Submitted by Izabel Franco (izabel-franco@ufscar.br) on 2016-09-27T18:42:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DissCGMC.pdf: 945416 bytes, checksum: c214a59703723eddf00342ccb67eaa0c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ronildo Prado (ronisp@ufscar.br) on 2016-10-03T18:43:12Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissCGMC.pdf: 945416 bytes, checksum: c214a59703723eddf00342ccb67eaa0c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ronildo Prado (ronisp@ufscar.br) on 2016-10-03T18:43:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissCGMC.pdf: 945416 bytes, checksum: c214a59703723eddf00342ccb67eaa0c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-03T18:49:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissCGMC.pdf: 945416 bytes, checksum: c214a59703723eddf00342ccb67eaa0c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-28 / Outra / According to Hegel the Modern philosophy begins with Descartes. In this sense, we proposed to investigate what are the consequences of such a statement in the Hegelian conception of History of Philosophy. The relevance of this issue is the meaning of the discipline History of Philosophy as it be understand by Hegel. The History of Philosophy is the exhibition’s of philosophy itself and the means for their intelligibility. The systems that arise in the way of History of Philosophy are the particular settings of a unique and overall Philosophy. The latest philosophies contain the above philosophies as one-sided or principles of your system. The philosophical progression advances of more abstract concepts to more concrete concepts. Therefore what is the revolution promoted by Cartesian thought, what this philosopher could start a new figure in the overall configuration of Philosophy? For the role of Descartes can be clarified, we studied the works Principles of the Philosophy, Metaphysical Meditations, and Discourse on Method of Descartes, as well as the chapter on Descartes in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, the Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, and the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences of Hegel. From the progression of Hegelian exposition, we analyzed as Hegel understands the Cartesian doubt, the formulation of the cogito, the idea of God and the divine veracity, primordial determinations of thought of Descartes, Hegel as highlighted by its principles, supporting our argumentation in considerations of Andrews, Bourgeois, Lebrun and Weiss. Recognizing the value of Descartes consists in the formulation of the unity of being and thinking, even if naively, Hegel says that such a notion is the most interesting of Modern Philosophy, because it identifies the moment of understanding metaphysics, abstract understanding, the first way of thinking, which precedes the time of dialectical thinking and speculative thought. If the History of Philosophy is the development and intelligibility own philosophy, we decided to put in relief, separately in Appendix, the Hegelian conceptions in the teaching of philosophy, both in the Secondary Education, responsible for the education of young people, as the University. / Segundo Hegel, a Filosofia Moderna se inicia com Descartes. Nesse sentido, propusemos investigar quais são as consequências de tal afirmação na concepção hegeliana da História da Filosofia. A pertinência dessa questão está no significado da disciplina História da Filosofia tal como a compreendia Hegel. A História da Filosofia é a exposição da própria Filosofia e o meio para a sua inteligibilidade. Os sistemas que surgem no percurso da História da Filosofia são as configurações particulares de uma única e total Filosofia. As filosofias mais recentes contêm as filosofias anteriores como unilateralidades ou princípios de seu sistema. A progressão filosófica avança dos conceitos mais abstratos para os mais concretos. Sendo assim, qual é a revolução promovida pelo pensamento cartesiano, como este filósofo pôde iniciar uma nova figura na configuração total da Filosofia? Para que o papel desempenhado por Descartes possa ser esclarecido, estudamos as obras Princípios da Filosofia, Meditações Metafísicas e Discurso do Método, de Descartes, assim como o capítulo sobre Descartes em Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, a Introdução às Lições sobre História da Filosofia e a Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas, de Hegel. A partir da progressão da exposição hegeliana, analisamos como Hegel compreende a dúvida cartesiana, a formulação do cogito, a ideia de Deus e a veracidade divina, determinações primordiais do pensamento de Descartes, destacados por Hegel como seus princípios, apoiando nossa argumentação nas considerações de Andrews, Bourgeois, Lebrun e Weiss. Reconhecendo que o valor de Descartes consiste na formulação da unidade entre o ser e o pensamento, mesmo que de modo ingênuo, Hegel afirma que tal noção é a mais interessante da Filosofia Moderna, pois identifica nela o momento da metafísica do entendimento, o entendimento abstrato, a primeira forma do pensar, que antecede o momento do pensamento dialético e especulativo. Se a História da Filosofia é o desenvolvimento e a inteligibilidade da própria Filosofia, decidimos, separadamente no Apêndice, destacar as concepções hegelianas no ensino da Filosofia, tanto no Ensino Médio, responsável pela educação dos jovens, quanto no Ensino Superior

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:29:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-02-26Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:20:12Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 rodrigues_apd_me_sjrp.pdf: 957510 bytes, checksum: 55e3937d74fcb290d6d51e27de575279 (MD5) / Considerando a evolução nos campos da produção artística e do próprio exercício crítico, o presente trabalho consiste em uma análise comparativa entre três contos da escritora brasileira Lygia Fagundes Telles e três telas do pintor belga René Magritte. Essa análise demonstra, a partir do conceito de homologia estrutural desenvolvido por Aguinaldo José Gonçalves, as correspondências estruturais e procedimentais entre Pintura e Literatura e, também, suas especificidades enquanto obras de códigos diferentes. O modo como cada obra, texto ou tela, trabalha a relação entre arte e realidade foi o fio condutor do processo analítico que também procurou demonstrar como a questão da representação é central na composição tanto dos contos como das pinturas. Assim, o trabalho não apenas reflete sobre as especificidades de cada sistema artístico mas também revela as correspondências e as similaridades no modo de produção da obra e nas concepções de arte, de representação, de linguagem, de signo presentes nos contos e nas telas desses artistas. / Considering the evolution in the fields of artist production and of critics exercises, this presents a comparative analysis among three short stories by the Brazilian writer Lygia Fagundes Telles and three paintings by the Belgian painter René Magritte. This analysis shows, from the concept of structural homology developed by Aguinaldo José Gonçalves, the structural and procedural correspondences between Literature and Painting and its specificities as works of different artistic systems. The way how each work, text or painting, deals with the relation between art and reality was the rail that led the analysis, that also intent shows that the question of representation is central in the composition as much the short stories as the paintings. In this way, this analysis not just reflects about each artistic systems specificities but also reveals the correspondences and similarities in the way of production of the art object and in the conception of art, representation, language, sign in the short stories and paintings by these artists.

Le XIXe siècle a les caractéristiques d’un grand siècle, parce qu’il hérite des engagements idéologiques et sociaux des philosophes des Lumières, mais aussi des promesses suscitées par la Révolution de 1789 qui ouvre une ère de mutations intellectuelles et d’évolutions sociales. Au-delà des tensions sociales et politiques exprimées par une littérature dont l’engagement consiste à faire évoluer le personnage, notamment le héros de jeunesse, encore attaché à des rêves dans une société où tout est et reste à reconstruire, il importe de répondre à une préoccupation fondamentale : comment s’affirmer, se construire un destin lorsqu’on ne s’éprouve soi-même que comme une énigme, une préoccupation existentielle et un malaise ? Le roman d’apprentissage du XIXe siècle nous met en présence de destins en devenir, d’ambitions et de potentialités en quête de réalisation, ce qui lui confère ses qualités esthétiques / The XIXe world has features of a wide world, because it inherits ideological social philosophers lights pawning ; but therefore given rise to promises by the Revolution of 1789 who opens an era of intellectual mutations and of social evolutions beyond social political expressed tensions by a literature of which the pawning consist to make to evolve the personage, notably the youthful hero, still fond to dream in a society where everything is and remains to reconstruct, it imports to answer to a fundamental preoccupation : how to assert oneself, to build a destiny when one himself does not test myself that as an enigma, an existential preoccupation and an indisposition ? The tutorial novel of the century puts us in presence of destinies in development, of ambitions and of potentialities after fulfillment, what gives confers him all his aesthetic qualities

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Edgard V C Zanette.pdf: 940001 bytes, checksum: dcbded6f36763d42bd96ff3e0fa9d0bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The methodical doubt enables the discovery of the first certainty of cartesian philosophy, the cogito. The cogito is discovered, not invented. For this intrinsic characteristic of the cartesian method, and to understand the cogito we have to pass through the most radical hyperbolic doubt. The cartesian doubt puts in motion continuous process that destroys all and any opinion that contains the slightest hint of doubt. In a first moment in this process of destruction of de losses, the methodical doubt propose abandonment of the external external world instead subject meditador, because the senses deceive, and all that, somehow, expect them to exist is considered doubtful, and therefore uncertain. The rigor of this review proposed by Descartes will, however, later, developed another separation between the subject of de doubt and everything external to it. This second stage is the most dramatic and radical the cartesian thought, because is through him that there will be conditions of possibility to the cogito to be discovered and sensed, as the fist certainly in the order of the Meditations. Despite this dramatic context that cogito appears, the problem of the external world dont's contributes only to the discovery of the cogito, but the problem of the external world will reappear solved by the cogito, when destroyed the possibility of doubt and the overall failure of reason. Is about this first movement of the emergence of the problem from the external world, its development and it's overcoming whit the discovery of the cogito that emerges what we call the subject or subjectivity in Descartes. Therefore, we will investigate this discovery process of cogito, via methodical doubt, where skepticism is reinvented by Descartes as the firt moment of the serch for truth, such that the problem of the external world emerges as the condition of the destruction of the losses for the discovery at least one indubitable truth. After the cartesian doubt, as the sense and the complement of the same, we have the birth of the cartesian notion of subject or subjectivity. Against this notion we will investigate that constitutes the first moment of subjet discovery or cartesian subjectivity centered in the cogito, wich we shall call the metaphysical subject. / A dúvida metódica possibilita a descoberta da primeira certeza da filosofia cartesiana, o cogito. O cogito é descoberto e não inventado. Por essa característica intrínseca ao método cartesiano, para bem compreendermos o cogito temos que passar pelo crivo da mais radical dúvida hiperbólica. A dúvida cartesiana coloca em marcha um processo contínuo que destrói toda e qualquer opinião que contenha o mínimo indício de dúvida. Em um primeiro momento, nesse processo de destruição dos prejuízos, a dúvida metódica propõe o abandono do mundo externo ao sujeito meditador, pois os sentidos enganam e tudo o que, de alguma maneira, dependa deles para existir é considerado duvidoso, e, portanto, incerto. O rigor dessa análise crítica proposta por Descartes vai, porém, adiante, desenvolvendo outra separação entre o sujeito da dúvida e tudo o que lhe é externo. Esse segundo momento é o mais dramático e radical ao pensamento cartesiano, pois é por meio dele que haverá as condições de possibilidade de o cogito ser descoberto e intuído, como a primeira certeza na ordem das Meditações. Apesar desse contexto dramático em que o cogito aparece, o problema do mundo exterior não contribui somente para a descoberta do cogito, mas o problema do mundo externo reaparecerá e será solucionado pelo próprio cogito, ao ser destruída a possibilidade da dúvida global e da falência da razão. É sobre esse primeiro movimento de surgimento do problema do mundo exterior, seu desenvolvimento e sua superação com a descoberta do cogito que emerge o que chamamos de sujeito ou subjetividade em Descartes. Sendo assim, investigaremos esse processo de descoberta do cogito, via dúvida metódica, em que o ceticismo é reinventado por Descartes como o primeiro momento da busca pela verdade, de modo tal que o problema do mundo exterior emerge como a condição da destruição dos prejuízos para a descoberta de ao menos uma verdade indubitável. Após a dúvida cartesiana, como o sentido e o complemento da mesma, temos o nascimento da noção cartesiana de sujeito ou subjetividade. Diante desta noção iremos investigar em que consiste o primeiro momento da descoberta do sujeito ou da subjetividade cartesiana centrada no cogito, que denominaremos de sujeito metafísico.

Orientador: Márcio Augusto Damin Custódio / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-26T07:54:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vieira_GabrielArrutiAragao_M.pdf: 1078546 bytes, checksum: 6293d6197371e4d5e74b8dbc53153c62 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: O objetivo desta dissertação é apresentar o modo como Arnauld interpreta a relação corpo-alma na união substancial estabelecida por Descartes como compatível à filosofia de Agostinho e mostrar que esta concepção está presente nas Paixões da Alma e nas Meditações. Primeiro investiga-se as objeções de Arnauld direcionadas a Descartes e suas respectivas respostas, considerando as comparações entre Descartes e Agostinho feitas por Arnauld como base para os questionamentos estabelecidos na discussão. Esta comparação se refere a aspectos fundamentais da concepção da união substancial em questão, a saber, ao princípio do cogito, à distinção real entre substância pensante e substância extensa e à afirmação de que o conhecimento formado por concepções puras do entendimento é mais certo que os conhecimentos formados através da imaginação e da experiência sensível. Na sequência, apresenta-se o modo como Arnauld no Examen utiliza o texto de Agostinho para defender Descartes de acusações de heresia, o que confirma a ideia de que Arnauld concebe a relação corpo-alma proposta por Descartes como compatível com a filosofia de Agostinho. Por fim, sustenta-se que a posição de Arnauld quanto à relação corpo-alma está presente nas Paixões da Alma e nas Meditações / Abstract: The objective of this dissertation is to present how Arnauld interprets the body-soul relation in substantial union established by Descartes as compatible with the philosophy of Augustine and to show that this conception is present in the Passions of the Soul and the Meditations. First we investigate the Arnauld¿s objections directed to Descartes and their respective answers, considering the comparisons between Descartes and Augustine made by Arnauld as the basis for the questions set out in the discussion. This comparison relates to fundamental aspects of the substantial union in question, namely, the principle of the cogito, the real distinction between thinking substance and extended substance and the assertion that knowledge formed by pure conceptions of the understanding is more certain that the knowledge formed through imagination and sensory experience. Following, we present how Arnauld uses Augustine¿s text to defend Descartes from accusations of heresy, which confirms the idea that Arnauld conceives the body-soul relation proposed by Descartes as compatible with the Augustine¿s philosophy. Finally, we show that the Arnauld¿s position about body-soul relation is present in the Passions of the Soul and the Meditations / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Initiée par René Girard, la théorie mimétique suggère que l’égalité des conditions consacrée comme un droit exacerbe la rivalité entre semblables. Quand l’étiolement de la souveraineté étatique et la logique compétitive de l’économie marchande coïncident avec la prolifération de conflits aux enjeux planétaires, cette rivalité des égaux prend une valeur paradigmatique. L’ambition d’une anthropologie mimétique à traiter de l’époque contemporaine mieux que la philosophie politique idéaliste ou la science politique réaliste suppose une reformulation. Espérance de pallier une insuffisance d’être, le désir mimétique, ou désir d’être autre, aboutit à un résultat contradictoire, la déception de rester insuffisant, l’autre étant alors perçu à la fois comme modèle et obstacle. Pour les acteurs politiques, ce désir devient la revendication d’une égale puissance d’être, promesse faite autant par la citoyenneté, le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes que la souveraineté des États sur leur territoire et leur population.En tant que modalité de la contention de la violence, le politique serait ainsi analysable par une « science des rapports humains », anthropologie englobante et non-disciplinaire adoptant un interdividualisme méthodologique. Sur fond de menaces inédites pour la pérennité de l’humanité, la réciprocité des rapports humains fait douter de la compatibilité entre projet égalitaire, quête d’identité et concorde sociale. Ces rapports questionnent également la prépondérance actuelle de la compétition dans les institutions, entre autres politiques, laquelle s’est imposée comme liant paradoxal du gouvernement représentatif et de l’économie de marché. / Conceived by René Girard, mimetic theory suggests that the equality of conditions, established as a right, exacerbates the rivalry between similar individuals or groups. When the withering away of state sovereignty and the competitive logic of the market economy overlap with the multiplication of conflicts, this rivalry of equals becomes a relevant paradigm.Mimetic anthropology’s ambition – to address contemporary issues better than either idealistic political philosophy or realistic political science –, demands nevertheless to be revisited. The hope to overcome a lack of being, mimetic desire, or one’s desire to become someone else ends up giving way to a contradictory outcome: the disappointment of remaining oneself, the other thereby being perceived as both one’s model and one’s obstacle. For political actors, this desire turns into the claim of the equal power to be, which the promise of citizenship, the right of peoples to self-determination and the state sovereignty over its people and its territory each exemplify. As a modality of the containment of violence, politics could then be analyzed by a non-disciplinary "science of human relationships", implementing a methodological interdividualism. Against the backdrop of unprecedented threats to the survival of humanity, the reciprocity of human relationships casts doubt on the compatibility between the egalitarian project, the quest for identity, and social harmony. These relationships also question the current predominance of competition in the institutions, including political institutions, which has become the paradoxical binding agent between representative governments and the market economy.

In presenting their correspondence, I highlight the means in which Hobbes is able to divorce nature and politics in his philosophy. This is done by bringing to light Hobbes’s agreement with Descartes’s deceiving God argument. First, I demonstrate Hobbes’s hidden agreement with it by analyzing his objection to Descartes’s first Meditation. Second, I show that Hobbes and Descartes both retreat into consciousness in order to deal with the possibility of deception on the behalf of God. Third, I trace Hobbes’s rational justification for entertaining that very possibility. Fourth, I bring forward Hobbes’s certain principle, that God is incomprehensible. Fifth, I demonstrate Hobbes’s rationalization for rendering nature incomprehensible in turn. From this key insight, the differences between the two philosophers stand out more. Whereas Descartes rids himself of the possibility of a deceiving God, Hobbes does not. Sixth, I show that Descartes needs to rid himself of that possibility in order to have a basis for science, Hobbes’s science is such that he does not need to rid himself of that possibility. My investigation ends by considering both Hobbes’s and Descartes’s stance on nature, in relation to politics. I find that Hobbes’s principle is much more practical that Descartes’s principle. Hobbes’s principle is shown to be much more instructive and sustainable for human life. In conclusion, this analysis of the origins, principles, and orientation of the two philosopher’s thought brings forward the overarching question, whether the recovery of value and meaning is to be brought about in nature, or in civilization.

No description available.

The main subject of the presented work is the question of power within the context of sociological theory, and in relation to the mechanism of psychological mimesis and the phenomenon of the sacred. Our starting point is René Girard's mimetic theory, which systematizes the relationship between the mechanism of psychological mimesis and the sacred - in the light of the phenomenon of violence. We, firstly, present Girard's mimetic theory, explicate its main concepts, and situate all into a broader context. Further, we critically examine Girard's theoretical scheme and come to the conclusion that his theoretical and conceptual framework calls for a revision, if it is to be utilized within the context of sociology and social theory. Consequently, we try to "sociologize" Girard's thinking. First, we position his line of thought into the wider sociological context, and then examine his theory in the light of thinking of two classical sociologists, Gabriel Tarde and Émile Durkheim. We then project this examination into a theoretical and conceptual synthesis on the basis of which we formulate our own conceptual scheme, which is based on the assumption of psychological mimesis as an anthropological constant, and which overcomes the main shortcomings of Girard's theoretical framework. On the basis of this...

This is a dissertation about human separatism. Human separatism is the social imaginary according to which Humanity should aim to use technology to “separate” itself from nature. It is incoherent and self-undermining. But it has also proven persistent and resilient, and appears to be intensifying in the face of fears about phenomena like climate change. In chapter 1 I unpack three distinct conceptions of “separation” that I argue have prevailed at different times in European philosophical and cultural history. The first is ontological, or related to being; the second is epistemological, or related to knowing; and the third is “nomological”, or related to law-making and laws. These correspond roughly to Ancient thought (in Plato and Augustine), Early Modern thought (in Bacon and Descartes) and Modern thought (in Kant and the contemporary “Ecomodernists”), respectively. I also offer some reasons for concluding that the concept of separation is in general incoherent. In chapter 2 I reflect upon why this imaginary has proven so difficult to overcome. Specifically, following existential psychology, I propose that it is a perverse manifestation of terrors that are central to the human condition. In particular it is a manifestation of the fears we have as human beings about our limited agency and our mortality or finitude. These fears are powerful enough to override rational thinking. Insofar as fantasies about separation from nature provide a salve for them, these fantasies persist over time. Insofar as fears of death and mortality are more and more front-and-centre for us as individuals and collectives, these fantasies become ever-more resilient to critique, and continue to intensify. In chapter 3 I consider some challenges that emerge when we attempt to gather resources for imaginative alternatives to separatism. I consider the ideas that we might either (a) invent a new story from whole cloth, or (b) appropriate the stories and theories of other cultures and attempting to graft them onto our own. I reject these approaches, and explore some resources from critical ecofeminism as intellectual tools to understand them, and develop some design parameters for alternative approaches. In chapter 4, I explore the narratives of some First Nations Australian cosmologies as they speak to the relationship between human beings and the natural world in the work of the First Nations writers Mary Graham and Tyson Yunkaporta. I then consider what might be involved in presenting some of these same insights in terms that adhere to the design parameters I set out in chapter 3. I propose that the genre of narrative tragedy is a powerful place to do some of this work. To flesh out this claim, I offer a series of detailed reflections on narrative tragedy, drawing on the work of Julian Young, and suggest that tragic narratives offer a powerful place for metabolizing existential anxieties, for coming to terms with ecological reality, and for encouraging and engaging in dialogue about imaginative alternative futures.