Comme la propriété privée, la propriété publique a été confondue avec les biens qui n’en sont que les objets. En droit privé, comme en droit public, il est possible, pourtant, de considérer que la propriété n’est pas un bien. Droit subjectif, la propriété est la puissance que le sujet exerce sur les biens. Formellement, elle est le droit de jouir et de disposer des choses conformément au droit objectif. Matériellement, elle variera en fonction du statut de droit objectif qui habilite le sujet de la propriété, le propriétaire. Les personnes publiques, sujets de l’action publique, sont propriétaires sur le fondement d’une compétence que leur assigne immédiatement l’obligation d’agir dans l’intérêt public. La compétence attribue aux personnes publiques un droit de propriété public, affecté au service du seul intérêt public. Envisager les personnes publiques propriétaires au lieu de la propriété des personnes publiques, aura permis de contribuer à la théorie des ordres juridiques partiels comme représentation de la distinction du droit public et du droit privé. Cela conduit à proposer une définition juridique de l’action publique : l’ensemble d’activités mises en œuvre à partir de l’exercice, par les personnes publiques, de leurs droits subjectifs publics, de puissance et de propriété. / As it is the case for private property, the public property was long time confused with the goods that are its objects. However, in public law as in private law, we should consider that property right is not a good. Being an individual right, the property stands for the power exerted by a subject over goods. Formally, it is the right to enjoy and dispose of goods according to law. Materially, it will vary depending on the applicable law which empowers the owner, subject of the property. Public entities, subjects of public action, are owners based on a competency immediately assigned to them by their duty to act in the public interest. This competency grants to public entities a right to public property only affected to the public interest. Focusing on the public persons as owners instead of considering only their property helps contributing to the theory of partial legal orders (“théorie des ordres juridiques partiels”) as a representation of the distinction between public and private law. This finally leads to suggest a legal definition of the public action as a set of activities implemented by the public persons in the exercise of their subjective rights of property.

Abstract Developing countries are net importers of intellectual property products and open source software (OSS) production is one way in which local socio-economic development can take place. The public goods characteristics of OSS are contested and this study investigates whether in a developing country context OSS is a pure public good that can be locally appropriated and not exclude any users or producers from doing so. This case study of an OSS public good finds that it does not have all the characteristics of a pure good, that there is a role for a sponsor, and in particular the importance of copyright protection of derivatives in order to ensure that the source code does not fall out of fashion and use. Having explored that, however, there is further evidence that OSS collaborative learning is both publically and personally beneficial for developing country computer programmers. Furthermore, the state benefits from the improved benefits of health information systems made possible through the appropriation of this model of learning.

O presente estudo pode ser considerado parte da linha de pesquisa Comércio, Direitos Humanos e Desenvolvimento, temática recorrente que procura entender e analisar os impactos do comércio internacional na realização dos direitos humanos e no desenvolvimento, além de propor alternativas sobre o inter-relacionamento das três áreas. A integração positiva entre elas depende de muito mais do que a adoção de medidas preventivas contra os possíveis prejuízos advindos da liberalização. Um sistema de comércio internacional que seja realmente favorável aos direitos humanos e ao desenvolvimento entendido não apenas como benefício econômico, mas principalmente como desenvolvimento social, político e cultural , deve ir além e atuar de forma positiva e não passiva. Neste sentido, não se pode considerar a liberalização dos serviços educacionais no âmbito da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), se não forem conduzidas de forma a contribuir para a realização do direito ao desenvolvimento em todas as nações e a todos os indivíduos. No entanto, evidenciada existência de um atual mercado educacional, deve-se buscar alternativas para colocar a realização do direito ao desenvolvimento um direito humano que garante a realização de diversos outros direitos humanos no topo dos objetivos do comércio internacional. Assim, é obrigatório que se procure encontrar uma maneira de negociar o setor de serviços educacionais que não prejudique e ainda colabore para uma implementação mais efetiva do direito ao desenvolvimento. Objetivando cooperar com este relevante e necessário propósito, este estudo discute a atual relação entre o comércio internacional de serviços educacionais e o direito ao desenvolvimento, bem como analisa a importância da educação para os direitos humanos e o desenvolvimento. Afinal, a educação deve ser vista como uma mercadoria liberalizável ou deve ser tratada, acima de tudo, como um direito humano e um bem público, que deve ser protegido? / This study can be considered as part of the current research under Trade, Human Rights and Development, that intends to understand and evaluate the impacts of international trade at human rights and development, besides proposing alternatives to relate all three areas. Integrating international trade, realization of human rights, and development depend on much more than just preventing consequential damages of trade liberalization. An international trade system that is really favorable to development considered not only as economical gain, but also as social, political and cultural development and human rights must go further, and act positively rather than just passively. In this scenario, negotiating education services at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in a way that does not contribute to the realization of the right to development in all nations and for all human beings can not be considered welcome or even feasible. However, bearing in mind that there is already an education market, reality claims for alternatives to put the realization of the right to development as a human right that guarantees several other fundamental rights at the top of international trade goals. Therefore, finding a way of liberalizing education services that does not hinder and yet cooperates to a more effective implementation of the right to development is now mandatory. Aiming to cooperate with this relevant and necessary purpose, this study discuss the current relation between international trade in education services and the right to development, as well as the importance of education to human rights and development. After all, should education be seen as international trade commodity or should it be treated, above all, as a human right and a public good in need of protection?

对于转型期中国地方政府行为的研究，现有文献日益重视正式制度对官员行为的激励和约束作用：以GDP为标尺的相对绩效考核制度是改革开放后中国经济成功的决定因素，同时该正式制度也是地方政府忽视公共物品供给的重要原因。即使在考虑了正式制度及社会经济因素之后，本研究仍然观察到地方政府在公共物品供给水平上存在着显著的地区和时间差异。然而，对于此差异背后的决定因素，现有文献却考察不足。本文认为，非正式制度是造成该差异的原因。通过采用地区领导人籍贯作为非正式制度的代理并利用1990年至2010年的中国地级市数据，本研究系统检验了上述假设。本文发现，和来自外地的地方领导人相比，那些在其籍贯地任职的官员有更大的动力为本地区提供公共服务：本地籍贯的领导在基础教育、公共医疗和环境保护上的财政投入比重显著高于外地籍贯的领导。本研究同时发现，公共服务支出份额的增加是以基础设施建设支出的减少为代价的：本地籍贯官员对该项支出的投入比重显著低于外地籍贯官员。同时，利用省级数据及相同的模型设定，本文也发现非正式制度在省级行政单位依然发挥作用，但作用程度减弱。上述发现彰显出在一个正式制度主导的环境中，非正式制度依然发挥着显著的作用，并在一定程度上弥补了前者的不足。在实证发现的基础上，本研究又通过案例分析和访谈进一步考察了非正式制度发挥作用的机制。通过分析两个地级市的本地籍贯领导大力发展民生项目的行为以及普通民众对本地官员和外地官员的看法，本文详细说明了非正式制度对官员行为产生影响的机制，从而为实证分析揭示出的因果机制提供了证据。本研究认为，造成上述差异的原因在于：相比于外地官员，本地官员更多地被嵌入到当地的人际网络中，出于对本人及本家族在家乡声望的重视，他们会对民生项目有更多的投入。本文对非正式制度及两种制度互动的考察凸显出非民主国家内部官员行为丰富的制度动态。 / Literature on local government behavior in transitional China has primarily examined the impact of formal institutions on the motivations of officials in promoting local economic growth. In particular, investigations focused on how the existing personnel management system provides a “yardstick competition among local officials and therefore guarantees the success of economic reform. Meanwhile, such formal institutions have similarly been studied for the crucial reason that local government ignores the provision of public goods. Nevertheless, even after controlling the influence of formal institutions and socio-economic factors, variations could still be observed on the level of efforts among local governments regarding the provision of public goods. However, these variations cannot be sufficiently explained by existing literature. This research, based on prefectural data in China in 1990-2010, aims to fill this gap through a systematic examination of the effects of informal institutions on local government behavior, especially the casual relationship between the hometown of officials and the provision of local public goods. This research, based on prefectural data in China in 19902010, aims to fill this gap by systematically examining the effects of informal institutions on local government behavior, especially the casual relationship between the hometown of officials and the provision of local public goods. This study finds that holding other variables equal, a native prefectural leader would significantly increase fiscal expenditure rates on basic education, public health, and environmental protection in his jurisdiction, compared with a leader with a different hometown. However, the increased expenditure on public goods impacts those on infrastructure construction, which tends to incur a lower expenditure rate from a local leader compared with that of an official from other prefectures. Meanwhile, using provincial data, this research determines that informal institutions influence the upper-level government, though the effects have weakened. These findings reveal that, in an environment dominated by formal institutions, informal institutions still influence the behavior of officials. In addition, to a certain extent, informal institutions could mitigate the negative effects of formal institutions on the behavior of officials. Based on empirical findings, I used two cases and several interviews with local people and officials to further investigate the mechanism of this influence from informal institutions. By analyzing the efforts of native leaders on promoting the provision of local public goods, I illustrate the mechanism on how the informal institution shapes the behavior of officials, thereby providing evidence for a casual causal relationship. I attribute such pattern to the constraints of local reputation imposed on native officials, who would be deeply embedded in local personnel networks and therefore focus on the evaluation from local people. Local reputation thus imposes additional constraints on the behavior of native officials, which serves as a kind of bottom-up accountability. By investigating the effects of informal institutions and the interaction of formal-informal institutions, this research would help deepen our understanding on the dynamics of institutions under nondemocratic regimes and enable more accurate predictions of political behavior. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 王芳. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 146-154). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Wang Fang. / Chapter 第1章 --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第2章 --- 制度及官员行为：一个综述 --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1 --- 制度 --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 正式-非正式制度的划分标准 --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 非正式制度发挥作用的机制 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- 正式制度与官员行为 --- p.17 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 当代中国的人事管理制度 --- p.18 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 人事管理制度的影响 --- p.30 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- 人事管理制度与公共物品供给 --- p.35 / Chapter 2.3 --- 非正式制度与官员行为 --- p.37 / Chapter 第3章 --- 地方政府公共物品供给 --- p.46 / Chapter 3.1 --- 地方政府概况 --- p.46 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- 各级政府的性质、地位和职能 --- p.47 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- 地级市政府：历史沿革 --- p.51 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- 地级市政府：决策过程 --- p.54 / Chapter 3.2 --- 公共物品供给的法律规定及各级政府职责 --- p.62 / Chapter 3.3 --- 经济学文献上的中国公共物品供给研究 --- p.72 / Chapter 第4章 --- 籍贯：一个非正式制度 --- p.76 / Chapter 4.1 --- 官员籍贯回避制度 --- p.76 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- 帝制中国的避籍制度 --- p.77 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- 当代中国的避籍制度 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.2 --- 籍贯与官员行为 --- p.89 / Chapter 第5章 --- 数据及实证分析 --- p.93 / Chapter 5.1 --- 数据及模型 --- p.93 / Chapter 5.2 --- 实证结果及讨论 --- p.103 / Chapter 5.3 --- 非正式制度对省级政府行为的影响 --- p.109 / Chapter 第6章 --- 因果机制：案例研究 --- p.114 / Chapter 6.1 --- 案例分析 --- p.114 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- 山东省东营市市委书记石军 --- p.115 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- 甘肃省兰州市市委书记陈宝生 --- p.120 / Chapter 6.2 --- 访谈资料 --- p.124 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- 宁夏回族自治区固原市 --- p.125 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- 江苏省南京市 --- p.127 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- 内蒙古自治区兴安盟 --- p.129 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- 浙江省绍兴市 --- p.131 / Chapter 6.3 --- 本地籍贯的约束机制 --- p.133 / Chapter 第7章 --- 结论 --- p.137 / Chapter 7.1 --- 研究发现 --- p.137 / Chapter 7.2 --- 本文贡献 --- p.139 / 附录 --- p.142 / Chapter 附录一： --- 《党政领导干部任职回避暂行规定》 --- p.142 / Chapter 附录二： --- 石军简历 --- p.144 / Chapter 附录三： --- 陈宝生简历 --- p.145 / 参考文献 --- p.146 / 英文文献 --- p.146 / 中文文献 --- p.151 / 史书典籍 --- p.153 / 法律法规 --- p.153 / 媒体资源 --- p.154

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:22:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rosana Moitinho dos Santos Silverio.pdf: 724434 bytes, checksum: dd77ebbe4a2c6d2c2f6dde7881869089 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-09-23 / Within the new prospect of a consolidating political agenda, institutional and legal urban reform, we are witnessing a systemic social evolution and are urged to rethink urban public property in practice. There are a large number of indicators showing that it is reaching its end and the citizens are failing to recognize the urban laws that were produced collectively and socially. Given this factor, we seek a demonstration of the treatment of social function as a conceptual evolution in the field of philosophy to sociology and of the latter to the field of law; thus aiming to demonstrate that although the public equity and real estate are subject to other principles incidents, we must also meet the requirements fundamental to ordering the city expressed in the master plan. Within this planning instrument, the object of study was determined specifically to delineate the social function of public property as a methodological approach to study. Executing the research invoked the doctrine andhe body of law that justifies the application of the social function of property to public property in urban real estate, will result in the determination of cases that coadunaram with this new social, political and legal / Dentro da nova perspectiva de consolidação da agenda política, institucional e legal de reforma urbana que estamos assistindo com a evolução social e sistêmica, somos instigados a repensar a propriedade pública urbana quando na pratica, e por um número expressivo de indicadores, não atinge seu fim precípuo, deixando de reconhecer a Cidade e o Direito produzido coletiva e socialmente. Diante deste fator buscamos uma demonstração do tratamento da função social enquanto evolução conceitual do campo filosófico para o sociológico e deste último para o campo do direito, objetivando assim demonstrar que embora o patrimônio público imobiliário esteja submetido a outros princípios incidentes, deve também atender às exigências fundamentais de ordenação da cidade expressas no plano diretor, dentro deste instrumento de planejamento, o objeto de estudo foi determinado especificamente o delineamento da função social da propriedade pública como recorte metodológico para estudo. Para efetivação da pesquisa invocamos a doutrina e o acervo legislativo para justificar a aplicação da função social da propriedade ao patrimônio público imobiliário urbano, resultando na apuração de casos que se coadunaram com essa nova realidade social, política e legal

The theme of thesis is to analyze the effectviveness of public- private partnership. The thesis consists of theoretical and practical parts. The theoretical part defines public goods and means of their security. The following defines the public-private partnership. Than there is the evaluation of public procurements and Public Private Partnership projects in a legal and financial aspects. The practical part describes legal security and financing of Public Private Partnership project Aquapark Olomouc along with SWOT analysis and risk analysis. The analysis above leads to the identification of problematic points of the project. Finally, suggestions are formulated to solution of identified problems and evaluate whether, in this particular case, public-private partnership has been effective.

公共投資是政府施政的表現，以提升國民生活品質；民主國家的政黨在選舉前多以公共投資作為政見訴求重點，而執政後的政黨，更是利用掌握國家資源分配權力之便，積極進行各項公共投資，以突顯政績。這是為何在過去四十年裡，自由世界許多國家藉凱因斯的「擴張總需求」主張，大肆以赤字支用方式擴大政府規模，恣意揮霍國家資源從事各項硬體軟體公共投資。但是造成的後果是國家財政赤字龐大，陷入以債養債的困境。近年來，時代潮流猛然反轉，多數國家都自「大政府」的迷夢中省悟，努力抑制財政赤字的進一步擴大，採取緊縮性政策逐步削減長年累積的龐大公共債務之際，我國恰好在此時放棄了保守穩健的作風，於民國七十九年推出涵蓋七七五項計畫項目，金額高達八．二兆元的六年國建計畫。計畫推出初期，引起了排山倒海的質疑，以如此龐大的公共支出驟然在短短六年期間投入，是否超出政府財政負擔能力範圍﹖對總體經濟以及產業､就業結構之衝擊是否太大﹖公共投資的財源問題，關係了計畫的成敗，行政官署在規劃公共投資計畫時，是否對「成本效益」作了澈底的考量，並且以其為計畫推動與否的評估指標﹖如果決定推動一項需要龐大資金的計畫時，財源在那裡﹖由現有稅收支應，或以「受益者付費」原則開闢新的財源，以免增加國庫負擔。如果公共投資計畫牽涉了不同的各級政府，經費要如何分擔﹖這些都是在計畫付諸執行前必須先予確定的。我國公共政策的規劃一向有不夠嚴謹的缺失，致使執行時遭致諸多障礙，是政府施政上的弱點。六年國建計畫在整體財源籌措方面，受到了最多議論。探討六年國建中個案計畫的財源籌措過程，可以提供政府未來在規劃公共投資計畫時 ，一個檢討的方向。

This dissertation is devoted to the analysis of various aspects of inefficiency in the political economy. It consists of four self-containing theoretical essays. The first two chapters deal with the interplay between inefficiency and commitment. Chapter 1 studies the problem of commitment in autocratic regimes and its implications for growth. Chapter 2 argues that the absence of commitment undermines the validity of the Coase theorem. The next two chapters address alternative sources of inefficiency, abstracting from commitment-related problems. Chapter 3 discusses inefficiencies arising in organizations whose members possess veto power and suggests a way of mitigating the problem. Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of demand linkages on the efficiency of lobbying for trade policy. Chapter 1. “Autocracy, Devolution and Growth” Some autocracies have sustained high economic growth for many decades; others have stagnated at low levels of production. Paradoxically, the stagnating autocracies appear to possess more natural resources and be more resistant to political change than the growing autocracies. The paper argues that the scope for capital accumulation and growth in an autocracy is largely determined by the autocrat's incentive to cling to power. The main result of the paper is that there will be private capital accumulation only if the autocrat’s benefits from political control are not too high. The reason is that, as capital accumulates and growth slows down, the autocrat faces an increasing temptation to expropriate the capitalists. Since expropriation eliminates growth, the autocrat may voluntarily refrain from expropriating if future growth is sufficiently large; otherwise, the temptation to expropriate can only be resisted through a credible commitment, that is, by devolving some political power. For autocrats with large benefits of control, for example valuable natural resource rents, devolution of power may always be unattractive. As a result, capitalists realize that they will eventually be expropriated, and capital accumulation therefore never starts. On the other hand, autocrats with small resource rents will eventually devolve power, since this commitment is necessary to sustain growth. Therefore, capitalists are willing to start accumulating despite the autocratic regime. In other words, autocracies are vulnerable to the resource curse.   Chapter 2. “The Coase Theorem Is False” (with Tore Ellingsen) The paper provides simple and robust counterexamples to the Coase Theorem. More precisely, we show that equilibrium investments in club goods can be suboptimally small despite the presence of well-defined and perfectly protected property rights and the absence of transaction costs and informational asymmetries. The reason is that, in equilibrium, a club of owners will typically not exercise their right to exclude outsiders, preferring instead to exercise their right to sell access. As long as the club of owners does not have all the bargaining power in such ex post access negotiations, strategic non-membership provides a valuable free-riding opportunity. Chapter 3. “Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity” (with Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart and Guido Friebel) In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogeneous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on the entire organization. In the presence of externalities and an incomplete charter, the threat of forming an “inner organization” can undermine the veto power of the less efficient members and coerce them to exert more effort. We identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is never executed, and under which inner organizations are equilibrium outcomes, and provide a rationale for the diversity of decision rules. Chapter 4. “Protection for Sale to Oligopolists” This paper modifies Grossman and Helpman’s "Protection for Sale" model by allowing demand linkages and oligopolistic competition. It shows that increased substitutability between products weakens interest groups’ incentives to lobby. For the case of two industries it obtains a particularly simple result: the protection of the organized industry’s product falls, whereas the protection of the unorganized industry’s product increases with product substitutability. The model suggests that empirical studies of the "Protection for Sale" may overstate the lobby groups’ desire for protection. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

In the first chapter, I quantify the welfare effect of eliminating the U.S. capital income tax under international financial integration. I employ a two-country, heterogeneous-agent incomplete markets model calibrated to represent the U.S. and the rest of the world. Short-run and long-run factor price dynamics are key: after the tax reform, post-tax interest rate increases less under financial openness relative to autarky. Therefore the wealth-rich households gain less. Post-tax wages also fall less, so the wealth-poor are hurt less. Hence, the fraction in favor of the reform increases, although the majority still prefers the status quo. Aggregate welfare effect to the U.S. is a permanent 0.2 % consumption equivalent loss under financial openness which is 85.5 % smaller than the welfare loss under autarky. The second chapter aims to answer two questions: What helps forecast U.S. inflation? What causes the observed changes in the predictive ability of variables commonly used in forecasting US inflation? In macroeconomic analysis and inflation forecasting, the traditional Phillips curve has been widely used to exploit the empirical relationship between inflation and domestic economic activity. Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), among others, cast doubt on the performance of Phillips curve-based forecasts of U.S. inflation relative to naive forecasts. This indicates a difficulty for policy-making and private sectorâs long term nominal commitments which depend on inflation expectations. The literature suggests globalization may be one reason for this phenomenon. To test this, we evaluate the forecasting ability of global slack measures under an open economy Phillips curve. The results are very sensitive to measures of inflation, forecast horizons and estimation samples. We find however, terms of trade gap, measured as HP-filtered terms of trade, is a good and robust variable to forecast U.S. inflation. Moreover, our forecasts based on the simulated data from a workhorse new open economy macro (NOEM) model indicate that better monetary policy and good luck (i.e. a remarkably benign sample of economic shocks) can account for the empirical observations on forecasting accuracy, while globalization plays a secondary role. / text

Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen (Payments for Ecosystem Services – PES) und auktionsbasierte Vergabeverfahren sind ein wichtiges und innovatives Instrument im Kampf gegen den fortwährenden Verlust von biologischer Vielfalt. Basierend auf einem Vertrag zwischen einem Leistungserbringer und einem öffentlichen oder privaten Leistungsempfänger, der die Naturschutzleistung entlohnt, können bestimmte Vorgaben der Landschaftspflege oder der agrarwirtschaftlichen Bearbeitung verbindlich festgelegt werden. Die Vorteile von PES liegen in dem direkten monetären Anreiz zur Bereitstellung von Naturschutzleistungen und zudem in der Möglichkeit, ein Niveau an Umweltschutz und –qualität jenseits des von der Umweltgesetzgebung sichergestellten Mindestniveaus zu implementieren. Der Nachteil liegt in der hohen Informationsasymmetrie in der Vertragsbeziehung, welche einerseits dem Umweltgut als Vertragsgegenstand und andererseits der Natur ökonomischen Handelns geschuldet ist. Thema dieser Dissertation ist die Analyse der interdependenten Beziehung von Kompetitivität und Vertragserfüllung und das Aufzeigen der Relevanz von Vertrauen und Reziprozität in Verträgen über Umweltgüter. Auf diese Weise leistet sie einen Beitrag zu der umfangreichen und multidisziplinären Literatur über Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen und Naturschutzauktionen. Während der vergangenen 25 Jahre habe Praktiker und Wissenschaftler unser Verständnis der Funktionsweise von Ausschreibungen zur Allokation von Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen konstant verbessert und erweitert. Ein Großteil der Forschungsaktivität war jedoch auf die Auktionsmetrik und das Bieterverhalten gerichtet, wohingegen die resultierende Vertragsbeziehung zwischen Programmverwaltern (den Käufern) und Landbesitzern (den Ausführenden) weitgehend unbeachtet blieb. Wie in dieser Dissertation bewiesen wird, ist jedoch genau diese Beziehung der Schlüssel für ein erfolgreiches marktbasiertes Naturschutzprogramm. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird in drei Artikeln argumentiert, dass Vertrauen und Reziprozität für die Überwindung von asymmetrischer Information in kompetitiv alloziierten PES-Verträgen von herausragender Bedeutung sind. Anhand eines für diese Arbeit entwickelten, zweistufigen experimentellen Testszenarios wird der Entscheidungsprozess in der inversen Auktion und in der anschließenden Vertragserfüllung in der kontrollierten Laborumgebung simuliert. In einem ersten Experiment kann auf Basis dieses Untersuchungsdesigns gezeigt werden, dass die Informations- und Anreizkonstellation in Naturschutzauktionen ein erhöhtes Risiko für vorvertragliche adverse Selektion, opportunistisches Verhalten bei Vertragserfüllung und somit suboptimale Ergebnisse birgt. Das Marktversagen kann jedoch durch eine vertrauensstiftende Institution, wie zum Beispiel Kommunikation zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern, verhindert werden. Persönliche Interaktion veranlasst Marktteilnehmer ihr individuell-rationales Verhalten zugunsten einer sozial-verträglicheren Verhaltensweise zu ändern. Dabei entsteht ein erhebliches Potential für die Bilateralisierung der Vertragsbeziehungen. Ein zweites Experiment verdeutlicht jedoch, wie wichtig vertrauensbasierte Vertragsbeziehungen insbesondere in Bereitstellungsumgebungen sind, die stark von externen, stochastischen Einflüssen verzerrt werden können. Ohne das nötige Vertrauen bricht die Kooperation in einem derartigen Szenario fast vollständig zusammen. Schließlich lässt der systematische Vergleich der Ergebnisse aus beiden Experimenten in einem dritten Aufsatz keinen Zweifel daran, dass stabile Langzeitvertragsbeziehungen in auktionsbasierten Vertragsnaturschutzprogrammen gefördert und nicht verhindert werden sollten. Langzeitverträge sind randomisierten Kurzzeitverträgen aus der Perspektive des Naturschutzes aber auch hinsichtlich der Kosteneffektivität überlegen. Daher liegt eine wesentliche Herausforderung für Programmentwickler darin, einerseits die Bildung von ausreichend Sozialkapital zu ermöglichen und andererseits faire Markt- und Vergabestrukturen zu erhalten.