In professional partnerships, partners have to agree how to split their income between each other. Such a profit sharing system (PSS) must be perceived as being fair and motivating to ensure the enduring success of the partnership. Surprisingly, quite different systems are in use today in otherwise comparable firms. The understanding of a “fair share” and how to motivate best varies con-siderably. Existing literature on professional service firms rarely discusses in which circumstances the different PSS types are adequate; non-economic per-spectives are scarce. Using semi-structured interviews with senior partners from large German law firms, this study evaluates their understanding of trust, fairness and motivation, and how that links to their respective PSS’s. It adds the otherwise missing peer-to-peer perspective to existing organisational research on fairness, trust and motivation. The findings include the presence of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation through money, but also through peer pressure. Different fairness ideals clearly link to PSS types. Mutual trust, based on knowing each other, is key in all but one PSS type. An important, but yet overlooked differentiator between PSS’s is whether profit distribution decisions are made based on algorithms or on human (committee) decisions. A new framework is developed that links the beliefs and values of the partners with the specific characteristics of the PSS, which are systematically assessed for the first time. This framework offers partners from law firms and potentially other professional service firms a methodical approach to identify and discuss their needs and to identify the most appropriate PSS for their specific situation.

In the present thesis we study with-profit policy in life insurance. First we intro- duce general information about profit sharing and basic terms. We shortly look at the life insurance legislation. In the main part of thesis we look at three me- thods of calculation profit sharing and thereafter own method will be suggested. In second part of thesis we describe cash-flow model of life insurance implemented in iWorks Prophet Software. All methods with various economic scenarios and with various parameters settings will be tested in this model. Finally we analyse results of projections, we compare cash-flow for important variables a we describe advantages and disadvantages for every method.

Nous nous proposons de modéliser différents types de mécanismes d'incitation salariale, de déterminer les conditions de leur mise en place et d'analyser leurs effets sur les efforts des salariés, la performance des firmes et le surplus collectif. Ces effets sont étudiés dans des cadres statique et dynamique. Les deux premiers chapitres (2 et 3) s'insèrent dans un cadre d'analyse statique. Dans les trois derniers chapitres (4, 5 et 6), nous intégrons une dimension temporelle dans l'analyse se passant dans un cadre dynamique. Dans le chapitre 2, nous analysons les déterminants de l'actionnariat salarié et évaluons son impact sur le bien être des différents agents économiques. Nous prouvons théoriquement et empiriquement, l'importance de considérer conjointement la désutilité à l'effort des salariés et la taille de l'entreprise pour expliquer l'actionnariat salarié. Nous montrons également que les entreprises assez larges vont distribuer à l'équilibre des parts de capital sous-optimales à leurs salariés. Nous comparons dans le chapitre 3, du point de vue des différents agents économiques, deux scénarios de partage du profit: un premier où la part de profit résulte d'une négociation et un second où cette part est fixée unilatéralement par les capitalistes. Nous montrons que les capitalistes peuvent préférer la négociation alors qu'il est possible pour les salariés de préférer une fixation unilatérale. Nous justifions également la nécessité d'une intervention de l'Etat, les intérêts des deux capitalistes et du planificateur social n'étant jamais convergents. / We aim at modeling various incentive mechanisms, determining the conditions of their implementation and analyzing their effects on employees’ efforts, the firm’s performance and the social welfare. These effects are studied in static and dynamic frameworks. The first two chapters (2 and 3) are parts of the static analysis. In the last three chapters (4, 5 and 6), we take into account a temporal dimension. In the chapter 2, we analyze the factors which determine the employee ownership implementation and estimate its impact on agents’ welfare. We prove the importance to consider jointly the effort disutility and size in the explanation of employee ownership implementation. We also show that large firms are going to distribute sub-optimal capital shares to their employees. We compare in the chapter 3, from the viewpoint of the various economic agents, two scenarios of profit sharing: the first one where the part of profit results from a negotiation and the second where this part is unilaterally fixed by capitalists. We show that those shareholders may prefer bargaining while it is possible for the employees to prefer a unilateral fixing of profit shares. We also justify the necessity of a regulator’s intervention as the interests of both capitalists and social planner never converge. The chapter 4 examines the optimal strategy of divesting actions by the large shareholder in an infinite horizon game where divesting shares allows an increase in the company’s value through its incentive effect on the managers’ efforts.

This research study is concerned with the effects and dynamics of 'integrated' schemes of employee participation, where workers are involved in both work-related decision-making, and also share in the profits of their employer. Prior research and the literature on employee participation has tended to concentrate on the process and effects of either financial participation in isolation, or of decision-making participation, but seldom on situations where both are employed simultaneously. Based on a thorough literature review, this study presents a 'Model of Integrated Employee Participation (incorporating moderating effects)'. The model explicates a process through which both types of worker involvement may operate together, leading to a set of behavioural and performance outcomes. Where the formal participation schemes are operationalised such that, combined, they lead to perceptions equivalent to 'psychological ownership', a substantial goal-congruence and integration of the employee with the organisation occurs. These processes lead, in turn, to influences on individual and organisational outcomes. Antecedent and moderating variables to the operation of such 'integrated' participation schemes are identified in the model. Specifically, the effects of the schemes are postulated to be moderated by employees' biographical and personality factors, by their perceptions of managerial commitment to employee participation, and by their perceptions of aspects of the organisation's managerial system of communication and control. The relevance and implications of the model to the South African gold-mining industry are discussed. Major pillars of this 'Model of Integrated Employee Participation (incorporating moderating effects)' were tested within a detailed investigation of the participation schemes in operation at a profitable South African gold-mining company. This investigation was longitudinal in nature, with two major surveys being performed over a ten-month period. The findings suggested that while the effects of the 'integrated' schemes on employees' job satisfaction, performance and stability were as anticipated, the proposed moderating effects were generally non-existent or insignificant. In order to obtain greater clarity of the dynamics of 'integrated' schemes of employee participation, a path analytic exploration of the interrelationships between the measured variables of the study was then undertaken. A detailed path model was developed and then tested, at three levels of the organisational hierarchy as well as on the entire workforce. The path model was substantially supported for the 'entire workforce', and for the largest stratum of the mine's employees, being the 'unskilled and semi-skilled' workers. Satisfaction with participation was found to be positively and significantly associated with perceived extent of participation. This applied to both the financial and decisional elements of the schemes. Job satisfaction and employee performance were also found to be positively associated with perceived extent of participation and / or satisfaction therewith. Employees' perceptions of managerial commitment to 'integrated participation' predicted their satisfaction therewith. Aspects of the organisation's system of managerial communication and control were found to significantly affect levels of job satisfaction and employee performance in the participative environment of the mine. The model was only partially supported, however, at the more senior levels of 'management' and 'supervisors and artisans'. It thus appeared that 'integrated participation' schemes may not enhance job satisfaction and performance at the higher levels of the organisational hierarchy, and that the schemes' effects may thus be moderated by employee seniority. The empirical findings were supportive of much of the literature on participation programmes. They were particularly consistent with 'affective' and 'contingency' explanatory models of the effects of -participation. The findings did not, however, support 'cognitive' explanatory models of the effects of participation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, 1995.

The aim of my thesis was to show the influence of legislative changes on the accounting of business corporations. Analyses were performed on actual legislative changes, which to the greatest extent related to the recodification of private law in the Czech Republic and their entry into force of law about and concerning commercial companies and collectives. These factors resulted in adjustments to several provisions of laws regarding accounting and related supplementary regulations. On the basis of these analysed legislative changes, case studies were subsequently developed for a specific business corporation, namely the company STAX Metal Fibers s.r.o. The individual parts of the case studies were developed according to the actual state of the business corporation, and these case studies may be used by the enterprise to enhance its business activities further. The suggestions were concentrated on the area of reserve funds created within the accounting entity, the introduction of common stock, the possibility of advance or down payment in proportion to share of profits and a proposal to use sanctions from outstanding claims. In the conclusion recommendations were made concerning legislation with a special focus on the ambiguity of some terms in different laws.

The present study focuses on the research and evaluation of a profit- and/or result-sharing plan (PRSP) applied during 7 years at the CERTHIL Company. Multi-variable and descriptive analyses were the methods used. The objective of the research was to propose a methodology that would facilitate the implantation and evaluation of future profit-sharing plans at other companies. It is classified as a quantitative study. A questionnaire (Likert scale) was given to directors and collaborators of CERTHIL and directors of the company CERMISSÕES, which intends to implant the PRSP. The evaluation of indicators by the multi-variable analysis allowed for the selection of an ideal group of variables for analysis. The factorial analysis enabled the identification of the degree of importance of each indicator analyzed, facilitating the study of those indicators that have greater and lesser influence in the plan. The analysis of the principal components allowed for the reduction and identification of variables of greater statistical relevance, that better explain the factors to be analyzed and identify those that will maintain greater management control. The methodology proposed proved to be important and highly applicable in the evaluation and implantation of Profit- and/or Result-Sharing plans. This method can be used as a tool to monitor performance indicators applied to the PRSP and contribute to business planning. / O presente estudo concentra-se em uma pesquisa e avaliação do plano de participação nos lucros e resultado PLR aplicado há 7 anos na CERTHIL. Utilizou-se os métodos de análise descritiva e multivariada. O objetivo da pesquisa é avaliar os critérios do PLR por meio dos indicadores de desempenho aplicado aos processos produtivos. Classifica-se como pesquisa quantitativa. Aplicou-se um questionário valendo-se de uma escala Likert onde foi aplicado junto aos gestores e colaboradores da CERTHIL e gestores da CERMISSÕES - que pretende implantar a PLR. A análise descritiva foi útil para fazer o comparativo do entendimento e opinião dos respondentes de ambas as cooperativas sobre a PLR, quanto a sua implantação, influência na qualidade, lucratividade, gestão administrativa, motivação, relacionamento e comprometimento. A avaliação dos indicadores, através da análise multivariada, possibilitou selecionar um grupo ideal de variáveis para análise. A análise fatorial proporcionou a identificação do grau de importância de cada indicador analisado, facilitando o acompanhamento dos indicadores que influenciam em maior e menor importância na composição do plano. A análise de componentes principais possibilita reduzir e identificar as variáveis de maior relevância estatística, que mais expliquem os fatores a serem analisados e identifiquem as que deve manter um maior controle gerencial. Os procedimentos multivariados confirmam sua importância e aplicabilidade na avaliação e implantação de planos de participação nos lucros e resultados nas empresas. Pode-se utilizar,esse método, como ferramenta para monitorar indicadores de desempenho aplicados a PLR e contribuir na gestão administrativa.

L'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension des enjeux de l'épargne salariale pour les politiques de rémunérations dans les entreprises en France. Une mise en perspective historique et théorique permet d'abord d'identifier les motivations conduisant les entreprises à développer un dispositif alliant l'intéressement et le PEE. Ensuite, nous explicitons à travers une modélisation théorique de type « Principal-Agent » les caractéristiques d'un contrat associant l'intéressement à un PEE. Les prédictions théoriques qui en découlent sont enfin validées par une étude empirique sur des données individuelles d'entreprises et de salariés. A partir d'une estimation par appariement sur le score de propension, les résultats révèlent que les entreprises qui intègrent à leurs politiques de rémunérations un dispositif alliant l'intéressement et le PEE versent en moyenne des salaires de base plus faibles, compensés par le versement d'une prime d'intéressement. Par ailleurs, celui-ci s'accompagne d'un impact positif et significatif sur le profit mais d'un effet non significatif sur la productivité du travail des entreprises. Il existe néanmoins une corrélation positive entre la mise en œuvre du dispositif et la productivité du travail pouvant avoir pour origine un effet de sélection. Ces travaux nous invitent à défendre la thèse selon laquelle l'instauration par les entreprises d'un dispositif alliant le partage du profit et le PEE vise non seulement des effets d'incitation mais aussi des objectifs de maîtrise des coûts salariaux. Au-delà, lorsque le PEE donne lieu à la constitution de l'actionnariat salarié, il permet aux entreprises de poursuivre des objectifs de stabilisation du capital. / This dissertation aims at shedding a new light on the analysis of the effects of profit sharing and employee ownership plan on wages practices in France. We firstly purpose a survey of the theoretical foundations of profit sharing and employee ownership plan. By considering institutional and macroeconomic changes in France since 1980, we secondly develop an historical analysis of the financial participation. In this context, we argue that a system based on both profit sharing and employee ownership plan is not only designed as an effort incentive scheme but also as a risk transfer device. We thirdly develop a Principal-Agent model to determine the optimal characteristics of a contract based on both profit sharing and employee ownership plan. Our hypothesis is then tested on an original matched employer-employee database concerning French firms. Using a Propensity Score Matching method which allows controlling for potential selection bias, we show that such a contract has no significant impact on the labour productivity but a positive one on the firm's benefit. We finally find a negative impact on the employee's base wage but no significant effect on the total earnings.

This article addresses the antinomy concerning to profit sharing to the workers. Through an analysis of the classic criteria of antinomy solutions and particulars of the Labour Law, the author recognize the prevalence of the classic criteria. / El presente artículo aborda la antinomia referente al pago de utilidades a los trabajadores. Realizando un análisis sobre los criterios de solución de antinomias clásicas y particulares del Derecho del Trabajo, el autor reconoce la prevalencia de los criterios clásicos.

企業內勞資雙方所扮演的角色屬於社會夥伴的形式，此種社會夥伴關係的發展，牽涉到整體經濟發展的成果分配形式；然而社會經濟的發展不應僅以工資及盈餘作為分配企業經濟成果的唯一管道，加上我國近年來貧富差距不斷的擴大，政府應當盡可能擴大勞動者的儲蓄，直接參與生產資本的投入，分享企業的經營成果，以創造更多的社會財富分配管道。 所謂勞工財務參與乃勞工參與企業經營成果之形式，不論是以利潤分享或是股票持有的形式，均得以自歐盟過去十五年的議程之間所見。因此，本研究透過比較研究之方式，以歐盟六個成員國（包含法、德、 英、愛爾蘭、荷蘭及比利時）為研究對象，藉此分析其勞工財務參與制度及社會夥伴觀點。此外，本文歸納整理歐盟成員國實施勞工財務參與所產生之問題，並介紹其建議解決方法，作為我國參考之經驗。 最後，本研究自歐盟勞工財務參與之角度，將我國企業內勞工財務參與計劃之內容（包含年終獎金、利潤分享計劃及員工所有權計劃三種類型）作一比較後，提出相關制度缺失；透過檢視歐盟勞工財務參與之八大原則，我國於制度上缺乏平等原則，成為圖利少數管理人員之工具。因此，為有效推行我國勞工財務參與制度，本研究建議勞資政三方自以下方向著手：一、政府層面：明確定義計劃中「勞工」之範圍，董監事兼具勞工身分者應排除適用；條件式地提供稅賦誘因，以促進計畫的實施；儲蓄理財制度的健全發展，協助勞工財產之形成。二、勞工層面：加強勞工財務參與之教育宣導，增進勞工的認知；建議政府設立專責主管單位監督勞工財務參與計畫之設立及運作，以確保計畫之公平性。三、雇主層面：促進企業實施勞工財務參與制度；實施廣泛勞工基礎的財務參與計劃，避免淪為少數高階人員自肥的工具；不應限制計劃的投資標的，分散投資風險性；並訂定實施辦法及專責機構辦理，以便於企業推行、增加勞工的參與率。

C’est au milieu du XXème siècle que la participation des salariés reprend un nouveau souffle sous l’impulsion du général de Gaulle. Ainsi dès 1947, celui-ci prône l’idée d’une troisième voix entre capitalisme et communisme. Malgré l’attachement du général de Gaulle à la nécessité de mettre en œuvre cette association du capital et du travail, il peine à élaborer, de façon pratique, son projet de réforme participative. Un consultant, polytechnicien, Marcel Loichot, essaye alors de proposer un modèle opérationnel de participation qui permettra tout à la fois un autofinancement des entreprises et une redistribution du capital au salarié. Il s’agit de permettre aux salariés d’accéder à l’outil de production et ainsi d’accéder au pouvoir dans l’entreprise. Le schéma proposé par Loichot est soutenu par Louis Vallon et René Capitant. Le projet ainsi décrit s’inscrit dans un mouvement appelé « pancapitaliste ».Les projets avancés par le mouvement « pancapitaliste » sont alors soumis à l’analyse de la commission Mathey qui émet de nombreuses réserves. Par ailleurs de nombreuses réticences se forment tant du côté patronal que salarial. Finalement, le 17 août 1967 deux ordonnances mettent en œuvre un dispositif de participation des salariés et qui donne naissance au PEE. Face aux résistances rencontrées, l’ordonnance n° 67-694 met en place un dispositif qui est loin des attentes du projet pancapitaliste. Même si elle comporte déjà quelques écueils, elle constitue toutefois une trame qui peut servir de support à la construction d’un nouveau projet de société. Au fur et à mesure des différentes évolutions législatives, l’ordonnance de 1967 a été très largement revisitée et s’est principalement orientée vers un dispositif de démultiplication du financement des entreprises. L’accès au capital des salariés même s’il demeure potentiellement massif et collectif n’entraîne aucun exercice effectif de pouvoir des salariés. Le PEE contient aujourd’hui toute une série de filtre et d’écran à cet éventuel pouvoir. Par ailleurs, si l’accès demeure massif et collectif, il permet surtout aux salariés aux plus haute rémunérations d’être investis de titres de leur entreprise. On assiste à une bipolarisation du PEE. Ce dispositif rapproche ainsi les cadres des préoccupations des actionnaires mais sans jamais leur conférer aucun pouvoir. Les salariés aux plus faibles rémunérations subissent alors de plein fouet ces rapports de subordination. Le PEE, loin d’avoir construit un nouveau projet de société, a progressivement glissé vers un pur outil de financement de l’entreprise. De même, loin de redonner du pouvoir aux salariés, il répercute avec plus d’intensité les rapports hiérarchiques et aboutit à une sorte de renforcement du lien de subordination juridique. / In the middle of the 20th century, the participation of the employees takes a new breath with the help of general de Gaulle. In 1947, he proposed the idea of a third way between communism and capitalism. In despite of this will of general de Gaulle, it was difficult for him to develop this project into practice. So a polytechnician consultant called Marcel Loichot, then tries to propose an operational model of participation which is at the same time a self-financing companies and a redistribution of capital to the employees The aim is mainly to allow the employees to accede to the production tools and at the same time to accede to the power in the firm.The schema proposed by Loichot is supported by Rene Capitant and Louis Vallon. The project is called the “pancapitalism” movement. This project was subjected to Mathey’s commission which expressed many disagreements with the movement. Besides, a lot of reservations were expressed by the labor unions and the employers. Finally, on 17 august 1967, two ordinances instaure a system of employee participation. Because of the resistances encoutered, the act n° 67-694 adopted is far from the expectations of the project pancapitalism. Even if the act contains some pittfalls, however it is a frame that can be used to support the construction of a new social project.As to the various legislative changes, the act of 1967 was revisited and focused to a scaling system of corporate finance. The acces to the capital by employees, even if it is still potentially massive and collective, does not allow to get an effective exercise power for the employees. Today, the schema authorizes principaly the hight classes of employees to access to the capital of their firm. This last element can be analyse as a polarization of the PEE. The device brings closer those hight classes of employees to the interest of the shareholders but never give them any power. The lower wages will undergo the full force of these relations of subordinationThe PEE, far from building a new social project has gradually shifted to a pure tool of corporate finance. Far from restoring power to the employees, it affects more intensely the reporting relationship and culminates in a kind of strengthening of the legal subordination link.