This thesis contains three main parts. In the first part, we adapt a model developed for the US economy to the unique Chinese economic and institutional context. The uniqueness is mainly from two perspectives: the dual-channel housing financing system in China and the existence of the shadow banking sector (which differs from the shadow banking in developed economies) in China’s housing market. It would be difficult to obtain a clear picture of the Chinese housing market and macroeconomy without a thorough understanding of these two characteristics. This is due to the crucial role played by shadow banking and other informal finance institutions within the context of China in both the development and purchase of housing, in supporting productive economic activities in general, and that the housing market is in turn intricately connected to the health of the Chinese economy, being a key ‘barometer’. The second part of the research is the quantification of the determinants of the scale of shadow banking in China. The quantification is crucial since policy makers need to be aware of how sensitive shadow banking is to various factors. We develop a theoretical framework to explain the evolution of the scale of shadow banking in China. As part of this research, we investigate whether the real interest rate of household saving deposits, the required reserve ratio and bank loans to business and household are the main factors in explaining the evolution of China’s shadow banking. In the third part of research, we employ a credit risk and macroeconomic stress test to investigate the vulnerability of the commercial banks in China. Our originality here is the integration of both the role of shadow banking and housing market related loans in the commercial banks’ stress test scenarios at the macro level. Since a systematic analysis regarding the effect of changes in the macroeconomy and housing market on the credit risk of commercial banks in China is scarce, we use bank stress tests to analyse the credit risk in terms of the non-performing loans ratio of commercial banks in China; this is in response to changes in the macroeconomic factors and housing market. We address the role of the variation of the scale of shadow banking in China in terms of its contribution to the credit risk because of its uncertainty and close link with the commercial banks. Stress tests often focus on a single bank or financial institution yet we apply the same principles to examine the financial system as a whole in China, which would allow us to quantify the systemic risk in the entire Chinese financial system; and which variables, especially shadow banking contribute to the risks and by how much. This thesis contributes to the understanding of how China’s dual-channel housing finance system and shadow banking affect the evolution of house prices; and also, the main driving factors of the scale of China’s shadow banking and whether the housing market related loans and shadow banking pose risks to commercial banks. Possible research questions raised by the main findings of this thesis will enrich the debate on China’s housing market, shadow banking and regular banks, especially at a time when China is reforming its economic structure.

Cette thèse est la première tentative pour examiner empiriquement trois aspects différents liés au système bancaire parallèle. Nous cherchons à mieux comprendre le sujet de la finance de l'ombre.Le chapitre 1 se concentre sur la corrélation entre le système bancaire parallèle et les autres institutions financières ordinaires, principalement les banques, les compagnies d'assurance et les fonds de pension. Les résultats suggèrent que le système bancaire parallèle agit comme un complément et non comme un substitut à d'autres institutions financières régulières.Le chapitre 2 examine les déterminants des prêts bancaires parallèles. Ce chapitre étudie comment la réglementation et d'autres facteurs influencent le rôle du système bancaire parallèle dans l’offre de crédit. Les résultats de ce chapitre indiquent que le système bancaire parallèle n'est pas une réponse à une réglementation stricte.Le chapitre 3 montre qu'il y a un impact positif du système bancaire parallèle sur la stabilité et la rentabilité bancaires. Cependant, ces résultats sont inversés pendant les périodes de crise. Ces résultats indiquent que le système bancaire parallèle a un impact positif pendent les « bonnes » périodes et un impact négatif pendant les « mauvaises». / This PhD dissertation is the first attempt to empirically examine three different aspects related to the shadow banking system. We generally aim at providing a better understanding of the shadow banking topic.Chapter 1 focuses on the correlation between the shadow banking system and other regular financial institutions mainly banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. The results suggest that shadow banking system is acting as a complement and not a substitute to other regular financial systems.Chapter 2 examines the determinants of shadow banking loans. This study investigates how regulations and other factors impact the role of the shadow banking system in supplying credit. This chapter’s results indicate that shadow banking system is not an answer to high and severe regulations.Chapter 3 shows that there is a positive impact of the increased share of shadow banking system on banking stability and profitability. However, these results are inversed during crisis periods. These results indicate that shadow banking system makes good times better and bad time worse.

This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, titled "Aggregate Risk and Bank Risk-Taking", I propose a general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and a drop in investment and output. With some opacity in bank balance sheets, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on bank deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, bank lending is crowded out by risky asset purchases and weak economic fundamentals lead to a banking crisis. Policy interventions face a trade-o¤ between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening their risk-taking incentives. Due to this trade-off, liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when it is not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate the bad equilibrium. The second chapter, titled "Gambling Traps", analyzes macroeconomic dynamics under this framework in a dynamic general equilibrium model. I show that self-fulfilling expectations about high bank risk-taking may lead to 'gambling traps' associated with slow recovery from crises. In a gambling trap, high bank funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a prolonged period of financial fragility and a persistent decline in economic activity. I bring this model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Finally, I show that subsidized loans to banks, similar to the European Central Bank's longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) may perpetuate gambling traps. The third chapter, titled ''Shadow Banking and Market Discipline on Traditional Banks'', is joint work with Matthieu Darracq-Paries, Christo¤er Kok, and Dawid · Zochowski. In this chapter, we present a general equilibrium banking model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. We show that depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring the model to bear on the 2007-09 financial crisis in the United States, during which shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation causes a fire-sale and exposes traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in compensation for liquidity risk also weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave them in default. Financial stability is achieved with a tax on shadow bank profits or collateralized liquidity support to traditional banks.

Pour remédier aux nombreuses insuffisances et défaillances constatées dans le système de régulation et de surveillance du secteur financier, post crise, de nombreuses réformes institutionnelles ont été réalisées à l'initiative des organismes et autorités de régulation bancaire et financière aussi bien au niveau national qu'au niveau international. Le Royaume du Maroc, en vertu de son statut avancé, signé en octobre 2008, a fait un réel effort pour réduire les différences entre les législations marocaine et européenne. Il a consenti à se rapprocher des normes européennes sur le plan législatif et réglementaire avec l'objectif d'être intégré au marché intérieur européen et de disposer d'une économie plus efficace. Toutefois, le système bancaire marocain ne semble pas adhérer aux changements induits par ce travail de convergence, si non il y a encore du chemin à faire dans ce sens et une convergence totale demandera, incontestablement, "des années"! Cette thèse tente d'examiner les difficultés d'adaptation des techniques de régulation européenne au système financier marocain à travers notamment, le système de régulation des banques marocaines, l'encadrement des mécanismes relevant du shadow banking et des opérations du marché des produits dérivés. Elle met l'accent sur les nombreux défis que cette industrie aura à relever dans les années à venir. Après une analyse des principales difficultés d'adaptation des techniques de régulation européennes au système financier marocain (Partie I), quelques solutions sont proposées, à savoir la finance islamique comme une finance complémentaire à la finance conventionnelle, l'inclusion financière comme une solution ayant pour finalité la réduction de la pauvreté et la création de postes d'emplois et le crowdfunding comme moyen de financement par le public de projet de création d'entreprise et solution au resserrement de crédit constaté après la crise de 2008 (Partie II). / The extent of the 2008 financial crisis' diffusion gave rise to strenuous and far-reaching debates about international financial stability. In fact, the question of financial instituions' social responsability seen as a financial stability vector has become the center of every debate. Financial instituions' governance and risk management devices have not only highlighted the vulnerability of the banking system, but also its inability to deal with liquidity requirements. With no doubt,banks have not been cautions enough to evaluate the risks they were taking. After the crisis, many institutional reforms were carried out at the initiative of banking and financial regulatory authorities, both at national and international levels, to tackle the numerous shortcomings and deficiencies found in the financial sector's regulation and supervision system. Under the Advanced Status, signed in October 2008, the Kingdom of Morocco has tried hard to reduce the gap between the Moroccan and the European legislations. In fact, it has agreed to move closer to European standards on the legislative and regulatory level aiming to be more integrated into the European internal market and to have a more efficient economy. Nevertheless, the banking system doesn't seem to adhere to the changes that were induced by this convergence work. Thus, there is still some way to go in this direction, not to mention that such a total convergence would take "years"! This thesis attempts to examine the difficulties of adapting European regulatory techniques to the Moroccan financial system, particularly through the Moroccan banks' control system and the supervision of mechanisms that take place under the "Shadow Banking" and the derivative market. It emphasizes all of the challenges this industry will have to face in the coming years. After an analysis of the main difficulties of adapting European regulatory techniques to the Moroccan financial system (Part I), some solutions are suggested,namely Islamic finance as a complement to the conventional one, financial inclusion as a solution aiming to reduce poverty and create jobs, and "Crowdfunding" as a financing tool for the mass individual investors to back start up projects, and a solution to the credit tightening phenomenon after the crisis of 2008 (Part II).

2007-2008的金融大海嘯中，影子銀行及系統重要性金融機構(systemically important financial institutions, SIFIs)扮演重要角色。金融機構證券化移轉資產的個別風險，以資產池最低報酬作為擔保品，發行高品質債權證券。隨投資人財富愈多，對安全資產需求愈大，金融機構擴大槓桿及風險資產投資。SIFIs數量少但規模大，相對於其他小型金融機構有較好的投資效率，其投資、證券化及其他業務與經濟體系具有複雜而規模大的關係，具有太大、太複雜以致不能倒的性質。SIFIs透過證券化移轉個別風險，在景氣蕭條及經濟個體普遍忽略尾端風險下，金融體系具有脆弱性。在已經存在SIFIs的金融體系下，金融脆弱性隨SIFIs及其他小型金融機構投資效率差距愈大愈加增強。 / The shadow banking system and systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) play important roles in recent financial crisis. Financial institutions (FIs) securitize risky assets and use the lowest payoffs of the securitized assets as collateral to issue riskless debts. As the demand for riskless assets increases, FIs initiate more risky assets and increase leverage. SIFIs are large and advantageous to invest in risky assets compared to small FIs. The complex connection between SIFIs and economy make them too big or complex to fail. SIFIs transfer idiosyncratic risk and undertake systemic risk via securitization. Financial system is fragile to recession when entities neglect tail risks. In the financial system in which SIFIs exist,the financial fragility is severer when the gap of the investment ability between SIFIs and other small FIs becomes larger.

Diese Doktorarbeit besteht aus drei Aufsätzen, in welchen die Reaktion von Finanzinstitutionen auf Geldpolitik analysiert wird. In dem ersten Aufsatz finde ich anhand eines Bayesian VAR, dass eine Erhöhung des Leitzinses zu einer zusätzlichen Kreditvergabe in Nichtbanken (NBFI) führt. Banken verleihen wie bereits bekannt weniger. Der Grund für die gegensätzliche Bewegung liegt in der unterschiedliche Art der Finanzierung. Dieser Befund legt nahe, dass die Existenz von NBFI die Volatilität der aggregierten Kreditvergabe zu geldpolitischen Schocks verringern könnte. Zusätzlich bietet die Analyse einen Erklärungsansatz für die Beobachtung, dass sich die Kreditvergabe seit der Finanzkrise stockend entwickelt hat. Im zweiten Aufsatz knüpfe ich an diese empirische Untersuchung an, indem ich ein theoretisches Modell mit unterschiedlichen Arten von Firmenfinanzierung entwerfe. Haushalte müssen sich zwischen festverzinsichlichen und erfolgsbedingten Sparmöglichkeiten entscheiden. Auf Grundlage des Modells von Bernanke, Gertler und Gilchrist (1999) mikrofundiere ich die Entscheidung über Unternehmensgründung in Form von Eigenkapitalinvestitionen. Im dritten Aufsatz entwickele ich ein geschätztes DSGE Modell mit Finanzierungsfriktionen, welches in der Lage ist, die empirischen Ergebnisse zu replizieren. Ich untersuche, wie sich die Regulierung von Schattenbanken auf eine Volkswirtschaft am ZLB auswirkt. Konsumvolatilität wird reduziert, wenn Schattenbankenkredite stattdessen von Banken vergeben werden. Alternativ dazu führt die Behandlung von Schattenbanken wie Investment Fonds dazu, dass eine Volkswirtschaft am ZLB eine mildere Rezession und einen schnelleren Austritt erlebt. Der Grund liegt darin, dass ein Nachfrageschock, der die Volkswirtschaft zum ZLB bringt, eine Reaktion hervorruft, die vergleichbar mit geldpolitischen Schocks ist, da am ZLB keine Möglichkeit der Leitzinsverringerung besteht. / This thesis consists of three essays that analyze the reaction of financial institutions to monetary policy. In the first essay, I use a Bayesian VAR to show that an increase in the monetary policy rate raises credit intermediation by non-bank financial institutions (NBFI). As is well known, credit intermediation by banks is reduced. The movement in opposite directions is explained by the difference in funding. This finding suggests that the existence of NBFI may decrease aggregate volatility following monetary policy shocks. Following this evidence, I construct a theoretical model that includes different types of funding in the second essay. Households face a savings choice between state contingent (equity) and non-state contingent (debt) assets. I use the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) as a basis and microfound the decision by which new net worth in entrepreneurs is created. A Bayesian estimation suggests a change in the survival rate of entrepreneurs, affecting impulse responses. The analysis suggests that models that use the financial accelerator should include endogenous firm entry if variables regarding household portfolios or shocks directly affecting firm net worth are considered. In the third essay, I develop an estimated monetary DSGE model with funding market frictions that is able to replicate the empirical facts. In a counterfactual exercise I study how the regulation of shadow banks affects an economy at the ZLB. Consumption volatility is reduced when shadow bank assets are directly held by commercial banks. Alternatively, regulating shadow banks like investment funds results in a milder recession during, and a quicker escape from, the ZLB. The reason is that a recessionary demand shock that moves the economy to the ZLB has similar effects to a monetary tightening due to the inability to reduce the policy rate below zero.

Submitted by Leonardo Barros (lbbpinho@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-11T21:09:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ind Serv Financeiros e PIB_Reg Quantilica_vfinal.pdf: 1283647 bytes, checksum: 8ddccbe33173406c2f4c6ff48d41296a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2017-09-11T21:10:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Ind Serv Financeiros e PIB_Reg Quantilica_vfinal.pdf: 1283647 bytes, checksum: 8ddccbe33173406c2f4c6ff48d41296a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-12T16:05:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ind Serv Financeiros e PIB_Reg Quantilica_vfinal.pdf: 1283647 bytes, checksum: 8ddccbe33173406c2f4c6ff48d41296a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-09 / This paper aims to analyze theoretically and empirically the positive relationship between the development of the financial services industry and economic growth and, based on these results, reflect the importance of this industry for Brazilian economic growth. The financial services industry influences economic growth due to the functions that its agents play in the financial system, such as: a) mobilization of resources; b) allocation of resources in space and time; c) risk management; d) selection and monitoring of companies; e) production and dissemination of information. Therefore, this work also aims to contribute with a historical review of the Financial Services industry in Brazil until the present day, collaborating with the academic literature of the lines of research on this industry. To analyze the correlation reported in many economic literatures, it was decided to apply the quantile regression technique, based on data from 81 countries, which allow an analysis of the positive impact generated by the financial system development indicators and their agents in the distribution Conditional response variable (measures of economic growth). The estimates obtained allow us to conclude: there is a positive relationship between a developed financial services industry and economic growth. And our conclusion is that Brazil has a mature and growing Financial Services industry, and according to the empirical results of this study; This segment is an important contributor to Brazilian economic growth. / Este trabalho tem o objetivo de analisar teórica e empiricamente a relação positiva existente entre desenvolvimento da indústria de serviços financeiros e crescimento econômico e, a partir desses resultados, refletir a importância dessa indústria para o crescimento econômico brasileiro. A indústria de serviços financeiros influencia o crescimento econômico devido às funções que seus agentes desempenham no sistema financeiro, tais como: a) mobilização de recursos; b) alocação dos recursos no espaço e no tempo; c) administração do risco; d) seleção e monitoramento de empresas; e) produção e divulgação de informação. Por isso, esse trabalho também tem como propósito contribuir com uma revisão histórica da indústria de Serviços Financeiros no Brasil até os dias atuais, colaborando com a literatura acadêmica das linhas de pesquisa sobre essa indústria. Para analisar a correlação relatada em tantas literaturas econômicas, decidiu-se por aplicar a técnica de Regressão Quantílica, a partir de dados de 81 países, o que permitiu uma análise da influência positiva gerada pelos indicadores de desenvolvimento do sistema financeiro e seus agentes na distribuição condicional da variável resposta (medidas de crescimento econômico). As estimativas obtidas permitem concluir: há uma relação positiva entre uma indústria de serviços financeiros desenvolvida e crescimento econômico. E nossa conclusão é que o Brasil possui uma madura e crescente indústria de Serviços Financeiros, e segundo os resultados empíricos desse estudo; esse segmento é um importante contribuinte para o crescimento econômico brasileiro.

This diploma thesis is focused on shadow banking and its impact on the financial markets. The first section defines shadow banking and offers an overview of its instruments and activities with focus on the advantages and risks related to securitization, repurchase agreements and money market funds. The second section begins with an overview of systemic risk emerging from shadow banking activities. Substantial part of the thesis is dedicated to measurement of the shadow banking sector size based on methods of Financial Stability Board. The thesis concludes with an overview of current regulatory progress in transforming shadow banking into resilient market-based finance.

Cette thèse passe en revue certains facteurs de risques économiques (risque de revenu, risque de la finance parallèle, et risque carbone) en utilisant de nouvelles sources de données et méthodologies. Le premier chapitre examine comment la réponse de la consommation face au risque de capital humain affecte la finance des ménages. A partir de données conjointes sur la consommation, les revenus et les actifs des ménages américains, ce papier documente le lissage excessif de la consommation comme un facteur essentiel pour le choix de portefeuille et montrer qu’il peut expliquer les énigmes financières observées chez les ménages américains. Par ailleurs, le papier formalise l’effet du lissage excessif sur le choix de portefeuille à l’aide d’un modèle de cycle de vie où un ménage est confronté à un risque de revenu salarial idiosyncratique. Le modèle est calibré de façon à correspondre aux observations sur le cycle de vie de la détention d’actifs risqués des ménages américains. Le deuxième chapitre évalue le transfert de risques des banques dans les activités bancaires non réglémentées. En exploitant les variations dans les risques discutés par les banques dans leur rapports financiers et en utilisant les outils de l’analyse textuelle, ce document fournit une nouvelle mesure de l’activité bancaire non-réglementée. Le papier montre empiriquement que (1) les banques sont plus susceptibles de contourner les régulations lorsque leurs contraintes de fonds propres deviennent contraignantes, (2) il existe une relation positive entre le transfert de risque et le risque extrême des banques. Par la suite, le papier rationalise ce transfert de risque en utilisant un modèle macroéconomique avec un secteur financier. Dans le modèle, l’événement de défaut de paiement et la présence d’externalités dues à une application imparfaite de la réglementation encourage les banques à s’engager dans une stratégie de transfert des risques. Enfin, le papier utilise ce cadre pour étudier la régulation optimale. On montre qu’une taxe sur l’activité sectorielle réduit efficacement le transfert des risques des banques par rapport à d’autres politiques comme la réglementation des fonds propres de la banque. Enfin, le troisième chapitre aborde l’effet du risque carbone sur la stabilité économique. Nous étudions ce risque à l’aide de données de panel pour 50 États américains au cours des années 1998 à 2018. De plus, nous supposons une dépendance transversale des facteurs communs non observés (par exemple, les liens commerciaux, l’intégration financière) entre les États. En utilisant une approche d’émissions de carbone basée sur la consommation, ce chapitre montre qu’une diminution d’une unité des émissions de carbone est associée, à long terme, à une croissance de la production logarithmique par habitant de 4,5 points de pourcentage. En outre, nous trouvons des impacts différentiels dans la distribution du revenu par habitant des États. Ces résultats éclairent le débat sur la voie de transition optimale vers une économie sobre en carbone. / This thesis reviews some economic risk factors (labor income risk, shadow banking risk, and carbon risk) using new data sources and novel methodologies. The first chapter investigates how the response of consumption to human capital risk affects household finance. Using joint data on consumption, income, and assets of representative US households, I document the excess smoothness of consumption as an essential factor for portfolio choice and show that it can explain household finance puzzles. Furthermore, I formalized the effect of the excess smoothness on the portfolio choice using a structural life-cycle model where a household faces an idiosyncratic wage income risk. The model is calibrated to match relevant aspects of the dynamics and the life cycle of risky asset holding from the PSID. The second chapter assesses banks’ risk-shifting in the non regulated banking activity, also called shadow banking. Exploiting variations in risks disclosed by banks in their financial reports and using textual analysis tools, this document provides a new measure non regulated banking activity. The paper empirically documents that (1) banks are more likely to shift risk out of the regulator’s reach when their risk-based capital constraints become binding, (2) there is a positive relationship between risk-shifting and tail risk of banks. The paper then rationalizes banks’ risk-shifting behavior using a macroeconomic model with a financial sector. In the model, the event of default on debt and the presence of externality due to imperfect regulation enforcement encourage banks to engage in risk-shifting strategies. As a result, banks behave as cross-sector arbitrageurs. Finally, the paper uses this framework to study optimal regulation. We show that a tax on sectoral activity effectively reduces banks’ risk-shifting compared to other bank’s equity regulation policies. Finally, the third chapter studies the effect of carbon risk on economic stability using a consumption-based carbon emissions approach for 50 U.S. states over the years 1998 - 2018. The paper assumes a cross-sectional dependence from unobserved common factors (e.g., trade linkage, financial integration) between the states. Under this assumption, we find that one unit decreases in carbon emissions is associated with 4.5 percentage points decrease in the per capita output growth over the long run. Besides, we find differential impacts across the distribution of per capita states income. These findings inform the debate over the optimal transition path toward a low carbon economy.

Cette thèse comporte trois chapitres dans lesquels j'étudie les coûts de transaction des actions, les anomalies en finance et les activités du système bancaire parallèle. Dans le premier chapitre (co-écrit avec René Garcia), une nouvelle façon d'estimer les coûts de transaction des actions est proposée. Les coûts de transaction ont diminué au fil du temps, mais ils peuvent augmenter considérablement lorsque la liquidité de financement se raréfi e, lorsque les craintes des investisseurs augmentent ou lorsqu'il y a d'autres frictions qui empêchent l'arbitrage. Nous estimons dans ce chapitre les écarts entre les cours acheteur et vendeur des actions de milliers d'entreprises à une fréquence journalière et présentons ces mouvements importants pour plusieurs de ces épisodes au cours des 30 dernières années. Le coût de transaction des trois quarts des actions est fortement impacté par la liquidité de fi nancement et augmente en moyenne de 24%. Alors que les actions des petites entreprises et celles des entreprises à forte volatilité ont des coûts de transaction plus élevés, l'augmentation relative des coûts de transaction en temps de crise est plus prononcée pour les actions des grandes entreprises et celles des entreprises à faible volatilité. L'écart entre les coûts de transaction respectifs de ces groupes de qualité élevée et qualité faible augmente également lorsque les conditions financières se détériorent, ce qui prouve le phénomène de fuite vers la qualité. Nous avons construit des portefeuilles basés sur des anomalies et avons estimé leurs "alphas" ajustés pour les coûts de rééquilibrage sur la base de nos estimations des coûts de transaction pour montrer que toutes les stratégies sont soit non rentables soit perdent de l'argent, à l'exception de deux anomalies: le "prix de l'action" et la "dynamique du secteur industriel". Dans le deuxième chapitre, j'étudie comment la popularité des anomalies dans les revues scienti ques spécialisées en finance peut influer sur le rendement des stratégies basées sur ces anomalies. J'utilise le ton du résumé de la publication dans laquelle une anomalie est discutée et le facteur d'impact de la revue dans laquelle cette publication a paru pour prévoir le rendement des stratégies basées sur ces anomalies sur la période après publication. La principale conclusion est la suivante: lorsqu'une anomalie est discutée dans une publication dont le résumé a un ton positif, et qui apparaît dans une revue avec un facteur d'impact supérieur à 3 (Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies), cette anomalie est plus susceptible d'attirer les investisseurs qui vont baser leurs stratégies sur cette anomalie et corriger ainsi la mauvaise évaluation des actions. Le troisième chapitre (co-écrit avec Vasia Panousi) propose une mesure de l'activité bancaire parallèle des entreprises opérant dans le secteur financier aux États-Unis. À cette fi n, nous utilisons l'analyse de données textuelles en extrayant des informations des rapports annuels et trimestriels des entreprises. On constate que l'activité bancaire parallèle était plus élevée pour les "Institutions de dépôt", les "Institutions qui ne prennent pas de dépôt" et le secteur "Immobilier" avant 2008. Mais après 2008, l'activité bancaire parallèle a considérablement baissé pour toutes les fi rmes opérant dans le secteur financier sauf les "Institutions non dépositaires". Notre indice du système bancaire parallèle satisfait certains faits économiques concernant le système bancaire parallèle, en particulier le fait que les politiques monétaires restrictives contribuent à l'expansion du système bancaire parallèle. Nous montrons également avec notre indice que, lorsque l'activité bancaire parallèle des 100 plus grandes banques augmente, les taux de délinquance sur les prêts accordés par ces banques augmentent également. L'inverse est observé avec l'indice bancaire traditionnel: une augmentation de l'activité bancaire traditionnelle des 100 plus grandes banques diminue le taux de délinquance. / This thesis has three chapters in which I study transaction costs, anomalies and shadow banking activities. In the first chapter (co-authored with René Garcia) a novel way of estimating transaction costs is proposed. Transaction costs have declined over time but they can increase considerably when funding liquidity becomes scarce, investors' fears spike or other frictions limit arbitrage. We estimate bid-ask spreads of thousands of firms at a daily frequency and put forward these large movements for several of these episodes in the last 30 years. The transaction cost of three-quarters of the firms is significantly impacted by funding liquidity and increases on average by 24%. While small firms and high volatility firms have larger transaction costs, the relative increase in transaction costs in crisis times is more pronounced in large firms and low-volatility firms. The gap between the respective transaction costs of these high- and low-quality groups also increases when financial conditions deteriorate, which provides evidence of flight to quality. We build anomaly-based long-short portfolios and estimate their alphas adjusted for rebalancing costs based on our security-level transaction cost estimates to show that all strategies are either unprofitable or lose money, except for price per share and industry momentum. In the second chapter I study how the popularity of anomalies in peer-reviewed finance journals can influence the returns on these anomalies. I use the tone of the abstract of the publication in which an anomaly is discussed and the impact factor of the journal in which this publication appears to forecast the post-publication return of strategies based on the anomaly. The main finding is the following: when an anomaly is discussed in a positive tone publication that appears in a journal with an impact factor higher than 3 (Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies), this anomaly is more likely to attract investors that are going to arbitrage away the mispricing. The third chapter (co-authored with Vasia Panousi) proposes a measure of the shadow banking activity of firms operating in the financial industry in the United States. For this purpose we use textual data analysis by extracting information from annual and quarterly reports of firms. We find that the shadow banking activity was higher for the “Depository Institutions", “Non depository Institutions" and the “Real estate" before 2008. But after 2008, the shadow banking activity dropped considerably for all the financial companies except for the “Non depository Institutions". Our shadow banking index satisfies some economic facts about the shadow banking, especially the fact that contractionary monetary policies contribute to expand shadow banking. We also show with our index that, when the shadow banking activity of the 100 biggest banks increases, the delinquency rates on the loans that these banks give also increases. The opposite is observed with the traditional banking index: an increase of the traditional banking activity of the 100 biggest banks decreases the delinquency rate.