Neste trabalho é apresentada e defendida a tese segundo a qual o projeto filosófico de Arthur Schopenhauer deve ser entendido como o estabelecimento de um sistema de filosofia transcendental, constituído de uma teoria da experiência coordenada a uma teoria geral das faculdades cognitivas e a um “primeiro princípio”, que apresentamos e discutimos. Assim compreendida, a filosofia de Schopenhauer guarda uma relação peculiar de continuidade com a filosofia transcendental de Kant: herda e reformula o projeto de Karl Leonhard Reinhold, articulado em resposta aos céticos Salomon Maimon e Gottlob Ernst Schulze, edificando um sistema de filosofia transcendental que contempla as ambições fundacionistas presentes no projeto de Reinhold, as críticas que esse projeto recebera e críticas endereçadas à própria teoria da experiência de Kant no contexto de recepção da Crítica da Razão Pura. / In this work is presented and defended the thesis according to which Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical project should be understood as aiming at putting forward a system of transcendental philosophy. That system comprises a theory of experience coordinated to a general theory of cognitive faculties and to a “first principle” which we present and discuss. So understood, Schopenhauer’s philosophy exhibits a peculiar relationship of continuity with Kant’s transcendental philosophy: it inherits and reformulates Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s project as it was conceived in response to the skeptics Salomon Maimon and Gottlob Ernst Schulze, building a system of transcendental philosophy which encompasses the foundationalist ambitions of Reinhold’s project and the criticisms which that project had received, as much as some criticisms which was addressed at Kant’s theory of experience itself in the context of reception of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Neste trabalho é apresentada e defendida a tese segundo a qual o projeto filosófico de Arthur Schopenhauer deve ser entendido como o estabelecimento de um sistema de filosofia transcendental, constituído de uma teoria da experiência coordenada a uma teoria geral das faculdades cognitivas e a um “primeiro princípio”, que apresentamos e discutimos. Assim compreendida, a filosofia de Schopenhauer guarda uma relação peculiar de continuidade com a filosofia transcendental de Kant: herda e reformula o projeto de Karl Leonhard Reinhold, articulado em resposta aos céticos Salomon Maimon e Gottlob Ernst Schulze, edificando um sistema de filosofia transcendental que contempla as ambições fundacionistas presentes no projeto de Reinhold, as críticas que esse projeto recebera e críticas endereçadas à própria teoria da experiência de Kant no contexto de recepção da Crítica da Razão Pura. / In this work is presented and defended the thesis according to which Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical project should be understood as aiming at putting forward a system of transcendental philosophy. That system comprises a theory of experience coordinated to a general theory of cognitive faculties and to a “first principle” which we present and discuss. So understood, Schopenhauer’s philosophy exhibits a peculiar relationship of continuity with Kant’s transcendental philosophy: it inherits and reformulates Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s project as it was conceived in response to the skeptics Salomon Maimon and Gottlob Ernst Schulze, building a system of transcendental philosophy which encompasses the foundationalist ambitions of Reinhold’s project and the criticisms which that project had received, as much as some criticisms which was addressed at Kant’s theory of experience itself in the context of reception of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando de Sa Moreira.pdf: 900127 bytes, checksum: e6dca220fe2a2ad340fec9e410b1d430 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-01 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This dissertation investigates the conception of asceticism on two German philosophers, Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. Whereas there isn't a precise language to mediate this two philosophies, we apply the concepts of pathos and ethos to make a dialog between the German philosophers, which allow us to investigate how these concepts appear in the cosmological and ethical parts of their theories. Especially in the Nietzsche's philosophy, we concentrate the researches on his third period. We use mainly the books Genealogy of Moral, Beyond Good and Evil and The Antichrist. About Schopenhauer's books, we use mainly the two volumes of The World as Will and Representation. Our conclusion is that, on Schopenhauer's doctrine, the cosmological effectiveness (Wirklichkeit) is pathos, but the metaphysical reality (Realität) is ethos. Therefore the asceticism is a sui generis pathos on Schopenhauer: when the will extraordinarily makes a turn, it makes the negation of the will, it does not become an absolute nothing. It become a relative nothing, a negative pathos. The same does not occur to Nietzsche. According to the philosopher of the will to power, the will never negates itself. All the effectiveness is always pathos and there is no ethos: the world is always pathos, in all aspects. The asceticism is an ordinary case of the will to power (Wille zur Macht) and the ascetic pathos is merely a strategy of a form of life to conserve itself in existence. / Esta dissertação investiga a concepção de ascetismo nos filósofos alemães, Arthur Schopenhauer e Friedrich Nietzsche. Considerando que não há uma linguagem precisa para mediar estas duas filosofias, aplicamos os conceitos de pathos e ethos para criar o diálogo entre os dois filósofos alemães, o que nos permite investigar como esses conceitos aparecem nas partes cosmológicas e éticas das suas teorias. Na filosofia nietzschiana, concentramos nossas pesquisas no seu terceiro período, principalmente os livros Genealogia da moral, Além de bem e mal e O anticristo. Em relação às obras schopenhauerianas, utilizamos principalmente os dois volumes de O mundo como vontade e representação. Nossa conclusão é que, na doutrina schopenhaueriana, a efetividade cosmológica (Wirklichkeit) é pathos, mas a realidade metafísica (Realität) é ethos. Assim, o ascetismo é um pathos sui generis em Schopenhauer: quando a vontade extraordinariamente faz uma viragem, ou seja, faz a negação da vontade, ela não se torna um nada absoluto, mas se torna um nada relativo, um pathos negativo. O mesmo não acontece em Nietzsche. Para o filósofo da vontade de potência, a vontade jamais nega a si mesma. Toda efetividade é sempre pathos e não há ethos algum: o mundo é sempre pathos, em todos os seus aspectos. O ascetismo é um caso ordinário da vontade de potência (Wille zur Macht) e o pathos ascético é apenas uma estratégia de uma forma de vida para conservar-se na existência.

Proposed thesis is an attempt to summarise the term object in the work of American philosopher Graham Harman, he himself named Object oriented ontology. The accent will be given also to other terms such as realism, essence, quadruple dimension of object, withdrawal of object, intentionality, conception of time and space, emanation and others. It attempts to create a certain genealogy of those terms in the work of other authors (Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzche, Merleau-Ponty) and consequent comparison with the use of those terms in Harman's work. The aim is to create a certain critical overview of Harman's conception of o object and in general speculative realism theory and point out certain other approached to the classical subject-object dimension.

<p>Denna c-uppsats behandlar Nietzsches avvikelse från Schopenhauers <em>Världen som Vilja och Föreställning</em> i verket <em>Tragedins födelse</em>. Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka varför det för Nietzsche är möjligt att förena det apolliniska och det dionysiska medan det för Schopenhauer inte är möjligt att förena vilja och föreställning.</p>

À sa publication, La Joie de vivre d'Émile Zola fut reçue comme un roman à thèse réfutant les théories d'Arthur Schopenhauer. C'était là l'intention avouée du romancier. Or, nombreux sont les critiques à avoir soulevé la dimension puissamment pessimiste de l'oeuvre, invoquant surtout le personnage fortement autobiographique de Lazare et une genèse textuelle problématique. Zola accordait une grande importance à la documentation qu'il préparait en vue de rédiger ses romans. Notre objectif premier est donc celui d'examiner la façon qu'a eu le romancier d'écrire la philosophie qu'il a lue. À cette fin, nous nous penchons sur le Dossier préparatoire de La Joie de vivre et y suivons les stades successifs du personnage schopenhauerien; nous étudions également la version publiée du roman, mais de façon ciblée: nous nous limitons aux thèmes -fort schopenhaueriens -de la douleur et du malheur. Nous constatons, à partir de l'analyse des personnages, qu'un système très proche des idées du philosophe structure l'oeuvre et hiérarchise les forces en présence. Au cours de la préparation et de la rédaction de l'oeuvre, les faits compilés se mêlent au hasard des données biographiques, idéologiques et littéraires qui viennent en former la matière narrative. Notre labeur de généticien aura été celui de démêler les diverses influences rencontrées et de les replacer en ordre chronologique. Certaines, comme celles de Guy de Maupassant ou de Paul Bourget n'avaient pas encore été attestées ou n'avaient pas fait l'objet d'études approfondies. II en résulte une vision plus complète de l'avant-texte. Nos résultats démontrent qu'Émile Zola s'est trouvé à fictionnaliser plutôt fidèlement, à plusieurs égards, une philosophie qu'il entendait au départ réfuter. Le sens philosophique de l'oeuvre demeure ambigu néanmoins, irréductible à une conclusion nette. Partant, nous nous interrogeons sur la portée philosophique d'un texte Iiltéraire aussi plurivoque qu'est La Joie de vivre. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Zola, La Joie de vivre, Schopenhauer, Philosophie, Génétique, Personnage.

Denna c-uppsats behandlar Nietzsches avvikelse från Schopenhauers Världen som Vilja och Föreställning i verket Tragedins födelse. Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka varför det för Nietzsche är möjligt att förena det apolliniska och det dionysiska medan det för Schopenhauer inte är möjligt att förena vilja och föreställning.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Curitiba, 2006 / Inclui bibliografia / O presente trabalho é uma investigação sobre a dimensão dionisíaca na tragédia grega, encontrada na produção filosófica do jovem Nietzsche, no período entre 1870 e 1876. Tem como ponto de partida uma reflexão sobre a Teoria do Uno-primordial e sua naturez