La philosophie politique de Leo Strauss a inspiré aux États-Unis des disciples bien au-delà des départements de philosophie. En créant une communauté de conversation, les « straussiens » ont insufflé à l’étude et à l’activité politique un style de pensée irréductible aux sensibilités libérale et conservatrice contemporaines, bien qu'ils aient principalement choisi de dialoguer avec le conservatisme politique naissant. Le conservatisme lincolnien qu’ils ont adopté en est une version modérée par le rationalisme du premier constitutionalisme américain et trouve son origine dans la réhabilitation polémique de la science politique aristotélicienne. En effet, cette science politique les a conduit à interpréter le constitutionalisme à la lumière des principes des pères fondateurs de la République américaine. / The Political Philosophy of Leo Strauss has a far wider sphere of influence in America than the departments of Philosophy. By creating their own community of conversation, the “straussians” inflected to study and political activity a style of thought beyond contemporary liberalism and conservatism, even if Straussians mainly chose to converse with new born political conservatism. The lincolnian conservatism they embraced is one moderated by the rationalism of the first American constitutionalism, and has foundings in the reenforcement of the aristotelician political science. This Political Science led them to read the constitutionalism thanks to the principles of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic.

Esta dissertação se dedica a uma comparação entre as interpretações da Revolução Francesa formuladas por dois autores e personagens políticos da França do século XIX: François Guizot (1787 1874) e Alexis de Tocqueville (1805 1859). Ambas as interpretações têm em comum o esforço intelectual de inscrever a Revolução Francesa na História de longo prazo da França e da Europa, em ruptura com a compreensão que tiveram da Revolução tanto revolucionários como contrarrevolucionários. Essa inscrição da Revolução na História implicava uma aceitação da sociedade pós-revolucionária como um produto irreversível de muitos séculos e não apenas de um ato isolado da vontade. O argumento desta dissertação tem como objetivo demonstrar que, para além dessa aceitação da sociedade pós-revolucionária a qual manteve Guizot e Tocqueville à distância tanto do discurso contrarrevolucionário, com seu projeto de restaurar na França a antiga sociedade pré-revolucionária, como do discurso socialista, com seu projeto de continuar a Revolução Francesa para levar a humanidade a uma sociedade diferente da que saiu diretamente da Revolução , os dois autores estudados legaram para a posteridade duas atitudes divergentes ou mesmo opostas diante da Revolução Francesa: Guizot celebrou o papel da Revolução na História como uma vitória das classes médias sobre o poder absoluto e o privilégio, ao mesmo tempo em que criticou suas bandeiras explícitas, com destaque para a da soberania do povo; Tocqueville, ao contrário, lamentou a obra da Revolução Francesa como uma realização inconsciente da cultura política centralizadora do Antigo Regime, mas, em vez de criticar a doutrina da soberania do povo, procurou reformulá-la em novas bases, inspirado pelo modelo americano. Para o autor de O Antigo Regime e a Revolução, a crítica à Revolução Francesa deve passar, portanto, de suas doutrinas explícitas para seu caráter implícito. Para construir essa hipótese, a dissertação faz o seguinte percurso: no Capítulo 1, são contrapostas a filosofia da História de Guizot, baseada no conceito de civilização, e a filosofia da História de Tocqueville, baseada no conceito de democracia. No Capítulo 2, compara-se o lugar que cada autor atribuía à Revolução Francesa em uma História francesa e europeia lida a partir das relações entre centro político e liberdades locais. O Capítulo 3, por fim, compara a recepção de cada autor aos chamados princípios de 1789, com destaque para o princípio da soberania do povo. / This dissertation is dedicated to a comparison between the interpretations of the French Revolution made by two authors and political figures of nineteenth-century France: François Guizot (1787 1874) and Alexis de Tocqueville (1805 1859). Both interpretations have in common the intellectual effort to inscribe the Revolution in France and Europes long term History, breaking with the understanding that both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries had about the Revolution. This inscription of the Revolution in History implied an acceptance of post-revolutionary society as an irreversible product of many centuries and not only of an isolated act of the will. As a result, Guizot and Tocqueville were critics both of the counterrevolutionaries, whose project was to restore in France the old pre-revolutionary society, and the socialists, whose project was to continue the French Revolution in order to lead humanity into a society deeply different from the one that emerged from the Revolution. Against this background, this dissertation aims at demonstrating that, beyond the acceptance of post-revolutionary society, Guizot and Tocqueville bequeathed to posterity two divergent or even opposite attitudes toward the French Revolution: Guizot celebrated the role played by the Revolution in History, as a victory of the middle classes against both absolute power and privilege, but at the same time he opposed its explicit flags, especially the sovereignty of the people; Tocqueville, on the other hand, deplored the Revolutions work as an unconscious realization of the centralizing political culture of the Ancient Regime, but, instead of criticizing the doctrine of popular sovereignty, he sought to reformulate it on new bases, inspired in the American model. According to the author of The Ancient Regime and the Revolution, thus, the criticism of the French Revolution should pass from its explicit doctrines to its implicit character. In order to build that hypothesis, this dissertation takes the following path: In Chapter 1, we will compare Guizots philosophy of History, based on the concept of civilization, with Tocquevilles philosophy of History, based on the concept of democracy. In Chapter 2, we will compare the place each author attributed to the French Revolution in French and European History, interpreted in the light of relations between political center and local freedoms. Chapter 3, lastly, compares each authors reception to what was called the principles of 1789, especially the sovereignty of the people.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 239-249). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

In the decade of the 1830's, Alexis de Tocqueville published a perceptive analysis of America in the Jacksonian era, which focused upon the customs, manners and intellectual habits of its citizens, and their social condition as seen through its political institutions. He advanced the proposition--a paradox of democracy--that equality of condition was as compatible with tyranny as with freedom. The social consensus, which stemmed from the wide acceptance of doctrine of equality and common wants and interests, when brought to bear upon legislator and judge, public official, juryman, and the non-conforming individual, he termed the "tyranny of the majority."

Le but de cette recherche doctorale est de mettre au jour une conception spécifique du libéralisme au XIXè siècle qui rendait possible la cohabitation des exigences libérales de respect de l’individu et de ses droits ainsi que des exigences nationales de vie en communauté et d’identité. Partant du principe que de nombreux auteurs ne considéraient pas que le concept de nationalité entrait en contradiction avec les valeurs libérales à cette époque, nous estimons qu’Alexis de Tocqueville, ainsi que John Stuart Mill, proposent la forme la plus cohérente et aboutie de réflexion en la matière, et ce à travers un libéralisme dit « d’esprit » que nous extrairons de leur pensée commune. En effet, alors qu’ils cherchent à contrecarrer les effets néfastes du matérialisme qui aurait comme principale conséquence d’abaisser l’âme des individus et de les priver de liberté, ils mettent au point une approche qui empêche la matérialisation ou la cristallisation complète des références proposées comme point de repère aux citoyens. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000416581-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 626223 bytes, checksum: 7fea76adca3066a3de5bc7de0f03b330 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / As democracias ocidentais contemporâneas caracterizam-se pelo consenso a respeito da defesa dos direitos individuais fundamentais. O princípio da igualdade, tanto em sua formulação jurídica quanto em sua expressão social, tem por objetivo fazer com que fatores como poder econômico, influência política, origem familiar e preferências pessoais não possam promover desigualdades que não possuem justificativa moral. O princípio da liberdade tem por objetivo garantir espaço para a autonomia e a livre expressão individual. O conflito entre esses dois princípios, como se sabe, define o contexto tanto das conquistas e dos impasses dos regimes democráticos quanto o contexto do debate filosófico a respeito da fundamentação da democracia. Minha tese é a de que a instauração do individualismo nas democracias ocidentais é o resultado de um longo processo de desenvolvimento histórico que estabeleceu a igualdade – e não a liberdade – como o princípio organizador fundamental da ordem social democrática. Essa reavaliação permite superar os impasses gerados por teorias que colocam a autonomia e a racionalidade como fundamento das sociedades democráticas, inflacionando, assim, o conceito de liberdade, restringindo a política a processos de deliberação que deveriam se aproximar de condições idealizadas que não encontram correspondência na prática social e, quase sempre, pressupondo definições para o que seria a natureza humana, a escolha racional ou uma verdadeira autenticidade ou esclarecimento que permitiria escapar de todos os tipos de determinações heterônomas. Para indicar em que sentido proponho essa reavaliação, inicio retomando a obra de Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). Proveniente de uma família aristocrata em plena época pós-revolucionária na França, Tocqueville analisa a formação dos Estados Unidos da América mostrando que, na instauração da democracia americana, o ideal de igualdade ocupa um lugar anterior ao ideal de liberdade não só historicamente, mas também na justificação e na prática do sistema democrático. Subverte-se, assim, tanto a leitura da modernidade enquanto tentativa de efetivar conjuntamente os ideais de igualdade e liberdade, quanto a leitura de que o traço essencial da modernidade seria a instauração de uma racionalidade que acabou tornando-se instrumental ou técnica. Na primeira metade do século XIX, com uma interpretação que evita o unilateralismo, Tocqueville constata que a característica principal das democracias é o fato de que os homens, colocados em situação de igualdade, isolados e entregues a si mesmos, são indivíduos frágeis que, desprovidos de tradições, só possuem a razão para tentar justificar as leis que devem se auto-impor. Essa leitura tocquevilleana negativa da democracia moderna permite compreender fenômenos contemporâneos aparentemente tão incompatíveis quanto, por exemplo, o isolamento social e o amplo consenso em relação aos direitos humanos ou as instituições jurídicas como instância última de mediação dos conflitos sociais e a falência praticamente completa da lei e de quaisquer instrumentos de poder para lidar com questões humanas e, mais recentemente, tecnológicas.O individualismo democrático é, fundamentalmente, a consequência da efetivação cada vez maior do ideal moderno de igualdade. A filosofia política precisa levar a sério o fato de que, ao mesmo tempo em que corrói o ideal de uma racionalidade autofundante, essa condição democrática abre espaço, como nunca antes na história humana, para a responsabilidade individual. Essa responsabilidade é que nos permite, enquanto seres limitados e contingentes, chegar mais perto do ideal moderno de autonomia e autodeterminação.

Raymond Aron is widely recognised as France's greatest twentieth-century liberal, but the specifically liberal quality of his thought has not received the detailed historical analysis that it deserves. His work appears to fit so well within widely accepted understandings of post-war European liberalism, which has been defined primarily in terms of its anti-totalitarian, Cold War orientation, that its liberal status has been somewhat taken for granted. This has been exacerbated by an especially strong perception of a correlation between liberalism and anti-totalitarianism in France, whose late twentieth-century renaissance in liberal political thought is viewed as the product of an 'anti-totalitarian turn' in the late 1970s. While the moral authority accumulated through decades of opposition to National Socialism and Soviet communism made Aron into an anti-totalitarian icon, his early contribution to the rediscovery of France's liberal tradition established his reputation as a leader of the renaissance in the study of liberal political thought. Aron's prominence within this wider renaissance suggests that an historical treatment of his thought is overdue, but while the assumptions underpinning his reputation are not baseless, they do need to be critically scrutinised if such a treatment is to be credible. In pursuit of this end, two main arguments are developed in the present thesis. These are, first, that Aron's liberalism was more a product of the inter-war crisis of European liberalism than of the Cold War and, second, that his relationship with the French liberal tradition was primarily active and instrumental rather than passive and receptive. The first argument indicates that Aron's liberalism developed through a dialogue with and partial integration of important strands of anti-liberal crisis thought during these inter-war years; the second that earlier liberals with whose work he is frequently associated - notably Montesquieu and Tocqueville - had no substantial formative influence on his political thought. These contentions are interrelated in that Aron's post-war interpretation of his chosen liberal forebears was driven by a need to address specific problems arising from the liberal political epistemology that he formulated before the Second World War. It is by establishing in detail the link between Aron's reading of Montesquieu and Tocqueville and these earlier writings that the thesis makes its principal contribution to the existing literature on Aron, but several other original interpretations of his work are offered across its four thematic chapters on 'Political Epistemology', 'Anti-totalitarianism', 'The End of Ideology' and 'Instrumentalizing the French Liberal Tradition'. Regarding Aron's relationship with the wider late twentieth-century recovery of liberal political thought in France, it contends that the specific liberal renaissance to which he contributed most substantially emerged not as part of the anti-totalitarian turn, but in hostile reaction to the events of May 1968. This informs a broader argument that French liberal renaissance of these years was considerably more heterogeneous than is often assumed.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T16:33:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EHPS - Josefa Eliana Souza.pdf: 549498 bytes, checksum: 4943669ec240cca8aad854584b915d09 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-06 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The objective of this study is to understand the way Tavares Bastos dealt with Brazilian public education in the 60 s and in the beginning of the 70 s, in the XIX century, as for what he named the Brazilian public education program . It also tried to answer the following question: if and how did the author try to incorporate North-American models into the program of public education in Brazil? In order to perform such task, pamphlets the author/politician published between the years of 1861 and 1873 were examined. The analysis of such work allows identifying elements tha t are part of the program of public education aimed at by Tavares Bastos, and it emphasis that elements of the North- American models were used, mainly the one implemented by Horace Mann, and the ones presented by Aléxis Tocqueville, as an appropriate ama lgam to direct the Brazilian people towards the path of progress and civilization. By picking elements that constitute those models, Tavares Bastos built arguments in order to defend the idea of a free and universal school, mandatory education, co-education schools, and a teaching program dedicated mainly to knowledge based on practical principles that would provide the students with a kind of training that would be more adequate to the needs of workers from the fields of industry, commerce, and agriculture of that time. Therefore, the provinces should be equipped with schools whose mission would be preparing students to perform the tasks society demanded and to prepare them for democracy / Neste estudo a finalidade é compreender o modo como Tavares Bastos tratou a instrução pública brasileira, na década de 60 e início de 70 do século XIX, no que denominou de programa de instrução pública brasileira . Buscou-se também responder a seguinte questão: se e de que forma o autor procurou incorporar modelos ou referentes norteamericanos ao programa de instrução pública do Brasil? Na realização dessa tarefa foram examinados os panfletos que o autor/parlamentar publicou entre os anos de 1861 a 1873. A análise dessa produção permite identificar elementos que constituem o programa de instrução pública almejado por Tavares Bastos e afirmar que elementos de modelos norteamericanos foram mobilizados, sobretudo o implementado por Horace Mann e os apresentados por Aléxis Tocqueville, como um amálgama adequado para conduzir o povo brasileiro ao caminho do progresso e da civilização. Ao pinçar elementos que constituem esses modelos, Tavares Bastos produziu os argumentos para defender a escola gratuita e universal, o ensino obrigatório, escola mista, programa de ensino voltado, sobretudo, para o conhecimento baseado em princípios práticos e que possibilitassem ao aluno um tipo de formação mais adequada às necessidades do trabalhador da indústria, do comércio e da agricultura da época. Por isso, as províncias deveriam ser dotadas de escolas, cuja missão deveria ser preparar o aluno para exercer as tarefas que a sociedade exigia e preparar o caminho para a democracia

No description available.

Can states formally recognize cultural diversity and, at the same time, preserve their political and social unity and provide the main public goods of modern citizenship? Is such conciliation feasible? Is it morally desirable? In the current context of unprecedented expression and politicization of cultural identities, especially in democratic countries, such questions are more and more crucial. To answer these questions, the present study considers the contribution of the modern federal tradition. Within this tradition, I analyze four federal responses to the unity-diversity dilemma. The first two---the Belgian and Canadian federations---are practical. Each embodies one of the two dominant contemporary models of federalism: classical liberal individualist, and multinational. I study the experience of each country over the past thirty years to compare the effects of the two models on citizenship. The potential of the modern federal tradition is further assessed through an examination of two theoretical and normative reflections, those of Tocqueville and Proudhon. / The central thesis is twofold. First, I contend that in a context of increasing cultural diversity, unity and diversity have an equal value and are both essential to citizenship. This is true both from a moral and from a practical point of view. Second, I argue that the dominant conceptions of federalism are unable to satisfactorily conciliate unity and diversity. Such task requires the development of what I call an intercultural federalism, one centered on the good of identity pluralization or complexitication. From a strictly practical point of view, only an intercultural federalism can prevent identity fragmentation and the political and social fragmentation which come with it. From a moral perspective, intercultural federalism promises not only to protect, but also to maximize the primary goods which are the most affected by identity fragmentation---political liberty and social solidarity---while also promoting individual liberty. Intercultural federalism rests on three principles which summarize the teachings of the modern federal tradition with regard to the establishment of just citizenship institutions in a context of diversity. Such institutions are just in that they protect and maximize the primary goods of citizenship for all citizens. The three principles are: (1) mutual recognition; (2) intercultural dialogue; (3) multi-varied asymmetrical institutionalization.