Artist Statement My art is about seeking answers to personal conflicts while telling a story of a chaotic journey. I reflect on everyday moments and my thoughts as I discover ways to make sense of situations and life. I do this by creating textural, vibrantly colored, and gestural surfaces that emulate the powerful waters of the seas. I want to reveal an emotionally driven and process-oriented experience to the viewer. While creating, I do not maintain full control of the media and let the process become part of the work. I aggressively layer thick paint, glass, and mixed media. I spontaneously apply spirals and swirls of vibrant color that undulate and rotate like waves of an ocean. The spirals and swirls are a recurring motif in my work. These forms are ancient symbols of evolution, growth, and change and reflect the examination of my life. The colors and marks represent the turbulent and constant chaos of life.

Honors Thesis--Western Washington University, 2003. / Also available online via the World Wide Web.

Most scholarship regarding Shakespeare’s King Lear rests on the analysis of Lear and Cordelia, with the odd reference to the eldest daughter, Goneril, and brief homages to the Gloucester subplot. Lear’s middle daughter, Regan, is rarely mentioned at all, unless it is in conjunction with one of her more scholastically popular sisters. Within these marginalized moments of notice, Regan is routinely simplified as being just another sinful sister, fitting nicely into the accepted binaries of good and evil outlined within the play. Despite the fact that most binaries, like characters, are flawed, Regan has been given little to no chance to be absolved of her supposed offenses. By looking at Regan through the lenses of a theatrical character study and also as a subject of iconography within the realms of classical art, film, graphic novels, and the stage, I aim to prove that Regan, despite her consistent relegation to the shadows, is a three-dimensional character who has simply been dealt a difficult hand by her creator.

Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att analysera den gränsdragning som görs mellen människa och djur ifråga om hur man räknas moraliskt. Det finns en gemenskap som kallas "den moraliska gemenskapen" och som består av de individer man anser förtjänar moralisk hänsyn. Eftersom den vanligaste synen på den moraliska gemenskapen är att den består av människor, medan djur står utanför, vill jag undersöka anledningen till detta. Jag går därmed igenom hur man kan värdera liv och vad som förväntas av en individ för att hon ska få räknas in i den moraliska gemenskapen. Jag granskar särskilt förmågors betydelse och får fram att dessa inte räcker till som kriterium för att någon ska få räknas moraliskt. Istället kommer jag fram till att man måste respektera allt liv. Jag har också undersökt vem det är som ska ta denna moraliska hänsyn och funnit att det är den som har förmågan att skilja på rätt och fel, den moraliska agenten , som ska göra det. Jag går också igenom vad den moraliska agenten har för ansvar. Iden andra delen av uppsatsen tillämpar jag det jag kommit fram till på den svenska vargen och det aktuella problemet med licensjakt. Utifrån det jag kommit fram till i min tidigare analys av djurens moraliska ställning, menar jag att det inte finns någon godtagbar etisk grund för licensjakt på den svenska vargen. Jag tror heller inte att jakten får den avsedda effekten att öka viljan bland vargmotståndarna att leva sida vid sida med vargen.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1993. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 149-157).

SARAIVA, Rutiele Pereira da Silva. Por uma ética antiespecista: o lugar dos animais não humanos na filosofia moral de Tom Regan. 2014. 126f. - Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2014. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-01-18T11:25:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_rpssaraiva.pdf: 741077 bytes, checksum: 9abaf18e19d1daa7d72b8f22b0b476c0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-01-25T14:29:25Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_rpssaraiva.pdf: 741077 bytes, checksum: 9abaf18e19d1daa7d72b8f22b0b476c0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-25T14:29:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_rpssaraiva.pdf: 741077 bytes, checksum: 9abaf18e19d1daa7d72b8f22b0b476c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / This work is intended to show that the debate concerning animal rights is philosophically relevant. It points out the fact that animal issues are related to human beings as well. Therefore, this dissertation is an effort to demonstrate that it is wrong to attribute only to human beings the status of holders of moral rights and that it is necessary to conceive an ethical framework grounded on a non-anthropocentric view. Particular attention is devoted here to the contribution of Tom Reagan who asserts animals are subjects of life and possess what is called inherent value, i.e., animals’ lives are not means to accomplish ends external to themselves. These affirmations are grounded on scientific studies of animal consciousness and on ethology. Peter Singer’s defense of the well-being of animals based on the fact that they are sentient beings will be also investigated. The expression rights of animals is not used in the context of this demarche because it relates to the respect humans beings should have to non-human animals without the recognition of them as holders of specific moral rights. The expression animal rights is purported to corroborate the notion that such rights are a reality to be accepted regardless the will of human beings. / Este trabalho pretende mostrar que o debate sobre os Direitos Animais possui relevância filosófica. Ele destaca o fato de que questões concernentes aos animais remetem também ao homem. Trata-se de um esforço para mostrar que restringir aos seres humanos a condição de detentores de direitos morais consiste num equívoco e, portanto, há a necessidade de uma ética não antropocêntrica. O foco principal é a contribuição de Tom Regan, o autor afirma que por serem sencientes, os animais são sujeitos de uma vida e possuem o que ele chama de valor inerente, ou seja, suas vidas têm um valor e fim em si. Tais afirmações são fundamentadas em pesquisas científicas sobre a consciência animal e estudos de etologia. É também objeto desta investigação a abordagem de Peter Singer, que defende o Bem-estarismo animal tendo a senciência como um princípio moral. Ressaltamos ainda que, uma vez que a expressão “direitos dos animais” comumente se refere à concessão de respeito pelos seres humanos aos animais a partir de determinados critérios sem que lhes caibam direitos específicos, a noção de “direitos animais” parte do pressuposto de que possuem direitos e que devemos reconhecê-los a despeito de nossa vontade; tentaremos corroborar a segunda tese.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Desde muito tempo os animais não-humanos foram relegados a um patamar inferior ao dos humanos, sob o pretexto de não possuírem racionalidade e autonomia, ou simplesmente porque o humano via a necessidade de se exaltar. O presente estudo integra o debate sobre a mudança de estatuto dos animais, que passariam a ser considerados sujeitos morais, objetos direto das nossas preocupações morais. O trabalho aborda a possibilidade de atribuição de direitos morais aos animais não-humanos, a partir do estudo da Teoria dos Direitos dos Animais não-humanos desenvolvida por Tom Regan, professor de Filosofia na Universidade da Carolina do Norte. Regan atribui direitos morais aos animais ao buscar os fundamentos destes direitos que são reconhecidos aos seres humanos, porém restritos a estes. A pesquisa pretende discutir a natureza, função e os fundamentos do que chamamos de direitos humanos. Considera-se que estes direitos possuem uma natureza moral, em consonância com as teorias de vários estudiosos, tanto da Filosofia, quanto do Direito. Em seguida, perquire-se sobre os requisitos para ter direitos morais. Concluído o estudo inicial, parte-se para a fundamentação de Tom Regan para os direitos morais básicos e a exposição de seus argumentos para o caso dos direitos dos animais. Na teoria reganiana foi cunhada uma noção que abarca todas as características relevantes como critérios para a posse de proteção moral através de direitos. As características que compõem a noção sujeitos-de-uma-vida, a qual reúne todos os seres que possuem valor inerente, são trabalhadas no último capítulo com base nos argumentos usados por Regan e seus oponentes. Sustenta-se que a Teoria dos Direitos Animais de Tom Regan, em que pese ter algumas limitações, apresenta uma fundamentação apropriada para os direitos morais básicos humanos e animais e é uma teoria que permite levar os animais ao patamar que lhes é próprio, mas que lhes foi sempre negado, aquele de sujeitos de direitos, seres que devem integrar a nossa comunidade moral. É uma teoria adequada também para deslegitimar nossa exploração dos animais em todos os níveis em que ela acontece.

Visual acuity is reduced when optotypes are viewed in the presence of surrounding contours. This reduction in acuity is known as the crowding effect and is thought to be caused by a varying combination of contour interaction, gaze instability and attention. Traditional studies have used single optotypes surrounded by flanking bars to investigate crowding. Such targets may not realistically replicate the crowding effect inherent in clinical vision charts. The aim of this thesis was to systematically investigate the effect of crowding on visual thresholds in subjects with normal vision and in subjects with amblyopia, using specially designed charts. In the 1st and 2nd experiment, contour interaction was assessed using a high (80 %) and low contrast (5.8%) Sheridan Gardiner repeat letter (SGRL) chart in subjects with normal vision. The effect of contour interaction was investigated by varying the inter-letter separation in the SGRL chart. Significant contour interaction was obtained at the abutting condition for both the contrast conditions. In the 3rd experiment the same protocol was repeated but in amblyopes. Significant contour interaction was obtained at 0.2 letter separation and the abutting condition for both the contrast conditions. The effect of contour interaction appears to be less for low contrast than for high contrast letters in normal, non-amblyopic and amblyopic eyes. Finally, in the 4th experiment a Sheridan Gardiner Complex Interaction (SGCI) chart that requires imposed gaze fixations was constructed to measure visual acuity in normal’s and amblyopes. The effect of any gaze instability on crowding was investigated by comparing SGRL thresholds to SGCI thresholds. The SGCI thresholds were higher than the SGRL thresholds at all the separations measured, suggesting an important effect of gaze instability on crowding. In conclusion, this research has shown that gaze instability is an important component of the crowding effect for letter chart acuity measurements. Visual acuity especially when screening for amblyopia should be measured using a whole optotype chart that requires optotype to optotype fixation.

Dans un contexte où la reconnaissance de droits légaux à certaines entités non humaines apparaît comme une évolution juridique de plus en plus plausible, ce mémoire se veut une exploration de la littérature philosophique et juridique en faveur de l’octroi de la personnalité juridique aux animaux. Tout d’abord, nous offrirons un bref tour d’horizon historique de la notion de personne et pourrons constater que si celle-ci a fortement été associée à l’autonomie morale dans l’histoire du droit et de la philosophie, cette définition de la personnalité souffre d’importantes incohérences lorsque vient le temps de justifier l’extension de la personnalité aux êtres humains dépourvus de cette autonomie morale. C’est le cas, par exemple, des enfants, des êtres humains plongés dans le coma, des handicapés mentaux ou encore de certaines personnes âgées. Nous pourrons également constater que le geste qui consiste à octroyer des droits légaux à ces individus tout en refusant de reconnaître ces mêmes droits aux animaux repose sur des bases théoriques fragiles qu’il convient de revoir l’aide d’une analyse approfondie des théories des droits des animaux proposées depuis les années 1970. Ces théories, et plus particulièrement celles proposées par Peter Singer, Tom Regan et Gary Francione, feront l’objet d’un examen qui permettra de faire ressortir leurs forces et faiblesses respectives. Enfin, dans le dernier chapitre de ce mémoire, nous nous pencherons sur le rôle que peuvent jouer les appels aux droits moraux dans l’attribution de droits légaux. Nous y brosserons aussi une esquisse des différentes formes de personnalité juridique et de statut politique que pourraient se voir octroyer les animaux non humains. / In a context where the recognition of legal rights to certain nonhuman entities appears to be an increasingly plausible legal development, this master’s thesis proposes an exploration of the philosophical and legal literature in favor of granting legal personhood to animals. First, I will provide a brief historical overview of the notion of “person.” I will also note that, while it has been strongly associated with moral autonomy in the history of law and philosophy, this definition of personhood suffers from substantial inconsistencies in justifying the granting of legal personhood to non-autonomous human beings. It is the case, for instance, of children, comatose human beings, the mentally disabled, and the elderly. We will also see that granting legal rights to these individuals while refusing to recognize these same rights to nonhuman animals is based on fragile theoretical foundations that need to be rectified with a thorough analysis of the theories of animal rights proposed since the 1970s. These theories, specifically the ones put forward by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione, will be examined to identify their respective strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the final chapter of this research will examine the decisive role that appeals to moral rights can play in granting legal rights to animals. It also outlines the various forms of legal personhood and political status that might be attributed to nonhuman animals.

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