Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T14:12:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_4770_.pdf: 859911 bytes, checksum: 17cb50074e843276cfa4052d8d86a352 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-25 / O objetivo central desta dissertação é realizar uma análise comparativa das obras de François Guizot e Alexis de Tocqueville. Este trabalho se insere, portanto, em um conjunto de estudos que, sobretudo a partir da década de 1980, procura avaliar a dívida intelectual do segundo para com o primeiro. Sabe-se que ambos viveram em uma época marcada pela instabilidade política e se dedicaram a discernir o sentido político e social da Revolução Francesa, procurando compreender as novas relações entre os indivíduos e o Estado. Inicialmente, será pesquisada a influência do conceito de civilização elaborado por Guizot no final da década de 1820 sobre a visão histórica de Tocqueville, particularmente sobre o que este chamou de revolução democrática. A análise deverá demonstrar que um e outro autor tinham uma avaliação fundamentalmente diferente dos efeitos das transformações sociais por que passara a França. Sustentando diferentes apreciações da sociedade em que viviam, julgaram de maneira diversa as relações dessa sociedade com o poder político. O segundo momento da pesquisa recairá, portanto, sobre o papel que reservaram aos cidadãos na construção da ordem política, uma vez que ambos rejeitavam a ideia de que a soberania pertencesse unicamente à realeza. De fato, evitando atribuir o poder político a qualquer indivíduo ou grupo social, evocaram alternadamente a soberania da razão ou do gênero humano e buscaram diferentes soluções para transformar o poder de direito em poder de fato. Todavia, nem um nem outro sistematizou suas reflexões sobre o assunto em uma grande obra de teoria política. Suas ideias encontram-se dispersas em seus livros de história e textos de intervenção política, de modo que a dimensão contextual é elemento obrigatório deste trabalho, que procura compreender as ambiguidades dos autores e as transformações em suas formulações conceituais, relacionando-as a problemas políticos específicos enfrentados por eles.

Frágil é, segundo Alexis de Tocqueville, o equilíbrio em que se encontra a liberdade em um estado social de igualdade de condições. Tomados pela sua maior paixão, a da igualdade, os homens democráticos podem assistir a conversão da liberdade em despotismo ao se entregarem à busca exclusiva e isolada de bens privados; ao abdicarem da faculdade de julgar, deixando-se guiar servilmente pela opinião da maioria, a fonte da autoridade em tal estado social. Em face disso, este trabalho objetiva analisar o modo pelo qual o autor delineia a natureza do estado social igualitário, n\' A democracia na América, sustentando-se que, ao discorrer acerca dos costumes estadunidenses, o autor forja um princípio normativo, a doutrina do interesse bem compreendido, o qual relacionaria, do ponto de vista analítico, a virtude e a liberdade. Abordar essa relação, de acordo com a nossa hipótese, seria compreender uma resposta circunscrita a um debate político do século XIX, sem abrir mão da reflexão acerca da originalidade de Tocqueville. / According to Alexis de Tocqueville, in the state of equality of conditions liberty is under serious threat. The passion for equality, which is the first and most intense passion of a democratic people, may prompt them to exchange liberty for despotism, in so far as they are willing to surrender themselves entirely to the search of material goods, and to resign their power of judgment for the sake of the opinion of the majority, which is the real source of authority in such a social state. Taking this fragile balance between liberty and equality into account, this dissertation aims at examining the nature of the state of equality of conditions in Tocqueville\'s Democracy in America. We argue that the consideration of American customs allows Tocqueville to postulate a normative principle, the doctrine of interest well understood, which may link analytically virtue and liberty. To investigate this relation, according to my interpretative hypothesis, is the key to understanding Tocqueville\'s original answer to a question posed by an important nineteenth century political debate.

Ma recherche vise à développer une interprétation originale de la pensée de Bertrand de Jouvenel, un des penseurs libéraux les plus importants du siècle passé. Je veux démontrer que Jouvenel ne doit pas être seulement considéré comme un philosophe. L’interprétation purement philosophique de sa pensée est due à la popularisation de ses deux œuvres, Du Pouvoir (1945) et De la Souveraineté (1955). Il est connu par avoir développé une vision historique et philosophique du pouvoir à partir de la théorie politique d’Alexis de Tocqueville. L’essentiel de la littérature critique sur cet auteur se concentre sur cette conception. Ma thèse se propose d’illustrer une vision plus complète de la pensée de Jouvenel. Je veux analyser ses écrits méconnus, comme The Pure Theory of Politics (1963). Jouvenel fut longtemps considéré comme un philosophe libéral. Cette vision, certes correcte, est pourtant incomplète: Jouvenel était un ami et collaborateur de Friedrich von Hayek, l’auteur libéral le plus important du XXème siècle. Toutefois, le Jouvenel des années 1940 et 1950, ne peut être considéré comme un libérale à part entière, car contrairement à Hayek, il n’était pas membre de l’École Autrichienne d’Économie. Jouvenel a élaboré un antiétatisme communautaire, très proche de la doctrine sociale de l’Église catholique. L’individualisme n’est pas la solution contre le pouvoir de l’État. Pour éviter que L’État acquière trop de pouvoir, il faut valoriser les corps intermédiaires de la société civile, comme la famille, les associations, etc. / My research aims to develop an original interpretation of the thought of Bertrand de Jouvenel, one of the most important liberal thinkers of the previous century. I intend to prove that Jouvenel has not only got to be considered a philosopher. The purely philosophical interpretation of his thought is due to the popularization of his two works, Du Pouvoir (1945) and De la Souveraineté (1955). He is known for having developed a historical and philosophical vision of power influenced by the political theory of Alexis de Tocqueville. Most of the critical literature on this author focuses on this conception.My dissertation aims to illustrate a more complete view of Jouvenel's thought. I want to analyse his misconceived works, such as The Pure Theory of Politics (1963).Jouvenel was long regarded as a liberal philosopher. This vision, however correct, is incomplete: Jouvenel was a friend and collaborator of Friedrich von Hayek, the most important liberal author of the 20th century. However, the Jouvenel of the 1940s and 1950s cannot be considered a liberal in its own right, because unlike Hayek, he was not a member of the Austrian School of Economics. Jouvenel developed a communitarian anti-statism, very close to the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. Individualism is not the solution against the power of the state. In order to prevent the State from gaining too much power, it is necessary to enhance the intermediary bodies of civil society, such as the family, associations, etc..

Frágil é, segundo Alexis de Tocqueville, o equilíbrio em que se encontra a liberdade em um estado social de igualdade de condições. Tomados pela sua maior paixão, a da igualdade, os homens democráticos podem assistir a conversão da liberdade em despotismo ao se entregarem à busca exclusiva e isolada de bens privados; ao abdicarem da faculdade de julgar, deixando-se guiar servilmente pela opinião da maioria, a fonte da autoridade em tal estado social. Em face disso, este trabalho objetiva analisar o modo pelo qual o autor delineia a natureza do estado social igualitário, n\' A democracia na América, sustentando-se que, ao discorrer acerca dos costumes estadunidenses, o autor forja um princípio normativo, a doutrina do interesse bem compreendido, o qual relacionaria, do ponto de vista analítico, a virtude e a liberdade. Abordar essa relação, de acordo com a nossa hipótese, seria compreender uma resposta circunscrita a um debate político do século XIX, sem abrir mão da reflexão acerca da originalidade de Tocqueville. / According to Alexis de Tocqueville, in the state of equality of conditions liberty is under serious threat. The passion for equality, which is the first and most intense passion of a democratic people, may prompt them to exchange liberty for despotism, in so far as they are willing to surrender themselves entirely to the search of material goods, and to resign their power of judgment for the sake of the opinion of the majority, which is the real source of authority in such a social state. Taking this fragile balance between liberty and equality into account, this dissertation aims at examining the nature of the state of equality of conditions in Tocqueville\'s Democracy in America. We argue that the consideration of American customs allows Tocqueville to postulate a normative principle, the doctrine of interest well understood, which may link analytically virtue and liberty. To investigate this relation, according to my interpretative hypothesis, is the key to understanding Tocqueville\'s original answer to a question posed by an important nineteenth century political debate.

Submitted by Cássia Santos (cassia.bcufg@gmail.com) on 2015-02-02T12:15:25Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Daniel de Lima Vieira - 2014.pdf: 6525469 bytes, checksum: 58439f6e338ab14aff1b0eab8e41f891 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2015-02-05T12:21:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Daniel de Lima Vieira - 2014.pdf: 6525469 bytes, checksum: 58439f6e338ab14aff1b0eab8e41f891 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-05T12:21:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Daniel de Lima Vieira - 2014.pdf: 6525469 bytes, checksum: 58439f6e338ab14aff1b0eab8e41f891 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-10-16 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Goiás - FAPEG / The last thirty years have witnessed a renewed interest in the civic -republican thought within Western political philosophy. The contributions of the Republican ideas are especially evoked in response to the debate between liberals and community that has been caught in recent decades. The notion of virtue reflects well the political thought of Alexis de Tocqueville who, marked by a combination of republican, liberal and communitarian ideas, has been rediscovered and become a rich source of inspiration for scholars who care about the future of democracy. From his observations on the United States of the early 1830s America, Tocqueville elaborates his original vision of the conditions of possibility of a political community in which equality and freedom tend to convergence. The democratic state, according to the author, only exists through the effort of balance between these two principles in the experience of citizenship. Tocqueville proposes a new political science that aims to guide the leaders of society in the task of educating citizens able to fight trends that threaten the survival of democracy. In its strategy to restore democratic customs of men, Tocqueville begins by welcoming a moral doctrine that preserves the motivational seal in the interest of the individual while expanding your perspective and your goals. The process of citizenship formation de Tocqueville advances encouraging men to counter their individualistic tendencies through political participation and the formation of opposing habits, acquire the taste for freedom. For Tocqueville, the institutions in general, religion, and political engagement play the political role of forging citizens and engender healthy cultural policy. If the irresistible march of equality that characterizes the new era is natural, the hope of Tocqueville is the guarantee of freedom through political art / Os últimos trinta anos testemunharam um renovado interesse no pensamento cívico-republicano no interior da filosofia política ocidental. As contribuições das ideias republicanas são especialmente evocadas como resposta ao debate entre liberais e comunitários que vem sendo travado nas últimas décadas. A noção de virtude bem reflete o pensamento político de Alexis de Tocqueville que, marcado por uma combinação de ideias republicanas, liberais e comunitárias, tem sido redescoberto e se tornado uma rica fonte de inspiração para estudiosos que se preocupam com o futuro da democracia. A partir de suas observações sobre os Estados Unidos da América do início da década de 1830, Tocqueville elabora sua visão original acerca das condições de possibilidade de uma comunidade política em que igualdade e liberdade tendem à convergência. O Estado democrático, segundo o autor, somente subsiste por meio do esforço de equilíbrio entre esses dois princípios na experiência da cidadania. Tocqueville propõe uma nova ciência política que vi sa orientar os dirigentes da sociedade na tarefa de formar cidadãos capazes de combater as tendências que ameaçam a sobrevivência da democracia. Em sua estratégia para restaurar os costumes dos homens democráticos, Tocqueville começa por acolher uma doutrina moral que preserva a foça motivacional do interesse do indivíduo enquanto amplia sua perspectiva e seus objetivos. O processo de formação da cidadania de Tocqueville avança encorajando que os homens combatam suas tendências individualistas mediante a pa rticipação política e, pela formação de hábitos opostos, adquiram o gosto pela liberdade. Para Tocqueville, as instituições em geral, a religião, e o engajamento político desempenham a função política de forjar cidadãos e engendrar uma cultural política saudável. Se a irresistível marcha da igualdade que caracteriza os novos tempos é natural, a esperança de Tocqueville é a garantia da liberdade através da arte política.

L’objectif de notre étude est d’examiner la philosophie tocquevillienne de la démocratie par rapport au libéralisme et au républicanisme. Dans la première partie, nous essayons de déterminer les principes de l’aristocratie et de la démocratie dans la philosophie politique de Tocqueville. Nous tâchons également d’éclaircir l’idéal de la démocratie et sa conception de la liberté. Dans la deuxième partie, nous examinons les difficultés que Tocqueville repère dans les conceptions libérale et républicaine de la démocratie. Dans la troisième partie, nous cherchons à approfondir les solutions qu’il propose pour remédier aux défauts de la démocratie. Pour ce faire, nous retenons en particulier les trois solutions suivantes : associations, décentralisation et représentation. En même temps, nous analysons en profondeur les réflexions de Tocqueville sur la doctrine de l’intérêt bien entendu pour mieux éclaircir sa position par rapport à la problématisation républicaine du libéralisme. Selon nous, l’analyse des trois solutions permet de penser que la philosophie tocquevillienne de la démocratie peut être appréhendée comme une tentative de suppléer à des défauts de la démocratie libérale en la corrigeant par des remèdes républicains, mais qu’elle est simultanément une critique libérale du républicanisme : Tocqueville applique certains correctifs républicains au niveau local, mais il maintient fermement les principes libéraux au niveau national. / The objective of our study is to examine Tocqueville’s philosophy of democracy with regard to liberalism and to republicanism. In the first part, we try to determine the principles of aristocracy and democracy in his political philosophy. We also endeavour to clarify what is for him the ideal democracy and his conception of freedom. In the second part, we analyze the difficulties spotted by him in the liberal and republican conceptions of democracy. In the third part, we try to go deeper into the solutions which he proposes to overcome the defects of democracy. In particular, we pay attention to the three following solutions: associations, decentralization and representation. At the same time, we analyze in depth Tocqueville’s reflections on the “doctrine of the enlightened self-interest” in order to better explain his position concerning a republican problematization of liberalism. In our view, the analysis of the three solutions allows to think that Tocqueville’s philosophy of democracy can be considered as an attempt to compensate some weaknesses of the liberal democracy by correcting them with republican remedies. However, this philosophy is simultaneously a liberal criticism of the republicanism: Tocqueville applies some republican correctives at a local level, but he claims the liberal principles at a national level.

En 1831, l’aristocrate français Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) traverse l’Atlantique afin d’aller rencontrer l’avenir au coeur des États-Unis d’Amérique. Avant de s’embarquer pour cette aventure, il a déjà la certitude du caractère inévitable de l’égalisation des conditions. Bien que l’avènement de l’état social démocratique soit un «fait providentiel» aux yeux du jeune homme, il s’inquiète en constatant une certaine ambivalence quant à sa tournure politique. La république libérale n’est pas la conséquence politique nécessaire de l’état social démocratique; son contraire, le despotisme, doit aussi être sérieusement envisagé. L’Amérique devient donc une destination de choix afin d’y observer tout le potentiel démocratique, et livrer ensuite ses découvertes dans ce chef-d’oeuvre que constitue La Démocratie en Amérique (1835-1840). Ce «fait générateur» qu’est l’égalité des conditions, alors même qu’il ouvre un champ des possibles immense pour l’épanouissement humain, présente aussi un risque de déshumanisation. Afin de tirer le meilleur de la démocratie, l’homme doit éviter de sombrer dans l’apathie vis-à-vis la chose politique. Renoncer à ses devoirs de citoyen revient à abdiquer sa liberté, et donc tout espoir de grandeur. Tocqueville fournit dans son ouvrage un véritable éclaircissement de la démocratie dans ses tendances les plus secrètes, et il envisage certains contrepoids permettant de maintenir le fragile équilibre. Tocqueville se porte ainsi à la défense de la liberté et de la dignité humaines qu’il croit réellement menacées. L’état social démocratique constitue-t-il une terre fertile à la grandeur humaine? Quelles sont les conditions de possibilité du déploiement de cette grandeur? Et pour nous, presque deux siècles plus tard, les mots de Tocqueville ont-ils encore une certaine pertinence? À la lumière des réflexions de Tocqueville nourries par ses découvertes en sol américain, le présent mémoire essaie de montrer que démocratie et grandeur humaine ne sont pas incompatibles. / In 1831, the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) sailed across the Atlantic Ocean to the heart of the United States of America in order to shed light upon the future of democracy. Before starting out on this adventure, he was already certain that social equality was inevitable. Even though, in his young eyes, the progression of the democratic social state was a “providential fact”, he became worried when he realized that there was a certain ambivalence concerning the political direction that the movement was taking. A democratic social state does not necessary lead to a liberal movement; its opposite, despotism, must seriously be taken into consideration. As such, America became his choice destination for observing all the democratic potential it had to offer, leading him to write his masterpiece Democracy in America (1835-1840), in which he shares his discoveries. Social equality opens an immense breadth of possibilities for human growth, but, at the same time, also presents a risk of dehumanization. In order to get the best out of democracy, humankind must avoid falling into apathy towards politics. Giving up one’s political responsibility is like abdicating one’s freedom and, as such, all hope for greatness. In his work, Tocqueville provides a true explanation of democracy, with all of its most secret orientations. He also provides measures that counterweight this nature, allowing for the fragile equilibrium to be maintained. In this manner, Tocqueville presents himself as the defender of human freedom and dignity, which he believes to be truly threatened. Does social equality allow for human greatness? If so, what conditions are required to deploy such greatness? Nearly two centuries later, are Tocqueville’s words still pertinent? In light of Tocqueville’s thoughts, which were fed by his discoveries on American soil, this dissertation attempts to demonstrate that democracy and human greatness are not incompatible.

When Alexis de Tocqueville observed the spread of modern democracy across France, England, and the United States, he saw that democracy would give rise to a new state of letters, and that this new state of letters would influence how democratic citizens and statesmen would understand the new political world. As he reflected on this new intellectual sphere, Tocqueville became concerned that democracy would foster changes in language and thought that would stifle concepts and ideas essential to the preservation of intellectual and political liberty. In an effort to direct, refine, and reshape political thought in democracy, Tocqueville undertook a critique of the democratic state of letters, assessing intellectual life and contributing his own ideas and concepts to help citizens and statesmen think more coherently about democratic politics. Here, I analyze Tocqueville's critique and offer an account of his effort to reshape democratic political thought. I show that through his analyses of the role of intellectuals in democratic regimes, the influence of modern science on democratic public life, the intellectual habits that democracy fosters, and the power of literary works for shaping democratic self-understanding, Tocqueville succeeds in reshaping democratic language and thought in a manner that contributes to the preservation of intellectual and political liberty within the modern democratic world.

The philosophy of Francis Bacon has an important and often overlooked place in the development of American political thought. John Dewey cites Bacon as the forefather of his own highly influential philosophical school, American pragmatism. I argue that, though Dewey is in many ways correct to look to Bacon as his predecessor, he overlooks or collapses certain crucial tensions in Bacon’s philosophical project. This causes Dewey to misinterpret the political implications of the philosophic project to which he himself is an heir. By exploring the tensions that Bacon maintains, and Dewey collapses, between human knowledge and human power, science and democracy, and progress in the sciences and progress within states, I hope to shed light on the true implications of Bacon’s philosophical project for American political thought. / text

Abstract The eighteenth century is doubtlessly an astonishing chapter in human history. Following America¡¦s independence that brought the first new democratic country to the world, the French Revolution further aroused tremendous political effects all over Europe, shocked the foundation of feudalism, and announced the advent of democratic era. Confronted with all these historical impacts, Tocqueville has achieved profound understanding and retrospection on the inevitable prevalence of democracy. The concept of liberty plays a very important role in Tocqueville¡¦s theory. As the wave of democracy crashed outmoded institution of feudalism, it also caused people to grow assimilated, or even philistine. In light of this, Tocqueville proposed that, in order to preclude domination and slavery, people should more actively grasp their liberty and develop the habitude and spirit of participating public affairs. Therefore, township and jury system in American tradition, as well as individual activities of organizing secondary civil groups through gilds, are highly regarded by Tocqueville with democratic connotation. From this viewpoint, Tocqueville¡¦s great expectation on liberty is essentially different from ¡§human¡¦s liberty from interference¡¨ of contractarian liberalism but is in harmony with the conventional idea of people¡¦s ¡§agency¡¨ in republicanism. This connotation of liberty, however, doesn¡¦t imply clashes without limit but suggests reasonable and restrained political participation within the schema of stable political institution. Thus, the concept echoes the conventional appreciation upon institution in roman republicanism. The researcher regards the integration of the aforementioned two aspects as ¡§liberty of institutional republicanism¡¨. This research intends to embody the republicanism value in Tocqueville¡¦s theory with an expectation to broaden the definition of his thought.