re-emerge. The purpose of the study is to analyze why the undertaken reforms are not always successful in preventing new scandals from happening. In order to do so, I focus on anti-corruption measures in two large Swedish municipalities that have repeatedly experienced corruption scandals, despite having taken action and putting anti-corruption measures in place: the cities of Norrkoping and Gothenburg. Interviews on the scandals and the anti-corruption reforms were conducted with officials and politicians, and empirical evidence has also been gathered from public documents and audit reports. The principal-agent theory and the ideal types of “value based” and “compliance based” approaches are the theoretical tools which are used to analyze the undertaken anti-corruption reforms. The results show that the reforms undertaken indeed have improved the integrity systems of the cities. However, the reoccurring scandals can best be explained by the fact that the reforms have not been properly incorporated properly in the administrations, which in some cases have resulted in an ignorance of the rules. Some scandals can also be explained by conscious criminal acts from the agents, acts that are difficult to guard oneself against no matter how well-designed the anti-corruption institutions are. The results hence show that it is hard to design institutions that obliterate the corruption that are undertaken on purpose by agents.

The study is based on a hypothetical deductive approach. The study applies a quantitative method. The material covers 3926 firm years between 2007–2019. The data studied is obtained from the ASSET4 database. Analysis of data has taken place in the statistics program IBM SPSS. The study is based in corporate governance where the balance between shareholders and stakeholders forms the basis together with the countries' legal origins, i.e. how the legal traditions of different countries affect firms' reporting. To analyze this, two parts are used, a period of voluntary reporting of ESG(2007-2016) and a period covering the regulatory framework implemented in the European Union where mandatory reporting (2017-2019) of non-financial information such as environment and social aspects were introduced for larger firms in 2017. Based on this, a comparison is made whether higher ESG reporting is achieved in the voluntary or mandatory environment.  The study finds evidence that higher ESG reporting is achieved in the mandatory reporting and that the countries' legal differences decrease during the mandatory reporting period. The results show that firms of Scandinavian legal origin have lower ESG reporting and that a concentrated ownership structure leads to a lower ESG reporting.

This dissertation contains three essays on the impact of other-regarding behavior on human decision-making. Chapter II uses experimental methods to analyze the relative performance of a variety of compensation contracts. This study creates an environment in which individuals are paid via common payment mechanisms employed in the dual-principal agent relationships (Piece Rate, Flat Rate, Salary, Bonus and Socialization) and examines the effect that different incentive structures have on agent behavior. In Chapter III I explore the potential outcomes of blended payment structures in a dual-principal agent environment. I draw from the previously conducted experimental study in Chapter II and simulate agent behavior induced by blended payment mechanisms. In Chapter IV, I move away from studying payment mechanisms to investigate the impact of intentionality and responsibility on an individual's decision-making process. I explore the effects of direct and indirect responsibility as well as selfish and kind intentions using experimental methodology. Each of these essays provides further evidence that other-regarding behavior has a significant impact on the outcome of an economic situation; therefore, emphasizing the need to address such behavior in theoretical designs. / Ph. D.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第23671号 / 経博第654号 / 新制||経||300(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)准教授 菊谷 達弥, 教授 関口 格, 准教授 安達 貴教 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

Bristen på familjehem och svårigheter med att rekrytera nya familjehem är idag ett aktuellt och omfattande problem. Familjehemsvården åsyftar att placera barn och unga som av olika skäl inte får sina behov tillgodosedda i sina biologiska hem. Socialtjänsten är ytterst ansvarig för handläggning och att säkerställa kvalitén på den familjehemsvård som bedrivs. Behovet av familjehem har ökat under de senaste åren medan socialtjänsten har svårt att rekrytera i samma takt, vilket i sin tur har lett till en ökad tillgång för privata företag att etablera sig på marknaden. Att samverka med privata aktörer i fråga om familjehemsvård har lett till utökat utbud av familjehem men även begränsad insyn i placeringar. Tidigare forskning väcker frågor om barnets bästa och socialsekreterarens roll i relation till den privatiserande marknaden som utvecklats samt den ökade efterfrågan av familjehem. Syftet med denna studie är därför att undersöka och jämföra socialtjänstens handläggning och socialsekreterares upplevelser i ärenden med kommunal respektive konsulentverksamhet inom familjehemsvården. Detta undersöks med en kvalitativ ansats, genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med tre socialsekreterare. Interpretativ fenomenologisk analys (IPA) har använts som analysmetod i studien där mönster och teman identifierats och analyserats vilket konstruerat resultaten för studien. Resultatet visade att handläggning för ärenden sker på samma sätt oavsett placeringsform men där förhållanden inom placeringar kan variera och påverka handläggningen. Vidare hur uppfattningarna om kvaliteten varierar.

Legislative oversight of the executive branch is a significant feature of the separation of powers, and takes on greater importance in a persistent era of divided political control in the United States federal government. Agency theory and oversight theory have served as principal lenses for the design and evaluation of congressional oversight functions. For the purpose of this study, oversight is politically-guided and technically-supported systematic foresight and review by First Branch members over Second Branch members and their activities in furtherance of public value and the protection of private liberties. The 1975-76 reformulation of the congressional oversight of federal intelligence activities offers a research opportunity to contrast the intelligence outcomes of a laissez-faire period of oversight (1947-1975) with a second period of active oversight (1976-2004). It also allows for the determination of whether more oversight (Johnson 1980; Zegart 2011) led to improved intelligence outcomes, and could serve as a case study in the more versus less foreign policy oversight scholarship debate (Olson 1989; Hinkley 1994; Scigliano 1994). The research is multi-faceted and employs mixed methods, primarily content analysis, comparisons of descriptive statistics, and Poisson regressions with time series autocorrelation corrections. The research contributes to our understanding of agency theory by attempting to evaluate several outcomes of an oversight design intervention: the Congress's transition from overseeing US intelligence activities via a few individuals in defense subcommittees to creating permanent standing select committees (with professional staff) in each chamber. The research provides public administration with new datasets focused on intelligence leaks and intelligence outcomes, specifically a record of intelligence failures and unavoided, uninitiated military conflicts involving the United States. It also provides a series of implications and recommendations for theory and praxis. / Ph. D.

Syftet: Syftet med studien är att undersöka operativa medarbetares upplevelse vid implementering av digitala verktyg. Dessutom identifiera potentiella utmaningar och eventuellt motstånd.  Metod: En kvalitativ forskningsansats med en induktiv ansats. Fem semistrukturerade intervjuer med anställda som arbetar inom offentlig förvaltning.  Resultat och slutsats: Studien visar att de operativa medarbetarna upplever fördelar vid implementering av digitala verktyg med positiv inställning. Däremot uppkommer det utmaningar som till exempel att det är tidskrävande att omvandla den traditionella arbetsmetoden till en mer digitaliserad arbetsmetod. En annan utmaning är att det kan finnas risk för kommunikationsbrist på grund av otydlig och otillräcklig kommunikation mellan medarbetarna och organisationen vilket leder till påverkan på medarbetarnas acceptans.  Examensarbetets bidrag: Denna studie kommer att bidra till en mer fördjupad förståelse av operativa medarbetares upplevelse vid implementering av digitala verktyg, vilket är viktigt att ta hänsyn till för att förstå dess påverkan på medarbetares vardag och välbefinnande. Genom att noggrant undersöka detta kan vi få en större bild på hur digital teknik kan påverka arbetsrutiner och effektivitet. Detta är avgörande för att förstå hur användbara och effektiva digitala lösningar kan stödja operativa medarbetarnas arbete snarare att försvåra.  Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Skapa en större kvalitativ datainsamling genom att inkludera större urval av respondenter och offentliga organisationer i Sverige samt andra länder. Skapa en kombination mellan kvalitativ och kvantitativ forskningsansats.

This paper introduces a novel methodology that integrates Machine Learning (ML), Operations Research (OR), and Game Theory (GT) to develop an interpretable heuristic for principal-agent models (PAM). We extract solution patterns from ensemble tree models trained on solved instances of a PAM. Using these patterns, we develop a hierarchical tree-based approach that forms an interpretable ML-based heuristic to solve the PAM. This method ensures the interpretability, feasibility, and generalizability of ML predictions for game-theoretic models. The predicted solutions from this ensemble model-based heuristic are consistently high quality and feasible, significantly reducing computational time compared to traditional optimization methods to solve PAM. Specifically, the computational results demonstrate the generalizability of the ensemble heuristic in varying problem sizes, achieving high prediction accuracy with optimality gaps between 1--2% and significant improvements in solution times. Our ensemble model-based heuristic, on average, requires only 4.5 out of the 9 input features to explain its predictions effectively for a particular application. Therefore, our ensemble heuristic enhances the interpretability of game-theoretic optimization solutions, simplifying explanations and making them accessible to those without expertise in ML or OR. Our methodology adds to the approaches for interpreting ML predictions while also improving numerical tractability of PAMs. Consequently, enhancing policy design and operational decisions, and advancing real-time decision support where understanding and justifying decisions is crucial. / Master of Science / This paper introduces a new method that combines Machine Learning (ML) with Operations Research (OR) to create a clear and understandable approach for solving a principal-agent model (PAM). We use patterns from a group of decision trees to form an ML-based strategy to predict solutions that greatly reduces the time to solve the problem compared to traditional optimization techniques. Our approach works well for different sizes of problems, maintaining high accuracy with very small differences in objective function value from the best possible solutions (1-2%). The solutions predicted are consistently high quality and practical, significantly reducing the time needed compared to traditional optimization methods. Remarkably, our heuristic typically uses only 4.5 out of 9 input features to explain its predictions, making it much simpler and more interpretable than other methods. The results show that our method is both efficient and effective, with faster solution times and better accuracy. Our method can make complex game-theoretic optimization solutions more understandable, even for those without expertise in ML or OR. By improving the interpretability making PAMs analytically explainable, our approach supports better policy design and operational decision-making, advancing real-time decision support where clarity and justification of decisions are essential.

Dans cette thèse, nous nous intéressons à des sujets différents en mathématiques financières, tous liés aux imperfections de marché et à la technique fondamentale de la maximisation d'utilité. Elle comporte trois parties. Dans la première, qui se base sur deux papiers, nous considérons le problème d'investissement optimal sur un marché financier avec coûts de transaction proportionnels. On commence par étudier le problème d'investissement dans le cas où la fonction d'utilité est multivariée (ce qui s'adapte particulièrement bien aux marchés des devises) et l'agent a une dotation initiale aléatoire, qui peut s'interpréter comme une option ou un autre contrat dérivé. Après avoir analysé les propriétés du problème et de son dual, nous utilisons ces résultats pour examiner, dans ce contexte, certains aspects d'une technique de pricing devenue populaire dans le cadre des marchés incomplets, l'évaluation par indifférence d'utilité. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous étudions le problème d'existence d'un ensemble de prix (appelés "prix fictifs" ou "shadow prices") qui offrirait la même utilité maximale à l'agent si le marché n'avait pas de frictions. Ces résultats sont utiles pour clarifier le lien entre la théorie classique des marchés sans frictions et la littérature en croissance rapide sur les coûts de transaction. Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, nous considérons le problème d'évaluation de produits dérivés par indifférence d'utilité dans des marchés incomplets, où la source d'incomplétude provient du fait que certains actifs ne peuvent pas être échangés sur le marché, ce qui est le cas par exemple dans le cadre des modèles structurels pour le prix de l'électricité. Sous certaines hypothèses, nous dérivons une caractérisation en terme d'équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades (EDSR) pour le prix, et nous nous concentrons ensuite sur les options européennes en établissant en particulier l'existence d'une stratégie de couverture optimale, même lorsque le payoff présente des discontinuités et est éventuellement non borné. Dans la dernière partie, nous analysons un simple problème de principal-agent à horizon fini, où le principal est essentiellement interprété comme un régulateur et l'agent comme une entreprise qui produit certaines émissions polluantes. Nous traitons séparément les problèmes du principal et de l'agent et nous utilisons la théorie des EDSR pour fournir des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes d'optimalité. Nous effectuons également des analyses de sensibilité et nous montrons des résultats numériques dans le but de fournir une meilleure compréhension du comportement des agents. / In this thesis we deal with different topics in financial mathematics, that are all related to market imperfections and to the fundamental technique of utility maximization. The work consists of three parts. In the first one, which is based on two papers, we consider the problem of optimal investment on a financial market with proportional transaction costs. We initially study the investment problem in the case where the utility function is multivariate (which is particularly suitable on currency markets) and the agent is endowed with a random claim, which can be interpreted as an option or another derivative contract. After analyzing the properties of the primal and dual problems, we apply those results to investigate, in this context, some aspects of a popular pricing technique in incomplete markets, i.e. utility indifference evaluation. In the second contribution to the transaction costs literature, we investigate the existence problem for a set of prices (called shadow prices) that would provide the same maximal utility to the agent if the market did not have frictions. These results shed some light on the link between the classical theory of frictionless markets and the quickly growing literature on transaction costs. In the second part of this thesis we consider the utility indifference pricing problem in incomplete markets, where the source of incompleteness comes from the fact that some assets in the market cannot be actively traded, which is the case for example in the framework of structural models for electricity prices. We provide a BSDE characterization for the price under mild assumptions, and then focus on the case of European claims by establishing in particular the existence of an optimal hedging strategy even when the claim presents discontinuities and is possibly unbounded. In the last contribution we analyze a simple principal-agent problem in finite time horizon, where the principal is mainly interpreted as a regulator and the agent as a firm producing some kind of polluting emissions. We separately treat both the agent's and the principal's problems and use the BSDE theory for providing necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. We also perform some sensitivity analyses and give numerical results in order to provide a better understanding of the agents' behavior.