Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Cornell University, 1994. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 371-380).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Yale University, 1986. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 457-473).

The full title of my Master's degree thesis is Partner's Profit Sharing Right in Various Forms of Companies The aim of my thesis is to analyse the existing regulation governing the right to a share in profits in various kinds of companies, compare it with the amended law, which is already relevant, but still not in force. In the legal regulation concerning the profit sharing right there are still many questions that have not been described and solved in legal literature. There are also some issues that have been already solved by authors, but there are different expert's opinions on such issues. In my thesis I have attempted to compare all these opinions with the wording of the law. The thesis consists of twelve main chapters, including an introduction and conclusion of my thesis. Chapter One, Profit Sharing Right to Profit Share - basic definition deals with the meaning and importance of the profit sharing right. Chapter Two "Legal Sources" defines statutes and other legal sources to which the thesis refers. It specifies main acts important...

This study investigated the factors that influence the adoption of ESOPs in Nigeria. Furthermore, the study investigated the influence of the adoption of ESOPs on organisational performance, employee retention and employee commitment. The study results reveal that trade union responsiveness, reforms, awareness of employee benefits and taxation implication positively influence the adoption of ESOPs based on transparency. The results in this study further reveal that trade union responsiveness, takeovers, reforms, awareness of employee benefits and taxation implication effectively influence the adoption of ESOPs based on two-way communication. In addition, the study results reveal that trade union responsiveness, takeovers, reforms, awareness of employee benefits and trust positively influence the adoption of ESOPs based on empowerment. The study further reveals that adoption of ESOPs based on transparency, two-way communication and empowerment leads to organisational performance, employee retention and employee commitment. This study, being the first of its kind in Nigeria, filled the gap that existed in the Nigerian literature in respect of the awareness and adoption of ESOPs. This study provides literature and theoretical model that can be used as a foundation by organisations and the government to start up the adoption of ESOPs. This study showed that ESOPs is beneficial to boost the economy, enhance desired organisational outcomes (organisational performance, employee retention and employee commitment) and meet the financial and retirement needs of employees. However, for organisations and employees to enjoy the full benefits of ESOPs, underlying forces such as, trade union responsiveness, takeovers, reforms, awareness of employee benefits, trusts and taxation implication must be taken into account. Furthermore, the adoption, implementation and operations of ESOPs will be successful management, trade union leaders and employees utilise strategies such as, transparency, two-way communication and empowerment.

When a property is in need to get access to a facility with a certain purpose – e.g. an access road to the property – the Swedish legislation states that it under some certain conditions is possible to establish the facility compulsory on another property. When a compulsory acquisition occur the legislation also states that the owner of the property that surrender land for the facility shall get compensated for the intrusion the facility makes on his or her property. The cardinal rule to determine the compensation level for these cases – when the Swedish Joint Facilities Act applies – is that the compensation level shall be based on the decrease in market value i.e. the damage that the facility causes on the acquired property plus an equitable share of the benefit that the facility causes for the properties that get access to the facility. These situations are in general speaking named profit sharing cases. Further states the travaux préparatoires that the distribution of the profit shall be equitable with guidance of the distribution that had occurred in a “normal” voluntary agreement between the involved parties (prop. 1991/92:127 s. 69). To be able to apply the legislators requirements of equitable and “normal” voluntary agreement in a real situation there are a number of methods that can be used to decide the compensation level. A problem with these methods is that it’s not always obvious a priori which method that should be used for a certain facility. A risk that occurs when it’s not clearly defined which method that shall be used in a certain situation is that substantially different levels of compensation can occur in different cases, even if the purpose with the facility is the same. For these cases when it’s not a priori defined which method that shall be used it’s up to the cadastral surveyor – after his or her preferences regarding what can be seen as equitable – to decide in the particular case which compensation level that best correspond to the legislators requirements of an equitable and “normal” voluntary agreement. With this said, there is an obvious risk that similar situations and cases get treated unequal from a compensation perspective according to which method the cadastral surveyor chose to apply. With respect to the problem description above, the purpose of this thesis have been to investigate how the compensation legislation in the Joint Facilities Act are applied or can be applied by the cadastral authority in joint facility procedures. The investigation was performed through a study of procedure acts from the cadastral authority. / När en fastighet har ett behov av att få tillgång till en viss typ av anläggning – t.ex. en utfartsväg från fastigheten – finns möjligheter att inrätta anläggningen tvångsvis på en annan fastighet. När tvångsvisa ianspråktaganden sker är den fastighetsägare som upplåter mark för anläggningen berättigad till ersättning. Huvudprincipen för att bestämma ersättningen i dessa fall – när anläggningslagen tillämpas – är att ersättningen dels ska bestå av marknadsvärdeminskningen som anläggningen orsakar, dels en skälig del av den värdeökning som sker hos den eller de fastigheter som får tillgång till anläggningen som inrättas. Dessa situationer brukar benämnas vinstfördelningsfall. Vidare har lagstiftaren uttalat att fördelningen av värdeökningen ska ske på ett skäligt sätt med ledning av den fördelning som hade blivit fallet vid en ”normal” frivillig överlåtelse parterna emellan (jmf. prop.1991/92:127 s. 69). För att kunna tillämpa lagstiftarens uppställda krav om skälighet och ”normal” frivillig överlåtelse i en praktisk situation finns ett antal metoder som kan tillämpas för att bestämma den totala ersättningen. Ett problem med dessa metoder är att det på förhand inte sällan är helt självklart vilken metod som har företräde framför en annan. En risk är då att väsentligt olika ersättningsbelopp utgår för anläggningar med liknande ändamål eftersom ersättningsnivåerna metoderna emellan ofta skiljer sig åt relativt mycket. För dessa mer oklara fall är det upp till förrättningslantmätaren – efter dennes preferenser gällande skälighet – att i det enskilda fallet avgöra vilken ersättningsnivå som är skälig och motsvarar en ”normal” frivillig överlåtelse. Det finns därmed en uppenbar risk att likande situationer kan behandlas olika ur ett ersättningsperspektiv beroende av vilken metod förrättningslantmätaren väljer att tillämpa. Förevarande arbete har av denna anledning undersökt hur Lantmäterimyndigheten i praktiken tillämpar ersättningslagstiftningen när anläggningar inrättas enligt anläggningslagen. Huvudsyftet med arbetet har formulerats som att undersöka hur ersättningslagstiftningen i anläggningslagen tillämpas eller kan tillämpas av LM vid anläggningsförrättningar. Undersökningen genomfördes genom att studera förrättningsakter där det fanns ett officialbeslut och/eller en officialutredning i ersättningsfrågan

C’est à travers une succession de crises rapprochées : le phylloxéra, les deux Guerres mondiales, la prohibition, la crise de 1929, les grèves de 1936, que s’est constitué dans le champagne un modèle social original. Celui-ci forme le fondement sur lequel l’ensemble des professionnels ont pu bâtir ensuite, dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, leur prospérité. La Maison Veuve Clicquot de 1908 à 1964 représente une bonne illustration de ce phénomène. Au cours de cette période, elle met en place un large système de protection sociale pour ses ouvriers. Cette politique s’inscrit alors dans une stratégie de gestion de la main-d’œuvre visant à stabiliser une aristocratie ouvrière au sein de laquelle la culture du métier constitue un élément central. Cette politique sociale sait évoluer et s’adapter à la fois aux changements de la société et de la production. Ainsi, lorsque la mécanisation, mais aussi l’émancipation des travailleurs remettent en cause ce modèle établi, les dirigeants abandonnent le paternalisme pour se tourner vers des relations plus paritaires grâce à l’institution d’un système d’intéressement.Parallèlement à cette politique interne, les négociants développent des politiques sociales vers l’extérieur, au bénéfice de leurs fournisseurs. Il s’agit de fidéliser les vignerons livreurs en leur garantissant une stabilité économique en dépit des aléas importants sur la période des expéditions de champagne. On observe dans ce domaine la même évolution des relations du paternalisme vers une nouvelle forme de paritarisme que manifeste la constitution d’institutions interprofessionnelles de type corporatif. Dans leur genèse, la Maison Clicquot joue un rôle déterminant. / It is throughout a great number of consecutive crises : the phylloxera, the two World Wars, Prohibition, the 1929 crisis, the 1936 strikes, that champagne built its original social model. This social model is the foundation on which the professionals were able to develop their business during the second part of the twentieth century. From 1908 to 196, Veuve Clicquot is a good illustration of this phenomenon. During this period, the firm created a social protection for its workers. This policy was part of a management plan which tried to maintain the stability of workers elite for whom the trade culture was a central aspect. This social policy was able to follow society and production shifts. For instance, when mechanization and workers emancipation appeared, throwing the model back into question, the executive gave away paternalism to introduce new joint relationships (between labor and management) thanks to the institution of a profit-sharing system.At the same time, the champagne houses developed external social policies that were beneficial for their suppliers, the wine growers. The stakes of these social policies were to secure their loyalty and to warrant them an economic stability despite the great variations of the market during the period of champagne sales. The same evolution from paternalism to a new kind of classless relationships, that can be observed in this field of activity, is demonstrated with the constitution of corporate interprofessional institutions. Veuve Clicquot played a decisive part in this setup.

Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo principal discutir os programas de participação nos lucros ou resultados (PLR) no setor bancário brasileiro, sob a ótica da flexibilização das relações entre capital e trabalho, no contexto das mais recentes transformações promovidas pelo capitalismo avançado. A investigação compreendeu, primeiramente, uma pesquisa documental e bibliográfica sobre o processo de regulamentação da PLR no Brasil e a posterior generalização de seu uso. Após o que, foram descritos os modelos de PLR adotados pelo setor bancário brasileiro e também em um caso específico, desde sua instituição nos moldes contemporâneos em 1995, até 2011, comparando-os e evidenciando sua transformação. Através de entrevistas com representantes sindicais e especialistas, destacaram-se as posições e as estratégias adotadas pelos diferentes atores sociais em relação ao tema. Em seguida, empreendeu-se uma observação participante em uma grande empresa do setor, que se concentrou na operacionalização concreta da PLR no cotidiano, o que ocorre por meio dos programas de metas de resultados que vinculam seu pagamento ao desempenho. Os resultados da pesquisa apresentaram elementos despóticos, como diversas formas de controle que garantem a execução de tais programas, ao mesmo tempo em que se observou uma natureza hegemônica, tanto nos espaços estabelecidos de negociação sobre as regras da PLR como no apoio dos trabalhadores e na participação dos sindicatos, assinalando-se características de um regime despótico-hegemônico. A interpretação dos dados com base na teoria sobre a construção do consentimento de Burawoy permitiu uma identificação dos programas de PLR ao estado interno, com relação às instâncias de conciliação de interesses e de participação. Ao final, a articulação da adesão subjetiva a tais programas é compreendida pela inserção cada vez mais individualizada no processo de trabalho. / The present research aimed to discuss the Profit Sharing (PS) plans of the Brazilian banking sector using the perspective of a more flexible capital/labor relationship considering the most recent transformations caused by advanced capitalism. At first, a document and bibliographical investigation about the implementation of PS in Brazil and its subsequent generalization was carried out. Later, PS models adopted by the Brazilian banking sector as well as a specific case are described, since their implementation according to the modern standards in 1995, until 2011 and then compared thus revealing their changes. Interviews with specialists and trade union representatives evidenced the different positions and strategies concerning the theme adopted by the different players involved. Subsequently, participant observation was conducted at a large banking institution, focusing on how PS works on a daily basis, showing that it takes place using targets and results plans linking remuneration to performance. Research results point to despotic elements, such as different forms of control that guarantee that such programs be enforced. It also shows the hegemonic nature of such programs, not only during established arenas for negotiations with regards to PS rules but also concerning employees support and their participation in unions, which reveal traits of a hegemonic-despotic regime. The interpretation of the data on the basis of the Burawoys theory about the manufacturing of consent made it possible to identify PS plans with an internal state, as far as instances of interest and participation conciliation are concerned. Lastly, subjective compliance with such programs is understood by the increasingly individualized features of the labor process.

Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo principal discutir os programas de participação nos lucros ou resultados (PLR) no setor bancário brasileiro, sob a ótica da flexibilização das relações entre capital e trabalho, no contexto das mais recentes transformações promovidas pelo capitalismo avançado. A investigação compreendeu, primeiramente, uma pesquisa documental e bibliográfica sobre o processo de regulamentação da PLR no Brasil e a posterior generalização de seu uso. Após o que, foram descritos os modelos de PLR adotados pelo setor bancário brasileiro e também em um caso específico, desde sua instituição nos moldes contemporâneos em 1995, até 2011, comparando-os e evidenciando sua transformação. Através de entrevistas com representantes sindicais e especialistas, destacaram-se as posições e as estratégias adotadas pelos diferentes atores sociais em relação ao tema. Em seguida, empreendeu-se uma observação participante em uma grande empresa do setor, que se concentrou na operacionalização concreta da PLR no cotidiano, o que ocorre por meio dos programas de metas de resultados que vinculam seu pagamento ao desempenho. Os resultados da pesquisa apresentaram elementos despóticos, como diversas formas de controle que garantem a execução de tais programas, ao mesmo tempo em que se observou uma natureza hegemônica, tanto nos espaços estabelecidos de negociação sobre as regras da PLR como no apoio dos trabalhadores e na participação dos sindicatos, assinalando-se características de um regime despótico-hegemônico. A interpretação dos dados com base na teoria sobre a construção do consentimento de Burawoy permitiu uma identificação dos programas de PLR ao estado interno, com relação às instâncias de conciliação de interesses e de participação. Ao final, a articulação da adesão subjetiva a tais programas é compreendida pela inserção cada vez mais individualizada no processo de trabalho. / The present research aimed to discuss the Profit Sharing (PS) plans of the Brazilian banking sector using the perspective of a more flexible capital/labor relationship considering the most recent transformations caused by advanced capitalism. At first, a document and bibliographical investigation about the implementation of PS in Brazil and its subsequent generalization was carried out. Later, PS models adopted by the Brazilian banking sector as well as a specific case are described, since their implementation according to the modern standards in 1995, until 2011 and then compared thus revealing their changes. Interviews with specialists and trade union representatives evidenced the different positions and strategies concerning the theme adopted by the different players involved. Subsequently, participant observation was conducted at a large banking institution, focusing on how PS works on a daily basis, showing that it takes place using targets and results plans linking remuneration to performance. Research results point to despotic elements, such as different forms of control that guarantee that such programs be enforced. It also shows the hegemonic nature of such programs, not only during established arenas for negotiations with regards to PS rules but also concerning employees support and their participation in unions, which reveal traits of a hegemonic-despotic regime. The interpretation of the data on the basis of the Burawoys theory about the manufacturing of consent made it possible to identify PS plans with an internal state, as far as instances of interest and participation conciliation are concerned. Lastly, subjective compliance with such programs is understood by the increasingly individualized features of the labor process.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att studera om Handelsbankens vinstandelsstiftelse Oktogonen ger upphov till motiverade anställda samt om Oktogonen och bankens låga personalomsättning har ett samband. Studien bygger på en fallstudie. Datainsamling har skett genom främst intervjuer och tidigare forskning i form av böcker och artiklar. Resultatet har visat att viktiga faktorer för att uppnå en låg personalomsättning inom banken bland annat är en decentraliserad organisation samt att anställda känner en trygghet till sin arbetsgivare. Oktogonen påverkar i begränsad utsträckning, dock främst äldre medarbetares rörlighet. / The purpose of this paper is to study if Handelsbanken’s profit- sharing foundation Oktogonen creates motivated employees and if Oktogonen and the bank’s low employee turnover are connected. The study is based on a case study. The data comes primarily through interviews and previous research in books and articles. The results showed that key factors in achieving a low turnover of staff is a decentralized organization and that the employees feel a sense of security to their employer. Oktogonen affects a limited extent, but mainly the older employees mobility.