Diss. (sammanfattning) Lund : Lunds universitet, 2005. / Härtill 3 uppsatser.

Submitted by Aelson Maciera (aelsoncm@terra.com.br) on 2017-08-01T19:31:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DissALF.pdf: 2099978 bytes, checksum: 7eb8a96e9c4894db8d4334e89700a547 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ronildo Prado (ronisp@ufscar.br) on 2017-08-08T17:50:53Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissALF.pdf: 2099978 bytes, checksum: 7eb8a96e9c4894db8d4334e89700a547 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ronildo Prado (ronisp@ufscar.br) on 2017-08-08T17:50:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissALF.pdf: 2099978 bytes, checksum: 7eb8a96e9c4894db8d4334e89700a547 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-08T17:55:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissALF.pdf: 2099978 bytes, checksum: 7eb8a96e9c4894db8d4334e89700a547 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-21 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Corruption is an object of study in several researches, but only recently it began to be investigated experimentally. Despite the progress, some gaps remain open, particularly in regards to the variables of which the observed behaviors are function, one aspect in which behavior analysis can contribute to operationalize the phenomenon and investigate the environmental variables that control these behaviors characterized as corrupt. One way to study this phenomenon is to expose the participants to a context in which they need to contribute to producing a particular public good, and then need to make decisions about how this good will be distributed among all participants. In this context, the participant can make three decisions: distribute in an egalitarian way; Distribute in an unequal way, favoring others, or distribute in an unequal way, favoring their own gains. A participant who makes distributions unequally for his own benefit shall behaving in a manner analogous to that described in the crime of embezzlement. Through the Public Goods Game (JBP), by modifying its original protocol, allowing the participants to manage the public resource, deciding how it will be distributed, it is possible to experimentally study this type of corrupt behavior. The aim was to investigate how the participants managed public resources under a PGG. Six participants were exposed to the procedure. They had to decide how the resource produced by her/his own contribution and that of the other players would be distributed among them. Five participants made unequal distributions, i.e, allocated most of the resources to themselves. This type of distribution is in correspondence with an embezzlement definition, allowing an approximation to real contexts. From these results, we suggest changes in the contingencies that control the occurrence of this type of behavior. / A corrupção foi objeto de estudo em diversas pesquisas, mas apenas recentemente ela passou a ser investigada experimentalmente. Apesar dos avanços obtidos, algumas lacunas permanecem em aberto, principalmente no que diz respeito as variáveis das quais os comportamentos observados são função, aspecto em que a Análise do Comportamento pode contribuir ao operacionalizar o fenômeno e investigar as variáveis ambientais que controlam estes comportamentos caracterizados como corruptos. Uma maneira de estudar este fenômeno é expor os participantes a um contexto em que eles precisem contribuir para produzir um determinado bem público, e em seguida, precisem tomar decisões a respeito da maneira como este bem será distribuído entre todos. Neste contexto, o participante pode tomar três decisões: distribuir de maneira igualitária; distribuir de maneira desigual, favorecendo os demais, ou distribuir de maneira desigual, favorecendo os seus próprios ganhos. Um participante que faça distribuições desigualmente em benefício próprio estará de comportando de maneira análoga a descrita no crime de peculato. Utilizando o Jogo dos Bens Públicos (JBP), modificando o seu protocolo original, é possível permitir que os participantes façam a gestão do recurso público, decidindo como ele será distribuído entre si mesmo e os demais participantes, o que torna possível estudar experimentalmente este tipo de comportamento corrupto. O objetivo deste estudo foi investigar o comportamento de contribuir e distribuir recursos públicos sob controle da quantidade de recursos produzidos pela contribuição de todos os participantes. Ao todo, seis participantes foram recrutados. As contingências programadas no presente estudo foram o número de fichas que um participante possuía em sua “carteira” no início da tentativa (condição antecedente), a resposta de contribuir e distribuir as fichas e o ganho obtido pela contribuição e distribuição efetuada. Como resultado, todos os participantes emitiram respostas de contribuições desiguais, isto é, contribuíram menos do que os demais participantes, e cinco destes participantes emitiram respostas de distribuições desiguais, isto é, distribuíram para si mesmos a maior parte das fichas produzidas. Esse tipo de distribuição encontra correspondência na definição de peculato, o que permite aproximar este estudo de contextos reais. A partir dos resultados discute-se mudanças nas contingências em vigor para controlar a ocorrência deste tipo de comportamento.

La thèse porte sur des modèles économiques en présence d’externalités. En suivant Laffont (1988), nous donnons la définition suivante d’externalité.“Effet indirect” signifie que l’effet est créé par un agent économique différent de celui qui est affecté, et que l’effet n’est pas produit par l’intermédiaire du système de prix. Par conséquence, le système des prix ne joue que le rôle d’égaler à l’équilibre l’offre globale et la demande globale. La définition ci-dessus montre que la présence d’effets externes nécessite une nouvelle description des caractéristiques des agents, c’est-à-dire des préférences individuelles, des ensembles de consommation et des ensembles de production des producteurs. La thèse se compose de trois chapitres. Le premier chapitre étudie les restrictions de testabilité d’un modèle spécifique avec des externalités et des biens publics. Dans le deuxième chapitre et le troisième chapitre, nous considérons un modèle d’équilibre général avec des externalités au niveau des préférences individuelles et des ensembles de production des producteurs. Dans le deuxième chapitre nous traitons l’existence d’un équilibre concurrentiel en utilisant un approche différentiable, et dans le troisième chapitre nous donnons un résultat de régularité. Dans le Chapitre 2, nous considérons un modèle d’économie de propriété privée avec des externalités de consommation et de production. En utilisant une approche différentiable, nous prouvons que l’ensemble des équilibres concurrentiels avec des consommations et des prix strictement positifs est non vide et compact. Dans le Chapitre 3, nous considérons des économies de propriété privée avec externalités de consommation et de production. Nous étudions des conditions suffisantes pour la régularité générique de ces économies. / We study the testability implications of public versus private consumption in col-lective models of group consumption. The distinguishing feature of our approach is that we start from a revealed preference characterization of collectively rational behavior. Remarkably, we find that assumptions regarding the public or private nature of specific goods do have testability implications, even if one only observes the aggregate group consumption. In fact, these testability implications apply as soon as the analysis includes three goods and four observations. This stands in sharp contrast with existing results that start from a differential characterization of collectively rational behavior. In our opinion, our revealed preference approach obtains stronger testability conclusions because it focuses on a global characterization of collective rationality, whereas the differential approach starts from a local characterization.We consider a general model of private ownership economies with consumption and production externalities. Each firm is characterized by a technology described by a transformation function. Each household is characterized by a utility function, the shares on firms’ profit and an initial endowment of commodities. Describing equlib-ria in terms of first order conditions and market clearing conditions, and using a homotopy approach based on the seminal work by Smale (1974), under differentiability and boundary conditions, we prove the non-emptiness and the compactness of the set of competitive equilibria with consumptions and prices strictly positive.We consider a general equilibrium model of private ownership economy with con-sumption and production externalities. Each firm is owned by the households and it is characterized by a technology described by a transformation function. Each household is characterized by a utility function, the shares on the firms profits and an endowment of commodities. The choices of all agents (households and firms) affect utility functions and production technologies. Showing by an example that basic assumptions are not enough to guarantee a regularity result in the space of initial endowments, we provide sufficient conditions for the regularity in the space of endowments and perturbations of the transformation functions.

Duan, Haiyan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-83). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.vi / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vii / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Question --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Approach and Methods --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- Structure of the Thesis --- p.7 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1 --- Provision of Public Goods as a Governmental Function --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Design and Practice of Fiscal Transfer --- p.11 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- China´ةs Fiscal Institution --- p.20 / Chapter 3.1 --- "The Drop of “Two Ratios"", and 1994 Fiscal Reform" --- p.20 / Chapter 3.2 --- Post-1994 System and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relation --- p.23 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Finance of Public Goods Provision --- p.37 / Chapter 3.4 --- Fiscal Institution below Province --- p.45 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- The Impact of Fiscal Transfer on Public Goods Provision: Cross-county Analysis of Shanxi --- p.52 / Chapter 4.1 --- The Equalization Effect of Fiscal Transfer --- p.54 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Impact of Fiscal Transfer on County Governments´ة Preference of Expenditure --- p.58 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.75 / REFRENCES --- p.79

Submitted by Evelyn Edith Contreras Medrano (contrerasmedrano@gmail.com) on 2017-03-10T21:05:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 EContreras 2016 - Local Institutions and Natural Resources vf.pdf: 2289932 bytes, checksum: 3e134974c30ddcb38184183d421e24e7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2017-03-20T13:10:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 EContreras 2016 - Local Institutions and Natural Resources vf.pdf: 2289932 bytes, checksum: 3e134974c30ddcb38184183d421e24e7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-22T18:33:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EContreras 2016 - Local Institutions and Natural Resources vf.pdf: 2289932 bytes, checksum: 3e134974c30ddcb38184183d421e24e7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-08 / After decades of research, there is still no consensus in the literature regarding the effects of natural resource abundance on the economic and political performance of a territory. This research aims to contribute to this discussion, by analyzing the role of institutions on explaining the relationship between natural resource-based revenues and the provision of public goods at the local level. In order to do so, I test the mechanisms previously proposed in the literature for explaining the natural resource curse effect at the national level (mediation and moderation effects of institutional quality), using cross-sectional data of Peruvian municipalities located in the Andean highlands, for the 2011-2014 period. The identification strategy proposed uses as source of exogenous variation for revenues, the location of natural resources and its value among the territory, and a set of rules established by law for the redistribution of natural resource-based revenues to the local governments. In order to deal with the endogeneity of institutional quality, I include 2SLS estimations, using the presence of 'Peasant Communities' (Comunidades Campesinas) as an instrumental variable. The results show some evidence of a positive effect of natural resource-based revenues on the provision of local public infrastructure (water, public lightning and rural roads), a null effect on education results, and a negative effect on health campaigns. However, regarding the role of institutional quality on explaining these effects, I find no significant effects for all of the outcomes and samples analyzed.

This study was focused on reasons for ineffectiveness of agri-environmental measure, which is the policy in which the state compensates farmers for losses caused when participating at production of public goods. The work selected as a subject of the study agri-environmental contract and its characteristics and other institutions, of which maturity influence the effects of that policy. The main goal was to identify these characteristics of contract and assess their balance in relation to the purpose and subject of the contract and long term benefit of both sides of the contract. Attitudes on the maturity of the contract characteristics have been collected between farmers and state administrators in survey (as sites of the contract) on national level and also in four regional case studies. It was revealed that most of the contract characteristics were not mature enough to serve to long term benefit for both sides of the contract, which decreases potential effectiveness of the agri-environmental policy. These are for example: information availability, trust between sides of the contract, tendencies to strategic behaviour, power distribution in the contract, sharing risks in the contract, adequacy of compensation level. Control and penalty system was regarded as rather adequate. Not mature institutions and characteristics of the contract increase transaction costs of both sides of the contract and decrease willingness to renew the contracts in future. The results of the research are for the state administration a good base for improvement of the contract in order to increase effectiveness of the agri-environmental policy in question.

A presente tese apresenta a usucapião superficiária de bens públicos como uma alternativa para assegurar o direito fundamental à moradia em áreas de exclusão social. Para chegar a tal desiderato, encontra-se supedâneo jurídico-normativo na função social da propriedade, especialmente no tocante à sua observância em terras públicas. Utiliza-se, ainda como suporte teórico à tese, a noção contemporânea de que a propriedade hodierna é um instituto plural, complexo, tomando emprestadas as ideias de Salvatore Pugliatti. Além disso, diante dos contornos atuais do Direito Civil-Constitucional, também é importante como lastro a análise da posse com função social, que em muitos casos pode até ser priorizada no confronto com o direito de propriedade meramente formal. Na construção da tese, foram utilizadas duas premissas. A primeira apoia-se na possibilidade do reconhecimento da posse em bens públicos, fundamentando-se especificamente nos regimes legais que a admitem, como a Lei 11.977/2009, por exemplo. Já a segunda se consubstancia na interpretação de que a vedação constitucional à usucapião de bens públicos não é absoluta, obstando apenas a aquisição da propriedade plena destes bens por particulares. A partir destes fundamentos são analisados os requisitos e as consequências do modelo de usucapião superficiária de imóveis públicos para fins de moradia, com ênfase particular quanto ao animus da posse. Conclui-se, ao final, que essa nova modalidade aquisitiva da propriedade superficiária pode ser um importante instrumento para a regularização fundiária em áreas de exclusão social, conferindo segurança jurídica aos moradores e transformando em ativo um amplo estoque fundiário que hodiernamente se apresenta como capital morto, conforme defende Hernando de Soto.

La thèse reconstruit l'histoire et les fondements épistémologiques de la théorisation des dépenses publiques de Richard A. Musgrave (1910-2007), notamment dans sa Theory of Public Finance (1959) en se concentrant sur deux concepts : les biens collectifs et les biens méritoires (biens sous tutelle). Premièrement, je montre qu'il est difficile de différentier les approches théoriques de Musgrave et de Buchanan selon la distinction positif/normatif. Deuxièmement, j'explique comment Musgrave et Samuelson affinent des arguments en faveur de l'intervention publique dans le cadre de la théorie des défaillances de marché, dans un monde où l'efficacité marchande est la norme par rapport à laquelle toute déviation doit être expliquée et justifiée. La théorisation effectuée par Musgrave et ses collègues est une rationalisation dans le langage économique de préoccupations sociales et politiques quant au rôle de l'État. Troisièmement, je suggère que Musgrave inventa le concept de biens méritoires pour compléter sa théorisation des dépenses publiques parce qu'il ne voulait pas se contenter du concept étroit de bien collectif pour rendre compte de l'ensemble des services publics et parce qu'il jugeait en particulier que ces dépenses méritoires avaient leur raison d'être. Quatrièmement, je retrace l'histoire du principe de souveraineté du consommateur afin de cerner la difficulté que pose la défense des biens méritoires aux États-Unis dans les années 1950. Le corpus sur la justification des biens méritoires est structuré en fonction de son rapport à ce principe. / The theorization of public expenditures in the twentieth century is a rationalization in the language of modern economics of social and political concerns regarding the role of the state. The thesis adopts a historical and philosophical perspective on two central concepts of Richard A. Musgrave's (1910-2007) Theory of Public Finance (1959): merit goods and social goods (or collective goods). Musgrave was more successful in introducing the definition of social (collective) goods in public economics (non-excludable and non-rival) than with his concept of merit goods. Yet, I suggest that he coined the latter because he wanted to build a comprehensive normative theory of the public household that would be useful for steering the revenue-expenditure processes. The two concepts play complementary roles in his theory which is a synthesis of various European traditions in public finance. Despite the rejection of merit goods by many economists, Musgrave's view on redistribution in-kind to fight poverty was shared by many liberal economists in the postwar period. The alternative approach to public finance of Buchanan is also discussed. I show that it is complicated to oppose Musgrave's and Buchanan's approaches along the positive/normative methodological line. In contrast, the friendly discussions between Samuelson and Musgrave led to a refinement of the market failure argument for public provision of collective goods. I identify the centrality of the principle of consumer sovereignty in this paradigm and I show how the literature on the justification of merit goods can be structured with respect to this principle.

A presente tese apresenta a usucapião superficiária de bens públicos como uma alternativa para assegurar o direito fundamental à moradia em áreas de exclusão social. Para chegar a tal desiderato, encontra-se supedâneo jurídico-normativo na função social da propriedade, especialmente no tocante à sua observância em terras públicas. Utiliza-se, ainda como suporte teórico à tese, a noção contemporânea de que a propriedade hodierna é um instituto plural, complexo, tomando emprestadas as ideias de Salvatore Pugliatti. Além disso, diante dos contornos atuais do Direito Civil-Constitucional, também é importante como lastro a análise da posse com função social, que em muitos casos pode até ser priorizada no confronto com o direito de propriedade meramente formal. Na construção da tese, foram utilizadas duas premissas. A primeira apoia-se na possibilidade do reconhecimento da posse em bens públicos, fundamentando-se especificamente nos regimes legais que a admitem, como a Lei 11.977/2009, por exemplo. Já a segunda se consubstancia na interpretação de que a vedação constitucional à usucapião de bens públicos não é absoluta, obstando apenas a aquisição da propriedade plena destes bens por particulares. A partir destes fundamentos são analisados os requisitos e as consequências do modelo de usucapião superficiária de imóveis públicos para fins de moradia, com ênfase particular quanto ao animus da posse. Conclui-se, ao final, que essa nova modalidade aquisitiva da propriedade superficiária pode ser um importante instrumento para a regularização fundiária em áreas de exclusão social, conferindo segurança jurídica aos moradores e transformando em ativo um amplo estoque fundiário que hodiernamente se apresenta como capital morto, conforme defende Hernando de Soto.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:36:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AnuskaIA.pdf: 788750 bytes, checksum: 3e9eb68e01cc2a95f7315ab5b061a6b4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-03-06 / Cooperation is a well known behavior and influenced by all cultures. Probably selective pressures brought advantages to individuals that cooperate, and then this behavior is current in human societies. Most of it is studied about cooperation and natural selection was understood by the game theory, a mathematical approach that helps to understand the conflict and cooperation. We believe that natural selection and game theory could facilitate understanding these behaviors and two theoretical articles were written regarding this view. It was also found that most of data about cooperation was obtained in (with) adults. Since game theory is effective to understand this phenomenon, and to be used and understood, two games were used with five and eleven year old children: the common pool and public goods games. The results are presented in four empirical articles. We found that children respond to social dilemmas of game theory like the adults do. They adjust their rounds regarding the feedback obtained of their partness; in the beginning they cooperate and reduce the degree of cooperation along (throughout) the following session; in the absence of punition the level of opportunism increased, mainly in larger groups; boys and girls behave differently when donate. This research suggest that cooperation has an evolutionary basis in human and it is since earlier in the behavioral pattern shown by adults. / A coopera??o ? um comportamento bastante difundido e estimulado em todas as culturas. Provavelmente press?es seletivas trouxeram vantagens para indiv?duos que cooperavam, e por essa raz?o, esse comportamento est? presente nas sociedades humanas. Muito do que se estuda sobre coopera??o e sele??o natural foi compreendida utilizando a teoria dos jogos, uma abordagem matem?tica que ajuda compreender o conflito e a coopera??o. Acreditamos a sele??o natural e a teoria dos jogos podem nos ajudar a compreender esses comportamentos e escrevemos dois dois artigos te?ricos abordando essa id?ia. Verificamos tamb?m, que muito dos achados sobre coopera??o foram realizados com adultos. Pelo fato da teoria dos jogos ser eficaz para compreender esse fen?meno, e de f?cil aplica??o e compreens?o, utilizamos dois jogos em crian?as de 5 a 11 anos de idade: o jogo da terra dos comuns e o dos bens p?blicos. Os achados est?o relatados em quatro artigos emp?ricos. Neles verificamos que as crian?as respondem aos dilemas sociais da teoria dos jogos de forma semelhante aos adultos. Elas ajustam as jogadas em fun??o do retorno que obt?m dos companheiros; s?o cooperativas no in?cio e reduzem a coopera??o ao longo das sess?es; na aus?ncia de puni??o o n?vel de oportunismo aumentou, principalmente nos grupos grandes; meninos e meninas se comportam de forma diferente na de realizar as doa??es. O conjunto deste trabalho sugere que a coopera??o tem uma base evolutiva em humanos e que ela est? presente desde cedo nos padr?es apresentados pelos adultos