Small states tend to use different security strategies to increase and gain influence over their own level of security. Sweden is a small Nordic state with a long history of proclaimed neutrality when it comes to security policy. But in the last couple of decades the country has increased its contributions to, and participations in, numerous EU and NATO security projects and exercises. In 2009, Sweden adopted a declaration of solidarity towards the member countries of the EU. In 2014, Sweden also signed a memorandum of understanding with NATO. This has ignited bothan internal and an external debate among political scientists and security experts about what the Swedish security strategy is. This paper seeks to describe and clarify the Swedish security strategy by analyzing documents on security policy from the Swedish government. The study also examines the level of continuity in the Swedish security strategy. Based on a theoretical framework of security strategies of small states, the study utilizes three ideal types of the small state security strategies balancing , bandwagoning and hedging to analyze and describe the Swedish security strategy. The study concludes that the Swedish security strategy as it is presented in two official documents on security policy ranging from 2009 to 2015 mostly indicates balancing . The willingness to strengthen the Swedish military capacity and theeagerness for cooperation with the EU, NATO and USA clearly indicates balancing towardsRussia, a state which is described as a security threat in both documents. However, there are also tendencies towards hedging due to the insistence of armed neutrality in both documents. The study also shows that while there is a high degree of continuity in Sweden’s security strategy there has been a small shift in strategy towards more balancing from 2009 to 2015.

The international political landscape of the 21st century is strewn with terrorist groups that choose to act violently in order for their political messages to be heard. Around the world groups have been formed to defend their ideologies and fulfill their political agendas through acts of terrorism. The Baader-Meinhof Gang [also known as the Red Army Faction], the Weather Underground, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, HAMAS, and the Irish Republican Army have existed for many decades. They represent only a small handful of terrorist groups that have kidnapped, targeted public institutions with bombs, and employed suicide terrorism. More often than not innocent civilians become involved in the carnage of an act of terrorism when they are caught off guard as unassuming bystanders. On September 11th, 2001 both the American public and US government officials bore the weight of that horrific day. Since 9-11, Americans were robbed of their sense of safety, and the American dream of tranquility was shattered. A general unease spread from the wreckage of the World Trade Centers, and with the passing of time a keen sense of awareness about terrorism took its place. The events of 9/11 have made US citizens fully cognizant that there are many actors actively plotting the destruction of the US. Now, eight years later, Americans live with the daily realization that such a heinous act could happen again, in some other unimaginable form. For the US government, the past eight years have been marked with as many successes as failures. The consequences of the inability of the US intelligence community to foresee the international plot unfolding, within and outside of the homeland, resulted in a major reorganization within the US government. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on November 25, 2002, and was created solely to address US vulnerabilities highlighted by the actions of nineteen al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. The DHS' main responsibility is to improve communication and information sharing among various intelligence-gathering agencies, so another attempt to plan an attack like 9/11 on US soil would be foiled before it materialized. The US government would no longer be noncommittal in the face of terrorism, as it had before 9/11. Clear messages to terrorists were sent on October 7th, 2001, through the US invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequently on March 20th, 2003 through the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the US' stance on the War on Terrorism was effectively and clearly communicated to al-Qaeda and throughout the rest of the world. The US might once have been labeled a paper tiger, but hitting the US at the core of their financial and military symbols struck a nerve. The terrorist attacks of 2001 taught the US government a vital lesson, but the military campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq would demonstrate that the US had even more to learn about the newest military tactics and techniques employed by the enemy, and how these tactics impacted on US military operations, strategies, and policies.

With the aim of contributing to the theoretical discussion of small state behaviour, this thesis investigates the Nordic state’s security strategies concerning the Arctic region. The applied theoretical framework is based upon a traditional state-centric understanding of security to investigate if the predicted behaviour derived from small state theory can be captured in the Nordic states' security strategies in the Arctic region. The study is conducted by a qualitative content analysis utilising Jacob Westberg’s theorisation of security strategies through the categories of context, ends, means and ways. The state-centric security focus is steered by the traditional realist focus of small states and motivated by the deteriorating geopolitical sphere currently occurring in the Arctic region, where the small Nordic states operate next to great powers. The results demonstrate that several aspects can be argued to coincide with the assumptions derived from small state theory, albeit some do not fully conform. Most apparent are the aspects relating to the importance of alliances and cooperation. Differences are also deductible between the small state's strategies, primarily between Denmark and Norway vis-a-vis Finland and Sweden. This incoherency enables a discussion of the relevance of states' size in the case of the Arctic theatre and of the noticeable shift in the states' referent security object. The analytical framework captures issues that point towards a more state-centric security understanding, presenting new threats to the state's survival in the Arctic region.

No / The dichotomy between prohibitive law and moral responsibility is at the centre of debates about the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. However, political interests remain an important factor not only in determining and tempering the humanitarian impulses of states, but also for gauging their more general adherence to the rule of law. The humanitarian intervention debate only has meaning in a context in which there is general, routine adherence to the non-interventionist norm of the international system, codified as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The `Bush Doctrine¿ of pre-emptive self-defence alters the political and politico-legal context that has until now given the humanitarian intervention debate its meaning and importance. Given this, together with a more general loosening of the strictures prohibiting or limiting the use of force, there is good cause for concern about the foundations of the post-1945 international order. The debate about humanitarian intervention can no longer abstract the tension between law and morality from a political arena that is facing such profound challenges.

The cyber world is growing as more information is converted from analogue to digital form. While convenience has been the main driver for this change little effort has been made on securing the data. Data breaches are growing in number and each breach is growing in severity. Combined with regulatory pressure organizations are starting to realize the importance of security. The increased threat level is also driving the security market for more potent solutions and artificial intelligence (AI) have in recent years been implemented to enhance the capabilities of security technologies.  The thesis aims to investigate the adoption of AI enabled cybersecurity technologies within the financial industry which is often perceived as the market leader regarding security. Using a qualitative method through a multiple case study, valuable insights were gained regarding how firms are working with security and what needs they have. To identify factors that influence the rate of diffusion of AI enabled security technologies the diffusion of innovation theory combined with the TOE framework was used in this study.  The thesis has contributed to the field of innovation management by enriching an area within IT innovation management by bridging the gap between security innovation and AI innovation. The study revealed that environmental factors, such as regulations and threat landscape, are forcing organizations to take action and control both how organizations work with security but also what technological attributes are perceived as advantageous. Detection and automation are two technological attributes that the companies are looking for to fill their needs. AI solutions are already being implemented to increase detection and automation we believe that the rate of adoption for AI enabled security innovation will only continue to grow. The results and findings contribute to an expanded understanding on the factors that affect adoption of AI security innovations within the financial industry. / Den digitala världen fortsätter att växa eftersom mer information omvandlas från analog till digital form. Medan bekvämlighet har varit den viktigaste drivkraften för denna förändring, så har lite ansträngning gjorts för att säkra upp den data som företagen besitter. Dataintrången växer i antal, och varje ny incident får allvarligare konsekvenser än den förra. Detta faktum kombinerat med strängare regelverk har fått företagen att inse vikten av att säkra sin miljö. Den förstärkta hotbilden driver också säkerhetsmarknaden framåt med nya lösningar, och artificiell intelligens (AI) har under de senaste åren i allt större utsträckning implementerats i säkerhetslösningar för att förstärka skyddet. Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka spridningen av AI-säkerhetsinnovationer inom finansbranschen, som ofta uppfattas som marknadsledande när det gäller säkerhet. Med hjälp av en kvalitativ metod genom en fallstudie på tre företag erhölls värdefulla insikter om hur företagen arbetar med säkerhet och vilka behov de har. För att identifiera faktorer som påverkar spridningshastigheten för AI-säkerhetslösningar användes ”diffusion of innovation”-teorin i kombination med TOE-ramverket i denna studie. Uppsatsen har bidragit till innovation management-området genom att berika ett område inom IT-innovation genom att brygga mellan säkerhetsinnovation och AI-innovation. Studien visade att miljöfaktorer, såsom regelverk och hotbild, kontrollerar både hur organisationer arbetar med säkerhet och vilka tekniska egenskaper som uppfattas som fördelaktiga. Detektion och automatisering är två tekniska egenskaper som företagen har stora behov av. AI-lösningar implementeras redan för att öka de egenskaperna. Vi argumenterar för att, utifrån de behoven som företagen har kombinerat med miljöfaktorerna, kommer spridningstakten att öka för AI-säkerhetsinnovation.

In a more complex and interdependent world, nations face new challenges that threaten their national security. National security should not be understood exclusively in the way of military threats by adversarial states but in a broader way: how old and new sectoral threats affect not only a state and its institutions but a nation as a whole, physically and economically. This dissertation looks into how the nature of security threats and risks has evolved in recent years. This dissertation then explores how different nations have decided to publish national security strategy documents and analyzes the way in which they include this broadened understanding of security: it finds that there is evidence of international policy diffusion related to the publication of such security strategies and that nations are evolving towards a broader understanding of security that includes models like whole-of-government, and whole-of-society. In the second half, this dissertation analyzes the route through which Mexico has reformed its national security framework since the year 2000 through a policy streams approach. After looking at the path that led to the creation of Mexico’s modern national security institutions, it analyzes the way in which Mexico national interests can be determined and how these interests inform the way in which Mexico understands national security threats and risks in the 21st Century. / text

IT experts often struggle to find strategies to secure data on the cloud. Although current security standards might provide cloud compliance, they fail to offer guarantees of security assurance. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the strategies used by IT security managers to host sensitive information in the commercial cloud. The study's population consisted of information security managers from a government agency in the eastern region of the United States. The routine active theory, developed by Cohen and Felson, was used as the conceptual framework for the study. The data collection process included IT security manager interviews (n = 7), organizational documents and procedures (n = 14), and direct observation of a training meeting (n = 35). Data collection from organizational data and observational data were summarized. Coding from the interviews and member checking were triangulated with organizational documents and observational data/field notes to produce major and minor themes. Through methodological triangulation, 5 major themes emerged from the data analysis: avoiding social engineering vulnerabilities, avoiding weak encryption, maintaining customer trust, training to create a cloud security culture, and developing sufficient policies. The findings of this study may benefit information security managers by enhancing their information security practices to better protect their organization's information that is stored in the commercial cloud. Improved information security practices may contribute to social change by providing by proving customers a lesser amount of risk of having their identity or data stolen from internal and external thieves

The concept of strategy has been the subject of much theorising and much has been written about what strategy is and what reasons might underlie the choice of different strategies. Considerably less has been written, however, about how strategy is actually done - what actions follow from the choice of strategy - and about those who actually do the action - the practitioners of strategy. In this paper, cooperation between France and Sweden is studied through the eyes of these practitioners with the ambition of increasing our understanding of defence strategic cooperation. The results of the study are threefold. Initially, French and Swedish strategy and the cooperation that takes place between the countries within the framework of their respective military cooperation strategies are described. Next, the practice of cooperation is described based on the activities described by the informants during the interviews. Finally, the practitioners' actions and the skills needed to operate in a political-diplomatic environment are described. Finally, a summary model of defence strategy cooperation from a practitioner's perspective is presented. The paper contributes both to the understanding of what cooperation actually consists of and to the understanding of how strategy becomes practical action. The inductive study is conducted as a qualitative interview study and does not claim to provide causal facts - the main contribution is about empirically grounded knowledge. / Strategibegreppet har varit föremål för omfattande teoretiserande och mycket har skrivits om vad strategi är och vilka skäl som eventuellt ligger bakom val av olika strategier. Betydligt mindre är dock skrivet om hur man egentligen gör strategi – vilket handlande som följer av valet av strategi – och om de som faktiskt utför handlandet – strategins praktiker. I denna uppsats studeras samarbetet mellan Frankrike och Sverige genom dessa praktikers ögon med ambitionen att öka vår förståelse för försvarsvarsstrategiskt samarbete. Resultatet av undersökningen är tredelat. Inledningsvis beskrivs fransk och svensk strategi och det samarbete som sker mellan länderna inom ramen för respektive militära samverkansstrategi. Därefter redogörs för samarbetes praktik utifrån de aktiviteter som informanterna beskrivit under intervjuerna. Slutligen beskrivs praktikernas handlande och de färdigheter som behövs för att kunna verka i en politisk-diplomatisk miljö. Avslutningsvis presenteras en sammanfattande modell för försvarsstrategiskt samarbete ur ett praktikerperspektiv. Uppsatsen bidrar dels till förståelsen av vad samarbete egentligen består av, dels till förståelsen av hur strategi blir praktisk handlande. Den induktiva undersökningen genomförs som en kvalitativ intervjuundersökningen och gör inte anspråk på att ge kausala fakta - det främsta bidraget handlar om empiriskt välgrundad kunskap. / Le concept de stratégie a fait l'objet de nombreuses théories et on a beaucoup écrit sur ce qu'est la stratégie et sur les raisons possibles du choix de différentes stratégies. Cependant, on a beaucoup moins écrit sur la manière dont la stratégie est réellement mise en œuvre - les actions qui découlent du choix de la stratégie - et sur ceux qui agissent réellement - les praticiens de la stratégie. Dans cet memoir, les résultats de l'étude sont triples. Dans un premier temps, il décrit la stratégie française et suédoise et la coopération qui a lieu entre les pays dans le cadre de leurs stratégies respectives de coopération militaire. Ensuite, la pratique de la coopération est décrite sur la base des activités décrites par les informateurs au cours des entretiens. Enfin, les actions des praticiens et les compétences nécessaires pour opérer dans un environnement politico-diplomatique sont décrites. Enfin, un modèle sommaire de coopération en matière de stratégie de défense du point de vue d'un praticien est présenté. Ce document contribue à la compréhension de ce qu'est réellement la coopération, et à la compréhension de la manière dont la stratégie devient une action pratique. L'étude inductive est menée sous la forme d'une étude qualitative par entretiens et ne prétend pas fournir des faits causaux - la principale contribution concerne les connaissances empiriques fondées.

This thesis asks why Japan decided to procure BMD if it meant building an infrastructure which, because of its technological nature, had the potential to disrupt Japan’s preferred security strategy of hedging, that is, maintaining ambiguity of commitment, vis-à-vis China and the US. The investigation was divided into three parts dealing with the following questions – Why did Japan's BMD procurement matter? Who mattered? Why were the BMD and related decisions made? Such a structure of research was informed by “neoclassical realism,” according to which the relative material power of a country sets the parameters of its foreign policy, but the policy choices within these international constraints are made by political elites. A range of policymaking heuristics were used to investigate the domestic element of the approach. In addition to the conventionally specified policymaking actors such as MOD, MOFA, Prime Ministers, an original attempt was made to identify the possible influences of several elite networks. On the basis of the notes from the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference, two elite networks were analysed, namely the Japan’s Congressional National Security Research Group and Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange. It was concluded that they have probably had some influence on shaping Japan's BMD decisions. The conclusion of this research is that BMD was procured despite its disruptive potential because it was a tool of shifting Japanese policy from one hedging policy to another, that is, from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength. An analysis of international relations in East Asia in 1994-2007 and an analysis of the views of the security elites make Japan's transition toward a military strength-based hedging appear rational and confirm BMD's utility as a tool in this transition. Some negative consequences of a possible disruption to hedging, induced by BMD, can be contained exactly because of such a reformatting of hedging.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / A changed security environment after the end of the Cold War forced Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden to reassess their security policy. New threats and challenges such as international terrorism, WMD, organized crime, the greater disparity of wealth and increased migration have replaced traditional military threats. Larger non-military concerns like peacekeeping operations, hu-manitarian support, and support to civil authorities have replaced territorial defense. All of which require international cooperation. Following a comprehensive security strategy, Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden aim to defend their territory, protect their population, and fostering international peace and security. Austria and Sweden focus on the integration and solidarity with the Euro-pean Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Switzerland retains its perpetual neutrality, but has shown increased international cooperation. Austria and Sweden model their Armed Forces after the EU Petersberg Tasks and have small peacetime organizations with a professional cadre and annual conscripts. The Swiss Armed Forces XXI focus on territorial defense and are organized in accordance with universal conscription and wartime organization policies. Traditional political, social, and economic aspects hinder Switzerland from following a straightforward strategy toward solidarity and fundamental change in its Armed Forces. Switzerland's new security policy and its Armed Forces XXI do not fully meet the requirements to fight new threats and challenges together with the international community. / Lieutenant Colonel, Swiss Air Force