Este trabalho examina a disciplina legal da remuneração dos administradores das sociedades anônimas. A análise é feita a partir de três perspectivas: (i) a dos incentivos que as estruturas de remuneração podem gerar ao desempenho dos administradores; (ii) a dos problemas e conflitos que a remuneração pode causar, notadamente entre os acionistas controladores e os não controladores, bem como entre os administradores e os acionistas; e (iii) a das soluções que a remuneração proporciona, sobretudo ao alinhar os interesses dos administradores com os da companhia e dos acionistas. Entre os objetivos esperados estão a contribuição para as discussões teóricas sobre a remuneração dos administradores e o aperfeiçoamento da aplicação da sua disciplina legal. Para tanto, serão de especial importância os comentários sobre a necessidade de aprimoramento das práticas de governança corporativa, em particular (i) a transparência, como mitigador de assimetria informacional e indutor de comportamentos adequados; e (ii) o comitê de remuneração, como elemento agregador de independência e redutor dos conflitos de interesse. Do ponto de vista estrutural, o trabalho divide-se em 6 capítulos. O primeiro contextualiza a importância da discussão teórica sobre o tema à luz de três recentes eventos: (i) a edição da Instrução CVM nº 480, de 2009; (ii) o crescimento do mercado de capitais brasileiro; e (iii) a dispersão da propriedade acionária observada em algumas companhias e a relação entre essa dispersão e a remuneração dos administradores. O segundo capítulo faz uma incursão na discussão sobre a remuneração dos administradores nos Estados Unidos, tratando dos problemas de agência e da remuneração como solução parcial para os referidos problemas ou parte integrante deles. O terceiro capítulo cuida da disciplina da remuneração dos administradores na Lei nº 6.404, de 1976. Os capítulos 4 e 5 tratam de modo específico de duas das modalidades de remuneração historicamente mais importantes nas companhias brasileiras: a participação nos lucros e a remuneração baseada em ações, particularmente as opções de compra de ações. Por fim, o sexto capítulo fecha o trabalho com considerações finais sobre a análise realizada e sobre as reflexões e estudos ainda a serem conduzidos. / The aim of this study is to examine the legal framework of executive compensation in Brazilian corporations. The analysis is conducted from three perspectives: (i) the incentives that compensation structures can create towards the enhancement of executives performance; (ii) the problems and conflicts arising from compensation schemes, particularly between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, as well as between managers and shareholders in general; and (iii) the solutions provided by compensation schemes, especially by aligning the interests of managers with those of the company and its shareholders. Some of its intended objectives are contributing to theoretical discussions about executive compensation and improving the application of its legal framework. For these purposes, comments on the need for improvement of corporate governance practices are noteworthy, particularly when it comes to: (i) disclosure, as a measure capable of mitigating information asymmetry and inducing appropriate behavior; and (ii) the compensation committee, as an element capable of promoting independence and reducing conflicts of interest. In terms of structure, this study is divided into six (6) chapters. The first chapter contextualizes the importance of theoretical discussion on the topic, taking into account three recent events: (i) the issue of CVM Instruction No. 480, of 2009, by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission; (ii) the growth of the Brazilian capital market; and (iii) the ongoing shareholding dispersion noticed in some companies and the relationship between such dispersion and executive pay. The second chapter tours the discussion about executive compensation in the United States, dealing with agency problems and with compensation schemes as either part of such problems or a partial remedy to them. The third chapter addresses the legal framework of executive compensation as established by Law No. 6,404, of 1976. Chapters 4 and 5 encompass two specific compensation schemes among the most historically important ones for Brazilian companies: profit sharing and equity-based compensation, particularly stock options. At last, Chapter 6 concludes this study with final remarks on the analysis conducted herein and on the reflections and studies to be yet carried out.

L’objectif de cette thèse est de comparer l’efficacité des primes à la suggestion, des primes à la performance, et de la cession de parts aux salariés pour stimuler leur implication dans les dispositifs de suggestion (cercles de qualité, réunions d’atelier, boîtes à idées, etc.). Dans un premier chapitre,sont présentés, une approche historique, un état des lieux et une revue de littérature. Le chapitre suivant pose les jalons d’une théorie, dans un cadre simplifié ne comprenant qu’un employeur et un employé. Il développe un modèle théorique original de la cession de parts, orienté vers les augmentations de capital dédiées aux salariés. Il est montré que, tant que l’employeur n’est pas limité dans le nombre de parts qu’il peut proposer, ce mécanisme est le plus efficace. Le troisième chapitre consolide les résultats du précédent dans un cadre à plusieurs employés. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre présente une étude économétrique à partir de l’enquête REPONSE. La spécification et les variables sont retenues dans le souci d’être au plus proche des modèles théoriques. Les résultats confortent fortement ceux des modèles théoriques élaborés dans les chapitres précédents. / This dissertation aims at comparing the efficiency of suggestion pay, performance pay and shares selling, so as to involve employees into suggestions schemes (e.g. quality circles, workshop meetings, suggestion box). In the first chapter, the historical background, the current situation and the state of literature are being investigated. In the following chapter, a simple framework is considered with only one employer and one employee. A formal model of shared ownership that fits with the French scheme of ’capital increase dedicated to the employees’ is sketched. It is shownthat, as long as the employer is not limited in the number of shares he can offer, the scheme performs better than suggestion pay and performance pay. Next chapter builds upon the previous model and extends the results to a broader framework with multiple employees. The fourth chapter presents an empirical study based on the REPONSE survey. The econometric specification and the variables are chosen to fit the theoretical models. The results strongly support the theory.

本研究以2000年至2004年台灣上市櫃的623家電子業為研究對象，探討員工分紅制度對企業經營績效的影響。本研究採用兩階段法，第一階段，採用DEA併用單變量統計之變異數分析法(ANOVA)及無母數分析法(Wilcoxon兩樣本檢定；K-W多樣本檢定)，來驗證電子業實行員工分紅對企業經營績效的影響。第二階段，DEA併用Tobit迴歸模型，比較第一階段單變量統計檢定的研究結果。研究結果發現： (1)電子產業內有發放員工分紅者的企業經營績效顯著較低，同時電子業發放前一年度員工分紅者對當年度的經營績效為負向顯著相關。 (2)電子產業內發放員工現金紅利對企業經營績效的影響顯著高於股票紅利者，同時電子業發放前一年度員工股票紅利者對當年度的企業經營績效為負向顯著相關。 (3)電子產業內員工分紅佔公司市值比例高者對企業經營績效的影響劣於員工分紅佔公司市值比例低者，且在增加其他控制變數後，電子業發放前一年度員工分紅佔公司市值比例高者對當年度的企業經營績效為負向顯著相關。 (4)電子產業內員工分紅佔薪資比例高者對企業經營績效的影響優於員工分紅佔薪資比例低者，且在增加其他控制變數後，電子業發放前一年度員工分紅佔薪資比例高者對當年度的企業經營績效為正向顯著相關。

Cross selling is the practice of selling additional products to an existing customer. It has the potential to boost revenues and can be beneficial for both the company and the customer. For many multi-divisional companies with product or service oriented organizational structures the attempt to realize the benefits of cross selling generates incentive problems. In this thesis, three problems spread over three business levels are identified. Firstly, management needs to (financially) motivate business units in fostering their cross selling efforts. Secondly, in order to make cross selling happen, business units need to cooperate and to exchange product-related information. Finally, in order to increase their short-term benefits business units might act opportunistically by selling products or services of other business units without paying attention to adding value for their customers. These incentive problems are theoretically examined by applying principal-agent theory and the theory of repeated games. Our findings suggest that an optimized incentive structure is required to make both the business units and the management better off. The thesis also analyses the circumstances and necessary prerequisites under which cross selling initiatives are beneficial for all involved parties. Apart from that cross selling sometimes may turn out to be non-beneficial. In addition to the elaborations above, risks and hazards of cross selling are presented in detail and applied for the extension of the underlying model. Bottom line, the work underlines that cross selling is to be realized holistically to ensure durable success. (author's abstract)

Submitted by Clara Costellini de Souza (costellini@gmail.com) on 2015-11-03T17:33:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Versão Final.pdf: 760259 bytes, checksum: bb2d4e1cccf2563e68c9daf5f0881309 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2015-11-09T13:33:31Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Versão Final.pdf: 760259 bytes, checksum: bb2d4e1cccf2563e68c9daf5f0881309 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-11-11T18:18:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Versão Final.pdf: 760259 bytes, checksum: bb2d4e1cccf2563e68c9daf5f0881309 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-11-11T18:18:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Versão Final.pdf: 760259 bytes, checksum: bb2d4e1cccf2563e68c9daf5f0881309 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-07-02 / In this paper, we study by means of a theoretical approach the Brazilian production sharing regime for oil exploration approved in Law No 12.351. We develop a model for production sharing to capture certain aspects of the Brazilian sharing model as compulsory participation of Petrobras, asymmetric information, and the presence of strategic participants. Using numerical solutions, we discuss the bidders’ strategies and their expected gains. Furthermore, we developed a model with heterogeneous costs to study the local content rules. / Neste trabalho, estudamos o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro, instituí do pela Lei No 12.351, para exploração de petróleo através de uma abordagem te orica. Desenvolvemos um modelo de partilha de produção a fim de capturar algumas características do modelo de partilha brasileiro como, por exemplo, a participação obrigatória da Petrobras, assimetria de informação e a presença de participantes estratégicos. Através de solução numérica, fazemos uma análise das estratégias dos participantes e dos ganhos esperados. Além disso, desenvolvemos um modelo de custos heterogêneos para estudar as regras de conteúdo local.

Au carrefour du droit du travail, du droit civil et du droit des sociétés siège la notion de rémunération. À l’image du contrat de travail, la rémunération peut se métamorphoser pour devenir un outil d’association financière des salariés à la performance de l’entreprise. L’association financière des salariés aux performances de l’entreprise ne présente pas un visage unique. Elle déploie d’abord ses effets dans le périmètre du Code du travail : l’individuel et le collectif se rejoignent pour dessiner une première forme d’association. Salaire et épargne salariale constituent les fruits du contrat de travail exécuté sous la seule bannière de la qualité de salarié. Celle-ci constitue l’élément primaire de l’association financière. L’actionnariat salarié emporte, en revanche, une double qualité : à celle de salarié s’ajoute celle d’associé. L’association financière devient alors parfaite. / At the crossroads between civil law and corporate law lies the notion of remuneration. Modelled on the contract of employment, remuneration can turn into a tool to share profits with the employees according to the performance of the company. Sharing profits with the employees according to the company’s performance is a multifaceted action. Its first effects appear within the scope of the labor code: the notions of individual and collective meet to give a first draft of profit sharing. Salaries and employee savings plans are at the core of profit sharing. On the contrary, employee share ownership presents a twofold position: employee and associate. Profits then become perfectly shared.

L'idée de base des contrats incitatifs est celle de la réalisation d'intérêts communs provoquant des changements dans le comportement des salariés et l'amélioration de la performance de l'entreprise. Les résultats et les succès de l'entreprise dépendent également du climat des relations professionnelles. Dans ce contexte, l'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension de la participation financière (l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié) et ses liens avec les conflits à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. La recherche sur ces deux thèmes est d'une importance pratique et novatrice. Tout d'abord, il existe au sein de l'entreprise une multitude de types de conflits. Nous nous intéressons principalement aux conflits collectifs. Ensuite, la plupart des études sur les conflits collectifs se concentre uniquement sur les grèves, en ignorant les autres formes d'actions collectives, et très peu d'études font le lien avec les systèmes d'incitations collectives au sein de l'entreprise. Ainsi, ce travail se décompose en quatre études empiriques. La première vise à analyser les différentes formes de conflits au sein de l'entreprise. La deuxième analyse l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. La troisième étude s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. Enfin, la dernière examine la performance des entreprises en fonction de la participation financière et des conflits collectifs. Nos recherches reposent sur des outils d'analyse multidimensionnelle et économétriques. L'approche multidimensionnelle fait appel à l'Analyse des Correspondances Multiples et à la Classification Hiérarchique Ascendante.L'approche économétrique fait usage de méthodes d'estimations classiques (OLS,Probit Simple, Probit Multinomial, Probit Ordonné), de modèles à sélection (Heckman), et des techniques d'estimations de modèles récursifs à équations simultanées traitant ainsi les problèmes d'endogénéité et la mixture (quantitative et qualitative) des variables dépendantes (Roodman, Conditional Mixed Process). / The basic idea of incentive contracts is that of achieving common interests causing changes in the behavior of employees and improving firm performance.The firms' outputs and success also depend on the industrial relation climate. In this context, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding offinancial participation (profit sharing and employee share ownership) and its links with the conflicts using data on French firms. Research on these topics isinnovative and highly recommended. First, there exists within the firm a multitude of types of conflicts. We are primarily concerned with collective conflicts. Most of studies on collective conflicts focuses only on strikes, ignoring other forms of collective actions. Very few studies make the link between collective incentive schemes and collective conflicts. Thus, this work is dividedinto four empirical studies. The first one analyzes the different forms of conflicts within the firm. The second one analyzes the effect of financial participation on collective conflicts. The third study focuses on the impact of bargaining and financial participation on the resolution of collective conflicts. The last one examines firm's performance based on financial participation and collective conflicts. Our research is based on multidimensional analysis and econometric tools. The multidimensional approach uses the Multiple Correspondence Analysis and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering. The econometric approach usesclassical estimation methods (OLS, Probit, Mutinomial Probit, Ordered Pobit),selection models (Heckman), and methods estimating simultaneous and recursive equations, treating the endogeneity problems and the mixture (quantitative and qualitative) of the dependent variables (Roodman, Conditional Mixed Process).

Bakgrund: Kunskapsintensiva organisationer upplever svårigheter när det kommer till att behålla medarbetare och de tvingas således arbeta för att hantera den frivilliga personalomsättningen. Den svenska advokatbranschen genomgår förändring och medarbetare byter arbetsgivare i allt större utsträckning. Samtidigt pågår diskussioner kring huruvida monetära- och icke-monetära incitamentssystem påverkar medarbetarnas motivation, arbetstillfredsställelse och engagemang. Därav har intresset väckts för att studera huruvida incitamentssystem påverkar den frivilliga personalomsättningen inom advokatbyråer verksamma i Sverige. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att skapa en ökad förståelse för hur incitamentssystem påverkar den frivilliga personalomsättningen inom advokatbyråer verksamma i Sverige. Metod: Studien innehar en kvalitativ forskningsstrategi och ett konstruktionistisktperspektiv. Arbetet följer en abduktiv ansats och en tematisk analys används viddata analysen. Syftet och forskningsfrågorna besvaras genom att utnyttja en flerfallsstudie på två olika advokatbyråer verksamma i Sverige, där 14 semi-strukturerade intervjuundersökningar ligger till grund för inhämtandet av det empiriska materialet. Slutsats: Studien påvisar att kunskapsintensiva organisationer bör utforma incitamentssystem med både monetära och icke-monetära incitament där en förståelse för att incitamentssystem kan påverka andra medarbetare än vad som var avsett är viktig. Monetära incitament tycks påverka arbetstillfredsställelsen men har begränsad effekt på medarbetarnas motivation och engagemang. De icke-monetära incitamenten tenderar att påverka den frivilliga personalomsättningen i större utsträckning / Background: Knowledge-intensive organizations experience difficulties when it comes to retaining employees and they are obliged to handle the voluntary turnover. The Swedish law branch of industry experiences a period of change where employees change employers to a greater extent. At the same time, there are ongoing discussions about how monetary- and non-monetary incentives affect employee motivation, job satisfaction and commitment. Therefore, it is interesting to study how incentive systems affect voluntary turnover in Swedish law firms. Purpose: The study aims to increase the understanding of how incentive systems affect the voluntary turnover in Swedish law firms. Methodology: The study is designed according to a qualitative research strategy and has a constructionist perspective. The work follows an abductive approach, and a thematic analysis is used when analyzing the data. The purpose and research questions are answered by utilizing a multiple-case study of two Swedish law firms, where 14 semistructured interviews generate the empirical material. Conclusion: The study shows that knowledge-intensive organizations should design incentive systems with both monetary and non-monetary incentives where an understanding that incentive systems can affect other employees than what was intended is important. Monetary incentives seem to affect job satisfaction but have a limited effect on employee motivation and commitment. The non-monetary incentives tend to affect voluntary employee turnover to a greater extent.

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