Military theories regarding surprise has a conceptual way of being described which may influence the effect that surprise actually has on a specific command level. Without sufficient explanations there might be unclear reasons for the conversion of these theories into practice. The existing research shows an increased possibility of surprise within the strategical command level and how to achieve it. It also shows the absence of research regarding what causes surprise on tactical command level, even if some theories describe surprise as being more effective at that level. Special operations can be included within the tactical command level and may offer an explanation. This case study examines which causes may lead to surprise on a tactical command level by analyzing descriptions of special operations within the conduct of regular warfare. With theoretical and empirical references, surprise was achieved in both of the selected cases. The results of the study can be divided in to two categories: the direct and the indirect causes. The categorization gives a further explanation in how to better understand surprise within a specific command level. The study contributes to the existing research by revealing a better understanding for commanders within a tactical command level in how to achieve surprise.

Since 1949, irregular conflicts have been the primary type of conflict. Although the Swedish government has found that a restructuring of focus from international operations to national defence is fundamental for Swedish security policy, the Swedish Armed Forces are still engaged in several irregular conflict arenas around the globe.By applying a theoretical framework based on counterinsurgency theory, this study ventures to explore whether this theory has been implemented in the main Swedish armed forces policy documents. The purpose of this is to facilitate an understanding for the potential strengths and weaknesses that these documents have when implementing counter insurgency in irregular conflicts.This study finds that there exists an implementation of counter insurgency theory in these policy documents as a prerequisite for Swedish operations in irregular conflicts. Furthermore, this proves a correlation between theory and policy something that may be a positive prerequisite for this kind of operations.Furthermore, this study finds that future studies in to the relevance of COIN theory in potential conflicts to come.

This thesis examines how risk taking and type of personality is connected. Using the HEXACO personality test to determine which type of person the respondents are. The thesis define risk taking from both civilian literature as well as military literature. The purpose for this thesis being to map the connection between risk taking and type of personality. In the long run the thesis aims to be able to discuss which individuals should serve in specific positions when their risk taking is accounted for.    Previous studies lack a clear military alignment towards a tactical level. These studies have studied risk in a military context but then connected with civilian research and not on a tactical, and more hands-on level. HEXACO and risk taking have been studied together in previous studies but in a civilian context. This thesis aims to tie these two areas of research together.   The result of the analysis gave no answer that was statistically significant. The factors from HEXACO analyzed was H, X, C and O. The E and A factor were not analyzed due to lack of research on which to build hypothesis. A correlation between the H-factor from HEXACO and risk taking can be observed but it was not statistically significant. The area needs more research which should mainly be aimed at the H-factor in relation to risk taking.

The conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and eastern Ukraine have spurred a great deal of interest regarding the implications for modern warfare. Both schoolers and militaries alike have been trying  to decern what kind of implications these conflicts, complete with new weapons and capabilities have upon tomorrow’s battlefield. Theories that try to provide an explanatory outcome of conflicts has often been centered down to the age-old question whether it is the scientific material side or the artistic maneuver that takes the precedence for explaining victory on the battlefield. The purpose of this paper is to try and combine those views by using Randall Collins theory regarding the outcome of conflicts, to explain the battles of Ilovaisk 2014 and the Azerbaijani advance in Sothern Nagorno-Karabakh 2020. That way both sides are taken into account and help mitigate the debate. Furthermore, the making of a structural analytical framework tests the theory and is beneficial for further research. The framework developed from the theory, have two different main casual ways to explain victory on the battlefield. One stem from the material side called attrition and one from the artistic side called maneuverer. The framework was then applied upon a number of different reports, books, and other open sources from the conflicts. Conclusions from the results are that attritional warfare has been a viable way to achieve victory and that the long-range precision firepower that drone warfare offer has the advantage over the defensive counters.

The concept of surprise is as old as warfare itself. All battlefield commanders want to defeat their foe with the smallest number of lost lives and expenditure of resources. This study will analyse what factors are necessary to achieve surprise and what the effect of that surprise can be. This study will apply Jim Storr’s theory of surprise against two different cases where surprise can be found. The first case is when the German forces stormed the fortress of Eben Emael during the Second World War where a small force of 86 paratroopers successfully managed to defeat a garrison of about 1000 men. The second case is the second battle of El Alamein where the British 8th army beat Rommel and his Das Afrika Korps. The aim of the study is to see how surprise was achieved and what the effect of the surprise was in the two cases according to Jim Storrs theory of surprise. The result of the study indicates that there are some explanatory powers to these cases with Jim Storr’s theory of surprise. In the case of Eben Emael it is quite significant and in the case of El Alamein it is somewhat limited.

In 1967 Israel clashed in a short but intense war with its middle eastern neighbours, later labelled as the six-day war. At the time Israel was poorly equipped and outnumbered in all areas compared to its opponents. Egypt was, on paper, the strongest contender against Israel being backed up with resources by the Soviet Union. Despite this Israel did not only come out on top but did so remarkably quick and with an efficiency that had not been seen since the German Blitzkrieg during world war II.  To this day there has been plenty of attempts to explain tactical success or defeat and what underlying factors that contribute to one side emerging victorious in tactical battles. Often these attempts single out one or a few deciding variables. The purpose of this study is to test Thunholm & Henåkers relatively new approach to explaining tactical success as an ideal sequence of factors and methods. Through a case study of the events of the six-day war this study will attempt to either reinforce or falsify the ideal sequence as a tool for understanding and explaining tactical success or defeat.  The result of this study reveals a continued need to test Thunholm & Henåkers theoretical framework in cases with a very high level of detail and possibly in a quantitative approach as well due to the nature of tactical events and effects being a matter of probability.

Militärstrategisk doktrin 2016 inriktar Försvarsmakten att förstå den militära strategin utifrån ett nytt perspektiv, en alliansstrategi. Försvarsmakten skall undvika att förlora enskilt för att sedan kunna vinna tillsammans med andra militära samarbetspartners, detta är nya förutsättningar i en svensk kontext. Den kvalitativa intervjustudien fokuseras på hur det militärstrategiska konceptet i den militärstrategiska doktrinen 2016 påverkar samspelet mellan militärstrategin och den högre taktiken inom den svenska Armén. Resultatet visar att en offensiv förförståelse på den högre taktiska nivån möter en mer defensiv militärstrategisk inriktning vilket kan vara problematiskt i samspelet mellan militärstrategin och den högre taktiken. Vidare visar resultatet på att en bristande implementering av den militärstrategiska doktrinen 2016 skapat en divergerande tolkning av den nya militärstrategin. Effekten av detta påverkar den kollektiva förståelsen avseende samspelet mellan den militära strategin och den högre taktiken.

Militärwissenschaften im Diskurs (I) – Militärwissenschaft im Umbruch (1990). Dokumentation (Reprint 1990 –2022): ‘Schriften der Militärakademie’ Heft 267/1990 'Zu den allgemeinen Grundlagen der Militärwissenschaft' – Aus dem Protokoll der wissenschaftlichen Konferenz vom 26. April 1990 in Dresden.:Militärwissenschaften im Diskurs (I) – Militärwissenschaft im Umbruch (1990). ○ Vorwort des Herausgebers zum Publikationsprojekt 2022 ○ Dokumentation (Reprint 1990–2022): ‘Schriften der Militärakademie’ Heft 267/1990‘: 'Zu den allgemeinen Grundlagen der Militärwissenschaft' – Aus dem Protokoll der wissenschaftlichen Konferenz vom 26. April 1990 in Dresden. • Vorwort von Rainer Böhme; • Horst Pukrop: Vorstellungen vom 23. März 1990. 'Über ein neues Verständnis der Militärwissenschaft“; • Rainer Böhme: Diskussionsangebot vom 19. April 1990: „Zu einigen grundlegenden Problemen der Militärwissenschaft“; • Rainer Böhme: Referat zur wissenschaftlichen Konferenz am 26. April 1990: „Überlegungen zur Lehre und Forschung in der Operativen Kunst, die sich aus verändertem Auftrag, Funktion und Aufgaben von deutschen Streitkräften ergeben“; • Klaus Kulisch: Diskussionbeitrag am 26. April 1990: „Zu einigen Grundfragen der Militärwissenschaft“; • Horst Pukrop: Diskussionbeitrag am 26. April 1990: „Zu Grundfragen der Militärwissenschaft“; • Autorenkollektiv, Rainer Böhme (Red.): 'Resümee vom 16. Mai 1990 zur wissenschaftlichen Konferenz.' ANHANG • Günther Pöschel: Vorschlag [des Dekans der Fakultät] vom 16. Mai 1990: 'Zur inhaltlichen Neugliederung der Lehre/Forschung in einer zukünftigen Fakultät ‘Militärwissenschaft’.

The new modern advancements in technology continues to impress with its superior features. However, implementing new technological systems can be problematic, and will require good planning and flexibility to utilize the technology to its full potential. Should new technology be adapted to fit into already existing tactics, or should the new technology and its characteristics and capabilities contribute to the development of tactics? The purpose of this study examines how tactics are affected by the implementation of a new technical system whitin the Swedish army. To analyze this, the author has chosen the implementation of the Armored Terrain Vehicle 360, which was intended to replace the previous, the Armored Personnel Carrier 302. The study uses a qualitative method, that is used to review theories that discuss military technique and tactics, and how they affect eachother. Indicators from the theories are identified in order to contribue to conclusions regarding the technical and tactical differences of both combat vehicles. The result of thestudy shows that the Swedish Armed Forces' implementation of the Armored All-Terrain Vehicle 360 has impacted and developed the tactics of the infantry units. Therefore, the results indicate that the units have had to develop new tactics as the characteristics of the new technology could not fully be applied and used within the existing tactics.

Drawing on sensegiving theory, utilizing interviews, doctrine studies and the-matic analysis methodology, this thesis investigates the prospects on Swedish Army´s tactical language to be efficient for facilitating situational awareness and issuing instructions in high-intensity warfare against a highly technolog-ical adversary in the land domain. In the study I conclude the tactical language is perceived as sufficient for its purpose but with remarks and offers a few suggestions to manage the flaws.