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Title: Ethical, Social and Political Dimension of Doping in the Field of Sport Objectives: To work up the issue of doping, a brief overview of doping agents and methods, history of doping and antidoping (doping organization, doping control and sanctions). Assess the issue of doping in sport from the perspective of ethical, social and political. Mapping anchoring doping issues in documents or legislation of the Czech Republic and the EU, to reveal the causes and consequences of doping and the prevention and repression as an integral part of the antidoping activities and also to the education of athletes. Methods: The dissertation has a theoretic character, uses qualitative methods: compares, analyse and interprets texts from publications and sources. It draws own conclusions from these bases. Results: This dissertation clears up the issue of doping in the dimensions of ethical, social and political. Collected and interprets virtually all relevant documents, on global scale. Emphasizes the need to combine prevention and repression in the fight against doping and the importance of education in the spirit of sport and the Olympic ideas. Keywords: Antidoping documents - Doping - Ethics in Sport - Evil in Sports - Gamesmanship - Sportsmanship

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-10-27T15:52:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Elizabeth Pedrosa Ribeiro_.pdf: 693060 bytes, checksum: fa60b29a6620288c17ff3c1a512d37ed (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-27T15:52:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Elizabeth Pedrosa Ribeiro_.pdf: 693060 bytes, checksum: fa60b29a6620288c17ff3c1a512d37ed (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-31 / Nenhuma / No esporte competitivo a busca da vitória parece exigir dos atletas certo grau de "imoralidade". Simulações e faltas provocadas intencionalmente, bem como provocações e mesmo agressões não são exatamente raras em esportes coletivos; em esportes individuais, o doping é um exemplo bem conhecido. Seriam esses comportamentos inerentes à prática do esporte? Estudos recentes mostram, por outro lado, que tais condutas dependem de certa anulação ou bloqueio dos mecanismos empáticos em nosso cérebro. Ao que parece, para que haja uma "vontade de vencer", é preciso menos empatia do que a moralidade exige. Contudo, sentimentos empáticos são condições fundamentais para que haja comportamentos morais adequados. Por outro lado, para que a competição aconteça é necessário que se manifeste uma vontade de vencer naqueles que estão competindo. Isso representa um problema para pensar a ética no esporte, visto que a vontade de vencer pode tornar-se uma paixão desimpedida. Neste trabalho, assume-se que somos seres morais e empáticos por natureza, mas que a empatia pode ser desenvolvida ou reprimida por uma série de contingências. Por outro lado, assumimos também que a vontade de vencer é uma dessas contingências, sendo inerente à competição. Assim, o que pode ou não acontecer durante um jogo parece estar diretamente relacionado à relevância do resultado e suas consequências. Conjugar empatia e vontade de vencer significa, portanto, conjugar variáveis morais eventualmente opostas, ambas, porém, necessárias para que o próprio esporte exista. Nesta tese, argumentarei que, durante uma competição, é inevitável que os atletas expressem sentimentos conflitantes e que há uma tensão inerente ao esporte entre a vontade de vencer e a empatia. Esses dois impulsos estão sempre presentes no esporte, pois eles representam, de um lado, o desejo do desportista em obter sucesso e, de outro, o desejo de respeitar o adversário, a fim de garantir uma competição justa. Combinar esses dois recursos sem fazer com que eles sejam anulados é talvez o maior valor do esporte competitivo. Como conclusão, defenderei, em termos metaéticos, que o exemplo do esporte mostra que uma concepção pluralista sobre os valores está mais próxima da verdade do que uma concepção monista. / In competitive sport, the pursuit of victory seems to require athletes a degree of "immorality." Intentional simulations and fouls, as well as provocations and even aggressions are not exactly rare in collective sports; in individual sports, doping is a well-known example. Are these behaviors inherent in the practice of sports? Recent studies show, on the other hand, that such behaviors depend on a certain nullification or blockage of the empathic mechanisms in our brain. It seems that a "will to win" requires less empathy than morality requires. However, empathic feelings are fundamental conditions for appropriate moral behavior. On the other hand, for the competition to happen it is necessary that a will to win be manifest in those who are competing. This presents a problem for thinking about sport ethics, since the will to win can become a passion unimpeded. In this work, it is assumed that we are moral and empathetic beings by nature, but that empathy can be developed or repressed by a series of contingencies. On the other hand, we also assume that the will to win is one of those contingencies, being inherent in competition. Thus, what may or may not happen during a game seems to be directly related to the relevance of the result and its consequences. Hence, to conjugate empathy and the will to win means to conjugate moral variables eventually opposed, since both of them are necessary for the sport itself to exist. In this thesis, I will argue that, during a competition, it is inevitable that athletes express conflicting feelings and that there is an inherent tension in the sport between the will to win and empathy. These two impulses are always present in the sport, since they represent, on the one hand, the desire of the sportsman to be successful and, on the other, the desire to respect the adversary, in order to guarantee a fair competition. Combining these two features without making them void is perhaps the greatest value of competitive sport. In conclusion, I will argue metaethically that the sport example shows that a pluralist conception of values is closer to truth than a monistic conception.

Le contexte particulier du dopage suscite de nombreuses questions à l'égard des obligations et de la responsabilité des médecins. Suivant le Code médical du Mouvement olympique (2005), les médecins doivent respecter les principes de l'éthique médicale et ceux de l'éthique sportive, comme le fairplay. Il arrive parfois que l'éthique sportive entre en conflit avec l'éthique médicale. Les médecins sont alors confrontés à d'importants dilemmes qui peuvent engager leur responsabilité professionnelle et civile. Ces dilemmes se situent notamment au niveau de l'obligation de soins et du secret professionnel. Par exemple, les médecins peuvent-ils prescrire des médicaments pour contrer les effets néfastes du dopage afin de préserver la santé des athlètes ? La question de la recherche sur l'amélioration de la performance est également préoccupante. En raison du caractère clandestin de cette recherche, il y a lieu de se demander si les médecins qui y participent respectent leurs obligations professionnelles. L'analyse des principaux instruments normatifs applicables en l'espèce démontre que les médecins ne doivent pas être placés dans une situation telle qu'ils doivent refuser de suivre des athlètes de crainte d'être accusés de dopage. De plus, le secret professionnel devrait être maintenu lorsqu'un médecin suit un athlète dopé afin de préserver la relation de confiance. Finalement, l'analyse du contexte de la recherche portant sur l'amélioration de la performance révèle que les médecins ne respectent pas toujours leurs obligations. Les médecins fautifs risquent donc d'engager leur responsabilité professionnelle et civile et de faire face à des sanctions sévères. / The particular context of doping raises many questions regarding the obligations and the liability of physicians. According to the Medical Code of the Olympic Movement (2005), physicians must respect the principles of medical ethics as well as those of sport ethics, such as fair play. Sometimes, sport ethics conflicts with medical ethics. Therefore, physicians are confronted with important dilemmas, which could engage their professional and civil liability. These dilemmas concern, in particular, the duty of care and professional secrecy. For example, could physicians prescribe drugs to counter the side effects of doping in order to preserve the health of the athletes? Issues surrounding research on the improvement of performance is also of interest. Because of the often clandestine nature of this research, it should be asked whether physicians who participate respect their professional obligations. An analysis of the principal normative documents applicable demonstrates that physicians should not be placed in a situation where they would refuse to treat athletes because of fear of accusations of doping. Moreover, professional secrecy should be maintained when a physician follows an athlete in order to preserve the relation of trust. Finally, the analysis of the context of the research on the improvement of performance reveals that physicians don't always respect their obligations. These physicians might engage their professional and civil liability and face severe sanctions.

Thèse réalisée en cotutelle avec l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, Université catholique de Louvain. / L’argument de cette thèse est le suivant : dans la rivalité, un agent peut tenter de satisfaire ses préférences aux dépens de celles des autres si cela permet de produire des bénéfices sociaux impossibles à produire autrement (et si ces comportements ne causent pas des torts trop grands). Développer cet argument équivaut à développer une éthique adversative, c’est-à-dire une formulation de la moralité dans des contextes comme une compétition sportive ou un procès. Cette éthique sera développée et appliquée aux comportements des agents économiques dans les marchés économiques. On répondra à deux questions. La première question porte sur le design de nos institutions sociales. On peut façonner une institution en ayant recours à un schème adversatif, c’est-à-dire un pattern d’interactions sociales remplissant sa fonction par une dynamique de rivalité. Quand est-il désirable d’avoir recours à ce type de schème? Il est désirable si le rapport entre sa fonctionnalité et ses torts est 1) acceptable et 2) comparativement préférable aux autres schèmes. Ces deux conditions forment un test (développé dans le premier chapitre). Le marché réussit ce test (deuxième chapitre). Dans un schème adversatif, on doit avoir la permission de se comporter de manière adversative. Mais cette permission ne s’applique pas à l’extérieur du schème ou à l’intérieur de schèmes non adversatifs incorporés (comme une entreprise dans un marché ou une équipe dans une compétition sportive). Superposées l’une à l’autre, ces deux limites créent une division tripartite ou une tripartition de la moralité applicable à un agent économique. Cette tripartition permet d’éviter certains problèmes du modèle de la primauté des actionnaires et de la théorie des parties prenantes (troisième chapitre). La deuxième question porte sur la moralité à l’échelle individuelle. Comment doit-on se comporter dans un schème adversatif? Il faut incarner l’idéal de la rivalité bénéfique, ce qui implique 1) de contenir ses comportements adversatifs à l’intérieur du schème, 2) d’en respecter les règles et 3) d’adopter des comportements permettant au schème de réussir le test (quatrième chapitre). Cet idéal évite certains problèmes avec l’idéal de la saine concurrence de Joseph Heath et l’idéal de la concurrence positive de Lynn Sharp Paine (cinquième chapitre). / The argument of my thesis can be summarised as follows: in the context of rivalry, an agent may attempt to satisfy his or her preferences at the expense of other agents’ preferences if this generates social benefits that could not be generated otherwise (without producing too much harm). This argument leads to an adversarial ethics, that is, a description of our moral obligations in contexts like a sport competition or a trial. This ethics will be developed and applied to the behavior of economic agents in the market. I will address two main questions. The first question focuses on the design of our social institutions. An adversarial scheme is a pattern of social interactions that fulfills its function through a dynamic of rivalry. Parts of our institutions can be modeled as adversarial schemes. When is it desirable to use these schemes? It is desirable if the balance between the scheme’s functionality and harms is 1) acceptable and 2) preferable by comparison with other schemes. These two conditions yield a test. The test is developed in the first chapter. The second chapter argues that the market passes this test. An agent must be allowed to adopt adversarial behaviors in an adversarial scheme. But this permission does not apply to his or her behavior outside the scheme or inside non-adversarial incorporated schemes (like a firm in the market or a team in sport competitions). These two criteria, once combined, yield a threefold distinction or a tripartition of the moral obligation of economic agents, which solves some of the problems with the shareholder primacy view and the stakeholder theory. The tripartition and its implications are presented in the third chapter. The second question focuses on our moral obligations at the personal level. How ought we to behave in an adversarial scheme? In the fourth chapter, I argue that we ought to adopt the ideal of beneficial rivalry, which implies that we ought to: 1) contain our adversarial behaviors inside the scheme, 2) respect the scheme’s rules and 3) adopt a behavior that will allow the scheme to pass the desirability test (developed in the first chapter). The fifth chapter argues that this ideal avoids some of the problems with Joseph Heath’s ideal of healthy competition and Lynn Sharp Paine’s ideal of positive competition.

L’argument de cette thèse est le suivant : dans la rivalité, un agent peut tenter de satisfaire ses préférences aux dépens de celles des autres si cela permet de produire des bénéfices sociaux impossibles à produire autrement (et si ces comportements ne causent pas des torts trop grands). Développer cet argument équivaut à développer une éthique adversative, c’est-à-dire une formulation de la moralité dans des contextes comme une compétition sportive ou un procès. Cette éthique sera développée et appliquée aux comportements des agents économiques dans les marchés économiques. On répondra à deux questions. La première question porte sur le design de nos institutions sociales. On peut façonner une institution en ayant recours à un schème adversatif, c’est-à-dire un pattern d’interactions sociales remplissant sa fonction par une dynamique de rivalité. Quand est-il désirable d’avoir recours à ce type de schème? Il est désirable si le rapport entre sa fonctionnalité et ses torts est 1) acceptable et 2) comparativement préférable aux autres schèmes. Ces deux conditions forment un test (développé dans le premier chapitre). Le marché réussit ce test (deuxième chapitre). Dans un schème adversatif, on doit avoir la permission de se comporter de manière adversative. Mais cette permission ne s’applique pas à l’extérieur du schème ou à l’intérieur de schèmes non adversatifs incorporés (comme une entreprise dans un marché ou une équipe dans une compétition sportive). Superposées l’une à l’autre, ces deux limites créent une division tripartite ou une tripartition de la moralité applicable à un agent économique. Cette tripartition permet d’éviter certains problèmes du modèle de la primauté des actionnaires et de la théorie des parties prenantes (troisième chapitre). La deuxième question porte sur la moralité à l’échelle individuelle. Comment doit-on se comporter dans un schème adversatif? Il faut incarner l’idéal de la rivalité bénéfique, ce qui implique 1) de contenir ses comportements adversatifs à l’intérieur du schème, 2) d’en respecter les règles et 3) d’adopter des comportements permettant au schème de réussir le test (quatrième chapitre). Cet idéal évite certains problèmes avec l’idéal de la saine concurrence de Joseph Heath et l’idéal de la concurrence positive de Lynn Sharp Paine (cinquième chapitre). / The argument of my thesis can be summarised as follows: in the context of rivalry, an agent may attempt to satisfy his or her preferences at the expense of other agents’ preferences if this generates social benefits that could not be generated otherwise (without producing too much harm). This argument leads to an adversarial ethics, that is, a description of our moral obligations in contexts like a sport competition or a trial. This ethics will be developed and applied to the behavior of economic agents in the market. I will address two main questions. The first question focuses on the design of our social institutions. An adversarial scheme is a pattern of social interactions that fulfills its function through a dynamic of rivalry. Parts of our institutions can be modeled as adversarial schemes. When is it desirable to use these schemes? It is desirable if the balance between the scheme’s functionality and harms is 1) acceptable and 2) preferable by comparison with other schemes. These two conditions yield a test. The test is developed in the first chapter. The second chapter argues that the market passes this test. An agent must be allowed to adopt adversarial behaviors in an adversarial scheme. But this permission does not apply to his or her behavior outside the scheme or inside non-adversarial incorporated schemes (like a firm in the market or a team in sport competitions). These two criteria, once combined, yield a threefold distinction or a tripartition of the moral obligation of economic agents, which solves some of the problems with the shareholder primacy view and the stakeholder theory. The tripartition and its implications are presented in the third chapter. The second question focuses on our moral obligations at the personal level. How ought we to behave in an adversarial scheme? In the fourth chapter, I argue that we ought to adopt the ideal of beneficial rivalry, which implies that we ought to: 1) contain our adversarial behaviors inside the scheme, 2) respect the scheme’s rules and 3) adopt a behavior that will allow the scheme to pass the desirability test (developed in the first chapter). The fifth chapter argues that this ideal avoids some of the problems with Joseph Heath’s ideal of healthy competition and Lynn Sharp Paine’s ideal of positive competition. / Thèse réalisée en cotutelle avec l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, Université catholique de Louvain.

Le contexte particulier du dopage suscite de nombreuses questions à l'égard des obligations et de la responsabilité des médecins. Suivant le Code médical du Mouvement olympique (2005), les médecins doivent respecter les principes de l'éthique médicale et ceux de l'éthique sportive, comme le fairplay. Il arrive parfois que l'éthique sportive entre en conflit avec l'éthique médicale. Les médecins sont alors confrontés à d'importants dilemmes qui peuvent engager leur responsabilité professionnelle et civile. Ces dilemmes se situent notamment au niveau de l'obligation de soins et du secret professionnel. Par exemple, les médecins peuvent-ils prescrire des médicaments pour contrer les effets néfastes du dopage afin de préserver la santé des athlètes ? La question de la recherche sur l'amélioration de la performance est également préoccupante. En raison du caractère clandestin de cette recherche, il y a lieu de se demander si les médecins qui y participent respectent leurs obligations professionnelles. L'analyse des principaux instruments normatifs applicables en l'espèce démontre que les médecins ne doivent pas être placés dans une situation telle qu'ils doivent refuser de suivre des athlètes de crainte d'être accusés de dopage. De plus, le secret professionnel devrait être maintenu lorsqu'un médecin suit un athlète dopé afin de préserver la relation de confiance. Finalement, l'analyse du contexte de la recherche portant sur l'amélioration de la performance révèle que les médecins ne respectent pas toujours leurs obligations. Les médecins fautifs risquent donc d'engager leur responsabilité professionnelle et civile et de faire face à des sanctions sévères. / The particular context of doping raises many questions regarding the obligations and the liability of physicians. According to the Medical Code of the Olympic Movement (2005), physicians must respect the principles of medical ethics as well as those of sport ethics, such as fair play. Sometimes, sport ethics conflicts with medical ethics. Therefore, physicians are confronted with important dilemmas, which could engage their professional and civil liability. These dilemmas concern, in particular, the duty of care and professional secrecy. For example, could physicians prescribe drugs to counter the side effects of doping in order to preserve the health of the athletes? Issues surrounding research on the improvement of performance is also of interest. Because of the often clandestine nature of this research, it should be asked whether physicians who participate respect their professional obligations. An analysis of the principal normative documents applicable demonstrates that physicians should not be placed in a situation where they would refuse to treat athletes because of fear of accusations of doping. Moreover, professional secrecy should be maintained when a physician follows an athlete in order to preserve the relation of trust. Finally, the analysis of the context of the research on the improvement of performance reveals that physicians don't always respect their obligations. These physicians might engage their professional and civil liability and face severe sanctions.