The dominant liberal peacebuilding critiques tends to focus on ‘states’ and the failure of interventions in rebuilding them. Consequently, a standardised critique has emerged largely because the critics apply a broad brush across a diverse range of contexts, programmes, issues and activities as illustrated by the lack of scrutiny on mine action and emerging contexts such as Somaliland. The liberal peacebuilding critics critique the standardised ‘one size fits all approach’ employed by interveners, yet they take the same approach. I therefore argue for the need to broaden the critique to include other elements and contexts of peacebuilding. I demonstrate that as an intervention mine action has intrinsic peacebuilding potential. However, the way mine action is implemented both globally and in Somaliland reflects the same dominant characteristics of the liberal peacebuilding critique i.e.; it is externally led; uses technical and standardised formulaic approaches; disregards local context thus failing to secure local ownership. Attributes that the critics argue have led to the failure and/or limited success of peacebuilding interventions. I therefore contend with the critics and demonstrate how these attributes have contributed to the challenges of implementing mine action activities thereby limiting mine actions ‘peace-ability’ potential in Somaliland. However, beyond the implementation modalities there are other factors that further contribute to limiting this potential; these include the Sector Actors; the Somaliland context i.e. the historical and political context, and the perception of Somaliland people. Thus in conclusion I argue for a nuanced critique that acknowledges the challenging realities of implementing programmes in challenging post conflict environments.

The dissertation uses the lens of electricity provision to examine processes of state formation in Somaliland, an unrecognized, self-declared independent state in the northwest of the former Somali Republic. The dissertation focuses on Hargeisa, the capital city at the heart of Somaliland's state-building project. After the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, private companies arose from the ruins of Hargeisa and turned the lights back on, navigating a fragmented post-war landscape by mobilizing local connections and transnational ties. However, being dependent on the political settlement that engendered the peace necessary for business, emerging private power providers were tied into a state-building project. The dissertation analyses the resulting tensions at the heart of this project, by examining the struggle to define the role, extents and limits of an emerging state in an interconnected world. Based on interviews in Somaliland and a survey of news media and grey literature, the dissertation has three aims. First, it provides a view into how social order and service provision persist after the collapse of the state. Secondly, it investigates how patterns of provision emerging in the absence of the state shape subsequent processes of state formation. Finally, it discusses how patterns of provision affect the interaction of state-building and market-making. In order to fulfil these aims, the dissertation examines how people invest in the project of building a state, both materially and discursively. The chapters present a narrative history of the electricity sector, explaining the attempts of both private companies and the government to claim sovereignty over the market and shape statehood in their own interests. The struggles shaping Somaliland's economic order reveal the contemporary significance of transnational connections, interconnected systems of capital flows, and the rise of corporate business actors. At the same time, they underline the abiding power of social structure, local identities, and historical memory.

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This dissertation is about the work of love songs in Hargeysa, Somaliland. In a setting where music and expressions of love are conspicuously absent from public soundscapes, I explore the lives and labour of a genre as it moves and is moved across time and space, the singing and speaking voices that animate these songs, and the entanglement of love songs in the mediation of intimacy and the shaping of contested post-war soundscapes. What, I ask, is a love song? In a setting marked by war, where music-making and expressions of love are contested, what do love songs do? And how do they do what they do? In answering these questions, I take love songs in motion as my primary ethnographic object and investigate the "labour" of love songs in two senses: the intimate human labour by which love songs are made, circulated, heard, performed and put to assorted uses, and the social-aesthetic-affective labour that a genre itself performs. Based on eighteen months of field-research with poets, musicians, singers, music-lovers and love-suffering audiences in Hargeysa, I track love songs through various stages of their multi-faceted lives: as they first come into the world through the collaboration of a poet and his muse, a musician and a singer; as they circulate and are re-animated alongside stories of singers and stories of encounters; as they are re-figured by the ears and voices of attentive listeners; as their sounding is learned by musicians; and as their live performance is negotiated and received in contested urban terrain. I show the primary labour of love songs to be the distillation, performance and creation of intimate social relations: intimate relations predicated on "dareen-wadaag" ("feeling-sharing") that transcend everyday cleavages and prohibitions, and that have the power to shape both individuals' personal intimate lives and the socio-political worlds in which songs move and do their work. I argue that love songs' ability to distill and open space for intimacy rests on an ideology of voice that figures the voice as a deeply personal mode of self-expression and the simultaneously multi-vocal practices of voicing by which love songs are animated. In other words, the "voice" is made - and made intimate - by its multi-faceted multi-vocal sociality. In so doing, this dissertation contributes to understandings of the workings and power of popular culture in Africa and beyond, recent anthropological efforts to hold together the sonic and social dynamics of the "voice", and broader anthropological conversations about the mediated, multi-vocal making of persons and social worlds.

The dominant liberal peacebuilding critiques tends to focus on ‘states’ and the failure of interventions in rebuilding them. Consequently, a standardised critique has emerged largely because the critics apply a broad brush across a diverse range of contexts, programmes, issues and activities as illustrated by the lack of scrutiny on mine action and emerging contexts such as Somaliland. The liberal peacebuilding critics critique the standardised ‘one size fits all approach’ employed by interveners, yet they take the same approach. I therefore argue for the need to broaden the critique to include other elements and contexts of peacebuilding. I demonstrate that as an intervention mine action has intrinsic peacebuilding potential. However, the way mine action is implemented both globally and in Somaliland reflects the same dominant characteristics of the liberal peacebuilding critique i.e.; it is externally led; uses technical and standardised formulaic approaches; disregards local context thus failing to secure local ownership. Attributes that the critics argue have led to the failure and/or limited success of peacebuilding interventions. I therefore contend with the critics and demonstrate how these attributes have contributed to the challenges of implementing mine action activities thereby limiting mine actions ‘peace-ability’ potential in Somaliland. However, beyond the implementation modalities there are other factors that further contribute to limiting this potential; these include the Sector Actors; the Somaliland context i.e. the historical and political context, and the perception of Somaliland people. Thus in conclusion I argue for a nuanced critique that acknowledges the challenging realities of implementing programmes in challenging post conflict environments.

What determines that states receive a de-jure recognition is not clear today. The three worlddominant theories constitutive theory, declarative theory and secession-theory all claim different criteria' that a state must meet in order to have the right to be recognized. The purpose of the thesis is to understand if there is a theory that is decisive. The thesis analyses two states, one of which has received international recognition while the other one has not. The thesis concludes that all three theories have the necessary conditions that can lead to recognition. The conditions in the secession theory on having a referendum have proved to be one of the crucial requirements for recognition, at the same time it is fundamental for a new state to meet the declarative theory requirements to have the possibility of recognition at all. However, it is a theory that argues for the decisive criteria, and it is the constitutive theory that claims that recognition from other states, such as the central state, is the main factor in succeeding in obtaining de-jure recognition. Although the criteria's in the other theories are met, it is only after recognition by the central government that membership of the UN can be achieved. / Vad som avgör att utbrytarstater erhåller ett de-jure erkännade är idag inte tydligt. De tre världs dominerande teorierna konstitutiva teorin, deklarativa teorin och secession-teorin hävdar alla olika kriterier som en stat måste uppfylla för att ha rätt att erkännas. Syftet med uppsatsen är att förstå vad som krävs för en stat att kunna erhålla ett internationellt erkännande. För att kunna genomföra undersökningen har två stater analyserats där den ena fått ett internationellt erkännande och den andra inte. Uppsatsens slutsats är att alla tre teorier har nödvändiga villkor som kan leda till erkännande. Secession-teorins krav på att ha en folkomröstning visar på en enorm drivprocess till att erkännas, samtidigt så är det grundläggande för en nybliven stat att uppfylla den deklarativa teorin krav för att överhuvudtaget ha möjligheten till erkännande. Däremot kan man finna de avgörande villkoren i den konstitutiva teorin som menar att erkännande från andra stater, såsom central är den främsta faktorn till att lyckas erhålla ett dejure erkännande. Även om kriterierna i den resterande teorin är uppfyllda leder ett erkännande av centralstaten till ett medlemskap i FN som är varje utbrytarstats mål med att avskiljas

This thesis is a theoretical and empirical inquiry into ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, seeking to explain the ‘failures’ and ‘successes’ of peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland. While warfare has increased globally since the end of the Cold War, the UN has made efforts to build peace (e.g. Boutros-Ghali 1992). While peacebuilding has become an internationally applied set of ideas and practices, one of the theoretical gaps is deliberation. This research thus conceptualises ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and associates this with peacebuilding in the non-Western, post-colonial, and (post-)conflict context. This research identified East Timor and Somaliland as its case studies. Despite similarity in the ‘legitimation problem’ with vertical (state-society) and horizontal (‘modernity’-‘tradition’) inequalities/differences based upon cultural and historical backgrounds, East Timor and Somaliland undertook different approaches in a decade after the end of their civil wars. While East Timor accepted UN peace operations, Somaliland rejected them. Yet both experienced similar transitions to make political order between ‘failure’ (political de-legitimation/societal dissent) and ‘success’ (political legitimation/societal consent).Accordingly, this thesis poses two questions: 1) what caused the UN to have ‘failed’ (to prevent the ‘crisis’ from recurring in 2006) in East Timor, and 2) what caused East Timor and Somaliland to have experienced ‘equifinality’ (making similar progress along different paths) in building peace (in East Timor from 1999 to 2012 and in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005). Findings, among others, include different paths in transition: a ‘hybrid’ path with external intervention in East Timor and an ‘agonistic’ path without it in Somaliland. Asymmetry in power relations urged deliberative agencies to address the ‘legitimation problem’ differently.

Author Samuel Lavoie Thesis Diplomacy and Diplomatic Institutions of Unrecognized De Facto States Somaliland, Transnistria and Artsakh (2020) Abstract As a topic, international recognition has been increasingly studied over the past twenty years, particularly since Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. This thesis attempts to advance our understanding of the underlying causes of the inability to gain political recognition by examining several factors that have been omitted from the academic literature. Specifically, it examines several key aspects of the diplomatic institutions, personnel, and approaches of three unrecognized de facto states that meet most of the criteria for statehood under international law, but have so far received no recognition recognized states. These entities are Somaliland, Transnistria, and Artsakh. This paper also draws on partially recognized states and finds that geopolitical and ideological factors generally prevail over diplomatic ones as the main drivers of political recognition. This is especially true when an entity is located in an area of fierce rivalry for influence, such as the PMR and the Republic of Artsakh. However, while remaining a secondary factor, diplomacy becomes more important for international recognition when the interests of...

This thesis provides a framework for viewing socio-political contexts and how these relate to interventionist projects. The framework draws on and combines strands from international relations and sociological perspectives of social interaction. The central question becomes how intervention and existing social contexts interact to produce unintended outcomes. It applies the analysis to two separate wider contexts: Afghanistan and Somalia, with a particular focus on the self-declared independent Somaliland as an internally generated and controlled transformational process. Unlike abstract directions of theoretical development the framework seeks to provide a platform that sets aside ideological assumptions and from which interventionist projects can be observed and evaluated based on literature, field observations and interviews. Drawing on such diverse influences as fourth generation peace and conflict studies, Morphogenetics, and social forces theory, the framework explores conditions and interest formations to capture instances of local agency that are part of a continuity of local realities. It views social interaction without imposing Universalist value assumptions, but also without resorting to relativism or raising so many caveats that it becomes impractical. It exposes the agency of local interest formations hidden beneath the discourses of ideologically framed conflicts. These social agents are often dismissed as passive victims to be brought under the influence of for example the state, but are in reality able to subvert, co-opt, constrain or facilitate the forces that are dependent on them for social influence. In the end, it is the modes of mobilisation that emerge as the most crucial factor for understanding the relevant social dynamics.

En dépit de sa complexité analytique, la situation sécuritaire de la Corne de l’Afrique peut être soumise aux outils de la Science politique afin de mieux comprendre les interactions entre les différents acteurs. Cette recherche s’efforce d’analyser les ressorts d’une équation sécuritaire qui peut paraître insoluble : le régionalisme est-il aujourd’hui un prérequis à l’émergence d’une paix régionale ? Pour répondre à cette question il est nécessaire de comprendre quels rôles jouent les processus sécuritaires régionaux (régionalisation et régionalisme) dans la construction des États de la Corne de l’Afrique. Cette étude s’efforce d’étudier les interactions entre le régionalisme, fondement de l’architecture de paix et de sécurité continentale, la régionalisation des conflits, qui semble à l’oeuvre dans cette région, et les processus de construction/formation de l’État. Les rapports entre les trois termes de l’équation dépendent du contexte et des interactions entre les différentes entités composant la région (États, acteurs non étatiques qui se dressent contre eux ou négocient avec eux et acteurs extérieurs). Deux types de dynamiques sont mises en évidence au terme de cette étude : l’une endogène, l’autre exogène. Dans la première, nous constatons que les conflits participent à la formation de l’État. Ils sont en grande partie des conflits internes et montrent qu’il existe une crise dans l’État. Ces États dominent le processus de régionalisme qui tente de réguler la conflictualité régionale avec un succès relatif puisque les organisations régionales cherchent à renforcer ou reconstruire l’État selon les critères idéalisés de l’État wébérien vu comme source d’instabilité. Le processus exogène se caractérise par le rôle des conflits régionaux dont l’existence sert de justificatif au développement et au renforcement du régionalisme, perçu comme la réponse la plus appropriée à ces problèmes de conflictualités. Cette conflictualité a pour source l’État car celui-ci est perçu comme faible. Le régionalisme permettrait de renforcer les États et diminuerait leurs velléités de faire la guerre. / In spite of its analytical complexity, the security context in the Horn of Africa may be submitted to the Political Science’ tools in order to better understand the complex interactions between the various actors. The present research thus seeks to analyze the mechanism underlying what appears as an unsolvable security problem: is regionalism a prerequisite for the emergence of a regional peace? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to understand the role of regional security processes (regionalization and regionalism) in the state formation and state building of the Horn of Africa’s states. This study endeavours to explore the interactions between regionalism, which are inherent in the creation of an African peace and security architecture, the regionalization of conflict, which seems at work in this area, and construction/formation state process. The relationship between the three terms of this equation depends on the context and interactions between the various entities that make up the region (states, non-state actors that stand against them or negotiate with the states and external actors). This study thus reveals two kinds of dynamics at play: an endogenous process and an exogenous one. In the first one conflicts are involved in the formation of the state and are largely internal conflicts. It demonstrates that there is a crisis in the state States dominate the regionalism process which tries to regulate regional conflit with relative success because regional organizations seek to strengthen or rebuild the state according to the idealized criteria of the Weberian State seen as a source of instability. The exogenous process is characterized by the role of regional conflicts whose very existence serves to justify the development and the strenghtening of regionalism thus perceived as the most appropriate answer to those security problems. States are the source of conflicts because they are perceived as weak. Regionalism would strengthen states and reduce the inclination of states to make war.