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[pt] O presente trabalho tem como proposta discutir The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), de James Harrington, situando-a no âmbito de uma literatura política dedicada à constituição de sociedades ideais na Inglaterra da Primeira Modernidade. Para tanto, abordaremos os conceitos de sociedade ideal e de utopia a partir de uma leitura de Utopia (1516) de Thomas More. Tanto Utopia, quanto Oceana são repúblicas ficcionais que, inspiradas na Antiguidade Clássica, apresentam uma sociedade livre, com ampla participação popular e fundadas em leis virtuosas. No entanto, esses textos são separados por mais de um século e também escritos sob diferentes contextos políticos. Ainda assim, destacam-se as sagazes imaginações políticas que os atravessam. Assim, esta dissertação analisa as diferenças e semelhanças tanto nas formas quanto nas funções dessas obras, ressaltando as transformações que o gênero utópico sofreu no decorrer dos anos e como isso transformou a sua interpretação. O debate em torno das sociedades ideais, especialmente do conceito de utopia, é substancial para a pesquisa, uma vez que se considera possível interpretar a obra de Harrington como utópica. / [en] The present work proposes to discuss The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) by James Harrington, placing the work within the framework of a political literature dedicated to the constitution of ideal societies in Early Modernity England. It treats the concepts of ideal society and utopia while engaging in a reading of Thomas More s Utopia (1516). Both Utopia and Oceana are fictional republics, which, inspired by Classical Antiquity, present a free society with broad popular participation and founded on virtuous laws. These texts are separated by a time gap of more than a century and also written under different political contexts. Nonetheless, the shrewd political imaginations that made them stand out. Thus, this dissertation analyzes the differences and similarities both in the forms and the functions of these works, highlighting the transformations that the utopian genre has undergone over the years and how this has transformed its interpretation. The debate about ideal societies, especially the concept of utopia, is substantial for this research since it deems possible to interpret Harrington s work as utopia.

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Ascetic Citizens: Religious Austerity and Political Crisis in Anglo-American Literature, 1681-1799, attends to a number of scenes of voluntary self-restraint in literary, political, and religious writings of the long eighteenth century, scenes that stage, what Alexis de Tocqueville calls, “daily small acts of self-denial” in the service of the nation. Existing studies of asceticism in Anglo-American culture during the period are extremely slim. Ascetic Citizens fills an important gap in the scholarship by re-framing religious practices of seclusion and self-denial as a broadly-defined set of civic practices that permeate the political, religious, and gender discourses of late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglo-American culture. This thesis focuses on the transatlantic relevance of the ascetic citizen—a figure whose rhetorical utility derives from its capacity, as a marker of political and religious moderation, to deploy individual practices of religious austerity as a means of suturing extreme political binaries during times of political crisis. My conception of asceticism’s role in Anglo-American society is informed by an understanding of ascetic citizenship as a cluster of concepts and cultural practices linking the ascetic’s focus on bodily control to republican theories of political subjectivity. The notion that political membership presupposes a renunciation of personal liberties on the part of the individual citizen represents one of the key assumptions of ascetic citizenship. The future guarantee of individual political rights is ensured by present renunciations of self-interest. As such, the ascetic citizen functions according to the same economy by which the religious ascetic’s right to future eternal reward is ensured by present acts of pious self-abnegation. That is to say, republican political liberty is enabled by what we might call an ascetic prerequisite in which the voluntary self-sacrifice of civic rights guarantees the state’s protection of such rights from the infringements of one’s neighbour. While the abstemious nature of ascetic practice implies efficiency grounded in economic frugality, bodily self-restraint, and physical isolation, the ascetic citizen functions as the sanctioned perversion of a normative devotional practice that circumvents the division between profane self-interest and sacred disinterestedness. The relevance of ascetic citizenship to political culture is its political fluidity, its potential to exceed the ideological functions of the dominant culture while revealing the tension that exists between endorsement of, and dissent from, the civic norm. Counter-intuitively, the ascetic citizen’s practice is marked by a celebration of moderation, of the via media. Forging a space at the threshold between endorsement/dissent, the ascetic citizen maps the dialectic movement of cultural extremism, forging a rhetorically useful site of ascetic deferral characterized by the subject’s ascetic withdrawal from making critical decisions. Ascetic Citizens provides a detailed investigation of how eighteenth-century Anglo-American authors such as Daniel Defoe, Samuel Richardson, Hannah Webster Foster, and Charles Brockden Brown conceive of individual subjectivity as it exists in the pause or retired moment between competing political orders.

L’objectif poursuivi dans ce mémoire est de démontrer comment, à travers les revers de la Fortune, c’est-à-dire à travers le fait de la contingence, il est possible de penser la liberté politique chez Nicolas Machiavel. Pour ce faire, nous travaillons à partir du concept d’histoire. Nous soutenons que pour être capable d’assurer la liberté des citoyens et de Florence, Machiavel élabore une théorie politique dont la pierre angulaire est la notion d’histoire : l’histoire est constitutive de la politique et elle est la condition sine qua non pour faire face à la Fortune. Pour soutenir une telle chose, nous présentons d’abord comment, durant l’Antiquité l’histoire a été conçue. Nous exposons par la suite le même questionnement, mais cette fois-ci en regard de la tradition humaniste. Il est alors possible de constater que les humanistes ont repris les intuitions gréco-romaines, mais qu’ils ont cristallisé la question de l’histoire autour de la vertu, du bien commun et de la vita activa. Nous tentons ensuite de situer Machiavel par rapport à ces conceptions issues de l’Antiquité et de la Renaissance au sujet de l’histoire. Par sa description de la nature humaine, des humeurs et son rapport à la vertu, nous arguons que sur plusieurs plans, il s’oppose à ses prédécesseurs immédiats, les humanistes. Nous explorons alors ce qu’il propose : une redéfinition de la prudence et du concept de vertu. Finalement, ces refus nous permettent de dégager sur quoi repose sa solution au problème de la Fortune: d’abord une lecture de la politique selon la vérité effective, et ensuite, la mise en place d’institutions capables de s’adapter aux changements et qui correspondent aux mœurs des citoyens. / The determined objective in this essay is to demonstrate how, through the reverse of the Fortune, in other words the contingency, it is possible to think the political freedom of Nicolas Machiavel. To accomplish that, we use the concept of history as a starting point. We hold that to be able to insure the freedom of the people and of Florence, Machiavelli elaborates a political theory who’s cornerstone is the notion of history: history is constitutive of politics and it is the condition sine qua non to face the Fortune. To do that, we first present how history was conceived during Antiquity. We then expose the same question, but this time with regards to the humanist tradition. It is therefore possible to ascertain that humanists reused the greco-roman intuitions, but they also crystallized the problem of history around virtue, the common good, and also the vita activa. We then attempt to situate Machiavelli based on his conceptions about history taken from the Antiquity and the Renaissance. Through his depiction of the human nature, the theory of humours, the polis and his conception about virtue, we argue that on many levels, he is in opposition with his immediate predecessors, the humanists. We then navigate through what he proposes: a redefinition of the concept of the prudence and virtue. Finally, these rebuttals allow us to bring out the basis on which holds his solution for the problem of Fortune: first on an oriented reading of politics based on the effective truth, and then on the establishment of institutions capable of adaptation and that correspond to the customs of the people.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

L'objectif poursuivi dans ce mémoire est de montrer que le néo-républicanisme possède les outils les plus efficaces pour penser la réconciliation des droits individuels, fondement des États de droits occidentaux contemporains, et des droits collectifs que peuvent légitimement réclamer les collectivités nationales. Dans cette visée, et comme de nombreux auteurs libéraux se sont attaqués à cette question dans les dernières décennies, j'expose d'abord trois stratégies libérales pour traiter cette possible réconciliation tout en faisant ressortir leurs faiblesses respectives. J'avance qu'aucune de ces stratégies ne permet vraiment de comprendre comment un régime de droits collectifs et un régime de droits individuels peuvent être articulés de façon cohérente. J'argue ensuite que le néo-républicanisme, parce qu'il comprend la liberté non pas comme l'absence d'interférence, mais comme un statut de non-domination, permet de voir que les droits collectifs des groupes nationaux et les droits individuels sont nécessairement compatibles, parce qu'ils s'organisent en fonction du même idéal. Les droits d'un individu et ceux de sa collectivité nationale sont, d'une certaine manière, les deux faces d'une même médaille, la non-domination individuelle dépendant de la non-domination du groupe national auquel l'individu appartient. En dernier lieu, je soutiens que cette compréhension du rapport entre les deux régimes de droits devrait se traduire par un ensemble de mesures institutionnelles concrètes dont la plus importante est la reconnaissance d'un droit, pour les collectivités nationales, à l'autodétermination. / The purpose of this M.A. research is to show that neo-republicanism provides the most efficient tools to think the reconciliation of a system of individual rights, upon which western contemporary states and their rule of law are based, and of a system of collective rights that can legitimately be claimed by national collectivities. Since the issue of the compatibility of individual and collective rights has mainly been tackled by liberals, I begin by presenting three liberal strategies to deal with this possible reconciliation and I try to highlight their insufficiencies. I claim that none of those strategies actually provide a consistent way to understand how a system of individual rights and a system of collective rights can coherently be articulated. I then argue that neo-republicanism, for it conceptualizes liberty not as the absence of interference, but as the absence of domination, makes apparent that national collectivities’ rights and individual rights are necessarily compatible since they spring from the same ideal. The rights of an individual and the rights of its national collectivity are, in a way, the two sides of the same coin, for individual non-domination depends upon the non- domination of the national group to which the individual belongs. Lastly, I claim that grasping the relationship between the two systems of rights in this manner should be reflected by a set of concrete institutional measures, the most important being the recognition of a right, for national collectivities, to self-determination.