This essay consists of a case study which examines China’s Belt and Road Initiative from two theoretical perspectives: realism and liberalism. The essay aims to enhance the comprehension of the Belt and Road Initiative by providing a realistic as well as a liberal interpretation of the project, and then comparing them to point out similarities and differences between these views. The essay concludes that the theoretical perspectives here work complementary rather than contradictory, and that what is hard to explain with one theory, often can be explained by the other. A liberal perspective sees more opportunities with the project, whereas a realistic one sees more risks but also necessities. The important aspects of the project from a liberal perspective concludes to be increased trade, international cooperation and interdependence, which are considered as risks from a realistic perspective. The main advantage is to increase power and security and legitimize the rule of the Chinese communist party, realistically speaking. Realism and liberalism interpret the goal with the project differently as well. Whereas realism sees BRI as a bold foreign policy project which aims to help China gain power to become a superpower and defeat poverty in China, liberalism view BRI as a foreign policy infrastructure project, built on trade, international cooperation and linking the world together.

In the context of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, this paper provides a comparative analysis of China's neocolonialism and smart power strategies through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The study analyzes the economic, political, and social consequences of China's growing presence in these nations and offers a deeper comprehension of their position in the region by drawing on a wide range of theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence. The research starts out by examining the idea of neocolonialism and how it relates to China's involvement in the area. It explores into a critical analysis of China's debt-trap diplomacy, which raised concerns regarding the BRI projects' long-term economic viability and political influence. The paper also looks into how China uses smart power as a strategic tool to expand its influence in the region, emphasizing on smart power programs, economic development, and cultural diplomacy.

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習近平出身紅二代，不同於前幾代中國大陸領導人以傳統意識形態路線為施政主軸，習近平卻提出了訴諸情感的「中國夢」。 既稱之為夢，即有無限想像空間，難加以具體化。而「中國夢」的戰略觀構想，不僅為主導與型塑著習近平時代中共的對外政策、戰略規劃與全球佈局。當前，「中國夢」的內涵伴隨著情勢發展和現實需要不斷的擴充，不僅積極應處周邊關係，穩定亞太地區、妥善處理海權爭議、牽制美國亞太「再平衡」戰略，並向西推進「一帶一路」戰略。 「一帶一路」不僅是彰顯習近平中國特色的大國外交理念，也創新發展中國外交思想和國際戰略，使對外工作具有鮮明的中國特色、中國風格、中國氣派，更推進中國新一輪對外開放並與沿線國家合作共贏的外交方略。 因此，從習近平擘劃的「中國夢」藍圖下，透由「一帶一路」戰略構想，開創對外政經合作的新格局，將成為習近平「中國夢」的歷史定位。

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences. / Department of Government and Public Administration

The following thesis conducted a case study to investigate the opinion of exper ts working on the Bombay-Ahmadabad HSR and Ankara-Istanbul HSR on how China uses HSRD and BRI to develop and utilize its soft power and whether that opinion ma tches the official Chinese point of view. The official Chinese view about BRI is that it seeks to deliver win-win outcomes, development, and improvement of lives for partici pating countries. In addition, it 'has no geopolitical motives, seeks no exclusionary bl ocs, and imposes no business deals on others … addresses people's desire for a better l ife … and shared benefits.' Ramo (2007)'s operationalization of the term global image was used to assess the respondents' opinions. The results showed that there is low dependability of the overa ll BRI among the respondents. A majority of the respondents (60%) claimed that BRI and HSRD are successful but were not impressed by the delivered value and quality o f BRI. 70% of the respondents believed that the Bombay-Ahmadabad HSR would ach ieve its objective and that it had a high level of technology. In terms of financial, socia l and political impact, the responses showed proportions of 40%, 37%, 44% respectiv ely gave a positive answer. Overall, it can be concluded that in terms of image the Bo mbay-Ahmadab gave...

Работа посвящена анализу развития экономического сотрудничества между РФ и КНР в контексте реализации китайской глобальной инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» (ОПОП). На основе широкого круга источников и литературы определяются основные направления взаимодействия, особенности и результаты сотрудничества в рамках ОПОП. Также анализируются позиции обеих стран и оценки взаимодействия, транслируемые международным экспертным сообществом. Автор приходит к выводу, что РФ и КНР не являются равноправными партнерами в проекте ОПОП, однако их сотрудничество, в целом, имеет положительную динамику. / The work analyses the development of economic relations between Russia and China in the context of the implementation of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the basis of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, the interaction, features and results of cooperation within the framework of BRI are determined. The official positions of the two countries are analyzed, as well as the assessment of interaction by the international expert community. The author comes to the conclusion that the RF and the PRC are not equal partners in the BRI project, however, their cooperation, in general, has positive dynamics.

Depuis le début des années 2000, la Chine et la RPDC (« Corée du Nord) ont tenté de mettre en œuvre des programmes de coopération économique et d’intégration transfrontalière. Ces programmes de coopération ont été facilité par des politiques réformatrices en Corée du Nord, la famine des années 1990 ayant fait prendre conscience à Pyongyang qu’un certain degré de réforme économique était nécessaire pour reprendre le contrôle et relancer une économie désorganisée et appauvrie. En conséquence, les échanges et les investissements entre la Chine et la RPDC ont connu une hausse spectaculaire. Ceci étant, les expérimentations politiques menées par Pyongyang, dont notamment les Zones Économiques Spéciales, n’ont pas réussi à attirer l‘attention des entrepreneurs et des officiels chinois.A travers l’étude empirique d’une selection de Zones Économiques Spéciales et de leurs environnements politiques et législatifs, des entretiens avec des hommes d’affaires chinois impliqués dans les relations économiques bilatérales à la frontière et des observations sur le terrain en Corée du Nord, l’auteur développe l’idée selon laquelle les stratégies d’engagement économiques chinoises et les politiques de développement économique nord-coréennes sont fondamentalement incompatibles, ce qui fait des actuellespratiques de coopération économique une source de tensions politiques. Il semblerait que la Chine a en effet essayé d’atteindre certains objectifs politiques et géopolitiques à travers des outils économiques, ce qui est vu par Pyongyang comme une ingérence dans ses affaires internes. Ces stratégies chinoises sont particulièrement intéressantes à étudier dans le contexte de l’initiative « One Belt, One Road ». Paradoxalement, l’auteur cherche à expliquer que les plus récentes générations de Zones Économiques Spéciales ne visent pas seulement à faciliter une certaine forme d’intégration économique bilatérale mais incarnent dans le même temps une forme de résistance à l’étreinte économique chinoise. / Since the beginning of the 2000’s, China and the DPRK (North Korea) have tried to implement economic cooperation and crossborder-economic integration programs. These cooperation programs have been facilitated by reformist policies in the DPRK, as the 1990 decade famine that struck North Korea convinced the Pyongyang leadership that some degree of economic reform was needed to restart and regain control over a greatly damaged economy. As a result, trade and investment ties between China and North Korea soared. However, political experimentations by the Pyongyang leadership, such as Special Economic Zones, have attracted limited attention from Chinese entrepreneurs and officials.Through an empirical analysis of a selection of North Korean Special Economic Zones and related policies, interviews with Chinese businessmen active in the borderlands as well as anecdotal evidence gathered in the DPRK, the author argues that Chinese economic engagement policies and North Korea’s economic development strategy bear structural incompatibilities which makes the current economic cooperation patterns a source of diplomatic and political friction. It seems that China has indeed been trying to achieve different political and geopolitical objectives through economic means, which largely resonates with the larger Chinese-led “One Belt, one Road” initiative” but is seen as interfering from Pyongyang. Quite paradoxically, the author argues that later generations of Special Economic Zones do not only constitute institutions designed to foster economic integration between China and the DPRK but also embody political resistance to the Chinese economic embrace. / Seit dem Beginn der 2000er Jahre haben China und die Demokratische Volksrepublik Korea (Nordkorea) versucht, eine wirtschaftliche Kooperation und grenzüberschreitende wirtschaftliche Integrationsprogramme zu implementieren. Diese Projekte wurden durch reformorientierte Politik in der DPRK ermöglicht, da die Hungersnot, welche Nordkorea in den 90er Jahren heimsuchte, die Pjöngjanger Führung überzeugte, dass ein gewisser Grad an wirtschaftlichen Reformen nötig sei, um die schwer beschädigte Wirtschaft neu zu starten und über sie Kontrolle auszuüben. Infolgedessen steigerten sich der Handel und die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen insgesamt zwischen China und Nordkorea auf ein noch nie da gewesenes Niveau. Jedoch haben politische Experimente der Führung in Pyongyang, einschließlich eines direkten „Policytransfers“, welche chinesischen Erfahrungen nachempfunden waren, wie zum Beispiel Sonderwirtschaftszonen, eingeschränkte Aufmerksamkeit von chinesischen Unternehmern und Beamten erfahren.Auf Basis einer empirischen Analyse einer Auswahl von nordkoreanischen Sonderwirtschaftszonen und damit verbundenen „Policies“, Interviews mit im Grenzgebiet aktiven, chinesischen Unternehmern und in Nordkorea gesammelten Einzelberichten, argumentiert der Autor, dass die chinesischen wirtschaftlichen Engagement Strategien und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstrategie Nord-Koreas strukturellen Unvereinbarkeiten aufweisen, welche die derzeitigen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsmuster zu eine Quelle diplomatischer und politischer Spannungen werden lassen. Es scheint, dass China in der Tat versucht hat, verschiedene politische und geopolitische Ziele auf wirtschaftlichem Wege zu erreichen, was größtenteils in der bedeutenden, von China angeführten, „One Belt, one Road“ Initiative seinen Nachhall findet, jedoch von Pjöngjang als Einmischung gesehen wird. Paradoxerweise sind, so die Argumentation des Autors, spätere Generationen der Sonderwirtschaftszonen nicht nur Institutionen zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Integration zwischen China und der Demokratischen Volksrepublik Korea, sie verkörpern auch den politischen Widerstand gegen die chinesische wirtschaftliche Umklammerung.

China has gone through a phase of rapid economic development in the last four decades. The country is the world’s biggest economy, measured in GDP purchasing power parity terms, and the largest trading nation in terms of the total sum of exports and imports of merchandise trade. With the launch of the century’s largest infrastructure project – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – by Xi Jinping in 2013, China is planning to revive the Ancient Silk Roads in order to gain geopolitical power beyond Asia. Thus far, huge flows of FDI have already made their way from China to countries along the Belt and Road, especially the ones in need of additional infrastructure provision. In this paper, the effect of Chinese outward FDI on economic growth in the BRI economies through infrastructure development is examined, thereby conducting a cross-country analysis with panel data for 34 and 27 countries, respectively, over the period 2005–2017. The direct effect of Chinese FDI on economic growth in BRI countries is ambiguous, supporting previous literature on FDI and economic growth. When adding infrastructure indicators to the regressions and accounting for the endogeneity problem, the effect of Chinese FDI on economic growth changes but remains insignificant, nevertheless. This is most likely due to the reduced sample sizes, on the one hand, and the fact that Chinese construction contracts play a bigger role than actual FDI in the BRI.

The European Union (EU) is a key trading partner for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Nearly one third of PRC's production is send to the EU and half of EU exports is directed to the PRC. Such huge trade volumes require an appropriate logistical connection, which is currently dominated by maritime transport. However, since 2007 railway transport has also been available. The aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the position of the railway transport of the PRC European route (with focus on the position of the Czech Republic) with regard to its development, obstacles and potential for the future. Firstly, the paper describes the background and reasons for the establishment of the New Silk Road (One Belt One Road initiative), followed by the trade and economic cooperation between the PRC and the Czech Republic. The practical part deals with individual aspects of railway connection. Neither in terms of trade volumes nor price can railway compete with the maritime solution, nevertheless it slowly but surely acquires its first regular customers.