Les rapports entre concurrence et droit fiscal, en tant que technique de mise en oeuvre du prélèvement fiscal, sont multiples et complexes. Il apparaît sans peine que la concurrence est affectée par le droit fiscal, dans la mesure où tant les dépenses fiscales que les normes fiscales peuvent dénaturer le rapport concurrentiel. En pratique un tel biais concurrentiel résulte de critères d’imposition ratione materiae ou personae qui décorrèlent la charge fiscale de l’avantage concurrentiel, lequel détermine à lui seul l’issue du jeu concurrentiel, et est réductible à l’avantage en valeur ajoutée. Dit de manière plus analytique, le droit fiscal est distorsif de concurrence lorsqu’il traite certains concurrents ou actes concurrents de manière différenciée, soit de jure, soit de facto, c’est-à-dire en fonction de leurs caractéristiques économiques, dans la mesure où une telle différenciation ne recoupe pas les différences de valeur ajoutée. Le jeu concurrentiel est par ailleurs un instrument du droit fiscal, qui définit un principe dit « de pleine concurrence » pour déterminer objectivement la base imposable d’échanges intragroupes. Ce principe, qui emporte des effets importants en droit commercial et en droit de la concurrence, permet en outre d’exposer empiriquement les distorsions de concurrence naissant d’une méconnaissance de la valeur ajoutée propre à chaque contribuable. Au final, la distorsion fiscale de concurrence apparaît bien comme une affaire de critère d’imposition ; cette dimension juridique pose nécessairement la question de la réception de cette distorsion par le droit positif. magistère de fait dessine ainsi une norme matérielle de concurrence qui affecte le droit fiscal. Ainsi, en droit interne, la teneur et la mise en oeuvre du principe d’égalité devant l’impôt repose de manière croissante sur des analyses concurrentielles spontanées du juge de l’impôt et du juge constitutionnel, dont la seule limite paraît être une approche abstraite de l’égalité et une grande latitude d’appréciation laissée par ces derniers au pouvoir fiscal. Ce rapport d’influence se double d’une véritable instrumentalisation du droit fiscal sur le terrain du droit économique, qui subordonne la fiscalité à sa propre finalité concurrentielle. En effet, le droit de l’Union européenne recourt de manière étendue et explicite à l’analyse concurrentielle dans son contrôle de conventionalité du droit fiscal, en s’opposant aux mesures fiscales internes susceptibles, par une atteinte à l’obligation de traitement national ou une concurrence fiscale déloyale, de mettre en échec l’intégration économique européenne. Appliquant au droit fiscal un prisme purement économique ne présentant que des égards très limités pour les objectifs et méthodes fiscales, le droit de l’Union européenne porte en germe la censure de toute politique fiscale, même indistinctement applicable, à raison de son objet mais plus encore de ses effets anticoncurrentiels. L’expression ultime de l’instrumentalisation du droit fiscal par la concurrence réside dans la jurisprudence qui commande l’imposition au seul regard des distorsions de concurrence naissant de son absence, faisant de la concurrence une source d’imposition. / The relationship between competition and tax law, defined as a means of setting the tax burden for corporations, is far-reaching and complex. Competition is undoubtedly shaped by tax law, insofar as tax expenditures and regular tax provisions may adversely affect the outcome of competition on a given market. Specifically, competition may be distorted by tax criteria that unalign the tax burden from the competitive advantage which determines the market outcome, and which can be defined as the difference in added value between competitors. A more analytical expression of this would be that the criteria setting the tax burden distort competition - either de jure or de facto - when they provide for a specific tax treatment of certain competitors or competing operations. Furthermore, pursuant to the arm’s length principle, competition can be considered as an instrument for tax law, insofar as it is used as a tool for setting intragroup tax bases. The arm’s length principle, which falls under anticompetitive pricing rules, evidences the distorsion of competition that stems from disregarding taxpayers’ respective added values, thereby empirically confirming that tax capacity and added value should be aligned in order for tax law to be competition-neutral. Accordingly, tax distorsions of competition are a question of tax criteria; this legal dimension begs the question of whether such distorsions are characterized and regulated by statute and /or case law.A first observation would be that competition increasingly applies to tax law, marginally via competition law (which is a paradox), but more profoundly and widely as the defining influence behind a number of provisions and principles that govern tax law. That competition is accordingly instrumental for these norms would tend to make of competition a substantive norm for tax law. The French principle of equality before tax increasingly factors full-fledged competition analyses in the tax and constitutional courts’ appreciation of the competitive effects of tax provisions, but its scope is curtailed by an overly abstract conception of equality and, overall, a reluctance to challenge the legislator’s policy decisions. This influence, characterized in French law and conducive to tax being affected by the objective of free competition, also entails the instrumentalization of tax law in the field of economic law, which imposes on tax law its own competitive objectives. Indeed, EU law provides a wider and more explicit use of competition analysis in its appreciation of the lawfulness of tax law, by precluding provisions which, through discrimination on the grounds of nationality or unfair tax competition, conflict with the European economic integration. Specifically, tax provisions are tested for anticompetitive object and / or effects, with their fiscal objectives or methods being mostly disregarded in this respect, to the extent that anticompetitive effects can be viewed as the ultimate governing principle for tax law. This is conducive to the instrumentalization of tax law by competition, with far-reaching implications for tax policies and their underlying criteria. Ultimately, tax law is instrumentalized by competition in the case-law that warrants taxation on the grounds of the distortions of competition that would arise from its absence, effectively making competition a source of taxation

The goal of master thesis is evaluation of efficiency of state aid in the agriculture focusing on food quality marks. At the beginning of the work are described state institutions supporting Czech producers and their products. Evaluation of efficiency is made based on telephone interview with producers and quantitative research among consumers. Telephone interview is conducted with producers who can use a logo Regionalni potravina on their foodstuff. The aim of this research is to find out, if the producers achieved positive results in their sales after obtaining food quality mark. Quantitative research is made among consumers, where the key question is what awareness consumers have about food quality marks, what is the key factor in buying decision and if consumers noticed promotional campaigns of the Ministry of Agriculture focusing on aid of Czech producers with food quality marks. After making research it will be easier to say if state aid is effective or if there are spotted flaws or what.

The thesis with the topic State Aid and Taxation of Renewable Resources deals with the renewable resources in general, reason of their support, function of renewable resources powerplants etc. This thesis describes also the state aid of renewable resources in the Czech Republic and their taxation as well. A small part of this thesis analyzes the state aid in the other EU countires and contains their comparision with the Czech Republic.

Sveriges regering införde år 2020 ett statligt hyresrabattsstöd för ekonomiskt utsatta branscher som avsåg årets andra kvartal, och infördes som en snabb åtgärd för att begränsa oron som pandemikrisen medförde på marknaden. Stödet har kritiserats av både lokalhyresgäster och fastighetsägare. Frågan har varit kontroversiell med blandade åsikter om hur fördelningen av statens subventioner ska konstrueras för att uppnå bästa resultat i rådande situation.Syftet med studien är att belysa hur den statligt subventionerade hyresrabatten under coronapandemin har använts i praktiken. För att besvara studiens olika frågeställningar och för att uppnå syftet med studien, har en kvalitativ forskningsmetod använts. Avsikten med den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun är att förstå det utforskade ämnet ur de intervjuade fastighetsbolagens perspektiv och erfarenhet.Resultatet visar på att de främsta grunderna till varför bolagen tilldelat hyresrabatt till sina hyresgäster, har grundats i att fungera som en hjälpande hand och samtidigt undvika vakanser genom att värna om relationen mellan bolag och kund. Hyresrabatten har medfört en ekonomisk fördel för både fastighetsägare och hyresgäster där majoriteten av hyresgästerna har kunnat fortsatt bedriva sin verksamhet. För fastighetsägarna har det inneburit minimerade ombyggnadskostnader för att anpassa lokaler till nya hyresgäster. Det har framförts kritik mot själva upplägget av hyresrabattstödet, den administrativa delen har varit mycket invecklad och komplicerad. Man har dels fått agera som mellanhand och som ensam bransch behövt axla ansvaret, men även inneha rollen av en vågmästare vad avser tilldelning av hyresrabattstödet. / The Swedish government introduced a state rent rebate support for vulnerable industries in the first quarter of 2020, as a quick solution to dampen market turmoil. The support has been criticized by both tenants and property owners. It has been a controversial issue with various opinions on how the distribution of state subsidies should be constructed to best fit the current situation.The study is based on examining the state subsidized rent rebate that was distributed to the most affected industries. The purpose of the study is to clarify how the state-subsidized rent rebate during the corona pandemic has been used in practice.To answer the study's questions and to achieve the purpose of the study, a qualitative research method has been used. The purpose of the qualitative research interview is to understand the topic explored from the interviewee's own perspective and experience.The results show that the main reasons to why a rent discount was given to tenants, was to act as a helping hand to those most effected by the pandemic, but also to avoid vacancies. The rent discount resulted in a clear financial advantage for both the property owners and the tenants, where the majority of the tenants have been able to continue their business. The property owners have avoided high renovation costs to adapt premises for new tenants.Criticism has been leveled at the very structure of the rent rebate support, as the administrative part was complicated. The propery owners have partly been acting as an intermediary and solely shoulder the responsibility in terms of allocating the rent rebate.

The European Union was devised to promote competition in the international market environment and ensure balanced allocation of fiscal and political requirements of the Member States. Globalization has led to enabling tax environments through granting of tax benefits by EU Member jurisdictions intended to promote competition in attracting foreign investment, trade, and development. Multinational Corporations may often exploit these tax benefits through various tax arrangement provisions causing a loss of tax revenue. The European Commission is implored to oversee the tax ruling granted by the Member States that is distortionary to the internal market. The Notion of State aid rule Article 107(1) TFEU is adopted as part of the mechanism to combat distortions that leads to tax evasion and harmful tax competition.  This research is intended to analyse the Commission and the General Court’s approach to demonstrate illegal or unlawful State aid through varied and adaptive methodology to tackle emerging complex tax arrangements provisions of Multinational Corporations, notably the Amazon and Engie recent cases. This paper also discusses the identification of potential conflict of laws between the relevant general system of legal rule of the domestic tax legislation and EU Law. Specifically with regards to the determination of whether a tax benefit confers a tax advantage and subsequently if that advantage is deemed selective in nature in a transfer of financial asset undertaking under a certain domestic law. The dynamics of potential abuse of law and aid recovery with the general tax principle of Legality will also be explored.

Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

A pre–post case study was conducted to examine how target revenue funding from Texas House Bill 1 (2006) has impacted the school districts within the Texas Education Service Center Region X area. Forced by the courts, the Texas Legislature was required to fix the Texas school finance system because of a de facto statewide property tax it had created by capping school district’s maintenance & operations tax rate at $1.50. Texas Governor Rick Perry used this opportunity to reduce school district M&O taxes by one-third. The Texas Legislature passed House Bill 1 (2006), the Public School Finance and Property Tax Relief Act, in response to the courts and to address a continuous decline in state funding support for public education. The Public School Finance and Property Tax Relief Act reduced local school districts’ property tax rates and revenue with the assurance that these funds would be exchanged for state aid. Local school property taxes were reduced over two years, 2006–2007 and 2007-2008, by 33%. In order for the State of Texas to meet the state aid funding guarantee from House Bill 1 (2006), each school district was frozen to its 2005–2006 revenue per weighted student, which was called a district’s revenue target. This study examined the impact target revenue has had on these school districts by analyzing and comparing revenues and expenditures prior to and following the law’s implementation. Specifically, changes in per-student revenue, per-student expenditures, and district fund balances were assessed.

Die Regierungen in der Europäischen Union retten Unternehmen in Schwierigkeiten durch staatliche Rettungs- und Umstrukturierungsbeihilfen. Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Kapiteln, die solche Beihilfen analysieren. Im ersten Kapitel nutze ich Daten von 86 Fällen aus den Jahren 1995-2003 um zu prüfen, wie wirksam die Beihilfen bei der Konkursprävention sind. Es gibt drei Ergebnisse. Erstens steigt die geschätzte diskrete hazard rate in den ersten vier Jahren nach der Subvention und sinkt danach, was nahelegt, dass einige Sanierungen den Konkurs eher verzögern als verhindern. Zweitens, Regierungen favorisieren staatliche Unternehmen bei Beihilfeentscheidungen, obwohl diese keine besseren Überlebenschancen haben. Drittens, die Wahl, ob Rettungs- oder Umstrukturierungsbeihilfe gewärt wird, ist eine endogene Variable in der Analyse. Wenn man sie als exogen betrachtet, unterschätzt man die Auswirkungen auf die Konkurswahrscheinlichkeit. Das zweite Kapitel ist eine Studie über die Auswirkungen von Bailouts auf Marktstruktur und Wohlfahrt in einem internationalen, asymmetrischen Cournot -- Duopol. Es wird gezeigt, dass die optimale Beihilfe positiv ist, auch wenn der Marktaustritt einer Firma nicht verhindert werden kann. Der Grund hierfür ist ein strategischer Effekt, der die effizientere Firma zu einer zusätzlichen kostenreduzierenden Maßnahme veranlasst. Wird der Marktaustritt verhindert, ist Effizienz geringer. Das dritte Kapitel enthält empirische Belege der politischen, institutionellen und wirtschaftlichen Determinanten der Sanierungsubventionspolitik. Ich nutze einen neuen Datensatz über Entscheidungen über Rettungs- und Umstrukturierungsbeihilfen während der Jahre 1995-2003 zusammen mit Informationen über Wahlergebnisse in den Europäischen Ländern. Das wichtigste Ergebnis ist, dass die Beihilfen in Ländern mit Mehrheitswahlsystem wahrscheinlicher sind, insbesondere während der Jahre vor Wahlen. / Governments in the European Union bail out firms in distress by granting Rescue and Restructuring Subsidies. This thesis consists of three chapters analyzing European bailouts. In the first chapter, I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine the effectiveness of bailouts in preventing bankruptcy. The results are threefold. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate increases during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. Second, governments'' bailout decisions favored state-owned firms, even though state-owned firms did not outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an endogenous variable and treating it as exogenous underestimates its impact on the bankruptcy probability. Policy implications are discussed in the chapter. The second chapter is a study of the effects of bailouts on market structure and welfare in an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly. I show that the subsidy is positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a strategic effect, which forces the more efficient firm to make additional cost-reducing effort. When the exit is prevented, allocative and productive efficiencies are lower than in case of exit. The third chapter provides evidence of political, institutional and economic determinants of bailout policies. I use a new data set based on rescue and restructuring aid decisions during the years 1995-2003 merged with information about electoral outcomes in European countries. The main finding is that in countries with majoritarian democratic institutions bailouts are more likely, in particular during years preceding elections. Since bailouts are a targeted fiscal policy, the evidence supports the theory of Persson and Tabellini (2000) predicting that electoral systems shape incentives for fiscal policy choices.

Initialement exclu des domaines couverts par le Traité de Rome, le transport maritime a fait l’objet en 1992 de mesures permettant l’accès des armateurs de l’Union à la libre prestation de service sur les lignes intérieures des États membres. Néanmoins, l’espace maritime européen n’a pas de consistance juridique : il n’est composé que de la juxtaposition des espaces reconnus par le droit international comme la mer territoriale de chaque État membre. Au-delà de cette limite, la mer est internationale. L’Union, au fil des élargissements, a perdu sa configuration continentale pour intégrer un nombre croissant d’îles ce qui accentue l’importance des transports maritimes pour la libre circulation des personnes et des marchandises au sein du marché intérieur. En outre, la situation géographique, économique et démographique de ces îles est hétérogène : quelques habitants dans les Orcades, plusieurs millions en Sicile ... Malgré la diversité des territoires insulaires, de la mer du nord à la mer Egée, les conditions de mise en oeuvre de la libre prestation de service de transport maritime par le règlement du Conseil n° 3577/92 (cabotage) sont identiques en dépits de la réalité contrastée des marchés concernés. Pourtant, les mesures adoptées par l’Union, au regard des conditions d’attribution des aides relatives aux missions de service public vers les îles, notamment dans le cadre d’un SIEG, ont des effets restrictifs tant sur les conditions de concurrence entre les armateurs que sur les échanges commerciaux entre les États membres. Malgré l’incompatibilité des aides aux entreprises, le Traité FUE ménage des dérogations dont la Commission peut jouer. Dans le secteur maritime les aides compatibles avec le Traité FUE concernent notamment la construction navale, la sécurité, la formation des équipages. Une distinction doit être opérée entre ces aides sectorielles et les aides individuelles concernent les transports de ligne. Lorsqu’ils sont corrélés à des contrats de service et, où, à des obligations de service public établis sur des trajets prédéterminés, les dispositifs d’aide agissent comme des barrières non tarifaires aux échanges qui structurent les circulations maritimes et impactent le fonctionnement du marché intérieur en influant sur l’origine nationale des marchandises destinées aux consommateurs insulaires. La Commission, sous le contrôle de la Cour, analyse les marchés et la compatibilité des aides en anticipant leurs effets. Cependant, cette activité prédictive la conduit à influencer les marchés maritimes. L’étude de la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission en matière d’aide au transport maritime montre qu’elle utilise une analyse ligne par ligne qui restreint le marché géographique. Ayant établi en 2005, et renouvelé en 2011, l’exemption de notification des compensations de service public et pratiquant des analyses insuffisantes des marchés maritimes, la Commission se prive de contrôler les conditions réelles de la circulation maritime de marchandise. Cependant, si la Commission exempte de notification la majeure part des aides au profit des SIEG de transport maritime, et si ses analyses des marchés sont insuffisantes, c’est in fine la capacité du juge de l’Union à arbitrer entre l’intérêt général des États membres et l’intérêt commun de l’Union qui, compte tenu du principe du contrôle restreint applicable en matière de faits économiques complexes, est remise en cause. / Initially excluded from areas covered by the Treaty of Rome, maritime transport has been in 1992 the subject of measures allowing shipowners to access to the freedom to provide services on domestic routes in the Member States. Nevertheless, the European maritime area has no legal consistency: it is only composed of the juxtaposition of areas recognised by international law as the territorial sea of each Member State. Beyond this limit, the sea is international. Over the course of enlargements, the Union has lost its continental configuration to integrate a growing number of islands, which highlights the importance of maritime transport for the free movement of people and goods within the internal market. In addition, the geographic, economic and demographic situation of these islands is heterogeneous: some people are living in Orkney, millions of others are living in Sicily... Despite the diversity of island territories from the North Sea to the Aegean Sea, the conditions for the implementation of the freedom to provide maritime transport service by Council Regulation No 3577/92 (cabotage) are identical, despite the multifaceted reality of the concerned markets. However, the measures adopted by the Union, based on the conditions for the allocation of the aid in connection with public service missions to the islands, particularly in the context of an SGEI, have restrictive effects both on the conditions for competition between shipowners, and on trade exchange between the Member States. Despite the inconsistency of State aid with companies, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) allows derogations on which the Commission can play. In the maritime sector, the aid compatible with the TFEU is about shipbuilding, safety, crew training, amongst others. A distinction must be made between these sectoral aid and individual aid as regards transport line. When correlated with service contracts or with public service obligations established on predetermined paths, the aid system acts as a non-tariff barriers to trade, which structure maritime traffic and impact the functioning of the market by influencing national origin of goods for consumers living in island regions. The Commission, under the control of the Court, analyses the markets and the compatibility of aid by anticipating their effects. However, the predictive activity leads the Commission to influence maritime markets. An analysis of the decisions taken by the Commission on aid to maritime transport shows that it uses a line by line analysis which brings a restriction on the geographic market. Having established in 2005 and renewed in 2011 the exemption from notification of public service compensation, and having practiced insufficient analysis of the maritime market, the Commission denies controlling the real conditions of maritime traffic goods. However, if the Commission exempts from notification the main part of aid in favor of SGEI shipping, and if its market analyses are insufficient, it is ultimately the ability of the EU Courts to arbitrate between the public interest of the Member States and the common interests of the Union, which, based on the principle of limited control applicable to the complex economic facts, is questioned.

S’il est désormais clairement établi que les personnes publiques peuvent, d’une part, prendre en charge des activités sur le marché, d’autre part, candidater à des contrats de la commande publique, les conditions dans lesquelles s’exerce la concurrence des personnes publiques sont souvent l’objet de contestations dans la mesure où on leur fait reproche d’être avantagées par leur statut de droit public. L’objet de cette thèse est de démontrer que les personnes publiques ne sont ni avantagées, ni défavorisées par leur statut mais simplement inadaptées et inadaptables au milieu concurrentiel car le statut de droit public implique structurellement une distorsion concurrentielle et donc une atteinte à l’exigence d’égale concurrence. Cette difficulté pourrait toutefois être surmontée en consolidant les sociétés publiques. / It is now established that a public law person can take over activities on the market, and apply for public procurement contracts. But the terms under which these public law persons are present on the competitive market are disputed, as their statute under public law is often criticized as an unfair advantage. This thesis aims to demonstrate that public law persons are neither advantaged nor disadvantaged by their statute, but are simply not suited – and can't be adapted – to the competitive market, as their public law statute structurally implies a competitive distortion and an infringement to the legal requirements for fair competition. That difficulty may however be overcome by consolidating state-owned enterprises.