Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Edgard V C Zanette.pdf: 940001 bytes, checksum: dcbded6f36763d42bd96ff3e0fa9d0bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The methodical doubt enables the discovery of the first certainty of cartesian philosophy, the cogito. The cogito is discovered, not invented. For this intrinsic characteristic of the cartesian method, and to understand the cogito we have to pass through the most radical hyperbolic doubt. The cartesian doubt puts in motion continuous process that destroys all and any opinion that contains the slightest hint of doubt. In a first moment in this process of destruction of de losses, the methodical doubt propose abandonment of the external external world instead subject meditador, because the senses deceive, and all that, somehow, expect them to exist is considered doubtful, and therefore uncertain. The rigor of this review proposed by Descartes will, however, later, developed another separation between the subject of de doubt and everything external to it. This second stage is the most dramatic and radical the cartesian thought, because is through him that there will be conditions of possibility to the cogito to be discovered and sensed, as the fist certainly in the order of the Meditations. Despite this dramatic context that cogito appears, the problem of the external world dont's contributes only to the discovery of the cogito, but the problem of the external world will reappear solved by the cogito, when destroyed the possibility of doubt and the overall failure of reason. Is about this first movement of the emergence of the problem from the external world, its development and it's overcoming whit the discovery of the cogito that emerges what we call the subject or subjectivity in Descartes. Therefore, we will investigate this discovery process of cogito, via methodical doubt, where skepticism is reinvented by Descartes as the firt moment of the serch for truth, such that the problem of the external world emerges as the condition of the destruction of the losses for the discovery at least one indubitable truth. After the cartesian doubt, as the sense and the complement of the same, we have the birth of the cartesian notion of subject or subjectivity. Against this notion we will investigate that constitutes the first moment of subjet discovery or cartesian subjectivity centered in the cogito, wich we shall call the metaphysical subject. / A dúvida metódica possibilita a descoberta da primeira certeza da filosofia cartesiana, o cogito. O cogito é descoberto e não inventado. Por essa característica intrínseca ao método cartesiano, para bem compreendermos o cogito temos que passar pelo crivo da mais radical dúvida hiperbólica. A dúvida cartesiana coloca em marcha um processo contínuo que destrói toda e qualquer opinião que contenha o mínimo indício de dúvida. Em um primeiro momento, nesse processo de destruição dos prejuízos, a dúvida metódica propõe o abandono do mundo externo ao sujeito meditador, pois os sentidos enganam e tudo o que, de alguma maneira, dependa deles para existir é considerado duvidoso, e, portanto, incerto. O rigor dessa análise crítica proposta por Descartes vai, porém, adiante, desenvolvendo outra separação entre o sujeito da dúvida e tudo o que lhe é externo. Esse segundo momento é o mais dramático e radical ao pensamento cartesiano, pois é por meio dele que haverá as condições de possibilidade de o cogito ser descoberto e intuído, como a primeira certeza na ordem das Meditações. Apesar desse contexto dramático em que o cogito aparece, o problema do mundo exterior não contribui somente para a descoberta do cogito, mas o problema do mundo externo reaparecerá e será solucionado pelo próprio cogito, ao ser destruída a possibilidade da dúvida global e da falência da razão. É sobre esse primeiro movimento de surgimento do problema do mundo exterior, seu desenvolvimento e sua superação com a descoberta do cogito que emerge o que chamamos de sujeito ou subjetividade em Descartes. Sendo assim, investigaremos esse processo de descoberta do cogito, via dúvida metódica, em que o ceticismo é reinventado por Descartes como o primeiro momento da busca pela verdade, de modo tal que o problema do mundo exterior emerge como a condição da destruição dos prejuízos para a descoberta de ao menos uma verdade indubitável. Após a dúvida cartesiana, como o sentido e o complemento da mesma, temos o nascimento da noção cartesiana de sujeito ou subjetividade. Diante desta noção iremos investigar em que consiste o primeiro momento da descoberta do sujeito ou da subjetividade cartesiana centrada no cogito, que denominaremos de sujeito metafísico.

Orientador: Márcio Augusto Damin Custódio / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-26T07:54:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vieira_GabrielArrutiAragao_M.pdf: 1078546 bytes, checksum: 6293d6197371e4d5e74b8dbc53153c62 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: O objetivo desta dissertação é apresentar o modo como Arnauld interpreta a relação corpo-alma na união substancial estabelecida por Descartes como compatível à filosofia de Agostinho e mostrar que esta concepção está presente nas Paixões da Alma e nas Meditações. Primeiro investiga-se as objeções de Arnauld direcionadas a Descartes e suas respectivas respostas, considerando as comparações entre Descartes e Agostinho feitas por Arnauld como base para os questionamentos estabelecidos na discussão. Esta comparação se refere a aspectos fundamentais da concepção da união substancial em questão, a saber, ao princípio do cogito, à distinção real entre substância pensante e substância extensa e à afirmação de que o conhecimento formado por concepções puras do entendimento é mais certo que os conhecimentos formados através da imaginação e da experiência sensível. Na sequência, apresenta-se o modo como Arnauld no Examen utiliza o texto de Agostinho para defender Descartes de acusações de heresia, o que confirma a ideia de que Arnauld concebe a relação corpo-alma proposta por Descartes como compatível com a filosofia de Agostinho. Por fim, sustenta-se que a posição de Arnauld quanto à relação corpo-alma está presente nas Paixões da Alma e nas Meditações / Abstract: The objective of this dissertation is to present how Arnauld interprets the body-soul relation in substantial union established by Descartes as compatible with the philosophy of Augustine and to show that this conception is present in the Passions of the Soul and the Meditations. First we investigate the Arnauld¿s objections directed to Descartes and their respective answers, considering the comparisons between Descartes and Augustine made by Arnauld as the basis for the questions set out in the discussion. This comparison relates to fundamental aspects of the substantial union in question, namely, the principle of the cogito, the real distinction between thinking substance and extended substance and the assertion that knowledge formed by pure conceptions of the understanding is more certain that the knowledge formed through imagination and sensory experience. Following, we present how Arnauld uses Augustine¿s text to defend Descartes from accusations of heresy, which confirms the idea that Arnauld conceives the body-soul relation proposed by Descartes as compatible with the Augustine¿s philosophy. Finally, we show that the Arnauld¿s position about body-soul relation is present in the Passions of the Soul and the Meditations / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Initiée par René Girard, la théorie mimétique suggère que l’égalité des conditions consacrée comme un droit exacerbe la rivalité entre semblables. Quand l’étiolement de la souveraineté étatique et la logique compétitive de l’économie marchande coïncident avec la prolifération de conflits aux enjeux planétaires, cette rivalité des égaux prend une valeur paradigmatique. L’ambition d’une anthropologie mimétique à traiter de l’époque contemporaine mieux que la philosophie politique idéaliste ou la science politique réaliste suppose une reformulation. Espérance de pallier une insuffisance d’être, le désir mimétique, ou désir d’être autre, aboutit à un résultat contradictoire, la déception de rester insuffisant, l’autre étant alors perçu à la fois comme modèle et obstacle. Pour les acteurs politiques, ce désir devient la revendication d’une égale puissance d’être, promesse faite autant par la citoyenneté, le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes que la souveraineté des États sur leur territoire et leur population.En tant que modalité de la contention de la violence, le politique serait ainsi analysable par une « science des rapports humains », anthropologie englobante et non-disciplinaire adoptant un interdividualisme méthodologique. Sur fond de menaces inédites pour la pérennité de l’humanité, la réciprocité des rapports humains fait douter de la compatibilité entre projet égalitaire, quête d’identité et concorde sociale. Ces rapports questionnent également la prépondérance actuelle de la compétition dans les institutions, entre autres politiques, laquelle s’est imposée comme liant paradoxal du gouvernement représentatif et de l’économie de marché. / Conceived by René Girard, mimetic theory suggests that the equality of conditions, established as a right, exacerbates the rivalry between similar individuals or groups. When the withering away of state sovereignty and the competitive logic of the market economy overlap with the multiplication of conflicts, this rivalry of equals becomes a relevant paradigm.Mimetic anthropology’s ambition – to address contemporary issues better than either idealistic political philosophy or realistic political science –, demands nevertheless to be revisited. The hope to overcome a lack of being, mimetic desire, or one’s desire to become someone else ends up giving way to a contradictory outcome: the disappointment of remaining oneself, the other thereby being perceived as both one’s model and one’s obstacle. For political actors, this desire turns into the claim of the equal power to be, which the promise of citizenship, the right of peoples to self-determination and the state sovereignty over its people and its territory each exemplify. As a modality of the containment of violence, politics could then be analyzed by a non-disciplinary "science of human relationships", implementing a methodological interdividualism. Against the backdrop of unprecedented threats to the survival of humanity, the reciprocity of human relationships casts doubt on the compatibility between the egalitarian project, the quest for identity, and social harmony. These relationships also question the current predominance of competition in the institutions, including political institutions, which has become the paradoxical binding agent between representative governments and the market economy.

In presenting their correspondence, I highlight the means in which Hobbes is able to divorce nature and politics in his philosophy. This is done by bringing to light Hobbes’s agreement with Descartes’s deceiving God argument. First, I demonstrate Hobbes’s hidden agreement with it by analyzing his objection to Descartes’s first Meditation. Second, I show that Hobbes and Descartes both retreat into consciousness in order to deal with the possibility of deception on the behalf of God. Third, I trace Hobbes’s rational justification for entertaining that very possibility. Fourth, I bring forward Hobbes’s certain principle, that God is incomprehensible. Fifth, I demonstrate Hobbes’s rationalization for rendering nature incomprehensible in turn. From this key insight, the differences between the two philosophers stand out more. Whereas Descartes rids himself of the possibility of a deceiving God, Hobbes does not. Sixth, I show that Descartes needs to rid himself of that possibility in order to have a basis for science, Hobbes’s science is such that he does not need to rid himself of that possibility. My investigation ends by considering both Hobbes’s and Descartes’s stance on nature, in relation to politics. I find that Hobbes’s principle is much more practical that Descartes’s principle. Hobbes’s principle is shown to be much more instructive and sustainable for human life. In conclusion, this analysis of the origins, principles, and orientation of the two philosopher’s thought brings forward the overarching question, whether the recovery of value and meaning is to be brought about in nature, or in civilization.

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The main subject of the presented work is the question of power within the context of sociological theory, and in relation to the mechanism of psychological mimesis and the phenomenon of the sacred. Our starting point is René Girard's mimetic theory, which systematizes the relationship between the mechanism of psychological mimesis and the sacred - in the light of the phenomenon of violence. We, firstly, present Girard's mimetic theory, explicate its main concepts, and situate all into a broader context. Further, we critically examine Girard's theoretical scheme and come to the conclusion that his theoretical and conceptual framework calls for a revision, if it is to be utilized within the context of sociology and social theory. Consequently, we try to "sociologize" Girard's thinking. First, we position his line of thought into the wider sociological context, and then examine his theory in the light of thinking of two classical sociologists, Gabriel Tarde and Émile Durkheim. We then project this examination into a theoretical and conceptual synthesis on the basis of which we formulate our own conceptual scheme, which is based on the assumption of psychological mimesis as an anthropological constant, and which overcomes the main shortcomings of Girard's theoretical framework. On the basis of this...

This is a dissertation about human separatism. Human separatism is the social imaginary according to which Humanity should aim to use technology to “separate” itself from nature. It is incoherent and self-undermining. But it has also proven persistent and resilient, and appears to be intensifying in the face of fears about phenomena like climate change. In chapter 1 I unpack three distinct conceptions of “separation” that I argue have prevailed at different times in European philosophical and cultural history. The first is ontological, or related to being; the second is epistemological, or related to knowing; and the third is “nomological”, or related to law-making and laws. These correspond roughly to Ancient thought (in Plato and Augustine), Early Modern thought (in Bacon and Descartes) and Modern thought (in Kant and the contemporary “Ecomodernists”), respectively. I also offer some reasons for concluding that the concept of separation is in general incoherent. In chapter 2 I reflect upon why this imaginary has proven so difficult to overcome. Specifically, following existential psychology, I propose that it is a perverse manifestation of terrors that are central to the human condition. In particular it is a manifestation of the fears we have as human beings about our limited agency and our mortality or finitude. These fears are powerful enough to override rational thinking. Insofar as fantasies about separation from nature provide a salve for them, these fantasies persist over time. Insofar as fears of death and mortality are more and more front-and-centre for us as individuals and collectives, these fantasies become ever-more resilient to critique, and continue to intensify. In chapter 3 I consider some challenges that emerge when we attempt to gather resources for imaginative alternatives to separatism. I consider the ideas that we might either (a) invent a new story from whole cloth, or (b) appropriate the stories and theories of other cultures and attempting to graft them onto our own. I reject these approaches, and explore some resources from critical ecofeminism as intellectual tools to understand them, and develop some design parameters for alternative approaches. In chapter 4, I explore the narratives of some First Nations Australian cosmologies as they speak to the relationship between human beings and the natural world in the work of the First Nations writers Mary Graham and Tyson Yunkaporta. I then consider what might be involved in presenting some of these same insights in terms that adhere to the design parameters I set out in chapter 3. I propose that the genre of narrative tragedy is a powerful place to do some of this work. To flesh out this claim, I offer a series of detailed reflections on narrative tragedy, drawing on the work of Julian Young, and suggest that tragic narratives offer a powerful place for metabolizing existential anxieties, for coming to terms with ecological reality, and for encouraging and engaging in dialogue about imaginative alternative futures.

La présente thèse porte sur la traduction des deux volumes de contes berbères, Contes populaires berbères (1887) et Nouveaux contes berbères (1897), par René Basset (1855 – 1924). Cet orientaliste et linguiste français est l’auteur de nombreuses publications dans divers domaines dont les études berbères. Considéré comme un des fondateurs de la dialectologie berbère, il est surtout connu pour les contes berbères qu’il a recueillis, transcrits et traduits. En outre, ces contes se caractérisent par les copieuses notes comparatives qui les accompagnent. Dans ces notes, Basset établit une étude comparative entre la tradition orale berbère et d’autres traditions dans le monde, dans le but d’en dégager les traits communs. Notre recherche se propose d’étudier, en premier lieu, la traduction des contes, en confrontant les traductions aux contes en langue verbaculaire, afin de déterminer les stratégies mises en œuvre par le traducteur. En deuxième lieu, cette thèse explore l’appareil paratextuel, notamment les préfaces des deux volumes et les notes comparatives, puis étudie le lien entre celles-ci et les contes traduits. En dernier lieu, nous retracerons la trajectoire de vie et le parcours professionnel de Basset en vue de déterminer sa position dans le champ académique de l’orientalisme et des études berbères. Ces trois objectifs conjugués ensemble nous permettront de comprendre les influences et les liens mutuels entre la pratique traductive de Basset, sa production intellectuelle et sa trajectoire professionnelle. Pour ce faire, nous nous appuierons essentiellement sur la théorie des champs de Pierre Bourdieu. En explorant les capitaux (social, économique, culturel) dont dispose René Basset, nous mettrons en lumière les liens qu’il a tissés pour se positionner dans le champ universitaire de l’époque. L’intégration de la dimension sociologique dans notre recherche traductologique souligne l’interdisciplinarité de celle-ci. Par ailleurs, notre thèse vient combler une lacune béante dans les études berbères, à savoir l’étude traductologique de la production orale et écrite berbère. / The translation of two volumes of Berber tales, Contes populaires berbères (1887) and Nouveaux contes berbères (1897) by René Basset (1855 - 1924) is what this thesis is about. The French orientalist and linguist has authored numerous publications in various fields, including Berber studies. Considered one of the founders of Berber dialectology, he is best known for the Berber tales he collected, transcribed and translated. These tales are also distinctive for the copious comparative notes that accompany them. In these notes, Basset conducts a comparative study between Berber oral tradition and other traditions around the world, to identify their common features. Our research will first examine the Basset’s translations, comparing them to the Berber tales to determine the translator’s strategies. We will thereafter explore the paratextual apparatus, in particular the prefaces to the two volumes and the comparative notes and it also studies the link between these and the translated tales. Finally, we will trace the course of Basset's life and professional career to determine his position in the academic field of orientalism and Berber studies. Together, these three objectives will grant us insight into the mutual influences and connections between Basset's translating practice and his intellectual output and professional career. To accomplish this, we will rely primarily on Pierre Bourdieu's field theory. As we explore the relationships developed by Basset to position himself in the academic field of the period, we shed light on the social, economic and cultural capitals at his disposal, The inclusion of this sociological dimension in our research underscores its interdisciplinary nature. At the same time, our thesis addresses a major lacune in Berber studies, namely the traductological study of Berber oral and written works.

Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2014

Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2012