This thesis has analysed the relations among the women’s movement, the state and the labour market policy during and shortly after the Second World War and to what extent this period can be characterised as a formative phase as regards gender relations. The aim has been to study women’s strategic actions in order to influence the Swedish Government’s labour market policy in the period from 1939 to 1947. The thesis shows the conflicts of interest that manifested themselves between Statens arbetsmarknadskommission (SAK, ‘the National Swedish Labour Market Commission’) and its advisory women’s group, experts on women’s issues, concerning the planning and utilisation of female labour. SAK thought that the work of the experts on female issues should only focus on the short-term labour problems caused by the national crisis situation, while the experts on women’s issues were of the opinion that they should also work with long-term labour-market issues for women. These different ways of thinking and understanding the problem originated in different views on women’s work. The experts on women’s issues wanted to strengthen women’s position on the labour market by abolishing the wage differences between the genders, breaking the gender segregation in education, and broadening the occupational choices of girls. They had three strategies for achieving this: a strategy of professionalisation, a strategy of change, and a strategy of state feminism. The strategy of professionalisation was aimed at raising the value of traditional female work, in terms of both status and wages. The strategy of change was aimed at creating new opportunities for women to leave typical low-wage jobs and gain access to better paid jobs in male-dominated areas. The strategy of state feminism was aimed at paving the way for women in new and expanding occupational areas beside the traditional male occupations. Can the period during and shortly after the war be characterised as a formative phase of the issue of gender relations? It is evident that this period did not involve a revolution of the societal gender order. The idea of women as reserve labour did not disappear. The post-war planners considered that, in the transition to peace, the women who had replaced men who were called up should be redeployed or retrained for employment in household work, in hotels, restaurants and cafés, in shops and in health care. In spite of the great shortage of labour in the post-war period, leading politicians and economists stuck to old ways of thinking. A clear indication on the part of the Government was that the women’s movement’s demand for long-term planning in order to utilise female labour was turned down. One important difference from the First World War was that the Government produced peace plans for women’s work during the Second World War. The period also led to ideological and institutional consequences that could be the beginning of a change of the societal gender order. From her central position in Kommissionen för ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering (‘the Commission for economic post-war planning’), Karin Kock could see to it that women’s demands for greater occupational mobility and a loosening up of the gender division of labour had an impact on the post-war planning of the war years. The experiences of women in male industries in the Second World War, both in Sweden and abroad, showed to some extent that it was possible to change the gender division of labour. The modern welfare state also came to correspond to a great extent to the state feminist strategy of the experts on women’s issues. With the historical formation of the welfare state a new type of occupational groups developed, the so-called welfare state professionals.

From 1933 to 1945, thousands of European Jews attempted to gain access to Canada in order to escape Nazi oppression. This thesis examines Canada’s immigration records and policies during this period. In addition to bringing light to key issues concerning popular Canadian perceptions of Jewish immigrants and refugees in the thirties and forties, this history raises important questions about the Canadian government and ethical responsibility in a time of war; about the relationship between government policy and provincial politics; and about the position taken by Canada’s longest serving Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, and his Cabinet. The author’s research brings attention to Irving Abella and Harold Troper’s work, None is too Many, which, since its publication in 1982, has stood as the authoritative work on the subject. A variety of important issues which are not treated in detail in this earlier monograph are examined in depth in this analysis: The prevalence of anti-Semitism in French and English Canada, and the Canadian immigration record are treated in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 and 4 investigate accusations that William Lyon Mackenzie King, Ernest Lapointe, Frederick Charles Blair, and Vincent Massey harboured anti-Semitic views. It is found that such charges suffer from a serious lack of evidence. Although sometimes the language used by these men in their correspondence and letters can be shocking to the modern reader, it was the colloquial language during their lives. Furthermore, their personal documents often exhibit evidence of sincere sympathy for the Jews of Europe, and frustration with Canadian popular opinion. The author concludes that collective memory of the Holocaust has affected perceptions concerning the Canadian immigration record during the period in question. Anti-immigration sentiment was strong in Canada during the Depression. Nevertheless, as the Canadian Government became increasingly aware of the persecution of Jews within the Reich, particularly following the events of Kristallnacht in November of 1938, measures were put into place to ease Jewish immigration to Canada, such as including refugees among the admissible classes of immigrants. The Canadian Government did not begin to receive information concerning the extermination of European Jewry until 1942. By this time, there was hardly anything Canada could do. Heinrich Himmler had forbidden Jewish emigration from the Reich in October of 1941, the war was in full swing by 1942, and ships carrying refugees and PoWs were not safe from U-boat attacks. From 1933 to 1945 Canada allowed 8,787 Jews into the country. However, all immigration to Canada was slowed during this time. Consequently, Jews, in actuality, represented a higher percentage of immigrants arriving in Canada, at this time, than they had from 1923 to 1932. This illustrates Canada’s doors we not closed specifically to Jewish refugees during the Depression and Second World War.

This thesis follows the development of Howard Charles Green’s (1895-1989) views on war and disarmament as both a private citizen and as a Member of Parliament. It draws its conclusions from a large archival base. Beginning with Green’s experiences in the First World War, this thesis charts Green’s views on war through to the United Nations Irish Resolution on disarmament of December 20, 1960. Contrary to current historiography examining the Diefenbaker period, it proves that Green’s beliefs about war only changed after his appointment as Secretary of State for External Affairs in June 1959, and even then it took time for his new ideals to “harden.” Prior to his “conversion” he believed that war remained a viable aspect of foreign policy and often encouraged its fuller prosecution.

This thesis follows the development of Howard Charles Green’s (1895-1989) views on war and disarmament as both a private citizen and as a Member of Parliament. It draws its conclusions from a large archival base. Beginning with Green’s experiences in the First World War, this thesis charts Green’s views on war through to the United Nations Irish Resolution on disarmament of December 20, 1960. Contrary to current historiography examining the Diefenbaker period, it proves that Green’s beliefs about war only changed after his appointment as Secretary of State for External Affairs in June 1959, and even then it took time for his new ideals to “harden.” Prior to his “conversion” he believed that war remained a viable aspect of foreign policy and often encouraged its fuller prosecution.

No description available.

Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka huruvida den tyska ubåtskrigföringen under andra världskriget använde sig av sjökrigsmetoder som beskrevs av Sir Julian Corbett i början av 1900-talet. För att testa Corbetts teorier studeras slaget om Atlanten 1939 – 1945 som ett empiriskt fall. Frågeställningen i denna rapport är: Vilka likheter och/eller skillnader finns mellan Sir Julian Corbetts sjökrigsmetoder och det tyska ubåtsvapens agerande under slaget om Atlanten? Metoden som används för denna undersökning är en komparativ metod där slaget om Atlanten studeras som ett fall. Resultatet visar att det finns en del likheter men också skillnader mellan tyskarnas ubåtskrigföring och Corbetts teorier. Corbett menar att syftet med all sjökrigföring är att alltid direkt eller indirekt säkra ett sjöherravälde eller att hindra motståndaren från att säkra den. Det tyska ubåtsvapnet försökte aldrig att etablera ett sjöherravälde utan valde att bestrida och neka britterna ett sådant. Detta gjorde de genom Corbetts metoder fleet in being, nålsticksoperationer och sjöfartskrig. Resultatet visar på en skillnad i metod gällande sjöfartskrig då Corbett menar att den effektivaste metoden är att anfalla fiendens hamninlopp och terminaler medan det tyska ubåtsvapnet bedrev sjöfartskrig ute på öppet hav med goda resultat. / The purpose of this study is to examine whether the German submarine warfare during the World War II used the principles of maritime strategy described by Sir Julian Corbett during the early 1900s. The Battle of the Atlantic will be used as an empirical case to test Corbett’s theories. The issue addressed in this report: What similarities and/or differences exist between Sir Julian Corbett’s maritime strategy and the German submarine actions during the Battle of the Atlantic? The method used for this study is a comparative method and the Battle of the Atlantic is studied as a case. The result shows that there are some similarities but also differences between the German submarine warfare and Corbett's theories. Corbett believes that the purpose of all naval warfare is to always directly or indirectly secure a sea command or to prevent the opponent from securing it. The German submarine force never tried to establish a sea command but chose to deny the British Navy and establishment of one. They did this by Corbett methods fleet in being, minor counter attacks and attack of trade. The results show a difference in the approach regarding maritime war. Corbett believes that the most effective approach is to attack the enemy's harbour and terminals while the German submarine force conducted maritime war on the high seas with good results.

From 1933 to 1945, thousands of European Jews attempted to gain access to Canada in order to escape Nazi oppression. This thesis examines Canada’s immigration records and policies during this period. In addition to bringing light to key issues concerning popular Canadian perceptions of Jewish immigrants and refugees in the thirties and forties, this history raises important questions about the Canadian government and ethical responsibility in a time of war; about the relationship between government policy and provincial politics; and about the position taken by Canada’s longest serving Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, and his Cabinet. The author’s research brings attention to Irving Abella and Harold Troper’s work, None is too Many, which, since its publication in 1982, has stood as the authoritative work on the subject. A variety of important issues which are not treated in detail in this earlier monograph are examined in depth in this analysis: The prevalence of anti-Semitism in French and English Canada, and the Canadian immigration record are treated in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 and 4 investigate accusations that William Lyon Mackenzie King, Ernest Lapointe, Frederick Charles Blair, and Vincent Massey harboured anti-Semitic views. It is found that such charges suffer from a serious lack of evidence. Although sometimes the language used by these men in their correspondence and letters can be shocking to the modern reader, it was the colloquial language during their lives. Furthermore, their personal documents often exhibit evidence of sincere sympathy for the Jews of Europe, and frustration with Canadian popular opinion. The author concludes that collective memory of the Holocaust has affected perceptions concerning the Canadian immigration record during the period in question. Anti-immigration sentiment was strong in Canada during the Depression. Nevertheless, as the Canadian Government became increasingly aware of the persecution of Jews within the Reich, particularly following the events of Kristallnacht in November of 1938, measures were put into place to ease Jewish immigration to Canada, such as including refugees among the admissible classes of immigrants. The Canadian Government did not begin to receive information concerning the extermination of European Jewry until 1942. By this time, there was hardly anything Canada could do. Heinrich Himmler had forbidden Jewish emigration from the Reich in October of 1941, the war was in full swing by 1942, and ships carrying refugees and PoWs were not safe from U-boat attacks. From 1933 to 1945 Canada allowed 8,787 Jews into the country. However, all immigration to Canada was slowed during this time. Consequently, Jews, in actuality, represented a higher percentage of immigrants arriving in Canada, at this time, than they had from 1923 to 1932. This illustrates Canada’s doors we not closed specifically to Jewish refugees during the Depression and Second World War.

War news and public relations (PR) was a critical consideration for the Canadian Army during the Second World War. The Canadian Army developed its PR apparatus from nothing to an efficient publicity machine by war’s end, despite a series of growing pains. Canadian Military Headquarters in London appointed the first PR Officer, William Abel, in January 1940. PR services overseas grew along with the size of the army. The early days were marked by lack of coordination and often jurisdictional and personality conflicts between Abel and the other PR Officers and organizations. The 19 August 1942 Dieppe raid was the low point for both the accuracy of war news and Canadian PR involvement because Lord Mountbatten’s Combined Operations Headquarters minimized Canadian PR’s involvement in planning. This resulted in early portrayals of the raid as successful and the British censored a more honest explanation by the Canadian Army. The Sicilian and Italian campaigns provided a learning experience for the PR units. In Sicily, the news coverage of the Canadians was a public success, but PR had trouble with their allies in gaining national recognition and representation. Additionally, the question of correspondents’ priorities and delays getting to the front and transportation difficulties angered the press. Many of these problems continued in Italy until the appointment of Richard Malone, who enjoyed support from the politicians, press, and military. Applying the Mediterranean experience and participating in Allied publicity planning contributed to the excellence of Canadian PR during the Northwest Europe Campaign. PR maintained the confidence of the press while still controlling the correspondents. The army also largely overcame the temptation to censor bad news although this sometimes embarrassed Ottawa. Allied regulations sanitized war news preventing the reporting of the more disturbing aspects of war. Through censorship, the army exercised a great deal of control over the news media, yet this hegemony was incomplete because of need to keep the press friendly. Although a large sceptical minority remained, most Canadians considered their war news to be accurate. In sum, Canadian Army PR was generally successful, portraying the army positively and attracting media coverage.

This dissertation examines relations between Canadian soldiers and German civilians from March 1945 to April 1946. This study will show that Canadian relations with German civilians were, in part, an extension of relations with civilians in liberated countries, but were also something new altogether. At the beginning of the invasion of Germany, most Canadian soldiers did not wish to associate with Germans and followed a fraternization ban that had been put into effect. Canadians were more likely than American soldiers to believe in the ban. Soldiers were fed a propaganda campaign that told them all Germans were evil and needed to be punished for starting the war. As the invasion proceeded further into Germany, more Canadians realized that all Germans were not Nazis and began to fraternize with the ban still in place. In the Netherlands, where Canadians have been remembered as liberators, relations at times were also tense and bitter after the war ended. Canadians also had to deal with large number of Displaced Persons (DPs), who caused more headaches than German civilians for the occupation authorities.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Kansas, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 18, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.