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In this thesis, my purpose is to determine why Augustine’s theory of knowledge by illumination was rejected by Franciscan theologians at the end of the thirteenth century. My main methodological assumption is that Medieval accounts of divine illumination must be interpreted in a theological context, or with attention to a scholar’s underlying doctrines of God and of the human mind as the image of God, inasmuch as the latter doctrine determines one’s understanding of the nature of the mind’s cognitive work, and illumination illustrates cognition. In the first chapter, I show how Augustine’s understanding of illumination derives from his Trinitarian theology. In the second chapter, I use the same theological methods of inquiry to identify continuity of thought on illumination in Augustine and Anselm. The third chapter covers the events of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries that had an impact on the interpretation of illumination, including the Greek and Arabic translation movements and the founding of universities and mendicant orders. In this chapter, I explain how the first Franciscan scholars transformed St. Francis of Assisi’s spiritual ideals into a theological and philosophical system, appropriating the Trinitarian theology of Richard of St. Victor and the philosophy of the Arab scholar Avicenna in the process. Bonaventure is typically hailed the great synthesizer of early Franciscan thought and the last and best proponent of traditional Medieval Augustinian thought. In the fourth chapter, I demonstrate that Bonaventure’s Victorine doctrine of the Trinity both enabled and motivated him to assign originally Avicennian meanings to philosophical arguments of Augustine and Anselm that were incompatible with the original ones. In the name of Augustine, in other words, Bonaventure introduced a theory of knowledge that is not Augustinian. In the fifth chapter, my aim is to throw the non-Augustinian character of Bonaventure’s illumination theory into sharper relief through a discussion of knowledge and illumination in the thought of his Dominican contemporary Thomas Aquinas. Although Aquinas is usually supposed to reject illumination theory, I show that he only objects to the Franciscan interpretation of the account, even while he bolsters a genuinely Augustinian account of knowledge and illumination by updating it in the Aristotelian forms of philosophical argumentation that were current at the time. In the final chapter, I explain why late thirteenth-century Franciscans challenged illumination theory, even after Bonaventure had enthusiastically championed it. In this context, I explain that that they did not reject their predecessor’s standard of knowledge outright, but only sought to eradicate the intellectually offensive interference of illumination, as he had defined it, which they perceived as inconsistent with the standard, in the interest of promulgating it. In concluding, I reiterate the importance of interpreting illumination as a function of Trinitarian theology. This approach throws the function of illumination in Augustine’s thought into relief and facilitates the effort to identify continuity and discontinuity amongst Augustine and his Medieval readers, which in turn makes it possible to identify the reasons for the late Medieval decline of divine illumination theory and the rise of an altogether unprecedented epistemological standard.

This thesis integrates the epistemology of testimony with work on the epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics of language. Epistemologists of testimony typically ask what conditions must be met for an agent to gain testimonial justification or knowledge that p given that p has been asserted, and this assertion has been understood. Questions regarding the audience's ability to grasp communicated contents are largely ignored. This is a mistake. Work in the philosophy of language (and related areas) suggests that the determination and recovery of communicated contents is far from straightforward, and can go wrong in many ways. This thesis investigates the epistemology of testimony in light of this work, with a special focus on miscommunication. The introduction provides a brief overview of some relevant work on testimony, the philosophy of language, and psychology, and argues that there is good reason to investigate the three. One obvious problem in this area is that if testimonial knowledge requires knowledge of what is said then the risk of miscommunication will block testimonial knowledge. Chapter two argues that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said. The remaining four chapters discuss problems which do to arise from miscommunication. Chapters three and four focus on the epistemic uncertainty of communication with context sensitive terms. Chapter three argues that many beliefs formed on the basis of context sensitive testimony are unsafe and insensitive. Chapter four argues that speakers often have plausible deniability about the contents of their assertions. Chapters five and six explore types of miscommunication which arise as a result of background mental states affecting our linguistic understanding. Chapter five explores the social/ethical consequences of this, arguing that certain groups are disproportionately subject to harmful misinterpretation. Chapter six argues that testimonial anti-reductionists make the wrong predictions about a range of cases of cognitive penetration.

Este trabalho versa sobre a antinomia da faculdade de conhecimento, também conhecida como paradoxo de Zeller, que Schopenhauer refere no primeiro livro de O mundo como Vontade e representação. Essa questão tem sido bastante discutida na história do pensamento schopenhaueriano e permanece ainda hoje como um problema em aberto. Desde os primeiros leitores de Schopenhauer, a antinomia da faculdade de conhecimento foi apontada como um problema de solução difícil, quando não impossível, e explicada de maneiras diversas. Algumas vezes, apontou-se a heterogeneidade das teorias sobre as quais o pensamento schopenhaueriano se ergue; em outras, a antinomia foi atribuída a erros de interpretação da filosofia kantiana; por vezes, remeteram-na a um dualismo em que se chocam materialismo e idealismo, ou realismo e idealismo, e há ainda outras visões. Nesta tese, propomos uma interpretação alternativa, que toma as dificuldades da filosofia schopenhaueriana como constitutivas, e, sem pretender justificá-la nem impugná-la, busca sua compreensão a partir das questões teóricas com as quais o filósofo se defrontou. Como resultado, encontramos que Schopenhauer evidencia a insuficiência tanto do idealismo quanto do realismo para a explicação completa e correta do mundo, bem como a mútua exigência entre ambos. A complementaridade entre os pontos de vista opostos do idealismo e do realismo impõe que sejam articulados, embora sua combinação origine os diversos problemas presentes na obra schopenhaueriana, entre os quais está a antinomia da faculdade de conhecimento. Adicionalmente, analisamos outras questões e dificuldades que surgiram no pensamento de Schopenhauer, algumas mencionadas pelo filósofo, outras não. / This work deals with the antinomy of the faculty of knowledge, also known as Zeller\'s paradox, to which Schopenhauer refers in the first book of The world as Will and representation. This question has been much discussed in the history of Schopenhauer\'s thought and still remains today as an unsolved problem. Since the early readers of Schopenhauer, the antinomy of the faculty of knowledge was pointed out as a problem of difficult solution, if not impossible, and explained in different ways. At times, the heterogeneity of the theories on which Schopenhauer\'s thought stands has been pointed out; other times, the antinomy was attributed to errors in the interpretation of Kantian philosophy; for many times referred to a dualism in which collide materialism and idealism, or realism and idealism; and there are still other viewpoints. In this thesis, we propose an alternative interpretation, which takes the difficulties of Schopenhauer\'s philosophy as constitutive, and not pretending to justify or contest it, we search for an understanding from the theoretical questions with which the philosopher faced. As a result, we find that Schopenhauer evidences the inadequacy of both idealism and realism for the complete and correct explanation of the world, as well as the mutual demand between them. The complementarity between the opposing viewpoints of idealism and realism demands they to be articulated, although their combination gives rise to the various problems present in Schopenhauer\'s work, among which is the antinomy of the faculty of knowledge. In addition, we analyzed other issues and difficulties that arose in Schopenhauer\'s thought, some mentioned by the philosopher.

Os projetos filosóficos desenvolvidos por Wittgenstein, em seu Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, e por Kant, em sua Crítica da Razão Pura, possuem uma estrutura e objetivos semelhantes. Ambos consistem em um ataque a determinadas pretensões da filosofia com base em uma investigação dos nossos meios de representação da realidade. Tais paralelos foram notados por alguns autores, que, por conseguinte, realizam uma aproximação entre as duas obras. A presente tese pretende aprofundar a discussão acerca da proximidade entre elas com base em um ponto que, segundo é do nosso conhecimento, ainda não foi suficientemente explorado. Partindo da ideia de que os dois projetos estão apoiados em suas respectivas teorias da representação e de que estas consistem em uma explicação da relação entre representação e realidade representada, realizaremos uma comparação acerca do modo como os dois filósofos concebem a natureza dessa relação. Mais especificamente, investigaremos se o Tractatus pode ser aproximado à Crítica também no que diz respeito à tese kantiana de que os objetos devem se conformar às condições necessárias dos meios de que dispomos para representá-los, tese esta que caracteriza a chamada Revolução Copernicana de Kant. Defenderemos que esse exame coincide com a consideração de um debate entre duas linhas interpretativas conflitantes presentes na literatura secundária do Tractatus, as quais denominaremos realista e antirrealista. Segundo a primeira, as teses tractarianas acerca das propriedades essenciais e necessárias da realidade dizem respeito a um domínio que deve ser concebido como, em algum sentido, independente da linguagem que o representa. Por outro lado, a segunda sustenta que tais propriedades essenciais e necessárias pertenceriam à realidade apenas na medida em que ela é representada pela linguagem, não sendo, portanto, independentes desta. Procuraremos mostrar que uma leitura antirrealista do Tractatus acaba por atribuir à obra uma concepção acerca da relação entre linguagem e realidade essencialmente análoga àquela que resulta dos princípios básicos da Revolução Copernicana de Kant, ao passo que, da perspectiva de uma leitura realista, o Tractatus seria completamente avesso a esses mesmos princípios básicos. A partir de um exame e de uma comparação entre as teorias kantiana e tractariana de representação, defenderemos uma leitura realista do Tractatus, e, por conseguinte, tentaremos mostrar que ele se afasta da Crítica no que diz respeito à sua Revolução Copernicana. Com isso, mais do que avaliar em que medida os projetos kantiano e tractariano podem efetivamente ser aproximados, esperamos mostrar que algumas das ideias e noções que são próprias da filosofia teórica de Kant podem ser utilizadas para iluminar certas questões levantadas no debate entre as leituras realista e antirrealista do Tractatus, sobretudo questões referentes à relação, desenvolvida no interior do sistema tractariano, entre forma lógica e ontologia. / The philosophical projects developed by Wittgenstein, in his \"Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus\", and by Kant, in his \"Critique of Pure Reason\", have similar structures and goals. Both consist in an attack on certain pretensions of philosophy based on an inquiry about the means we dispose to represent reality. Such parallels and affinities have been noticed by some authors in the secondary literature. The present thesis intends to deepen the debate on the proximity between these two works by focusing on an issue which, according to my knowledge, has not yet been sufficiently explored. Starting from the ideia that both of these projects are based on its respective theories of representation and that the latter consist in an explanation of the relation between representation and the represented reality, we will realize a comparison about how both philosophers conceive of the nature of such relation. More specifically, we will inquire whether the Tractatus is also akin to the Critique with respect to the Kantian thesis that objects must conform to the necessary conditions of our means of representing them, i.e. the thesis which characterizes the so-called Kants \"Copernican Revolution\". We will argue that such an inquiry coincides with an examination of a debate between two conflicting lines of interpretation present in the secondary literature about the Tractatus, which we will refer to as \"realist\" and \"antirealist\". According to the former, the Tractarian theses about the necessary and essential properties of reality are theses about a domain which should be conceived of as in some sense independent of the language that represents it. On the other hand, the latter entails the ideia that such necessary and essential properties belong to reality only insofar as it is represented by language, and should not, therefore, be conceived of as independent of it. We will attempt to show that an antirealist reading of the Tractatus ends up ascribing to the work a conception about the relation between language and reality which is essentially analogous to that which follows from the basic principles of the so-called \"Kant\'s Copernican Revolution\", while from the perspective of a realist reading the Tractatus would be completely alien to such basic principles. By means of an examination of and a comparison between the Kantian and the Tractarian theories of representation, we will defend a realist reading of the Tractatus and therefore attempt to show that it distances itself from the Critique when it comes to the latters \"Copernican Revolution\". By doing this, more than evaluate to what extent the Kantian and the Tractarian philosophical projects really are close to each other, we expect to show that some of the ideas and notions which are proper to Kant\'s theoretical philosophy may be used to shed light on certain questions which are raised in the debate between the realist and antirealist readings of the Tractatus, above all questions concerning the relation, developed within the Tractarian system, between logical form and ontology.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar o desenvolvimento da proposta fleckiana de uma teoria comparativa do conhecimento, seu estatuto epistemológico, bem como o diagnóstico de algumas de suas dificuldades teóricas. Defenderemos o caráter potencialmente científico de sua teoria e indicaremos que a incomensurabilidade entre estilos de pensamento constitui o problema mais imediato para sua efetivação. Nesse ínterim, sintetizaremos as principais diretrizes metodológicas esboçadas em sua teoria, entendida como um programa de pesquisa aberto, e indicaremos possíveis desdobramentos futuros. Esta dissertação terá início, em sua Introdução, com uma sucinta análise das principais fases de recepção da obra de Fleck, tendo em vista a compreensão de suas tradições de leitura e do significado atual de seus escritos. No Capítulo I, reconstituiremos o quadro conceitual da teoria comparativa de Ludwik Fleck a partir da análise de suas principais linhas e dimensões de desenvolvimento: médico-imunológica, sociológica, de crítica ao positivismo lógico e histórica. O Capítulo II será dedicado à análise dos processos comunicativos de sua teoria tanto ao nível diacrônico como ao nível sincrônico, bem como do fenômeno da incomensurabilidade. Estabeleceremos paralelos sobre a manifestação desse fenômeno com as formulações de Thomas Kuhn e Paul Feyerabend. No Capítulo III, abordaremos a tese do relacionismo cognitivo defendido por Fleck, indicando que sua teoria comparativa do conhecimento não possui um estatuto epistemológico privilegiado, sendo, portanto, um saber também relacional. Diante disso, defenderemos seu caráter científico, em conformidade, em linhas gerais, com as demais ciências naturais. Por fim, em nossas Considerações finais indicaremos, a partir das diretrizes lançadas pelo filósofo, algumas das possíveis linhas metodológicas que o programa da teoria comparativa deve seguir diante do problema da incomensurabilidade e da necessidade de um desenvolvimento metodológico mais preciso. / This dissertation aims to analyze the development of Fleck\'s proposal of a comparative theory of knowledge, its epistemological status and the diagnosis of some of its theoretical difficulties. We will defend the potentially scientific status of its theory and indicate that the incommensurability between thinking styles constitutes the most immediate problem for its effectiveness. Meanwhile, we intend to synthesize the main methodological guidelines outlined in his theory, understood as an open research program, and indicate possible future developments. This dissertation will start in its Introduction with a brief analysis of the main stages of reception of Fleck\'s work, so as to understand its traditions of readings and the current meaning of his writings. In Chapter I, we will reconstitute the conceptual framework of Fleck\'s comparative theory from the analysis of its main lines and dimensions of development: medical and immunological, sociological, as well as his criticism of historical and logical positivisms. Chapter II is devoted to the analysis of his theory of communicative processes at both the diachronic and synchronous level, as well as the phenomenon of incommensurability. We will establish parallels with Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend\'s formulations of this phenomenon. In Chapter III, we discuss the thesis of cognitive relationalism defended by Fleck, indicating that his comparative theory of knowledge does not have a privileged epistemological status, being, by its turn, also a relational knowledge. In the face of it, we will defend its scientific character, in accordance, in general, with the other natural sciences. Finally, in our final considerations we indicate, from guidelines released by the philosopher, some of the possible methodological lines that the program of comparative theory must follow regarding the problem of incommensurability and the need for a more precise methodological development.

O objetivo da presente dissertação é mostrar a necessidade dos signos e da linguagem nas teorias de conhecimento na França no século XVIII. Embora muitos outros filósofos tenham investigado a questão da importância e da necessidade da linguagem, tais como Rousseau e Du Marsais, analisamos os textos de Condillac e Diderot, nos quais os signos e a linguagem são considerados essenciais para a aquisição de conhecimento. Tal escolha foi feita, pois tanto Condillac quanto Diderot tomaram o surdo e mudo de nascença como exemplo para corroborarem suas teses sobre a origem da linguagem. A primeira obra apresentada é o Essai sur lorigine des connaissances humaines (Ensaio sobre a origem dos conhecimentos humanos) de Condillac, que baseou seu trabalho no empirismo de John Locke no An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Ensaio Acerca do Entenimento Humano). Na Primeira Parte do Ensaio, Condillac discute a origem e o desenvolvimento das faculdades da mente e do conhecimento humano. Para ele, a única fonte de todos os nossos conhecimentos encontra-se na sensação e todas as outras operações da mente são derivadas daí. Porém, para que essas operações se desenvolvam o uso dos signos e a linugagem se fazem absolutamente necessários. A Segunda Parte da obra descreve a origem e o progresso da linguagem cujos signos naturais são gradualmente substituídos por signos instituídos e sons articulados, formando-se a linugagem fonética articulada. A segunda obra analisada é o Tratado das Sensações, na qual Condillac demostra como as ideias se originam da sensação. Ele acredita que é necessário estudar os sentidos separadamente para poder distinguir quais ideias devem ser atribuídas a cada sentido. Dessa forma, pode-se observar como os sentidos são treinados e como um sentido pode auxiliar o outro. Em seguida, estudamos a Carta sobre os surdos e mudos de Diderot, texto no qual o autor francês investiga diversos tópicos estéticos, linguísticos e epistemológicos. Ele inicia a Carta com uma discussão sobre as inversões linguísticas e observa que o assunto somente pode ser tratado se primeiramente considerarmos como as linguagens foram formadas, o que conduz o enciclopedista a analisar a ordem natural das ideias e expressões. Para ele, a ordem natural só pode ser verificada por meio de um estduo da linguagem de gestos, visto que, os gestos exprimem melhor que as palavras. Para comprovar sua tese sobre a linguagem de gestos, ele utiliza exemplos da lingugaem gestual de surdos e mudos. Ele então desenvolve uma teoria sobre os hieróglifos, na qual a imagem hieroglífica reúne em uma única expressão todo um conjunto de sensações e ideias, passando pela linguagem de gestos, pantomima, prosódia, música e pintura. Baseado na teoria dos hieróglifos, ele mostra o conflito existente entre a ordem simultânea das ideias formadas em nosso pensamento e a ordem sucessiva do discurso. No final do texto, ele retoma os principais argumentos do debate precedente sobre a ordem das palavras. / The objective of this thesis is to show the necessity of signs and language in the theories of knowledge in France in the 18th century. Although several philosophers investigated the question of the importance and necessity of language, such as Rousseau and Du Marsais, we analysed texts of Condillac and Diderot, in which signs and language are considered to be essential for knowledge acquisition. Such choice was made since Condillac and Diderot considered the deaf-mute from birth as an example to corroborate their theses about the origin of language. The first book presented is the Essai sur lorigine des connaissances humanines by Condillac that based his work in the empiricism in the An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke. In Part I of the Essay, Condillac discuss the origin and development of the faculties of the mind and human knowledge. According to him, the only source for all knowledge is the sensation and the other operations are derived from this. However, for these operations to be developed the usage of signs and language are absolutely necessary. Part II of the Essay describes the origin and progress of the language which natural signs are gradually replaced by instituted signs and articulate sounds, what turn them into articulate phonetic language. The second text analysed is the Treatise on Sensations in which Condillac demonstrates how ideas come from sensation. He believes that it is necessary to study the senses separately to be able to distinguish which ideas should be assigned to each sense. In this way, it is possible to observe how the senses are trained and how a sense can aid another one. After that, we studied the Letter on the deaf and dumb by Diderot in which the French author investigates several aesthetics, linguistics and epistemological topics. He stars the Letter with a discussion about linguistic inversions and observes that the subject can only be dealt with if first we take into account how languages were formed. This leads the encyclopaedist to analyse the natural order of ideas and expressions. To corroborate his theses about gestural language, he uses examples of the deaf and dumb gestural language. Then, he develops a theory about hieroglyphs, in which the hieroglyphic image joins in one simple expression a whole set of sensations and ideas, going through pantomime, prosody, music and painting. Based on the theory of hieroglyphs, he shows the conflict that exists between the simultaneous order of formed ideas in our thought and the successive order of speech. At the endo of the text, he returns to the main arguments of the previous debate about the order of the words.

O propósito deste ensaio teórico é investigar a possibilidade da ampliação da compreensão do processo de embriogênese mental estudado pela Epistemologia Genética de Jean Piaget, como uma expressão determinada da noção do esforço de perseveração, conatus, da Philosophia de Baruch Espinosa, com o fim de investigar suas possíveis relações e desdobramentos para a compreensão da experiência ética espinosana. O resultado obtido até aqui indica o conceito de implicação significante da Epistemologia Genética como a noção vinculante entre o processo de embriogênese mental e o esforço de perseveração. Ao considerarmos que a implicação significante constitui o processo de elaboração gradual do necessário, imprescindível à compreensão da experiência da Liberdade na Ética, torna-se relevante a continuidade das investigações sobre as suas implicações para este tema essencial da Philosophia de Espinosa / This paper aims to investigate the possibility of increase the understanding of mental embryogenesis (as defined in Jean Piagets Genetic Epistemology) as a particular case of the striving for perseveration (conatus) of Baruch Spinozas Philosophia, in order to investigate their purported relations and possible consequences for the understanding of Spinozas ethical experience. Results obtained so far support the idea of \"significant implication\", as defined by the Genetic Epistemology, as a binding concept between the mental process of embryogenesis and the striving for perseveration. Assuming that the \"significant implication\" is the process of gradual elaboration of the idea of \"necessity\", vital to understanding the ethical experience of freedom, the research on the implications for this essential issue of Spinozas Philosophia becomes relevant

第三人效果研究已經過三十餘年的發展，但比較第三人效果認知對於行為層面預測力的研究仍然相當有限。本研究以霧霾調查紀錄片《穹頂之下》為研究主題，從心理學利己、利他動機的視角出發，探討第三人效果認知層面與行為層面間的關係。本研究在上海、深圳兩地進行問卷調查，共訪問926名大學生，研究結果顯示，受訪者會傾向於認為環保資訊對他人產生的影響大於對其自身產生的影響；然而，本研究發現，「對自己影響的認知」比「對他人影響的認知」更能顯著預測受訪者的蒐集資訊與響應性行為。同時，本研究結果顯示，「議題與個人的關聯程度」、「對訊息的涉入程度」均會影響「對自己影響的認知」和「對他人影響的認知」對行為意願的預測力。這些研究發現對於豐富第三人效果的理論框架有一定貢獻，同時亦為環境保護資訊的傳播提供了一定的實踐啟示。 / The third-person effect (TPE) hypothesis has been developed for over 30 years. However, very limit amount of TPE research have focus on comparing the predictive power of "perceived influence on self" and "perceived influence on others". This research fills the research gap by examining the relation between perceptual and behavioral components in the context of a Chinese documentary concerning haze weather, Under the Dome. Using the data from a survey concerning public opinion towards the haze documentary involving a sample of 939 college students in Shanghai and Shenzhen, results indicate that respondents tend to perceive the haze documentary have a larger influence on others than on themselves regardless of their perceived desirability of the documentary, and the perceived influence on self is a better predictor of the behavioral component compared to the perceived influence on self. Furthermore, issue relevance and media message involvement both have an influence on the predictive power of perceived influence on self and perceived influence on others. The research findings can contribute to the theoretical framework of TPE, as well as provide empirical implication for pro-environment communication. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 張晓. / Thesis (M.Phil.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-82). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Zhang Xiao.